Judgment :- The plaintiff is the appellant. 2. The plaintiff has filed the suit against the respondent/defendant for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from in any interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property contending, that he is taking water through underground pipelines for the past 60 years, which was recognised by the defendant in the year 1954, that the plaintiff has the right to irrigate his lands by taking water from Aliyar river, which he is doing from time immemorial and that the same cannot be defeated either by the Government or by any third party, which is now sought to be disturbed by the defendant. 3. The defendant, while opposing the claim had stated, that the act of the plaintiff in taking water through under ground pipeline and connecting the river and private well are illegal and unlawful, since he has not right to do that as per the agreement reached between the Government of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, the Government of Tamil Nadu has to maintain the supply of water, failing which they are liable for damages and that if the plaintiff is allowed to take water by illegal method, it may not be possible for the Government to safe guard the agreement and therefore, granting injunction against the defendant, who attempted to prevent the illegal act of the plaintiff, is not at all maintainable. 4. The learned District Munsif has come to the conclusion, while evaluating the materials placed before him, that the right to enjoy the water, abutting the plaintiff's property is a natural right and does not depend upon any grant and that the taking of the water by the plaintiff through underground pipeline was recognised even in the year 1954, which was subsequently protected by a G.O. in the year 1973. In this view, he decreed the suit as prayed for on 1.8.1989, which was challenged before the first appellate Court in A.S.No.62/91 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Udumalpet. 5. The learned Subordinate Judge, properly analysing the pleadings and applying the correct provisions of law as claimed by the respondent, setting aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court, dismissed the suit filed by the appellant, giving cause of action to prefer this second appeal. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. S. Kadarkarai and the learned Addl. Government Pleader, Mr. S. Senthilnathan. 7. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. S. Kadarkarai and the learned Addl. Government Pleader, Mr. S. Senthilnathan. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant attempted to set aside the decree and judgment of the first appellate Court on the sole ground viz., that the right of the plaintiff to take water through an underground pipeline was recognised, acknowledged, even in the year 1954, which was subsequently protected under the G.O. of the year 1973, which should follow, the right of the plaintiff to take the water from Aliyar river to the well, through the under ground pipeline, cannot be disturbed by the defendant and in order to protect the same, an injunction should be granted, restoring the judgment and decree of the trial Court. At any stretch of imagination, this cannot be labeled as a substantial question of law, much less question of law. The plaintiff, in order to succeed, must establish that he had the right to take river water through the underground pipeline and to discharge the same in the well and thereafter, to irrigate his lands with the help of an oil engine. As recorded by the first appellate Court, based on materials, except the oral assertion, there is no evidence to prove the long enjoyment of the alleged right for the past 60 years. 8. The document relied on to prove the above aspect viz., Ex.A1 does not indicate that the plaintiff was having underground pipeline in the year 1954. It is the communication addressed to the engineers concerned to ascertain, who are all the persons taking water from Aliyar river and this communication was not even addressed to the plaintiff. On the reverse side of Ex.A1, there is some Malayalam writing, for which translation was sought for from the Translation Section. They have informed that water flowing in the Aliyar river is being diverted, by cutting the river bed and by laying underground pipelines and by digging canals, letting water into the existing well and utilising the same for cultivation purpose, etc. From the translation also, it is not clear that the appellant/plaintiff was one of the beneficiaries, who had the benefit of underground pipelines from Aliyar river. From the translation also, it is not clear that the appellant/plaintiff was one of the beneficiaries, who had the benefit of underground pipelines from Aliyar river. Therefore, it is not possible to say that the authority, who had inspected the premises, had noted the existence of the underground pipeline of the plaintiff, so as to say that it should come within the protection extended, as per the alleged G.O. of the year 1973, which was not even produced before this Court for perusal. In this document, there is no indication of any kind that in the year 1954, the plaintiff had laid underground pipeline to take water. The plaintiff has not filed the report said to have been prepared, in pursuance of Ex.A1, so as to say that his pipeline was in existence prior to 1973, which was recognised in the year 1973, under the G.O. The alleged G.O. has not been brought to my notice to say that it protects the right of the plaintiff also. The fact D.W.1 has admitted that there is a G.O. which gives protection to the persons, who have laid pipeline before 1973 cannot be automatically extended to the plaintiff also, unless that G.O. is produced, thereby bringing the plaintiff within the meaning of the G.O. 9. The above aspects have not been properly analysed by the trial Court, whereas the first appellate Court correctly assessed the document, evidence and came to the conclusion that the individuals are not entitled to take water through underground pipelines, thereby affecting the agreement entered into between the two Governments. The payment of cess or the protection under the Tamil Nadu Irrigation Tanks (Improvement) Act, 1949 will not come to the aid of the plaintiff in this case, which is also not pleaded in the plaint. 10. The learned Government Advocate supporting the judgment of the first appellate Court contending, that the State Government alone is competent to regulate and distribute supply of water for irrigation to one and all whose lands form part of the ayacut, under an irrigational source, which cannot be whittled down or undermined by the civil Court, drew my attention to a case in State of Tamil Nadu rep. by the District Collector v. V.A. Abdul Rahim & another (1997-1-L.W.592), which was relied on by me in a case in C. Arulsamy and another v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by the District Collector v. V.A. Abdul Rahim & another (1997-1-L.W.592), which was relied on by me in a case in C. Arulsamy and another v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by the District Collector, Pudukottai District & others (2003 (3) L.W.855), while recognizing the right of the Government under the Act, where there is a prohibition to maintain a suit before the trial Court. Though the Act is in respect of tanks, the policy underlined and the ratio laid down by this Court in the former case are well applicable to the present case also. The ultimate party being the Government to regulate the water supply, the adjacent owners of Aliyar river cannot claim, as a matter of right, to tap water from the river through under ground pipeline, in order to drain the same in a private well, so as to store the water for irrigating their lands, as they like. If this kind of practice is allowed, even assuming that was in existence, then the Government may find it very difficult to regulate the water supply for the ayacutdars, who are also entitled to be provided with irrigation facilities. If all the adjacent owners of the rivers claim this kind of right, then the purpose of maintaining public irrigation system, would be deprived of. For that the court cannot be a party. Considering all these facts and circumstances of the case, the first appellate Court has rightly allowed the appeal, thereby upsetting the judgment of the learned District Munsif, in which I am unable to find any error either on law or on facts, warranting my interference. The appeal is dismissed as devoid of merit, but under the facts and circumstances of the case, no costs.