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2004 DIGILAW 1592 (RAJ)

Gopal : Khiladi : Ramsingh v. The State of Rajasthan

2004-11-01

KHEM CHAND SHARMA

body2004
JUDGMENT 1. - All these three appeals arise out of a judgment dated 2.5.2000 in a Sessions Case No. 47/98 and, therefore, they are being decided by this common judgment. 2. All the three appellants along with 3 co-accused were tried for offence u/ss. 120-B, 365, 366, 376(2)(g), 323, 379 & 368 IPC. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge has convicted all the three appellants for offence u/ss. 376(2)(g) and 366 IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each, in default thereof, each was to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months on the first count and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years with a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default thereof to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months on the second count. Appellants-Ram Singh and Gopal have further been convicted for offence u/s. 365 IPC and each has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years with a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default thereof, each to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. 3. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present appeals are that on 28.7.1998 the police recorded Parcha Bayan (Ex.P/7) of PW-2 Mst. Rammurti, wherein she alleged that on 24.7.1998 she along with her sister Mst. Sonyabai and brother Krishan Murari left Kota for Mehandipur Balaji and reached Hindaun at 8.00-9.00 p.m. On the next day i.e. on 25.7.1998 they visited Mehandipur Balaji and came back Hindaun in the evening at 6.00- 7:00 p.m. and boarded in a Jeep which was to leave for Kota. According to her, two persons were already sitting in the said Jeep. She felt that persons already sitting in the jeep were also the passengers. The driver crossed village Katkad and took the Jeep in the forest. Ram Singh got alighted her brother from the jeep and belaboured her with belt. Thereafter both the sisters were taken to the field where 5-6 persons were collected. She came to know about the names of accused as Ram Singh, Jag Mohan, Ganga Ram, Khiladi, Gopal and Teja Singh as they were talking with each other and calling their names. The accused managed liquor and then committed rape on both sisters. Her sister Sonya became unconscious. She came to know about the names of accused as Ram Singh, Jag Mohan, Ganga Ram, Khiladi, Gopal and Teja Singh as they were talking with each other and calling their names. The accused managed liquor and then committed rape on both sisters. Her sister Sonya became unconscious. She further alleged that accused took both of them to Katkad river where they again committed rape on them. On 26.7.1998 the accused kept detained both the sisters in aroom in village Khanid, where accused-Ram Singh and Jagmohan committed rape on them. In the night at about 9.00 p.m. both the victims were again taken to the same place where they were kept a day earlier. Four persons came there, who also committed rape on them. Thereafter, the aforesaid accused talked about sale of both the sisters. In the next morning at 4.00 a.m. the accused took them to road. At that time, accused-Gopal and Jag Mohan had accompanied them and they brought them to village Kushay in a Truck, where all of them took tea. Then they took both the sisters on foot to a big house towards village Piloda, where accused-Gopal wrote some thing on a stone slab. Then they were removed to some Tube well near village Kishorepur at about 10.00 a.m. and two persons came there in a Tata Sumo and asked her to accompany them, but she refused to go with them. Thereupon, they told that i they will kept them tied with chain and took them away in the night. Thereafter they paid Rs. 5,000/- to appellant-Jag Mohan and Rs. 500/- to appellant-Gopal and then one out of three who had come in a Tata Sumo committed rape on her and thereafter all the three left the place. In the evening, the complainant requested Man Singh to help them. Man Singh informed the vi:i45c-9 and the villagers came there and enquired from both the appellants. The villagers tied Jag Mohan and Ram Singh and on the next morning the villagers brought both the accused and the victim sisters to Gangapur.On the above parcha bayan, police registered a case for offence u/ss. 147, 376, 379, 365, 366 & 323 IPC vide FIR Ex.P/23 and proceeded with the investigation. The villagers tied Jag Mohan and Ram Singh and on the next morning the villagers brought both the accused and the victim sisters to Gangapur.On the above parcha bayan, police registered a case for offence u/ss. 147, 376, 379, 365, 366 & 323 IPC vide FIR Ex.P/23 and proceeded with the investigation. In the course of investigation, the police inspected the site, prepared site plan, seized broken pieces of glass bangles from the place of incident and recorded the statements of witnesses u/s. 161 Cr.P.C. The statement of victim girls were also recorded u/s. 164 Cr.P:C. The prosecutrix were also subjected to medical examination to find out whether they were ravished or not. The accused-appellants were arrested and on completion of usual investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the accused. 