JUDGMENT 1. Since all the aforesaid three writ petitions involve similar question of law, at the request of the respective parties, the arguments are heard together and are being decided by this common order. 2. The facts of the case of Ashok Kumar Devendra Meel & Party are taken as a leading case. 3. The petitioner firm was granted an exclusive privilege licence for the retail of IMFL, beer and country liquor in the Jaipur - Dausa group of the Excise Department for the period 1.4.2004 to 31.3.2005 for a sum of Rs. 1,75,33,33,333.33 4. The petitioner on acceptance of his bid made the requisite deposits and also furnished necessary bank guarantees. 5. The controversy arose when the respondent vide notification dated 5.8.2004 enhanced the permit fee per bulk litre on Indian made foreign liquor, Indian made beer and country liquor. The enhancement of permit fee is challenged by the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petitions on the ground that the permit fee as notified by the Excise Department in its excise policy for the year 2004 - 2005 constituted a part of the consideration for the Jaipur - Dausa group and in the most of the contract period the respondents have withdrawn the prevailing exemption on the permit fee qua IMFL/beer and by way of enhancement of the permit fee payable on per bulk litre of country liquor and the state Government in the most of the contract period cannot alter the terms of the contract entered into by the state government. 6. Mr. B.L. Sharma who is appearing for the petitioners submits that for the year 2004 - 2005, the permit fee payable for IMFL/beer would not exceed Re.1 per bulk litre for the year 2004 - 2005 and similarly that the permit fee for county liquor would not exceed Rs. 6 per bulk litre it is not open for the state Government to withdraw the exemption and enhance the permit fee as the contract has been duly executed between the state and the petitioner and the state Government is estopped to change/vary the terms and conditions of the contract. 7. Mr. 6 per bulk litre it is not open for the state Government to withdraw the exemption and enhance the permit fee as the contract has been duly executed between the state and the petitioner and the state Government is estopped to change/vary the terms and conditions of the contract. 7. Mr. Sharma further submits that the respondent state is bound to adhere to their own excise policy giving out the permit fee chargeable on IMFL, beer and country liquor for the year 2004 - 2005 and no change of policy in the excise year 2004 - 2005 would be permissible in law. 8. Mr. Sharma further submits that the action of the respondents is absolutely in contravention of provisions of Articles 19(1)(g) and 300 - A of the Constitution of India. 9. Mr. Sharma referred certain clause of excise policy of state Government for the year 2004 - 2005 and more particularly referred clause 10.2 of each of three licenses issued one each for I.M.F.L., beer and country liquor wherein it is stated that the provisions of Excise Act and the Rules will remain "Yatha Roop" and the word has been interpreted by the learned counsel for the petitioner "as they are". And it was submitted that the excise licence issued to the petitioner firm under section 24 of the Act of 1950 have a statutory character and the respondent cannot seek to vary the terms of the said statutory contract and by interpreting "Yatha Roop Se Lagoo Honge" , learned counsel for the petitioner demonstrates before this court that whatever law prevailing at the time of grant of contract and at the time of commencement of the contract, will only be applicable as it is. 10. Mr. Sharma further submits that the state Government has no power by resort to its power of delegated legislation under the Act of 1950 to make any changes in the payment of amounts to the state Government as determined on the basis of the bids made and accepted by the state government. 11. In support of his submissions Mr. 10. Mr. Sharma further submits that the state Government has no power by resort to its power of delegated legislation under the Act of 1950 to make any changes in the payment of amounts to the state Government as determined on the basis of the bids made and accepted by the state government. 11. In support of his submissions Mr. Sharma referred a case of Excise Superintendent, Warangal v. Delux, reported in (2001) 9 SCC 497 wherein the Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that "the right of the licensee to operate that licence for the excise year gets crystalised and that right cannot be put to jeopardy during the subsistence of the excise year." 12. Mr. Sharma submits with regard to stand taken by the state Government that right to change policy and freedom to legislate which is incorporated in the licence condition and the policy is in contravention of the principles laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. It is trite law that change in policy can be arbitrary and that delegated legislation cannot be used as a tool to the disadvantage of the citizen without the authority satisfying the court as to the reasonableness and the ex facie public interest in the exercise of legislative power by way of delegated legislation. 13. Mr. Sharma also referred rule 69(B) of the Rules of 1956 and Section 71 of the Act of 1950 and after referring these he submits that if the reasonable ground existed for setting up permit fee of Re.1 per bulk litre of I.M.F.L/beer and Rs. 6 per bulk late as 1.4.2004, what were the intervening circumstances and change of situation to warrant a complete overhaul of the permit fee within a period of 5 months. 14. Mr. Sharma also referred para 11 of the reply wherein reason of enhancement of the fee was shown as the state has permitted certain facilities and computerisation of the excise department and making all efforts in providing best of facilities to the petitioner and making efforts for reducing the smuggling in respect of areas of operation and the submission made on behalf of the state is mechanically denied as it is only irrelevant as a reasonable ground for enhancement of the fee. More particularly referred para 10 of the reply filed by the state and after referring the contents of the writ petition and reply filed as well as the rejoinder he placed reliance on the case of Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. v. Union of India & Others reported in 2000 (4) SC 57 wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that "power exercisable under section 25 of the Customs Act even if discretionary, was not unrestricted" and further held that "pattern of law imposing customs duty and the manner in which it is operated to a certain extent exposed the citizens liable to pay customs duty vagaries of executive discretion". It was further held that "where vide power is given to Government, the Government is to consider all relevant aspects governing the grant of exemption." He also referred para 12 of the aforesaid judgment wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that even if the Government has a right to change its policy, the Government was under a burden to establish the public interest for change of policy to reduce the extent of exemption. He also referred a case reported in (3) 2004 (6) SCC 465 and after referring the aforesaid judgment Mr. Sharma submits that plea of no estoppel against statute can be invoked only where the promise is made contrary to the provisions of a statute or in excess of the power of the person making the promise. 15. Mr. Sharma also submits that the authorities which have been cited by the respondents do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case, nor address any of the legal questions which arise and formulated for determination in the course of arguments and referring the judgments cited by the respondents, Mr. Sharma tried to distinguish the judgments referred by the opposite parties. 16. Mr. Sharma arguing at length and after referring the relevant provisions of law as well as the excise policy prayed to set aside the notification dated 5.8.2004 by which the respondents have withdrawn the exemption of permit fee. 17. Per contra learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Bharat Vyas, A.A.G. and Mr. R.B. Mathur for the respondent department have raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present writ petitions. 18. Learned Additional Advocate General Mr. 17. Per contra learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Bharat Vyas, A.A.G. and Mr. R.B. Mathur for the respondent department have raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present writ petitions. 18. Learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Bharat Vyas submits that the petitioners cannot assail the validity of notification as they have entered into the contract after going through the tender conditions, Excise Act and Rules and has submitted the bid with open eyes. Mr. Vyas referred specific condition no.6 which categorically stipulates that the petitioner shall abide by the terms and conditions of the licence and will make payment of duty, fee and other charges in accordance with the Excise Rules and the amendments made from time to time by the notification. Mr. Vyas also referred clause 7 of the tender form wherein the petitioners have categorically undertook to abide by the conditions and to make payment of duty, fees and other charges in accordance with the amendments that may be made from time to time. 19. The petitioners have challenged the notification dated 5.8.2004 (Annexures 4 and 5) and both these notifications pertain to amendments made in the rule 69 - B of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956. 20. In the first notification, the Government has sought to delete clause (1) of the notification dated 19.2.2004 (Annexure - 3). By notification dated 19.2.2004, the Government in exercise of its powers conferred upon it by sub - section (2) of Section 71 of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 granted exemptions w.e.f. 1.4.2004 on the payment of permit fee of such retail licences who have been granted licence under exclusive privilege system which was prescribed under rule 69 - B of the Rules of 1956 to the extent to which it exceeds the amount of Re.1.00 per bulk litre. 21. It is further submitted that the rate prescribed for payment of such permit fee under rule 69 - B of the Rules of 1956 was Rs. 4.00 per bulk litre, whereas the Government by the aforesaid notification granted exemption to the extent to which this amount exceeded the amount of Re.1.00 per bulk litre. In other words, an exemption of Rs. 3.00 per bulk litre was granted to such retail licensees in respect of IMFL & Beer. 4.00 per bulk litre, whereas the Government by the aforesaid notification granted exemption to the extent to which this amount exceeded the amount of Re.1.00 per bulk litre. In other words, an exemption of Rs. 3.00 per bulk litre was granted to such retail licensees in respect of IMFL & Beer. The state Government vide notification dated 5.8.2004 has simply withdrawn the said exemption, thus in effect requiring the licensee to pay the rate of permit fee as prescribed by rule 69 - B of the Rules of 1956 i.e. at the rate of Rs. 4.00 per bulk litre of IMFL and Beer. 22. Thus, Mr. Vyas submits that the state has only withdrawn the notification by which the exemption was given and since the petitioner has not challenged the validity of rule 69-B as amended upto date and only challenged the notification by which exemption has been withdrawn under the doctrine of promissory estoppel and as the petitioners agreed to enter into the agreement, principle of estoppel applied against the petitioners. 23. Mr. Vyas also submits that since these present writ petition involve several disputed facts which cannot be adjudicated upon by this court while exercising extraordinary power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 24. By referring section 41 and rules 69, 69-A, 69-B, 69-C and 69-D Mr. Vyas submits that the state Government is fully empowered to issue notification and have right to levy duty, fees and other charges as contemplated under the aforesaid provisions. 25. Mr. Vyas also submits that trade in liquor is not a fundamental right as it is a settled proposition of law that the citizen does not have any fundamental right to carry on trade in any noxious and dangerous goods like intoxicating drugs or intoxicating liquors. The power to legislate with regard to intoxicating liquor carries with it the power to regulate the same. The petitioners cannot claim as of right to carry on trade of liquor nor they have any right to restrict the Government form issuing any notification thereby changing the fee structure. 26. Mr. Vyas so far as merits of the case is concerned, submits that the petitioners have no merit in their favour and referred a clause 15 of the Excise Policy and Condition no.6 and rule 69 - B of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956 and after referring the aforesaid provisions of law Mr. 26. Mr. Vyas so far as merits of the case is concerned, submits that the petitioners have no merit in their favour and referred a clause 15 of the Excise Policy and Condition no.6 and rule 69 - B of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956 and after referring the aforesaid provisions of law Mr. Vyas submits that the exclusive privilege amount has not at all been enhanced. The binding contract is with regard to exclusive privilege amount. The rate of duty, fee and other charges are always variable and that is why condition no.6 was already part of tender document and the petitioners have also by way of clause 7 of the application undertook to abide by the conditions. Since the petitioners entered into agreement and agreed with the terms and conditions of the licence, they are estopped from challenging the impugned notification. 27. Mr. Vyas also submits that the state has provided facilities and by way of providing facilities, the state have to incur huge amount to computerize the Excise Department to increase the preventing force that too in the benefit of the petitioners as the petitioners are not capable to stop the smuggling of liquor and sale of illicit liquor etc. and against such facilities which has been provided by the State Government, the State Government has simply withdrawn the exemptions by the impugned notification which is under challenge. 28. In support of his submissions Mr. Was placed reliance on the case of Government of Maharasthra & Others v. Deokar's Distillery reported in 2003 (5) SCC 669 wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that "Liquor licensee does not have any fundamental right to deal in liquor. Once the liquor licensee had undertaken to abide by all reasonable orders under the Prohibition Act while obtaining the licence, they cannot wriggle out of the contractual liability incurred by them." 29. Once the liquor licensee had undertaken to abide by all reasonable orders under the Prohibition Act while obtaining the licence, they cannot wriggle out of the contractual liability incurred by them." 29. He also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa and Others v. Narain Prasad and Others, reported in 1996 (5) SCC 740 wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that "a person after having entered into an agreement voluntarily, containing the conditions aforesaid and having done the business under the licence obtained by him, cannot be allowed to either wriggle out of the agreements nor can be allowed to challenge the validity of the Rules which constitute the terms of the contract." 30. Mr. Vyas further submits that permit fee being regulatory fee, elgment of quid pro quo not sine qua non for charging the same since the respondents are required to supervise the work of their licensees throughout the state especially in regard to observance of conditions of licence particularly condition nos, 6 7 and 8 to ensure that they are faithfully followed. In such a situation, the fee that is being charged by the respondents is a permit fee and that element of quid pro not being necessary for charging of the same and placed reliance in this regard on the case M/s Geeta Enterprises & Another v. State of Rajasthan & Another, reported in 1993(2) RLR 183 = WLC 1993(3) 251 and the cases reported in (7) AIR 1983 SC 1246 , (8) 1997 (2) SCC 715 and (9) 1999(2) SCC 274 wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that "there is distinction between the fee charged for licences i.e. regulatory fees and fees for services rendered as compensatory fees. In the case of regulatory fees, like the licence fees, existence of quid pro quo is not necessary although the fee imposed must not be excessive". It was further held that a licence fee can also be regulatory when the activities for which a licence is given require to be regulated or controlled. 31. Mr. In the case of regulatory fees, like the licence fees, existence of quid pro quo is not necessary although the fee imposed must not be excessive". It was further held that a licence fee can also be regulatory when the activities for which a licence is given require to be regulated or controlled. 31. Mr. Vyas also placed reliance on the judgment reported in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Others v. State of Kranataka and Others, 1996 (10) SCC (sic Page....?) wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that "the state under its regulatory powers has the right even to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants, its manufacturers, storage, export, import, sale or possession. The right to regulate these activities or to carry on these activities vests in the State." It was further held that the word 'fee' is not used in the technical sense of the expression. By licence fee or fixed fee is meant the price or consideration which the Government charges to the licensees for parting with its privileges and granting them to the licensees. 32. With regard to promissory estoppel Mr. Vyas referred condition no.7 of the tender document and after referring this clause he placed reliance on the judgment Easter Industries Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board & Others reported in 1996 (11) SCC 199 wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that "the promissory estoppel would not apply in a case where there existed a contract duly executed under the law between the parties which binds them, unless the same is revised." 33. He also referred a case Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Administration and Others, reported in 2001(3) SCC 635 , for the purpose that policy of the state not to challenge as trade in liquor is not a fundamental right wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that "the courts in exercise of their power of judicial review do not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions of the executive unless the policy can be faulted on grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness." 34. So far withdrawal of the exemption is concerned, Mr. Vyas submits that the exemption granted under section 71(2) of the Rajasthan Excise Act from payment of permit fee is not a right. So far withdrawal of the exemption is concerned, Mr. Vyas submits that the exemption granted under section 71(2) of the Rajasthan Excise Act from payment of permit fee is not a right. Withdrawal of exemption earlier granted merely revive the liability of the licensee to make payment of permit fee already prescribed under rule 69 - B. 35. So far interpretation in condition no.10.2 the word Yatharoop is concerned, Mr. Vyas submits that the petitioners have wrongly interpreted this word as it denotes as it is and this word Yatharoop is understood by construing the conditions of the complete licence and has to be essentially understood in totality including in the light of condition no.6 of the tender conditions and clause 7 of the undertaking. In support of his submissions Mr. Vyas placed reliance on the judgments reported in (12) 2001 (1) SCC 534 , (13) 2001 (4) SCC 215 wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that "where a particular word is not defined in an Act or Rules, in such a situation its meaning must be understood in the context of the provisions of the Act or Rules and the object behind them. With regard to the judgments referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Vyas submits that the judgments referred by the petitioner have no relevancy and not applicable to the present case. 36. Having heard rival submissions of the respective parties and carefully perused the tender document and licence conditions and after carefully reading all the judgments referred by the respective parties, the present controversy is only with regard to the withdrawal of exemption vide impugned notification dated 5.8.2004. 37. First of all I would like to deal with the notification dated 5.8.2004. it is not disputed that the state Government has issued two notifications dated 5.8.2004 which are annexed with the writ petition as Annexures 4 and 5. In the first notification, the Government has sought to delete cause (1) of the notification dated 19.2.2004 (Annexure 3). 37. First of all I would like to deal with the notification dated 5.8.2004. it is not disputed that the state Government has issued two notifications dated 5.8.2004 which are annexed with the writ petition as Annexures 4 and 5. In the first notification, the Government has sought to delete cause (1) of the notification dated 19.2.2004 (Annexure 3). By notification dated 19.2.2004, the Government in exercise of its power conferred upon by sub - section (2) of Section 71 of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 granted exemptions with effect from 1.4.2004 on the payment of permit fee of such retail licensees who have been granted licence under exclusive privilege system and by another notification dated 5.8.2004 Annexure - 4 the Government has simply withdrawn the exemption which has been given earlier meaning thereby the licensees have to pay permit fee as prescribed by rule 69-B of the Rules of 1966. 38. Now the question arises whether the state Government is empowered to withdraw the exemption of the permit fee. 39. Having gone through the judgments referred by the learned counsel for the respondents wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that trade in liquor is not a fundamental right and consequently, the exemption which has been given by the Excise Department and withdrawal of the same gives no legal right to the petitioner to challenge the withdrawal of the exemption. 40. It is essentially required to deal with condition nos. 6 and 7 which have been heavily relied upon by both the parties. Conditions no.6 and 7 are reproduced hereunder:-HINDI MATTER 41. A bare perusal of condition no.6 reveals that the payment of duty, fee and other charges will be in accordance with the amendments made by the state from time to time and the petitioners will abide by the terms and conditions of the licence and will make the payment of duty, fee and other charges accordingly. And since the contract is executed by the petitioner agreeing with this condition, principle of estoppel applies against the petitioners to challenge such condition on eventuality of withdrawal of the exemptions. And similarly in condition no.7 petitioners have undertook to make the payment of revised duty, fees and other charges in accordance with the amendments made from time to time. 42. And similarly in condition no.7 petitioners have undertook to make the payment of revised duty, fees and other charges in accordance with the amendments made from time to time. 42. The petitioners do not dispute that these conditions are part of the contract and they have agreed by way of interpretation of word "Yatharoop" in clause 10.2 of the licence and by interpreting this word "yatharoop" as per the petitioners, whatever contained in the excise policy, the licence conditions should be made applicable 'as it is' whereas the meaning of Yathaswaroop mean whatever may be prevailing amendment made by the Excise Department will be applicable. I am not agree with the interpretation drawn by the petitioner and correct interpretation of Yatharoop means Yathaswaroop and since by way of impugned notification exemption which has been earlier granted has been withdrawn and whatever 'swaroop' is existed the petitioners have to abide by the terms and conditions as undertaken by the petitioners and the petitioners after accepting the terms and conditions cannot challenge the impugned notification by which the state Government has simply withdrawn the exemptions. 43. Further more, by way of exemption no legal rights are created in favour of the petitioners as the petitioners are well aware of this fact that in case the withdrawal of the exemption for which the state Government is empowered to withdraw the fee have to be charged from the petitioners as per section 69-B. 44. I have also considered this aspect that only three petitions are filed throughout in the State to challenge this notification and other contractors are paying fee strictly under rule 69-B and in view of this fact also I am not impressed with the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners that in most of the contract period, the respondents have enhanced fee which is absolutely incorrect but the respondents only withdrawn the exemption and not enhanced the fees. The fees are charged as prescribed under rule 69-B. 45. In view of the aforesaid observations, I find no merit in the aforesaid writ petitions. Consequently, the writ petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with no orders as to, cost.Petitions dismissed. *******