Judgment :- This O.P has been filed to set aside the order dated 9.10.2003 issuing a Non Bailable Warrant against the petitioner in C.C.No.3533 of 2001 pending on the file of the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate's Court, Saidapet. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The petitioner is working at the United States of America. The petitioner married one Janani (daughter of the complainant Shankar) on 7.2.2000. For the marriage, A1 demanded Rs.10,00,000/- as cash and gold and diamond jewellery worth Rs.15,00,000/- at the time of engagement on 10.5.1999 at the house of A1. On 25.12.1999, Rs.5,00,000/- was paid as first instalment of dowry amount and another sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid on 6.2.2000. Thereafter, the petitioner and his wife left for America on 24.2.2000. There, a dispute arose between the parties. The complainant wanted A1 to return to Madras to take care of his factories, for which, A2 and A3 demanded Rs.50,00,000/- to be deposited in the name of A1 and also to construct a bungalow for A1. At America, A1, at the instigation of A2 to A4 (parents and brother of A1) ill-treated the complainant's daughter Janani, physically assaulted her and therefore, the complainant's daughter Janani and his wife Vidya returned to India on 9.7.2000 and thereafter, lodged a complaint, based on which, investigation was conducted and final report was filed against the petitioner as A1 and his parents as A2 and A3 and his brother as A4. Except A1, others appeared in Court. Therefore, non-bailable warrant was issued against A1. 3. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that no summons was served on the petitioner (A1) and without service of summons, issue of non-bailable warrant is against law and the same is liable to be quashed. 4. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent and the learned counsel appearing for the intervener / complainant is that warrant that was issued is lawful and there is no illegality in issuing warrant. 5. Admittedly, so far, summons have not been served on the petitioner. 4. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent and the learned counsel appearing for the intervener / complainant is that warrant that was issued is lawful and there is no illegality in issuing warrant. 5. Admittedly, so far, summons have not been served on the petitioner. Under section 87(a) of Cr.P.C, if either before the issue of summons or after the issue of the same but before the time fixed for the appearance of the accused, the Court has reason to believe that the accused has absconded or will not obey the summons, the Court has got a right to issue warrant after recording its reasons in writing. Section 87(a) of Cr.P.C reads as follows: 87. Issue of warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons.-- A Court may, in any case in which it is empowered by this Code to issue a summons for the appearance of any person, issue, after recording its reasons in writing, a warrant for his arrest--- (a) if, either before the issue of such summons, or after the issue of the same but before the time fixed for his appearance, the Court sees reason to believe that he has absconded or will not obey the summons; 6. A summons is served on an accused to inform him about the pendency of a proceeding against him in a Criminal Court, nature of offence alleged against him, the name of the person who has lodged the complaint, the number of the case, date of hearing and the Court where he should appear. These are the purposes for which summons are sent to the accused. Therefore, summons are served on a person only to inform him about the pendency of the proceedings against him and necessity of the accused to appear before the Court on a particular day. 7. As far as this case is concerned, the petitioner was well aware of the proceedings against him that he is the first accused in C.C.No.3533/2001 on the file of the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai. Previously when a non-bailable warrant was issued against this very petitioner on the application of the complainant, the petitioner himself preferred Criminal Revision No.72/2002 and the same was admitted by the Sessions Court, Chennai. Previously when a non-bailable warrant was issued against this very petitioner on the application of the complainant, the petitioner himself preferred Criminal Revision No.72/2002 and the same was admitted by the Sessions Court, Chennai. In Crl.O.P Nos.6636 & 9478 of 2002, by order dated 13.11.2002, this Court directed this petitioner who was the second respondent in Crl.O.P No.9478 of 2002 to approach the Court which issued the warrant by filing the application for cancellation of warrant under section 70(2) Cr.P.C and a fortnight time was also granted to this petitioner to approach the concerned Court for the above said remedy. 8. Even on 27.11.2002, on behalf of the petitioner, a memo of appearance was filed by Thiru Mani, learned counsel who was appearing for the petitioner. On 21.8.2003, Crl.M.P No.3807/2003 was filed on behalf of the petitioner by the same counsel. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the petition reads as follows: "3. The absence of the petitioner is neither wilful nor wanton and is only due to bonafide reasons stated supra. 4. The petitioner therefore prays that this Honourable Court may be pleased to condone the absence of the petitioner and thus render justice." On 9.10.2003, once again, learned counsel who was appearing for the petitioner filed application under section 309 Cr.P.C, wherein he has mentioned as follows: "The petitioner submits that he has not been able to attend the Court today on account of the inability to get leave of absence from his office. It is assured that on the next date of hearing of the case, the petitioner would certainly appear in this Honourable Court. The date of hearing will be informed today itself so that necessary arrangements for the travel would be made by him forthwith. It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to adjourn the hearing date for the appearance of the petitioner and thus render justice." As per the petition dated 9.10.2003, the counsel who was appearing for the petitioner has undertaken to inform the petitioner about the hearing date so that necessary arrangements are made for his appearance in the Court at Madras. 