4. On the basis of evidence and material collected during investigation and placed before it, the learned trial Court framed charges for offence u/ss. 120-B, 365, 366, 376(2)(g), 323, 379 & 368 IPC against the appellants. The appellants denied the charges and claimed trial. 5. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and got exhibited some documents. After the prosecution evidence was. complete, the appellants were examined u/s. 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, the appellants did not examine Any witness. 6. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge did not find the charges u/ss. 120-B, 323, 379 & 368 proved against the appellants and accordingly, acquitted them of the said charges. However, the learned trial Court found the accused-appellants guilty of having committed offence punishable u/ss. 365, 366 & 376(2)(g) IPC and accordingly convicted and sentenced them the manner stated herein above. Hence, this appeal against conviction. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment, the evidence and material on record. 8. In assailing the conviction, learned counsel for the appellants have vehemently argued that both the victim laides had not seen the appellants prior to the date of incident, rather the appellants were unknown to them and therefore, the evidence of identification of appellants for the first time in the Court could not have been relied upon in the absence of test identification parade and on this ground alone, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. In support of their argument, learned counsel have relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700 . 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the above argument. It is not the case of the prosecution that appellants soon after the commission of offence left the place of incident leaving both the prosecutrix. Undisputedly, the appellants were not known to the victim ladies, but the fact remains that the appellants remained with the victim ladies for considerable time and during which the victimshad ample opportunity to identify the appellants in day hours and during night as well, inasmuch as the victims were ravished by the appellants twice during the period they were under their clutches. Therefore, the identification of the appellants for the first time in Court cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution case. I have also gone through the case law cited at the bar and in my considered view the case cited by the counsel for the appellants is of no help to the appellants. In Mohanlal Gangaram's case, the offence was committed during night hours and just after the appellant committed offence, he left the place and ran away. That apart PW-3 admitted that names of the accused were given to him by the police. It was in these circumstances that their Lordships of the Apex Court held that if the appellant was not known to him before the incident and was identified for the first time in the Court, in the absence of a test identification the evidence of PW-3 was valueless and could not be relied upon. 10. It was next contended by the counsel for the appellants that the learned trial Court has committed serious error in holding the appellants guilty of the charges on the uncorroborated sole testimony of both the prosecutrix. Learned counsel argued that their statements do not stand in corroboration with medical evidence, rather belied thereby. Referring the medical evidence, learned counsel submitted that there were no injuries on the persons of prosecutrix, including their private parts. Learned counsel further argued that conduct of the prosecutrix raises serious doubt on the genesis of the prosecution case. Learned counsel argued that their statements do not stand in corroboration with medical evidence, rather belied thereby. Referring the medical evidence, learned counsel submitted that there were no injuries on the persons of prosecutrix, including their private parts. Learned counsel further argued that conduct of the prosecutrix raises serious doubt on the genesis of the prosecution case. According to them, the prosecutrixs had ample opportunity to disclose the incident to the persons who met them during the time they were removed from one place to another, or to lodge a report of the incident at the police out-post. According to the learned counsel, these circumstances are sufficient to infer that both the ladies allegedly ravished were the consenting parties to the sexual intercourse. In support of their argument, learned counsel have relied upon Dilip & Anr. v. State of M.P., JT 2001 (8) SC 390 and Kuldeep K. Mahato v. State of Bihar, JT 1998(5) SC 395. 11. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the above arguments and have gone through the relevant evidence. So far as absence of injuries on the persons of prosecutrixs as pointed out by the counsel for the appellant is concerned, suffice it to say that both the prosecutrix were married ladies and were habitual to sexual intercourse. The version of the prosecutrix in itself is sufficient to believe that rape was committed on them by the appellants. It is not always necessary that in all cases of sexual assault, injuries must be there on the person of a victim of rape. In the case at hand, two married ladies unfortunately became prey in the hands of able bodies youth who wanted to satisfy their lust and succeeded in fulfilling their sexual lust. The helpless victims who were in clutches of appellants could not resist and they had no alternate except to obey their command. In my considered view submission of a female without putting any resistance would not necessarily tantamount to her consent. A mere act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion when volitional faculty is clouded by fear cannot be deemed to be consent. 12. Now comes the conduct of the prosecutrix. No doubt, it is evident from the statements of victims that one old lady and a child came to them. Likewise, while travelling in a truck, the police out-post also came in the way. 12. Now comes the conduct of the prosecutrix. No doubt, it is evident from the statements of victims that one old lady and a child came to them. Likewise, while travelling in a truck, the police out-post also came in the way. But the prosecutrixs did not disclose the incident to the old lady nor did they lodge a report at the police out-post. The reason is obvious. The prosecutrix were under the influence, control and command of the appellants. It has come in evidence that when residents of village Kishorepura asked them as to what had happened, the prosecutrixs instead replying the question, pointed towards the appellants and said "ask them". Therefore, it can well be inferred that both the victim ladies were so much terrorised that they could not dare to narrate the incident to the villagers. Both the victims have candidly stated that they did not know the appellants prior to the incident nor was there any motive for implicating them falsely. In this view of the matter, I am of the firm view that the evidence of both the prosecutrixs in respect of taking them away and subjecting them to sexual assault inspire confidence and there is nothing to discard the same. Keeping in mind the human psychology and behavioural probability in assessing the testimonial potency of the victim's version, it need be observed that why the victim ladies would foist a rape charge on strangers unless clear motive is there. The above fact improbabilise the hypothesis of false implication. I have also gone through the case laws cited at the bar. In Dilip & Anr. v. State of M.P. (supra), the age of victim girl was 16 years. The Apex Court found it difficult to accept the truthfulness of the version of prosecutrix that any sexual assault as alleged was committed on her because her narration of the incident was found to be basically infirm on account of being con adicted by the statement of her own aunt as also by the medical evidence and the FSL report. The Apex Court found it difficult to accept the truthfulness of the version of prosecutrix that any sexual assault as alleged was committed on her because her narration of the incident was found to be basically infirm on account of being con adicted by the statement of her own aunt as also by the medical evidence and the FSL report. That apart the suggestions in cross-examination given by the defence for false implication of the accused persons were also found to have not gone beyond being suggestions merely and it was in these circumstances that their Lordships held that "it is not necessary for us to dwell upon further to find out the probability of truth contained in the suggestions because we are not satisfied generally of the correctness of story as told by the prosecutrix". In Kuldeep K. Mahato v. State of Bihar (supra) the prosecutrix was below the age of 18 years. She had sufficient opportunity not only to run away from the house at Ramgarh but she could have also taken the help of neighbours from the said village. Her testimony was also not found to be corroborated by medical evidence. Keeping in view the conduct of the prosecutrix their Lordships were of the view that she was a consenting party. Their Lordships further noticed one important fact that it was not the case of the prosecutrix that she was put in physical restraint in the house at Ramgarh, with the result her movements were restricted. It was in these circumstances that their Lordships acquitted the accused of the charge u/ss. 366 & 376 IPC. Here, in the instant case, the prosecutrix, married ladies of 25 & 30 years of age who belong to Kota were abducted by the appellants in a Jeep from Hindaun while they were about to return after Darshan at Mehandipur Balaji and were taken to lonely places, kept wrongfully confined and were subjected to forcible sexual intercourse. They were so much terrorised that they could not dare even kk narrate the incident before mob of villagers. Thus the facts involved in the case are entirely different than those involved in the cited case and therefore, the cases cited at the bar are of no help to the appellants. 13. PW-1 Mst. They were so much terrorised that they could not dare even kk narrate the incident before mob of villagers. Thus the facts involved in the case are entirely different than those involved in the cited case and therefore, the cases cited at the bar are of no help to the appellants. 13. PW-1 Mst. Sonya Bai has categorically deposed that after Jagmohan left the place, appellant-Ram Khiladi committed rape on her, while appellants- Ram Singh and Gopal committed rape on her sister. PW-2 Mst. Ram Murti has categorically deposed that appellant-Gopal committed rape on her at the Doongari. She has specifically denied that appellant-Ram Singh committed rape on her. Rather, she has deposed that Ram Singh slapped her and told her as to why she came there in a Jeep and that Ram Khiladi would sale her. Thereafter, Ram Singh gave her a currency note of Rs. 100/- and asked her to run away. Thus, there is no iota of evidence td prove that either Khiladi or Gopal committed rape on PWs 1 & 2 respectively in furtherance of their common intention with appellant-Ram Singh. Appellant-Khiladi committed rape on. the prosecutrix (PW-1) at the well situated between Katkad river and Katkad village. At that time appellant-Gopal was not there. Gopal as per the version of the prosecutrix, came thereafter and he committed rape at hillock where appellant-Khiladi was not present. Khiladi was sleeping at the well and he was left there. Therefore, the prosecution has not been able to prove on the basis of evidence that PWs 1 & 2 were raped in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention. For the reasons therefore, the appellants could not have been convicted for the offence of gang rape punishable u/s. 376(2)(g) IPC. 14. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of offence of rape is not an accomplish after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. Her testimony has to be appreciated on-the principles of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness. In the case at hand, the prosecutrix (PW-1) has deposed that in the night appellants-Ram Singh and Gopal took her and her sister (PW-2) to the house of one Mangi Lal (brother-in-law of appellant-Ram Singh) and kept them in that house. Her testimony has to be appreciated on-the principles of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness. In the case at hand, the prosecutrix (PW-1) has deposed that in the night appellants-Ram Singh and Gopal took her and her sister (PW-2) to the house of one Mangi Lal (brother-in-law of appellant-Ram Singh) and kept them in that house. According to her, it was sun rise when they reached the house of Mangilal. She requested Mangilal to let them free, but Mangilal closed the door of the room and bolted from outside. According to her, both of them were kept confined in the room for whole of the day. Another prosecutrix (PW-2) has fully supported the version of her sister (PW-2). She has also deposed that Gopal and Ram Singh took both the sisters to a village and kept them confined in a room. Pointing towards co-accused-Mangilal, the witness stated that they were kept confined in the room of that man. According to her, appellant-Ram Singh provided them food. It is thus proved beyond doubt that appellants-Ram Singh and Gopal abducted PWs 1 & 2 with intent to wrongfully confine them so that they may be forced to illicit intercourse. It stands also proved that appellant-Khiladi also abducted them with intent that they may be forced to illicit intercourse. It must, therefore, be concluded that the prosecution has been able to prove beyond doubt the charges u/ss. 365 & 366 IPC against appellant-Ram Singh and charge u/ss. 366 & 376 IPC against appellant-Khiladi and charge u/ss. 365, 366 & 376 accused- appellant-Gopal. 15. Lastly, it has been contended by the counsel for the appellant that in all six accused faced trial. The learned trial Judge did not believe the prosecution evidence reliable and worthy of credence so far as participation of other 3 co-accused is concerned and accordingly acquitted them of the offences charged. In this back-ground learned counsel strenuously contended that the trial Court has committed grave error in convicting the appellants on the same set of evidence which has been discarded and disbelieved in respect of co-accused persons. 16. I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the above argument. I am not convinced with the above argument that a set of evidence if disbelieved as regards 3 co-accused, it would not be safe to rely the same set of evidence as regards the appellants. 