JUDGMENT 1. These appeals are directed against the order dated 1 4 1997 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 784/88 whereby the writ petition has been partly allowed, by setting aside the order of punishment of dismissal awarded by Disciplinary Authority, ordering reinstatement of 5 petitioner and matter was remanded to re-consider the case of petitioner or award of appropriate punishment as discussed. 2. The respondent-State produced copy of charge-sheet (Annex.R/1) which reads as under : " jktLFkku ljdkj dkfeZd % d&3 % foHkkx vkjksi i= of#) MkW0 vHk;jke pkS/kjh HksM+ o tu izlkj vf/kdkjh jktx<+ vkjksi fooj.k la[;k 1& fd mDr MkW0 vHk;jke pkS/kjh HksM+ o tu izlkj vf/kdkjh] jktx<+ ds ?kj ij dk;Z djrs gq;s fcuk iwoZ vuqefr izkIr fd;s eq[;ky; NksM+ dj ftyk dk;kZy; pw# esa #d dj vuq'kklughurk ds fy;s nks"kh gS] tSlk fd layXu vfHkdFku forj.k la0 1 esa of.kZr gSA vkjksi fooj.k la0 2& fd mDr MkW- vHkjke pkS/kjh HksM+ o mu izlkj vf/kdkjh] jktx<+ ds in ij dk;Z djrs gq, dk;kZy; le; i'pkr~ ftyk dk;kZy; pq# esa 'kjkc eaxok dj LVkQ ds lkFk cSB dj ihdj vkpkj.kkorhZ ds fu;e 26 % lh % dk mYya?ku dj fu;e 4 % IV % ds vUrxZr vuqfpr rFkk v'kksHkuh; vkpj.k rFkk uSfrd iru ds fy;s nks"kh gS] tSlk fd layXu vfHkdFku fooj.k la0 2 esa of.kZr gSA vkjksi forj.k la0 3& fd mDr MkW0 vHk;jke pkS/kjh HksM+ o mu izlkj vf/k0 jktx<+ fnukad 14-6-1982 dks ftyk dk;kZy; pw: esa 'kjkc ds u'ks esa dk;kZy; le; i'pkr~ Jh eueksgu izlkn ds iq= Jh /khjsUnz 'kekZ dks 'kjkc fiykdj mlds lkFk O;kfHkpkj dj vkpj.kkorhZ ds fu;e 4 % IV % dk mYya?ku dj vuSfrd dk;Zokgh ds fy;s nks"kh gS] tSlk fd layXu vfHkdFku fooj.k la0 3 esa of.kZr gSA ,l0Mh0 mi 'kklu lfpo " 3. The charge No 1 related to leaving the headquarters at Rajgarh without permission; charge No. 2 related to using the office of Sheep and Wool Department at Churu after office hours for indulging into drinks and charge No. 3 related to commission of offences under section 377 and 323 IPC in the Office of Sheep and Wool Department Churu on 14.6.1982. Details of which have been submitted alongwith charge-sheet. 4. Details of which have been submitted alongwith charge-sheet. 4. Charge No. 1, 2 and 3 all related to an incident that has taken place on 14.6.1982, namely leaving the headquarters without permission, misuse of the office where the petitioner stayed after office hours for indulging into drinks and committing offence of sodomy in the office after having taken drinks on 14.6.1982. Details of the charge refer to a report submitted to the police and the fact about the arrest of the incumbent in pursuance of that report and his release on bail on 16.6.1982. 5. Man Mohan and Nandlal were also subjected to enquiry, who were subordinate employees at Churu Office and were found drunk alongwith pet loner at the time of incident. The boy Dhirendra who was alleged to be vict of offence was son of the Man Mohan. 6. During the course of enquiry, Department has examined PW 1 Dr. S.K. Dhawan, PW 2 Sohan Khan, Chokidar PW 3, Telephone Operator and PW 4 Sajjan Singh, Sub-Inspector of Police. As per enquiry report, charges against the petitioner on all counts stand proved. Consequently vide order dated 45 18.3.1988 (Ex. 1), the petitioner was removed from service. In the enquiry in connection with same incident, Shri Man Mohan Sharma was punished with stoppage of one grade increment with cumulative effect. IVth Class Servant, Shri Nandlal was exonerated. PW 1 Dr. S.K. Dhawan was not the witness in trial before criminal Court. 7. The principal contention of learned counsel for the incumbent was 5 that in respect of same incident on a criminal charge, incumbent was subjected to the trial in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Churu and by order dated 27.2.1984. before initiation of inquiry, he has been acquitted. Therefore, on the basis of same charge, the petitioner could not have been subjected to punishment by reaching to a different finding than what has -to been reached by a judicial Court in a duly conducted trial. It was also the contention of incumbent that witnesses who have been examined before the Domestic Tribunal were also the witnesses examined during trial before the Criminal Court. Thus, on the basis of very same material, it was not possible for the enquiry officer or for that matter disciplinary authority to reach to a conclusion contrary to what has been reached to the criminal court. Thus, on the basis of very same material, it was not possible for the enquiry officer or for that matter disciplinary authority to reach to a conclusion contrary to what has been reached to the criminal court. It was also contended that copy of enquiry report has been submitted to the delinquent. 8. It was the case of Disciplinary Authority that delinquent has not been acquitted honourably in the trial but was given benefit of doubt, because victim Dhirendra and his father Man Mohan have turned hostile, as far as committing the sexual assault on Dhirendra. Dhirendra was examined by the prosecution during trial. The trial Court notwithstanding the finding the statement of all other witnesses trustworthy those who have not turned hostile and even hostile witnesses supporting the prosecution case about having been found in drunk state with pants down when police arrived on the scene and noticing the conduct and state of affairs in which the petitioner was arrested, did not convict the incumbent solely because victim has denied that incumbent had any design to have sex with him or that he had sex with him, Court expressed its inability to convict the accused on other material. In these circumstances, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that since the nature of proof required for convicting an accused in the trial is much higher and different from standard of proof required in the case of conducting domestic trial. Where in the case an accused is acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt, it is not an absolute rule that departmental authorities cannot reach a different conclusion by examining the same witnesses. He also relied on the surrounding circumstances which were found established during trial as well as during enquiry by the Domestic Tribunal and said that in these circumstances, the inference drawn by the enquiry authority and accepted by the disciplinary authority was reasonable 4o conclusion on the preponderance of probabilities of commission of misconduct by the incumbent, though may fall short of standard of proof required for conviction because of denial by the victim. The order of punishment cannot be set aside solely on the ground of earlier acquittal particularly when holding of an enquiry into the same incident after acquittal is permitted by law as has been stated and reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court more than once, and about which the delinquent officer does not join issue. 9. The learned Single Judge opined that if an accused is acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt, it is as good acquittal as a honourable one, and therefore, once the petitioner had been acquitted, the petitioner could not have been charge-sheeted once again on similar evidence, of having had an unnatural sex with Dhirendra Kumar. That matter in any case could not have been re-opened by the disciplinary authority specially when at the time of 1 alleged incident, none of the other persons who were said to be present, have been produced as witnesses against the petitioner i.e. Nandlal and Manmohan Prasad in the departmental enquiry proceedings. 10. On these conclusions the learned Single Judge did not sustain the finding of enquiry officer in respect of charge No. 3. The learned Single Judge was also of the opinion that leaving headquarter without permission did not amount to a misconduct, as it has not been so defined as misconduct and staying after office hours is also not a misconduct. However, the learned Single Judge concurred that there is evidence on record to show that petitioner while staying at night in the office in Churu as in drunken position alongwith other employees. The petitioner cannot be absolved of his misconduct. He was supposed to maintain his status and if during drinking, some injuries have been caused to his other co-accused persons in that situation, the petitioner cannot be absolved of the liability and charge of 15 misconduct. With these findings, Annex. 1 order of punishment and the findings on issue No. 1 and 3 of Annex. 1 were quashed and case was remanded back to the competent authority for consideration of quantum of appropriate punishment for the charge held proved by the learned Single Judge. 11. With these findings, Annex. 1 order of punishment and the findings on issue No. 1 and 3 of Annex. 1 were quashed and case was remanded back to the competent authority for consideration of quantum of appropriate punishment for the charge held proved by the learned Single Judge. 11. This judgement led to two appeals, one by the State Government which is D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 622/97 being aggrieved of setting aside of the order of punishment and quashing of finding on charges No. 1 and 3 and another by Abhay Ram, delinquent-incumbent, which is D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 896.197 being aggrieved with the remand of the case to the 25 disciplinary authority for passing fresh order as to quantum of punishment. 12. We have learned counsel for the parties in respect of both the appeals. 13. There is no dispute before us that after acquittal vide order dated 27.2.1984, it was competent for the disciplinary authority to hold an enquiry 30 in respect of said alleged incident, and therefore, apparently the learned Single Judge was wrong when he stated that no enquiry could have been instituted in respect of the charge which has been subject matter of criminal trial; and from which. the appellant has been acquitted. Perhaps this also changes the perception of considering the effective course, which an enquiry could take after acquittal. 14. The contention about non-delivery of enquiry report before imposing punishment also cannot in our view be sustained in view of the fact that Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, 1991(1) SCC 588 , after laying down ratio that providing the 40 delinquent officer with an enquiry report where Disciplinary Authority himself is not the enquiry officer is an essential concomitant of a fair enquiry as part of natural justice, has by specific direction, observed that it operates prospectively and not to affect the orders passed prior to the decision rendered in Mohd. Ramzan's case at whatever stage, the same may be pending. The decision in Mohd. Ramzan's case was amplified by enunciating the principle and extent of prospective operation of ratio laid in Mohd. Ramzan's case by the larger bench of Supreme Court, later on in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., 1993(4) SCC 727 . 15. The decision in Mohd. Ramzan's case was amplified by enunciating the principle and extent of prospective operation of ratio laid in Mohd. Ramzan's case by the larger bench of Supreme Court, later on in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., 1993(4) SCC 727 . 15. The inference drawn against findings of Disciplinary Authority because of non-production of Man Mohan and Nandlal also in our opinion cannot be sustained as it is founded by ignoring vital material on record. Man Mohan and Nandlal were not accused in criminal case and were produced as prosecution witnesses to prove charge of sodomy against delinquent, the victim of which, offence was son of Man Mohan. While Nandlal had supported the prosecution case on charge of sodomy. Man Mohan has turned hostile. Charges of insub-ordination in leaving Rajgarh without permission and misuse of office at Churu after office hours by indluging in drinks and disorderly behaviour unbecoming of a civil servant were not the one for which criminal trial has taken place. The departmental proceedings were initiated against petitioner delinquent Dr. Abhay Kumar alongwith Man Mohan and Nand Lal jointly. Therefore, question of examining Man Mohan and Nand Lal as departmental proceedings could be drawn for non-production of Man Mohan and Nandlal as prosecuting witness in departmental proceedings. 16. That leaves the principal contention raised about sustaining or not sustaining the finding of the disciplinary authority on charge No. 3, primarily on the ground of acquittal order recorded in favour of incumbent in the order dated 27.2.1984 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Churu. Both parties have not thought it proper to place that order on record. However, during the course of hearing, at the request of the Court, order dated 27.2.1984 was made available by learned counsel for the appellant. 17. In support of proposition, learned counsel for the delinquent officer has relied on the case of Shiv Prasad Sharma v. State, 2002(3) RLR 421 , Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1416 ; Sulekh Chand Salek Chand v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., JT 1995(1) (23) & Mohd. Umar v. The Rajasthan State Electricity Board & Anr., 1993(1) WLC 253 . 18. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1416 ; Sulekh Chand Salek Chand v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., JT 1995(1) (23) & Mohd. Umar v. The Rajasthan State Electricity Board & Anr., 1993(1) WLC 253 . 18. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has relied on the case of State of A.P. v. K. Allabaksh, 2000 SCC (L&S) 385 ; Yashbir Singh v. Union of India, 1998 SCC (L&C) 1723 ; State of T.N. v. M.A. Waheed Khan, 1999 SCC (L&C) 257 ; High Court of Judicature Bombay v. Uday Singh, 1997 SCC (L&S) 1132 & Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanamthitta & Ors. v. A. Gopalan, 1998 SCC (L&S) 124 . 19. In the present cse, it is apparent that the delinquent officer was tried under section 377 IPC for having had unnatural sex with one Dhirendra who is son of Man Mohan, a subordinate employee in the Office of Sheep and Whool, Churu after all the three had taken drinks. During the course of trial, the fact that all the three persons viz. Dr. Abhay Ram, delinquent officer, Man Mohan, the subordinate employee and his son Dhirendra were fond drunk in the office of Sheep and Wool at Churu and injuries, on the person of accused and victim found the victim with hook of his pant and 'Nada' of his undergarment broken. But victim Dhirendra and father Man Mohan had retracted from their police statements and became hostile about delinquent having sexual inter course with Dhirendra. The trial Court felt that it had not option but to give benefit of doubt to accused and acquitted him. 20. The principal on which no issue is joined is settled that ordinarily once a person is tried for offence on certain set of facts and he is acquitted, he can be subjected to a departmental enquiry on same set of facts, but he cannot be found guilty for committing misconduct on the same evidence, which was before the Court. It is also settled that standard of proof required to convict a person of offence is higher than the standard of proof required to prove misconduct in any departmental enquiry. Seemingly two principles sound incompatible. It there any meeting point? 21. In the present case, the guilt of accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, as per verdict of Court. 22. Seemingly two principles sound incompatible. It there any meeting point? 21. In the present case, the guilt of accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, as per verdict of Court. 22. The issue is that where the acquittal is not on full exoneration on merit, but by extending benefit of doubt, suggestive of facts that while on preponderance of probability, the acts constituting offence may be found to be proved, but the same not being proved beyond reasonable doubt, conviction is not possible, makes any difference on application of above principle. 23. The Consensus of judicial opinion indicates that it does make difference and it is possible to reach finding different from what has been ultimate conclusion in trial. It shall depend on findings on various findings reached by the Court in respect of multiple facts constituting offence or misconduct on the basis of material that has come on record and by application of test of preponderance of probability in standard of strict proof and finding on each given case. Any principal cannot be applied in vaccuo but depends on facts of each case. 24. In Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines, Nagpur & Anr. v. Ramchandran G. Modak & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 636 , the Court appears to have made this distinction clear when it said while holding that continuing a pending departmental enquiry after acquittal is permissible. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus: "The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have no continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal Court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction (discretion) in any way fettered." 25. In a recent decision in the case of Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanamthitta & Ors. In a recent decision in the case of Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanamthitta & Ors. v. A Gopalan, 1998 SCC (L&S) 124 , the Court directly considered the effect of acquittal of findings to be recorded in departmental proceedings. The delinquent officer was acquitted of the charge of criminal misappropriation of Rs. 8,000/- by giving him benefit of doubt. In disciplinary enquiry held subsequently, he was found guilty of that charge. When challenged before the Central Administrative Tribunal, the Tribunal did not sustain the findings on said charge because of acquittal. In the appeal before Supreme Court, it was contended by the counsel for the incumbent that Tribunal was right in conclusion. The Court upheld the contention and said thus: "We have heard Shri V.C. Mahajan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and Shri K.M.K. Nair, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, Shri Nair has submitted that since the respondent has been acquitted by the criminal Court on the charge of withdrawal of Rs. 8,000, the Tribunal was right in holding that the finding regarding the first charge could not be sustained. Shri Nair has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Nelson Motis v. Union of India . The said decision does not lend support to the said submission of Shri Nair. In that case the Court has rejected the contention that disciplinary proceedings, could not be continued in the face of the acquittal in the criminal case and has held that the nature an scope of the criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceedings and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings. This is so because in a criminal case the charge has to be proved by the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceedings the standard of proof for proving the charge is preponderance of probabilities. The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in holding that in view of the acquittal of the respondent by the Criminal Court on the charge relating to withdrawal of Rs. 8,000/- the finding on the first charge in the departmental proceedings cannot be upheld and must be set aside." 26. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in holding that in view of the acquittal of the respondent by the Criminal Court on the charge relating to withdrawal of Rs. 8,000/- the finding on the first charge in the departmental proceedings cannot be upheld and must be set aside." 26. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , is a case very near home on facts, and ratio laid in said case needs to be noticed in the background of its facts in same detail. 27. It was a case in which three police constables were charged with torture of an under trial accused in jail as a result of which he died. The witness of police torture in jail was another prisoner Durgalu who was an absconding prisoner and who was apprehended by villagers and handed over to village servants to be handed over him to Police Station, Kodur and was in police custody before the victim was arrested and has seen the victim 25 tortured by the police. 28. In the enquiry into circumstances which led to death of victim said Durgalu had made a statement that he had witnessed the torture of victim in Police Station. Police constables were charged with the offence under section 304(2) and 201 read with Section 114 IPC. 29. Before the Sub-Magistrate, said Durgalu, the alleged eye-witness turned hostile and denied having seen the torture. He stated that he had escaped from the custody of village servants before reaching police station, and was not in police custody at all when the alleged torturing of another prisoner took place. 30. The Sub-Magistrate discharged the constable on the ground that only eye-witness has turned hostile. 31. In the departmental enquiry against delinquent constables in relation to said incident of torture of the inmate of prison, the delinquents had taken the same plea that they have been discharged because the alleged eye- witness Durgalu had not at all been brought to police station by village servants. 32. The Dy. Superintendent of Police who held the enquiry in his report concluded thus "All these facts go to show that he was arrested on the 5th without a shadow of doubt, but if the judgment of the learned Court which is based on the retracted statement of Durgalu is considered the 'sacred truth' the delinquent may have benefit of doubt." 33. Superintendent of Police who held the enquiry in his report concluded thus "All these facts go to show that he was arrested on the 5th without a shadow of doubt, but if the judgment of the learned Court which is based on the retracted statement of Durgalu is considered the 'sacred truth' the delinquent may have benefit of doubt." 33. The Disciplinary Authority considered the report and found the charges against the delinquent constables proved and imposed punishment of dismissal, which on appeal was turned to removal. 34. The punishment was challenged before High Court on like ground, as before us that delinquent having been discharged because the eye-witness has turned hostile by retracting his earlier statement, no conclusion contrary to it can be reached in departmental enquiry which is contrary to Court. 35. The plea found favour with the High Court and order of punishment was quashed. 