9. From the facts mentioned above, it is clear that the petitioner himself has represented before the High Court and the lower Court through his counsel and hence he is well aware of the pendency of the proceedings against him. 9. From the facts mentioned above, it is clear that the petitioner himself has represented before the High Court and the lower Court through his counsel and hence he is well aware of the pendency of the proceedings against him. Through his counsel, he has taken several adjournments for his appearance in Court for facing trial. When the petitioner himself was aware of the proceedings and has taken part in the proceedings through his counsel, it is futile on his part now to contend that no summons have been formally served on him. When an accused has voluntarily taken part in a proceeding before a Court through a counsel, it has become unnecessary for the Court to serve him a summons. The purpose of serving summons on an accused is to inform him about the accusation for which he has to appear and explain on a particular date before a particular Court. When all these requirements are already known to the accused and he has voluntarily participated in various proceedings before the Court where the trial of the case is pending and also before the Hon'ble High Court, it is futile to contend that a formal summons has not been served on him. The intention of the petitioner is very clear that he wants to drag on the proceedings by not appearing in Court. 10. Another important aspect in this case is that the petitioner and the other accused (his parents and his brother) have filed a suit before this Court in C.S.No.351/2004 claiming the following reliefs: (i) Directing the Defendants 1-9 to jointly and severally pay damages of Rs.30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakhs only) to the Plaintiffs herein; (ii) Declaring that initiation of Cr.No.44 of 2001 by the First Defendant and all proceedings thereunder culminated in CC No.3533/2001 on the file of the 18th Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai filed against the Plaintiffs herein, is an abuse of legal process; (iii) Declaring that the Plaintiffs have never demanded any dowry whether in cash or kind whether directly or indirectly from Defendants 1-3 and have not harassed the Third Defendant for dowry; 11. Apart from maintainability of suit, with regard to prayers 2 and 3 as mentioned above, it is pertinent to note that the petitioner who is the 4th plaintiff in the suit has nowhere mentioned that a warrant is pending against him in the proceedings before the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet and that he is an absconding accused. 12. As far as the cancellation and recall of warrant is concerned, there is a specific provision in the Criminal Procedure Code under section 70(2) that every warrant issued by a Court shall remain in force until it is cancelled by the Court which issued it or until it is executed. Thus, there is a provision for the petitioner to appear before the said Court for cancelling or recalling of the warrant issued by that Court. When there is a specific provision under the Code, inherent powers of the High Court should not be invoked in matters which are directly covered by specific provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13. In the judgment reported in AIR 1959 SC 542 (Khushi Ram v. Hashim), the Supreme Court has held as follows: "It is unnecessary to emphasise that the inherent power of the High Court under S.561A cannot be invoked in regard to matters which are directly covered by the specific provisions of the Code; and the matter with which the learned Judge was concerned in the present proceedings is directly covered by S.215. Therefore, in our opinion the learned Judge was clearly in error in allowing his inherent power to be invoked under S.561A and in setting aside the order of the commitment." In the judgment reported in AIR 1978 SC 47 (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra), the Supreme Court has held as follows: "The following principles may be stated in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:- (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. In the judgment reported in 1994(2)LW(Crl) 402 (Saleem, P.A., etc.,others v. State rep. In the judgment reported in 1994(2)LW(Crl) 402 (Saleem, P.A., etc.,others v. State rep. by Inspector of Police, R-4, Pondy Bazaar, etc.,), it is held as follows: "These petitions were filed under S.482, Crl.P.C., seeking to recall the nonbailable warrants issued by the lower courts, for the arrest and production of the respective petitioners, facing trial for specified offences, by invoking the inherent powers of this Court under S.482 of the Code, straight away, even without approaching the Courts concerned, which issued such warrants, for 'cancellation'. Held: after discussing the relevant provisions of law and the submissions made before Court, the following directions were passed, namely: (1) Issuance of a warrant of arrest by a Court under this Code shall remain in force beyond the date fixed for its return, until it is cancelled or executed. (2) Since the Court, which isssued the warrant has the power to cancel it, it is but necessary for the person against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued to approach the said Court, by his personal appearance, for its cancellation, which issued it. (2) Since the Court, which isssued the warrant has the power to cancel it, it is but necessary for the person against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued to approach the said Court, by his personal appearance, for its cancellation, which issued it. (3) Once a person accused of an offence against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued makes his personal appearance, with a petition for its cancellation, before the court, which issued it, it behoves on its part not to take him into custody and send him to prison immediately