16. I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the above argument. I am not convinced with the above argument that a set of evidence if disbelieved as regards 3 co-accused, it would not be safe to rely the same set of evidence as regards the appellants. True it is that the prosecution evidence has been disbelieved in respect of offence alleged to be committed by coaccused, but that does not mean that it should be disbelieved and rejected so far as the present appellants are concerned. The Court has to separate chaff from the grain. I am fortified in my view by a decision of the Apex Court in Rizan v. State of Chhatisgarh, (2003) 2 SCC 661 , wherein, their Lordships of the Apex Court have held as under : "Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non- acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out the entire prosecution case. In assence a prayer is to apply the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything. Even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of a number of other co- accused persons his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff. Where the chaff can be separate from the grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of a particular material witness or material particular would not run it from the beginning to end. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witness cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has to received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law." 17. Thus, on the basis of law laid down by the Apex Court in Rizan's case, referred to above, the argument of the learned counsel is untenable as the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has not received general acceptance nor this maxim has come to occupy the status of a rule of law. Thus, on the basis of law laid down by the Apex Court in Rizan's case, referred to above, the argument of the learned counsel is untenable as the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has not received general acceptance nor this maxim has come to occupy the status of a rule of law. Therefore, the mere fact that a set of prosecution evidence has not been believed by the trial Court as regards participation of 3 co-accused, does not mean that the same set of evidence as regards appellants must also be rejected. The finding arrived at by the trial Court, in my view does not suffer from any infirmity so as to call for interference. 18. Mr. Ganesh Meena, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants has also filed an application u/s. 391 Cr.P.C. for taking some documents on record as additional evidence. Along with his application, the learned counsel has produced on record 5 documents, viz 3 FIRs and two complaints and on the strength of iii_se d uments learned counsel has tried to convince the Court that prosecutrix Mst. Ram Murti is a lady of bad character and she is involved in numerous criminal cases involving offence u/ss. 376, 366, 341, 323, 394 IPC etc. 19. I have gone through the documents annexed with the application for being taken on record as additional evidence and I am of the considered view that none of the document can be said to have any concern with Mst. Ram Murti, a victim of sexual assault in the present case. Document No. 1 is the FIR lodged by one Mahavir against Mst. Ram Murti and Ranjeet, on which a case for offence u/ss. 323, 341 & 394 IPC was registered at Police Station Udyog Nagar, Kota. This FIR does not contain the parentage of Mst. Ram Murti. Document No. 2 is the cross FIR lodged by Mst. Ram Murti, wherein her identity has been stated to be that of wife of Mukut Bihari by caste Bheel. Document No. 3 is the criminal complaint submitted to A.D.M., Kota against Ram Murti D/o Latoor Lal by caste Bheel Thakur, aged 20 years, R/o village Gurajhadi, Police Station Anta, district Baran. Document No. 4 is the FIR against one Mst. Ram Murti lodged at police station Naya Pura, Kota in 1996 with the allegation that she absconded from police custody. Document No. 4 is the FIR against one Mst. Ram Murti lodged at police station Naya Pura, Kota in 1996 with the allegation that she absconded from police custody. This document does not contain the where-abouts of Ram Murti. Document No. 5 is the complainant against Mst. Ram Murti W/o Mukut Bihari by caste Bheel Thakur, aged 32 years, resident of Bhurajedi, Police Station Anta, district Baran. In the case at hand, Mst. Ram Murti aged 30 years is a brahmin by caste. The names of her father and husband are Jai Narayan and Bhimrao, respectively and she is a resident of village Saroda. Thus, it is crystal clear that none of the documents has any concern or relevance with Mst. Ram Murti, a victim lady in this case. Nothing in respect of identity of Mst. Ram Murti as has been disclosed in the documents sought to be produced as additional evidence tally with that of her identity in the case at hand. For the reasons therefore, the application filed u/s. 391 Cr.P.C. is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 20. In the result, the appeals are partly allowed. While maintaining conviction of appellant-Ram Singh u/ss. 365 & 366 IPC and the sentences awarded thereunder, he is acquitted of the offence u/s. 376(2)(g) IPC. The conviction of appellants-Khiladi and Gopal u/s. 376(2)(g) and the sentences awarded thereunder are set aside. The conviction of appellant-Khiladi u/s. 366 IPC and that of Gopal u/ss. 365 & 366 IPC and the sentences awarded thereunder are maintained. Appellants-Khiladi and Gopal are convicted for offence u/s. 376 IPC and each of them is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, each of them will have to further undergo 6 months imprisonment.Appeals partly allowed. *******