JUDGMENT: The successful plaintiff before the trial Court, having failed to sustain the success before the First Appellate Court has come to this Court as appellant, for the restoration of the decree obtained by him in O.S.No.211 of 1989 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Thiruchengode. 2. The plaintiff/appellant moved the trial Court seeking a money decree on the basis of a promissory note dated 17.8.1986, for a sum of Rs.10,000, which contemplates interest also, contending that the same was executed by the defendant for consideration, despite issue of notice, the defendant, who is not entitled to the benefits of any debt relief Act, has failed to repay the same and therefore, a decree should be granted for the recovery of the amount. 3. The respondent/defendant questioning the genuineness of the suit promissory note and alleging that he had no direct money transaction with the plaintiff and in a way disputing the signature and thumb impression in the suit promissory note, disputed the liability; further contending that there was chit transaction between the parties and on one occasion, he became the prized subscriber, where he had affixed his thumb impression and signature in several blank promotes, to ensure prompt repayment of the instalment and if at all that should have been used, because of the fact this defendant intervened on behalf of his brother demandirig the plaintiff and Ramakrishnan to discharge the promissory note under which the plaintiff and one Ramakrishnan had borrowed the some amount from his brother. 4. The learned District Munsif, Thiruchengode, considering the rival contentions as well as the oral evidence of P.W.l and D.W.1 supported by respective exhibits, took the view that Ex.A-1 is the promissory note executed by the defendant, for the consideration of Rs.10,000, agreeing to pay the same with interest thereon, but failed to repay the same despite demand. By taking this view, the suit came to be decreed on 9.4.1991, under which the defendant was directed to pay the suit claim with subsequent interest and cost, which was challenged by the respondent/defendant before the Second Additional District Judge, Salem in A.S.No.139 of 1992. 5. By taking this view, the suit came to be decreed on 9.4.1991, under which the defendant was directed to pay the suit claim with subsequent interest and cost, which was challenged by the respondent/defendant before the Second Additional District Judge, Salem in A.S.No.139 of 1992. 5. The learned II Additional District Judge, considering the submissions made by either counsel as well as mainly relying upon Ex.B-4, came to the conclusion, that the suit promissory note was not supported by consideration, whereas it has come into existence, without consideration, during the chit transaction, in which the defendant had participated in the chit and became successful bidder. In this view, unable to agree with the case of the plaintiff, as well as the reasonings assigned by the trial Court, the First Appellate Court, upset the finding of the District Munsif, thereby allowing the appeal, dismissed the suit with cost, which is under challenge in this appeal. 6. While admitting the second appeal, this Court had formulated the following substantial question of law, for consideration: "Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in reversing the judgment of the trial Court, especially when the plea of the defendant in Court was contrary to the written statement and prima facie Ex.D-4 is of doubtful origin, and hence the approach of the appellate Court on this score had resulted in grave miscarriage of justice?" 7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr.V.Srikanth and the learned counsel for the respondent, Mr.S.P.Subramaniam. 8. Ex.A-1 is the promissory note dated 17.8.1986 said to have been executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff, for a sum of Rs.10,000, agreeing to repay the same with interest thereon, on demand. As evidenced by Ex.A-2, on 17.3.1989, the plaintiff demanded the amount due under Ex.A-1 through lawyer’s notice, which instead of realising the amount, elicited a reply dated 8.5.1989 (Ex.B-2). Thus, the plaintiff/appellant unable to realise the amount outside the Court, moved the forum, obtained a decree, which was upset by the First Appellate Court. 9. As evidenced by Ex.A-2, on 17.3.1989, the plaintiff demanded the amount due under Ex.A-1 through lawyer’s notice, which instead of realising the amount, elicited a reply dated 8.5.1989 (Ex.B-2). Thus, the plaintiff/appellant unable to realise the amount outside the Court, moved the forum, obtained a decree, which was upset by the First Appellate Court. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted, that in view of the specific admission made by the defendant regarding his signature and thumb impression in Ex.A-1, as well as by the oral evidence of P.W.1, the execution of the promissory note is proved beyond dispute and therefore, it should be presumed under the Negotiable Instruments Act that the same is supported by consideration, which was not properly considered by the First Appellate Court, which finding should be erased. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Ex.B-4 has nothing to do with the suit promissory note, even assuming that the document came into existence as recited therein. But unfortunately, on the surmises and conjectures, against the presumption, which protects Ex.A-1, the First Appellate Court reversed the well reasoned findings of the trial Court, committing error, not only on facts, but also on law. In this view of the matter, a submission was made to restore the decree granted by the District Munsif. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent/de- fendant countering the above arguments submitted, that the so called presumption attached to the negotiable instrument viz., in this case Ex.A-1 is not an absolute one, whereas it is a rebuttal and the same was substantially rebutted by proving Ex.B-4, as well as by producing other documents, showing the other attending circumstances, which were rightly and properly considered by the First Appellate Court, thereby upsetting the finding of the trial Court, which should receive the approval of this Court, not disapproval, so as to grant a decree, as claimed incorrectly. 11. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant and as rightly held by the trial Court also, it should be held, that the execution of Ex.A-1 was proved. It is also held by the First Appellate Court, that the defendant had admitted the signature and thumb impression found in Ex.A-1 as that of him. 11. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant and as rightly held by the trial Court also, it should be held, that the execution of Ex.A-1 was proved. It is also held by the First Appellate Court, that the defendant had admitted the signature and thumb impression found in Ex.A-1 as that of him. Therefore, Ex.A-1 comes within the meaning of a document, whose execution is well proved, thereby bringing the same within the meaning of a negotiable instrument, having the protection and presumption under-Sec.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as if the same is supported by consideration, as recited therein. This settled position of law is incorrectly followed by the learned trial Judge. True, this presumption is not an absolute one, whereas it is rebuttable. Mere creation of doubt or some surmises and conjectures alone may not be sufficient to dispel the presumption, contemplated under Sec.118 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. The evidence adduced for rebutting the above said presumption must be acceptable, having reference to the negotiable instrument in question, in this case viz., Ex.A-1. If some other documents are produced not connected with the suit promissory note, though they were between the same parties, that alone cannot create doubt or by creating a doubt, the presumption cannot be erased. In this case, as seen from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, he proceeded on the basis of the presumption as if Ex.B-4 alone is sufficient to dislodge the presumption, which I am unable to agree. In this context, we have to see the defence taken by the defendant. 12. In the written statement, in para.6 it is stated that the defendant was formally one among 10 members, for whom a chit was conducted, for a sum of Rs.10,000, and when he became the prized subscriber, while paying Rs.8,000 as prize amount, his thumb impression and signature were insisted and obtained in several blank pronotes, only to ensure prompt repayment of the instalments. Then it is stated, though he had suspected that one such blank pronote had been fabricated as suit promissory note, he has not conceded in para.7 that the signature and thumb impression in the suit promissory note are his own, whereas he denied. Then it is stated, though he had suspected that one such blank pronote had been fabricated as suit promissory note, he has not conceded in para.7 that the signature and thumb impression in the suit promissory note are his own, whereas he denied. Only during the explanation as observed by the Courts below, D.W.1 was compelled to admit the signature and thumb impression in Ex.A-11, thereby showing that he has not come to the Court with clean hands, though as defendant, he could take inconsistent defence also to some extent Even the averments in para.6 of the written statement would make it clear, assuming that Ex.A-1 is one of the promissory notes, where he signed, which according to him it was a blank one, it should be held as supported by consideration, since according to the defendant, he had subscribed his signature in the promissory note, for repayment of Rs.8,000 being the prize amount. This being the position, there is nothing wrong in concluding, apart from the case of the plaintiff, that the suit promissory note is supported by consideration. Then it is for the defendant to prove, that he had discharged the debt, for which we find nil evidence. The First Appellate Court not viewing the case from this angle, only elaborately discussing Ex.B-4, as if that had given a lever to rebut the presumption and shifting the burden of proof, rejected the case of the plaintiff, which is not in accordance with law. 13. The existence of Ex.B-4 was not stated in the written agreement. This signature of the plaintiff therein was disputed. Without giving an opportunity to the plaintiff, this document was produced, signatures was compared, though this Court is competent, but not taking into account, the contemporaneous documents, but taking into account the documents for different period, which may not be safe always, that too, considering the absence of plea in the written statement, as well as the inconsistent stand taken by the defendant/respondent. 14. Assuming that Ex.B-4 came into existence as recited therein, the suit promissory note cannot be the promissory note said to have been given by the defendant, subscribing his signature and thumb impression at the time of Ex.B-4. 14. Assuming that Ex.B-4 came into existence as recited therein, the suit promissory note cannot be the promissory note said to have been given by the defendant, subscribing his signature and thumb impression at the time of Ex.B-4. Because in the written statement, it is said at the time when the prize amount of Rs.8,000 was paid, thumb impression and signature were insisted and obtained in several blank promissory notes and one such pronote had been fabricated as suit promissory note. Ex.B-4 came into existence on 15.12.1983. The recital also says that the bond should be returned after five years i.e., probably in the year 1988. If the defendant had discharged the prize amount, which he claimed for which purpose he had subscribed his signature and thumb impression in a blank promissory note, then he ought to have taken steps for return of the promissory note. Therefore, the inaction on the part of the defendant, coupled with the non mentioning of the date of the execution of the promissory note, prompts me to think, that the case projected by P.W.1 based on Ex.A-1 must be true, since the same is also armed with presumption. In my considered opinion, neither Ex.B-4 nor any other documents relied on by the defendant, is sufficient to rebut the presumption. But unfortunately, the First Appellate Court considering some other extraneous circumstances, not connected with the suit transaction, landed in an erroneous conclusion, dislodging the well reasoned judgment of the trial Court and in this view, the interference of this Court is necessary. For the foregoing reasons, answering the question of law accordingly, I conclude the appeal deserves acceptance. The appeal is allowed setting aside the decree and judgment of the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.139 of 1992 dated 12.11.1992 restoring the judgment and decree of the trial Court in O.S.No.211 of 1989 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Thiruchengode with costs throughout.