36. The Apex Court upturned the judgment of High Court in appeal, The Apex Court held as under : "There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable 1,3 doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding u/Art. 226 of the Constitution a Court of Appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant.' "But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based. the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." (8) The Enquiry Officer had accepted the evidence of witnesses for the State that Durgalu was handed over to the respondent on March 5, 25 1954 and the observation that respondent may have the benefit of doubt it the judgment of the Magistrate is considered "scared truth" appears to have been made in a somewhat sarcastic vein, and does not cast any doubt upon the conclusion recorded by him. The Enquiry Officer appears to have stated that the judgment of the Magistrate holding a criminal trial against a public servant could not always be regarded as binding in a departmental enquiry against that public servant. In so stating the Enquiry Officer did not commit any error. The first ground on which the High Court interfered with the order of the punishing authorities is therefore wholly unsustainable." 37. The discharge of accused by giving benefit of doubt because the e e-witness had turned hostile did not come in the way of punishing him in Departmental proceedings on same set of facts constituting alleged conduct. 38. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, 1972(4) SCC 618 , the Court again said that a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard of required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. 39. In this connection, it may be apposite to allude to the principle that punishment in departmental proceeding and conviction of an offence are two 45 distinct fields and does not necessarily give rise to principle of double jet paddy and both punishment as a result of departmental enquiry and punishment following conviction can both be sustained independently. 40. Prahalad Meena v. State of Rajasthan, 2001(8) SLR 533 , was a case in which the enquiry into alleged misconduct has taken place prior so conclusion of criminal trial into offence on the basis of alleged misconduct. Order of punishment in departmental proceedings was imposed en 31.12.1990 after an enquiry was duly held on the charges informed into delinquent officer. Trial was concluded on 16.9.1999. Order of punishment in departmental proceedings was imposed en 31.12.1990 after an enquiry was duly held on the charges informed into delinquent officer. Trial was concluded on 16.9.1999. Thus the trial by the Court had no impact on the fairness of disciplinary proceedings and conclusion reached thereunder with less/rigour of burden of proof than in a 5 criminal case. It was in that circumstances, the Court held thus : "10. It is pertinent to mention here that the punishment of dismissal of the petitioner was not passed on the finding of conviction recorded by the Court in criminal case. The punishment has been imposed on the basis of an independent enquiry and the acquittal by the trial Court subsequent to the dismissal of the petitioner has no effect whatsoever on the proceedings already taken place long back." 41. In Kamruddin Pathan v. R.S.R.T.C., RLR 1987(11) 848 , this Court has applied the principle of double jeopardy in setting aside the order of dismissal following conviction on allegation which had been subject matter of 15 disciplinary enquiry earlier and lesser punishment was imposed. In view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Balwant Singh, 2003 AIR SCW 1645 , it cannot be held any longer a good precedent. The facts of the case were that after holding departmental enquiry on charges of carrying ticket less passenger in bus, the delinquent conductor was punished with stoppage of two grade increments. Later on, he was also convicted for the offence under section 8 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Service (Prevention of Ticket less Travel) Act, 1975. After conviction, his services were terminated on the basis of conviction by the criminal Court. This Court held it to be a case of double jeopardy and violative of Article 20 25 also, and set aside the termination order on the basis of subsequent enquiry. 42. In State of Haryana v. Bawant Singh (supra) the Apex Court has clearly held that in the circumstances as were present in Kamruddin Pathan's case (supra) does not amount to double jeopardy and punishment founded on conviction is independent of punishment awarded in previously concluded 30 enquiry. This Court said thus : "4. 42. In State of Haryana v. Bawant Singh (supra) the Apex Court has clearly held that in the circumstances as were present in Kamruddin Pathan's case (supra) does not amount to double jeopardy and punishment founded on conviction is independent of punishment awarded in previously concluded 30 enquiry. This Court said thus : "4. From the facts that are not in dispute it is abundantly clear that the order dated 12.3.1990 was passed against the respondent reducing the pay to the minimum of time scale of Driver for the period of four years on account of his causing loss and bringing bad name to the Department in the light of the order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, that too after holding enquiry under the Rules after giving him opportunity. The second order dated 17.9.1992 was passed on the basis of the conviction and sentence passed against him by the competent criminal court for the offence under section 304-A IPC which was permissible under the Rules. These being the facts. there was no question of prosecuting and punishing the respondent for the same offence twice. The High Court was not right in equating departmental enquiries on different grounds to a prosecution in criminal case. The High Court also has failed to see that the two orders passed against the respondent were on different grounds and were on different cause of actions." 43. In coming to this conclusion, the Court applied the principles enunciated in Union of India & Anr. v. P.D. Yadav, 2002(1) SCC 404 , in which the Court repelled the contention about double jeopardy in the context of Art. of the Constitution. It was explained that punishing a person under section 71 of Army Act and taking action under Regulation 16(a) are entirely different. Hence, no question of applying principle of double jeopardy. 44. In the context of aforesaid decision: we may see the facts of 1 present case. 45. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has found on the basis of evidence before it the following facts proved (1) At the time of alleged incident, the delinquent officer Abhay Ram, 5 victim Dhirendra and Man Mohan Sharma, father of victim were found drunk: (2) There were four injuries on the person of accused Dr. Abhay Ram Choudhary. 45. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has found on the basis of evidence before it the following facts proved (1) At the time of alleged incident, the delinquent officer Abhay Ram, 5 victim Dhirendra and Man Mohan Sharma, father of victim were found drunk: (2) There were four injuries on the person of accused Dr. Abhay Ram Choudhary. (3) There were three injuries on the person of victim Dhirendra; (4) Victim when police reached Dhirendra was found in condition that hook of his pant was broken and 'Nada' of his underwear was also broken; (5) No plausible explanation has been given for broken hook of pant and broken 'Nada' of underwear; (6) Nandlal, PW 1 is reliable witness and his statement is natural. This statement was discussed as under: " Qfj;knh ih0MCyw&1 uanyky dk ;g dFku gS fd ;g fjiksVZ izn'kZ ih&1 nsus x;k Fkk] ftl ij , ls ch o lh ls Mh xokg us viuk gLrk{kj crk;k gS] xokg us ;g Hkh dgk gS fd vfHk;qDr vHk;jke fnukad 14-6-1982 dh jkr dks 10&11 cts ftyk HksM+ mu dk;kZy; pq# esa vk;k] 'kjkc ih o /khjsUnz dqekj ds lkFk cqjk dke gqvk] ikl esa VsyhQksu ,Dlpsat ds vknfe;ksa dks dgk Fkk tgka ls pkj O;fDr vk;s rc /khjsUnz dqekj csgks'k Fkk] xokg us ;g Hkh dgk gS fd og nk: ihus ls csgks'k gks x;k FkkA vfHk;qDr dks le>k;k rks bl xokg ds Hkh pkVk ekjk fQj vfHk;qDr dks ;g dgk fd vki vkSfQlj gSa] ;g dke vPNk ugha gS] ij ugha gS] ij ugha ekuk fQj vfHk;qDr us bl xokg dks Hkh ekjkA iqfyl dks Qksu fd;k ij tc iqfyl okys ugha vk;s rks ;g xokg dksrokyh esa igqWapkA iqfyl us fQj ekSds ij vkdj uD'kk ekSdk izn'kZ ih&2 cuk;k] ,d ukMk o isUV dk gqd Hkh VwVk gqvk QnZ izn'kh ih&3 ds tfj;s cjken fd;k bl ij xokg us , ls ch viuk gLrk{kj gksuk Lohdkj fd;k gS] bl xokg ls yEch ftjg dh x;h gS ij xokg us ;g Li"V dgk gS fd mldh ogkWa M~;wVh 5 cts 'kke ls ysdj nqljs fnu losjs 10 cts rd dh Fkh] vkSj bl dk;kZy; ds pkjksa vksj dejs cus gq, gSa] MkDVj vHk;jke igys dk;kZy; esa vk;k Fkk fQj can djds pyk x;k vkSj okil 5-30 cts vk;s rc dk;kZy; dks rks cUn dj fn;k xsV dh [kyk gh j[kk ckn esa vfHk;qDr o eu eksgu vk;s vkSj dgk fd vUnj cSBsaxs fQj ;s lgk;d ftyk vf/kdkjh ds dejs esa cSBs Fks vkSj jkr Hkj ogkWa jgs] eueksgu /khjsUnz dqekj dk cki gS ftlus 'kjkc ih fQj blds dgus ls vkSj 'kjkc eaxk;h x;h] ckn esa /khjsUnz dks eueksgu us blh xokg gks Hkstdj jkr 8-30 cts cqyok;kA bl ckr ls budkj fd;k fd iou us ;g dgk gks fd 'kjkc dh O;oLFkk djs o ,slk djs fd MkWDVj dh Qftrh gks o fxjQ~rkj gks tkosA bl ckr ls Hkh bUdkj fd;k gS fd 'kjkc gsrq MkDVj /kou us iSls fns;s gks vkSj bl ckr gks Li"V rkSj ls dgk gS fd ;g xyr gS fd vfHk;qDr us cqjk dke ugha fd;kA bl lk{; ds eqdkcys vfHk;qDr dk dsoy budkjh dk c;ku gS] ekeys esa izFke lqpuk rRdky nh xbZ gS] vkSj izLrqr lk{; ds vk/kkj ij isUV dk gqd VwVuk o dPNs dk ukMk VwVuk] /khjsUnz dqekj eueksgu o vHk;jke dk 'kjkc ihdj okjnkr djuk Hkh izLrqr lk{; ds vk/kkj ij izdV gksrk gS] ijUrq vfHk;qDr }kjk ftl O;fDr ds lkFk ;g vizkd`frd laHkksx djus dk iz;ksx fd;k tkuk dgk x;k gS og Lor% i{knzksgh gqvk gS vkSj mldk firk eueksgu Hkh i{knzksgh gks x;kA ;|fi isUV ds gqd VwVus o dPNk dk ukMk VwVus dks dksbZ lUrks"ktud dkj.k mifLFkr ugha gksrk gS fQj Hkh tc ftlds lkFk d`R; gksrk gS og gh mlds lkFk d`R; gksus ls budkj dj tk;s rks U;k;ky; fQj ,sls ekeyksa esa dqN Hkh dj ugha ldrhA uanyky dk c;ku ;|fi dkQh izkd`frd gS ijUrq bl xokg ds dFku ls gh vfHk;kstu i{k dk eqdnek lkfcr ugha ekuk tk ldrk D;ksafd Lo;a ih0MCY;w0 2 /khjsUnz dqekj o mldk cki eueksgu ?kVuk ds rF;ksa ls budkj dj x;sA " 46. Significantly, Dhirendra with whom act of unnatural sex was alleged for, admitted that when police came on site hook of his pant was broken and his underwear was also with broken 'Nada' and he also admits about examination by doctor of himself, his father Man Mohan, and accused Dr. Abhay Ram. So also his father Man Mohan, PW 3 also became hostile as to actual commission of offence under section 377 by the accused but he too admits taking of alcohol by his son and that his son Dhirendra was unconscious and hook of Dhirendra's pant and hook of Dhirendra's 'Nada' were broken. 47. With all these findings, benefit of doubt was given to the accused for the offence under section 377 IPC only because Dhirendra, the alleged victim had denied actual commission of the act. 48. In the aforesaid background of findings of Court which conducted criminal trial, we find that so far as reaching the finding on the basis of evidence that was before the criminal Court, the Disciplinary Authority has reached same conclusion about same set of facts and delinquent was found dead drunk in the office at Churu after office hours with Dhirendra and Man Mohan and that Dr. Abhay Kumar and Dhirendra had injuries on their person and Dhirendra was found with hook of his pant broken and 'Nada' of his underwear also broken. Thus, there being parity of findings on all material aspect between the finding reached by the Criminal Court and the Disciplinary Authority, it cannot be said that by reaching finding contrary to criminal Court, the Disciplinary Authority has breached the cardinal principle of jurisprudence that administrative authorities cannot sit in judgment over verdict of Court of competent jurisdiction, as was held by this Court, in Mohd. Umar v. The Rajasthan State Electricity Board, 1993(1) 35 WLC (Raj.) 253 . 49. One has to keep in mind difference between findings of acquittal and finding of facts reached by the Court on multiple facts constituting offence or misconduct and attending circumstances leading to and corroborating end conclusions. Umar v. The Rajasthan State Electricity Board, 1993(1) 35 WLC (Raj.) 253 . 49. One has to keep in mind difference between findings of acquittal and finding of facts reached by the Court on multiple facts constituting offence or misconduct and attending circumstances leading to and corroborating end conclusions. If finding of acquittal is the only relevant factor, as is in the case of conviction, the very basic premise cannot be accepted that notwithstanding acquittal in criminal case, it is permissible to hold a departmental enquiry in respect of same incident and reach different conclusion, because on above principle, the finding of acquittal is the only conclusion which is relevant for reaching the conclusion whether charges levelled against accused are proved or not, it will be a futile exercise to hold a departmental enquiry after acquittal. 50. But undisputedly, law permits Disciplinary Authority to hold an enquiry against the delinquent even after acquittal in given circumstances. It cannot be said as a matter of law that, after acquittal from criminal Court, no disciplinary enquiry can be initiated. if the disciplinary enquiry can be inflate after acquittal, it must also be conceded that in such enquiry Disciplinary Authority can record finding of guilt. 51. It becomes relevant to look into facts which were proved or not proved by the Court during trial, and whether on facts proved by applying different standard of proof required is it possible to reach different conclusion. 52. Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1416 , is the case relied on heavily by the delinquent officer to contend that where departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on identical set of facts, and in evidence in both proceedings are 10 common and the employee is acquitted, said order of acquittal can conclude the departmental proceedings. On this premise, it was contended that all the witnesses who had been examined in departmental enquiry were examined in criminal case no additional evidence was led, hence it was not possible for the Disciplinary Authority to reach to a different conclusion. 53. To buttress this contention, decision in Mohd. Umar (supra) was also pressed in service. 54. We have given our anxious consideration to the contention and do not find ourselves in agreement with the aforesaid contention nor do we find any such absolute proposition laid in the above cases. 55. 53. To buttress this contention, decision in Mohd. Umar (supra) was also pressed in service. 54. We have given our anxious consideration to the contention and do not find ourselves in agreement with the aforesaid contention nor do we find any such absolute proposition laid in the above cases. 55. Undoubtedly, there ought to be and there is supremacy of judicial verdict over Domestic Tribunals and ordinarily it is not possible for Administrative Tribunal to reach a conclusion different from one reached in judicial proceedings by a Court. But there is no warrant that this principle has to be applied only with reference to end conclusion of acquittal in the case. What is emphasised that allegation in two proceedings must be on set of facts and same evidence to prove existence of said set of facts. 56. Before examining this aspect, we wish to clear one point. Conviction for an offence in a criminal case has different consequence from acquittal of charges in a criminal case. 57. In the service jurisprudence, conviction provides independent basis for imposing punishment of dismissal or removal than the charges of misconduct in respect of which one is prosecuted. A person who has been punsihed in departmental proceedings before conviction can be visited with punishment following conviction for an offence which has the ingredients of charges in domestic enquiry. In a case of departmental enquiry, proof of charges result in punishment. In case of conviction, punishment follows without holding any enquiry as envisaged in clause (a) to proviso to Article 311(2). This was clearly stated by Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Baiwant Singh, 2003 AIR SCW 1645 . 58. Contrary to this, acquittal of offence does not carry with it consequence of automatic disproving of charges of misconduct levelled against a delinquent officer and on proof of misconduct on the part of civil servant, punishment may follow. Acquittal itself cannot be basis of 45 exoneration. Basis of punishment or exoneration depends on proof of 'set of facts' that constitute the gravemen of charges. 59. The distinction will be clear if we examine the decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthyony's case (supra) in context of decision in State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 . Basis of punishment or exoneration depends on proof of 'set of facts' that constitute the gravemen of charges. 59. The distinction will be clear if we examine the decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthyony's case (supra) in context of decision in State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 . In M. Paul Anthyony's case allegations were that Superintendent of Police had raided residential premises of the appellant (M. Paul Anthony) and recovered a mining sponage gold ball weighing 4.5 grams and 1276 grams of gold bearing sand.' 60. On these allegations criminal proceedings were launched as well as departmental proceedings were also initiated treating recovery of gold s bearing sand in the raid as proof of misconduct. 61. Departmental enquiry was concluded earlier. Finding the charges of raid and recovery proved and officer was dismissed. Later on same set of evidence in criminal case the Court acquitted the accused holding that no raid took place and when no raid was there, there could be no recovery of o articles in said raid. The writ petition was allowed by the High Court finding that two set of findings were incompatible and after acquittal on same set of evidence the finding in departmental proceedings cannot be sustained. However, on Letters Patent Appeal, Division Bench upheld the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority on the ground that enquiry has been 15 conducted prior to conclusion of criminal case remain unaffected by result of criminal case. 62. Allowing the appeal, the Apex Court referred to very significant finding of the criminal case. The Court observed thus : "The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore. where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the 'raid and recovery' at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings, to stand " 63. In this situation, therefore. where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the 'raid and recovery' at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings, to stand " 63. Significantly, Court consciously did not invoke the principle of applying different standard of proof in the case of departmental enquiry and 30 criminal case because of emphatic finding that basic facts of raid and recovery were not held proved. That is to say, none of the set of facts was proved before the criminal Court. In fact, positive finding was that no raid was conducted and no recovery was made. Thus it was a case in which principle of supremacy of judicial finding over administrative adjudication fully operated and applied. It was not a case in which facts and circumstances probability, commission of offence were proved but ultimately benefit of doubt was granted to accused, as in the present case that notwithstanding preponderance of probability, the guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and the difference in conclusion rest only in degree of standard of 4'1 proof required. 64. The Court clearly and significantly held that had it been a case of benefit of doubt, it may have different consideration when it said. The Court observed thus : "35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case." 65. Similarly the decision in Sulekh Chand & Salek Chand v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., JT 1995(1) SC 23 proceeded on the basis that appellant was acquitted on merits of the charges under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Thereafter. he was overlooked for promotion I only on the ground that he was prosecuted for corruption charges. It was noticed that pursuant to acquittal, departmental proceedings were dropped. Thus there was no foundation for not giving effect to acquittal. Obviously, merely because an incumbent was prosecuted could not have resulted in 5 supersession, if he had been acquitted by the Court. It was noticed that pursuant to acquittal, departmental proceedings were dropped. Thus there was no foundation for not giving effect to acquittal. Obviously, merely because an incumbent was prosecuted could not have resulted in 5 supersession, if he had been acquitted by the Court. Without finding even guilty of corruption in any concluded proceedings, criminal Liar or departmental proceedings. it could not have an adverse effect on promotional opportunities of incumbent. Moreover, the Court emphasised that it was acquittal on merits. 66. Mohd. Umar v. The Rajasthan State Electricity Board & Anr., 1993(1) WLC (Raj.) 253 , was a case where the accused in criminal case has been acquitted on recording a categorical finding that prosecution has failed to prove the charge of theft against the petitioner. With this categorical finding in favour of the accused, this Court found that it is impossible to hold 15 in departmental proceedings the charge of theft proved on the principle of supremacy of judicial adjudication over domestic adjudication. However, the Court made clear distinction between an acquittal on merits and acquittal on technical grounds. 67. In context in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao's case (supra) where notwithstanding all attending circumstances stood proved, yet merely because of retracted statement of sole eye-witness, benefit of doubt in criminal case were to go in favour of accused, the finding arrived at by the disciplinary authority that the charge stood proved, was held to be not vitiated. Present case squarely falls within the ratio laid down in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 . 68. Moreover, as we have noticed above in totality of fact, all set of fact alleged in criminal case as well as disciplinary enquiry, stood proved in both proceedings. Criminal proceedings failed merely because of retracted statement of victim, notwithstanding all attending circumstances indicating towards guilt of accused solely on the basis of standard of proof required in criminal case for conviction. Criminal proceedings failed merely because of retracted statement of victim, notwithstanding all attending circumstances indicating towards guilt of accused solely on the basis of standard of proof required in criminal case for conviction. In such circumstances on proof of same set of facts as found to be proved in criminal case, involvement of delinquent is established with reasonable preponderance of probabilities, the finding of Disciplinary Authority cannot be brushed aside merely because of acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because of retracted statement of victim, who too did not deny the corroborative circumstances found at the time of arrive of police on the scene Finding delinquent in drunken state with victim and his father in the Churu Office at night in a drunken state, with victim's pant with broken hook and under garment with broken 'Nada' injuries on person of accused as well as victim and victim having been in unconscious state when police arrived and that delinquent and victim were found pants down are all sufficient indications of what has happened in the office at Churu. Applying test of preponderance of probability, the alleged misconduct on set of facts proved stood established. 69. Very significant finding which has been reached in departmental proceedings and which does not find place in the judgment of criminal trial is that at the time police reached the office of Sheep and Wool Department, Churu on the day of occurrence, it found both accused and victim naked below waist. This was founded on statement of PW 1 Dr. S.K. Dhawan and Shri Sajjan Singh, the then Sub-Inspector of/police who had conducted the initial investigations. Dr. S.K. Dhawan was not the witness who was before Court in criminal trial. This shows that in departmental proceedings, additional evidence was also led. In addition to that, the victim and his father who were prosecution witnesses in criminal trial and could not be disowned by prosecution were not the witness, at all. In fact, Man Mohan who too had indulged in drinks alongwith Nandlal with their officer, Dr. Abhay Ram were co-delinquents and their statements could not embellish the evidence led by the Department, as has happened in criminal trial to bring the case below the standard of proof required for conviction President is one such case in which the difference in standard of proof required in the two proceedings makes the 'o vital effete in result. 70. Abhay Ram were co-delinquents and their statements could not embellish the evidence led by the Department, as has happened in criminal trial to bring the case below the standard of proof required for conviction President is one such case in which the difference in standard of proof required in the two proceedings makes the 'o vital effete in result. 70. Even if actual art of sodomy is not proved, still sufficient to uphold the finding that petitioner was guilty of gross misconduct unbecoming of a civil servant and punishment awarded cannot be said to be disproportionate in any sense of term for misconduct proved. 71. In fact, even the second charge which has been found proved against the delinquent officer by the learned Single Judge too is grievous enough to sustain the punishment of dismissal. The learned Single Judge directed that competent authority to award appropriate punishment to be imposed on the petitioner on the remaining charge of misbehaviour of drinking in the office after office hours to create ugly scene in the office during night time. The learned Single Judge also found that there is evidence on record to show that the petitioner while staying night in the office in Churn was in drunken position alongwith other employees. 72. In our opinion, an officer of the standing of delinquent incumbent using the public office after office hours after having a drink party with other employees of the office and creating ugly scene itself was a conduct gravely unbecoming of an officer of the department to warrant his continuance as a civil servant. The gravity of his conduct cannot be compared with the indulgence of a peon subordinate to him in drinks with him at his stance. Dr.Abhay Ram as an officer had an additional reasonability to prevent misuse of office by his subordinate by making it a bar room and place of brawls. Instead of preventing it, he himself becoming party to bar and brawl, resulted in abdicating his duty to maintain the decorum and integrity of office. 73. It also cannot be lost sight of that he was posted at Rajgarh but he left his permanent office without permission, came to Churu and used public office after office hours fro indulging in booze. Not only, he took the drinks, he compelled his subordinate employees to take drinks with him. 73. It also cannot be lost sight of that he was posted at Rajgarh but he left his permanent office without permission, came to Churu and used public office after office hours fro indulging in booze. Not only, he took the drinks, he compelled his subordinate employees to take drinks with him. This conduct alone was highly unbecoming of an officer and amounted to grave misconduct. His involvement cannot be equated with involvement of his subordinates to warrant any parity. 74. In this connection, reference may be made to the Workmen of the Motor Industries Co. Ltd. v. The Management of Motor Industries Co. Ltd. Bangalore, 1969(2) SCC 13 . In the Workmen of the Motor Industries Co. Ltd. v. The Management of Motor Industries Co. Ltd. (supra) the auestion arose when for participating in illegal strikes and disorderly behaviour, three employees were dismissed and four others were not dealt with seriously by opining that they were misguided workmen but three employees were dismissed. Dealing differently with workmen and workmen indulging in illegal strike on the ground that the three punished workmen so who were in forefront to lead others to misconduct was not found discriminating by considering the conduct of three workmen was more grave than others. 75. Law is also trite that if punishment is found on more than one Ground and if one alone is proved, for which the same punishment can be imposed, the Court in judicial review will not interfere with it. 76. In State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779 , the case was concerned with a case where the High Court in a petition challenging the order of dismissal founded on multiple charges, opined that not all but only some of the charges stood substantiated directed the disciplinary authority to decide whether on the remaining charges punishment of dismissal could be sustained else lesser punishment would suffice. Reversing the decision of High Court, the Apex Court said thus : "It is not necessary for us to consider whether the High Court was right in holding that the finding of the Tribunal on charges 1(a) and 1(e) were vitiated for reasons set out by it, because in our judgment, the order of the High Court directing the Government to reconsider the question of punishment cannot, for reasons we will presently set 15 out be sustained. If the order of dismissal was based on the findings on charges 1(a) and 1(e) alone the Court would have jurisdiction to declare the order of dismissal illegal but first charge and the second charge was found not liable to be interfered with by the High Court and those findings established that the respondent was prima facie guilty of grave delinquency, in our view the High Court had not power to direct the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the order of dismissal." "If the High Court Is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were "unassailable", the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore, if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial mis-demenaour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdimeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice. The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in directing the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the question." 77. The principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, 1972(4) SCC 618 , the Supreme Court observed thus : "19. Now it is settled by the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra that if the order of a punishing authority can be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether the charge proved alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment. The Court is not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the misdemeanour established." 78. Again the Apex Court held in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanamthitta & Ors. v. A. Gopaian, 1998 SCC (L & S) 124 , finds that finding in first charge cannot be sustained because of acquittal of that charge. Since second charge stood proved, penalty of compulsory retirement s could still be sustained on that count. It said that having regard to the fact that he second charge related to misappropriation of funds for which the punishment of compulsory retirement could be imposed, the Tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction could not direct the appellate authority to review the penalty imposed on the respondent 79. Learned counsel for the delinquent officer also place reliance on a decision of this Court in Shiv Prasad Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 2002(3) RLR 421 . In this case, the question posed before us was not directly raised and decided. The facts of the case led the Court to conclude that enquiry was not concluded in accordance with principles of natural justice and fair opportunity was not given to the delinquent officer. This is apparent for following observations : "18. I am satisfied that conclusions of enquiry officer and disciplinary authority in the case on hand are based on the statements recorded behind the back of the petitioner and the same stand vitiated on the ground of denial of reasonable opportunity. When the petitioner stood discharged in a criminal case based on the same charges as were levelled against the petitioner in the departmental proceedings, it would be unjust unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex-parte departmental proceedings to stand." 80. Thus, the case is clearly distinguishable on facts. 81. When the petitioner stood discharged in a criminal case based on the same charges as were levelled against the petitioner in the departmental proceedings, it would be unjust unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex-parte departmental proceedings to stand." 80. Thus, the case is clearly distinguishable on facts. 81. The learned Single Judge has erred in not appreciating the distinction between responsibility of an officer which extends not only in the matter of ensuring the maintenance of integrity, devoting to duty and dignity of office, not only by himself but also extends to ensure maintenance of such devotion to duty and dignity of office at the hands of subordinate staff and the responsibility of subordinate staff or Class-IV servants of an office, which has resulted in undermining the gravity of misconduct, found to be proved by him also, Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules, 1971 may be referred to in this regard. 82. We are further of the opinion that learned Single judge erred in not treating the act of leaving Headquarters without permission subject of charge No. 1, as misconduct at all in the context of chain of events that has taken place and proved during disciplinary proceedings in this case. Leaving Headquarters without permission, when it is so required to be obtained, cannot be looked in isolation to ignore it as not an act of actionable insubordination in all circumstances, irrespective of surroundings. May be in isolation, mere leaving Headquarters without prior permission, for some justifiable reasons or in emergencies may not be looked upon as serious enough to entail disciplinary proceedings. But where Headquarter is left with intention to reach another office under it, for misusing it for a drink party with as subordinate staff of the said office, needs to be viewed as seriously and constituting part of the whole incident, which was grave misconduct. 83. To sum up in our opinion (1) The rule that if a person is acquitted of a criminal charge, he cannot be held guilty of same charge in departmental proceedings is not absolute in term. (2) There is a distinction between the case of honourable exoneration of the charge in criminal case and acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in a criminal case vis-a-vis holding of departmental enquiry in the 1 misconduct founded on same set of facts. (2) There is a distinction between the case of honourable exoneration of the charge in criminal case and acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in a criminal case vis-a-vis holding of departmental enquiry in the 1 misconduct founded on same set of facts. (3) This distinction is founded on the basis of difference in 'standard of proof requiring to prove a criminal charge beyond all reasonable doubt and proof of misconduct in departmental enquiry on preponderance of probabilities. (4) The impact on permissibility of disciplinary authority to reach a finding of guilt in a case where delinquent is acquitted of criminal charge on same set of facts by giving benefit of doubt will largely depend on facts and circumstances of case on findings actually reached by the Court on multiple facts from which end conclusion is to be drawn, as has been demonstrably established in State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. Shree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 . & Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanamthitta & Ors. v. A. Gopalan, (1998 SC (L&S) 124) and facts of present case. (5) There can be difference in punishment awarded to different person if the gravity of misconduct in the case of co-delinquent is different, as was found in the case of Workman v. Motor Industries Co. Ltd., 1969(2) SCC 13 . This difference in gravity may arise because of 20 different degree of responsibility which an incumbent has to shoulder. Creator the responsibility. greator the gravity. (6) Where a person is charged on number of count and if on judicial review, charge on same (some?) count alone is found sustained, on which punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority can be sustained, the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the punishment awarded by Domestic Tribunal and direct the Disciplinary Authority of re quantify the punishment. 84. As a result of aforesaid discussion, the appeal filed by the State, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 622/1997 is allowed, and appeal by the delinquent officer, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 896/97 is dismissed. The judgment under appeal is set aside. The writ petition filed by petitioner Dr. Abhay Ram is dismissed. The order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority is restored. 85. The writ petition shall pay the costs which is quantified at Rs. 5000/-. *******