after his appearance; but to pass an order on such petition, forthwith, without brooking any sort of a delay and if the order so passed ends in his favour, he shall be bound over to appear before court on an earliest date fixed for hearing or trial, as the case may be, or otherwise, he could be taken into custody forthwith and sent to prison , with a direction to the prison authorities for his production before Court on the earliest date fixed for such hearing or trial and on such other dates till the trial is over, so as to enable it to proceed, with ease and grace, and without any obstruction whatever, thereby not affecting in the least his right to speedy trial, a goal to be achieved, as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution; or on his application, being presented, release him on bail, on his executing a bond for a specified sum, with sufficient number of sureties, for such sum to secure his appearance on the dates fixed for hearing or trial, as the case may be. (4) However, a person, aggrieved by an order of refusal of the cancellation by a Magistrate, who issued the same, can further agitate the same, if he so desires, by filing a revision, either under section 397 or 401 of the Code, and then to invoke the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code, if grounds for resortment to such a course existed; and (5) Section 482 of the Code is not at all attracted for simpliciter 're-call' of a warrant; but, on the other hand, it is getting attracted for execution of a warrant, by issuance of a direction to a Police Officer or for that matter, any other person to whom it is issued, for its immediate compliance. It is not as if a warrant of arrest issued by a Court is not capable of being cancelled by the very Court, which issued it. Sub-Section (2) of Section 70 prescribes, that every such warrant shall remain in force until it is cancelled by the Court which issued or until it is executed. It is thus clear that once a warrant is issued, it shall remain in force, even beyond the date of hearing, until its cancellation or its execution. Once power is given to the Court, which issued it to cancel it, it is but proper to knock at the doors of the said Court, by filing an application for cancellation of the warrant so issued, on sufficient cause being shown therefor. Once such an application is filed, it is but necessary for the court to consider such an application and pass an order, without brooking any sort of a delay and penning down reasons therefor. If the order so passed is favourable to the accused, there is no need for him to agitate the matter any further. Once such an application is filed, it is but necessary for the court to consider such an application and pass an order, without brooking any sort of a delay and penning down reasons therefor. If the order so passed is favourable to the accused, there is no need for him to agitate the matter any further. If it goes against him, then, such an order has to be construed, in the eye of law, as a final order, liable to be further agitated in revisions, either under Section 397 before Court of Session or under Section 401 before this Court, no doubt a concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon those Courts, by the Code." In the judgment reported in 1999 SCC Crl.1296 (Mary Angel v.State of Tamil Nadu), the Supreme Court has held as follows: "If there is an express provision governing the particular subject-matter then there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court is required to apply, in the manner and mode prescribed, the provisions of the statute. But the highest court in the State could exercise inherent powers for doing justice according to law where no express power is available to do a particular thing and express power does not negative the existence of such power." 14. From the judgments cited above, it is clear that when there is a specific provision in the Criminal Procedure Code itself that for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party should appear before that Court to redress the grievance and should not come to High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C to exercise its inherent powers to quash an interlocutory order. Section 482 Cr.P.C should be used very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise secure the ends of justice. Once power is given to the Court which issued warrant to cancel it, it is but proper to knock at the doors of the said Court, by filing an application for cancellation of the warrant so issued, on sufficient cause being shown therefor. Once such an application is filed, it is necessary for that Court to consider such application and pass an order without any delay. If the order so passed is favourable to the accused, there is no need for him to agitate the matter any further. Once such an application is filed, it is necessary for that Court to consider such application and pass an order without any delay. If the order so passed is favourable to the accused, there is no need for him to agitate the matter any further. If it goes against him, then, such order has to be construed, in the eye of law, as a final order, liable to be further agitated in revisions, either under Section 397 before Court of Session or under section 401 before the High Court, no doubt a concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon those Courts by the Code. As far as this case is concerned, the petitioner has directly approached this Court under section 482 Cr.P.C without filing the application before the Court which issued non-bailable warrant. Only on filing the application by the petitioner before the concerned Court, if an adverse order is passed by the said court against the petitioner and if the petitioner is aggrieved against the said order, he can approach this Court by way of revision under section 401 Cr.P.C and not by way of petition to quash proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C. 15. For all the reasons mentioned above, this Crl.O.P to set aside the order of the learned Magistrate issuing non-bailable warrant is liable to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed.