JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 9.8.1994 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Bikaner in State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Dr. Mahesh Chandra Dadhich Civil Regular Appeal No. 5/1994 , whereby appeal of the appellants was dismissed against the judgment and decree dated 18.12.1993 passed by Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Bikaner in Civil Suit No. 588/1986 whereby the suit of the plaintiff- respondent was decreed. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for declaration, in the lower court, that order of dismissal dated 6.8.1986 from service be declared as null and void and non-effective against the plaintiff and he be ordered to be reinstated with all consequential benefits. He also prayed that the defendants be directed to treat the plaintiff in continuation of service and to give all service benefits. 3. The plaintiff pleaded in his plaint that while he was working as lecturer in Anesthesia in S.P. Medical College, Bikaner and while working as such, he requested the Principal for working in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia vide his letter dated April 22, 1982. The plaintiff's name was also sent by Dy. Secretary, Planning Department, Jaipur to Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. It was also pleaded that in January, 1993, when he met the representatives of Saudi Arabia Government, he was told that he has been selected for the post of Specialist in Anesthesia and he was directed to join in Riyadh after completing all the formalities along with no objection certificate. The plaintiff could riot complete the formalities as he was unwell and on getting well, he contacted the foreign representatives, who directed him to depart for Riyadh on January 23, 1983, otherwise his selection may be cancelled. The plaintiff further submitted that under the aforesaid special circumstances, he could not obtain no objection certificate in advance and left for Riyadh. He further pleaded that his application was forwarded to Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Rajasthan, Jaipur and this fact itself shows that in case he was selected for foreign assignment, the State Government will relieve him and he will have lien in his service in Rajasthan. The plaintiff also pleaded that to avoid all complications, he vide letter dated April 22, 1982 and January 18, 1983 requested the Commissioner and Secretary, Medical, Public Health and Family Welfare Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur. However, the State Government did not take any decision. The plaintiff also pleaded that to avoid all complications, he vide letter dated April 22, 1982 and January 18, 1983 requested the Commissioner and Secretary, Medical, Public Health and Family Welfare Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur. However, the State Government did not take any decision. It was also pleaded that a memorandum of charge-sheet dated 10.1.1985 was issued. The plaintiff applied for certified copies of certain documents on March 1, 1935 but the requisite documents were not supplied. In the meantime, he was suspended vide order dated December 6, 1983. However, he was reinstated in March, 1985. The enquiry officer was appointed. He made a request tor adjournment before the enquiry officer on November 8, 1985. But, as he was unwell, he did not make any clarification before the enquiry officer. Thereafter, he came to know that he has been removed from his service vide impugned order dated 6.8.1986. He pleaded that order of removal from service and enquiry proceedings were illegal and ineffective. The entire record was in possession and power of the defendants which ought to be summoned. The plaintiff, in para No. 12 of the plaint, pleaded that he has been discriminated from other persons similarly situated and he quoted the examples of Dr. Mahesh Upadhyay, Dr. N.K. Jagtawat, Dr. I.D. Kachhava, Dr. S.D. Sharma, Dr. J.P. Gupta, Dr. H.R. Sharma, Dr. O.P. Garg and Dr. Dilip Shankhla. The plaintiff alleged that the above referred persons were similarly situated and the State Government issued no objection certificate to them either in advance before they proceeded for Arabia and in some of the cases no objection certificate was not given in advance and the same was issued subsequently. The persons similarly situated moved Saudi Arabia without obtaining no objection certificate, were not removed from service but the plaintiff was removed from service. The plaintiff, in alternative, submitted that even if he was guilty of the charge, then the punishment awarded is not proper. He also alleged that he was not afforded proper opportunity in departmental enquiry against him. 4. The defendants-appellants filed their written statement before the lower court wherein the contents of plaint as pleaded were denied and it was submitted that suit of the plaintiff be dismissed. So far as the contents of para No. 12 of the plaint are concerned, it was replied that the same are not tenable. 4. The defendants-appellants filed their written statement before the lower court wherein the contents of plaint as pleaded were denied and it was submitted that suit of the plaintiff be dismissed. So far as the contents of para No. 12 of the plaint are concerned, it was replied that the same are not tenable. The entire proceedings from the date of suspension till the completion of enquiry were in accordance with the provisions of law. So far as specific examples of similarly situated persons are concerned, some of them were permitted in accordance with rules while some of them were denied and it was averred that this is not a case of discrimination. 5. In para No. 16 of the written statement, an objection about the jurisdiction of the civil court was taken on the ground that the present suit relates to the service matter and in view of Section 10 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976, the plaintiff should have approached the Service Tribunal by way of an appeal, therefore, the learned court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. It was prayed that the suit of the plaintiff be dismissed. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned lower court framed five issues. The issue No. 4 was relating to jurisdiction of the court in view of the objection taken in para No. 16 of the written statement. It is relevant to mention that issue No. 4 being a legal question, relating to the jurisdiction of the court, therefore, the learned lower court heard the arguments on issue No. 4 first and vide its order dated 4 12.1989, decided the issue No. 4 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The learned lower court held that Section 2(f) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976 defines the service matters wherein seniority, promotion, confirmation and pay-fixation have been included. The present matter relates to removal from service and the same is no included within the definition of service matters as defined under Section 2(1 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 19"6, therefore, the objection taken by the defendants is not tenable and Consequently issue No. 4 relating to jurisdiction of the court was decided in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter, in support of the case, the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and submitted documentary evidence also. The defendants examined DW-1 Subhash Chandra. 7. After hearing the parties. the learned lower court, vide its judgment an decree dated 18.12.1993, decreed the suit of the plaintiff and it was declared that the order dated 6.8.1986 Ex.15 removing the plaintiff from service is illegal and non-effective. The defendants were directed to reinstant the plaintiff with all consequential benefits. However, the learned lower court gave liberty to the defendants to pass an appropriate order of the penalty as passed in other similarly situated matters. It was also directed that his case may also he considered in view of the judgment of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Malchand Punia v. State of Rajasthan , a certified copy of which was placed on record. It was also ordered that the period from date of absence till the date of reinstatement in the service, be treated as without pay leave or special leave. 8. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree, the defendants-appellants filed regular first appeal before District Judge, Bikaner, who vide its judgment and decree dated 9th August, 1994 dismissed the same with costs. The learned District Judge observed that the order of the learned lower court, is based on principles laid down by Rajasthan High Court in the case of Dr. Malchand Punia's case, therefore, no interference is called for in the judgment passed by the lower court. 9. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by lower court as well as first appellate court, the defendant-appellants filed the present second appeal before this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. This appeal came up for admission before this Court on 24.7.1996. This Court while admitting the appeal framed the following substantial question of law: "Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction and authority to sit over the judgment and arrive at his own conclusion as to the adequacy of the punishment imposed in the departmental enquiry?" 11. It is relevant to mention that no order was passed on stay application in view of the order passed in appeal for early hearing. It is relevant to mention that no order was passed on stay application in view of the order passed in appeal for early hearing. Although no stay order was passed by this Court staying the operation of the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below, however, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has admitted during the course of arguments that plaintiff-respondent has not joined or was not allowed to join in view of judgment and decree passed by learned courts below. Learned counsel for the respondent has also admitted that the plaintiff had attained the age of superannuation long back. 12. I have heard the arguments of both the learned counsel in this second appeal and examined the pleadings as well as evidence and also the judgments of both the courts below. 13. Mr. Soni, learned additional Govt. Advocate, on behalf of the appellants, submitted following submissions:- (i) That the first appellate court has neither discussed the facts nor appreciated the evidence on record. His submission is that it was a duty of the first appellate court to look into the facts and evidence and to appreciate the facts and law both. He further submits that the judgment of the first appellate court is not a speaking judgment and in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Madhukar v. Sangram, AIR 2001 SC 2171 , the same is liable to be set aside by this Court. (ii) That the civil or even this Court while invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction, has got no power to interfere in the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority. He has referred the judgments rendered in SBI v. Samarendra Kishore, (1994) 2 SCC 537 ; Babulal v. State, 1995(3) WLC (Raj.) 237 ; State of Punjab v. Bakshi Singh, AIR 1997 SC 2696 : High Court of Judicature of Bombay v. Shashi Kant, AIR 2000 SC 22 ; Union of India v. Narain Singh, AIR 2002 SC 2102 and Regional Manager and Disciplinary Authority v. S. Mohad. Gaffer, 2002 (Vol.2) Apex Court's Judgment, 305 . (iii) That the Dr. Subodh Kumar, Similarly situated person, filed a writ petition before this Court and the said writ petition was dismissed and in the said judgment, the earlier judgment given in the case of Malchand Punia was also considered. The judgment of Dr. Subodh Kumar is reported in 1994(2) WLC 402 . (iii) That the Dr. Subodh Kumar, Similarly situated person, filed a writ petition before this Court and the said writ petition was dismissed and in the said judgment, the earlier judgment given in the case of Malchand Punia was also considered. The judgment of Dr. Subodh Kumar is reported in 1994(2) WLC 402 . (iv) That the jurisdiction of the civil court to sit as a court of appeal is barred. He has referred the judgment given in the cases of Dhruv Green Field Limited v. Hukam Singh, 2002 (Vol. 2) Apex Court's judgment, 298 and Chandra Kant Tuka Ram v. Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad, 2002 (Vol.1) Apex Court's Judgments, 281 . (v) That the suit was barred by limitation as it was filed after expiry of three years from the cause of action. He submits that the cause of action accrued on the date of suspension. (vi) That the decree of the lower court is also liable to be set aside as the plaintiff did not challenge the procedure of the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings. 14. Mr. M. Mridul, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the judgment passed by the first appellate court is well reasoned and speaking one. The first appellate court has discussed the facts as well as law and the said judgment is based on the judgment of this Court given in the case of Mal Chand Punia v. State of Rajasthan , a certified copy of which was placed on record wherein the record of the similarly situated persons were called by the High Court and the same were examined and were referred in the judgment. The first appellate court had observed that the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower court is based on and covered by the judgment given by this Court in the case of Mal Chand Punia v. State of Rajasthan . 15. Mr. M. Mridul further submitted that the civil court was competent to entertain and decide the suit for declaration and the order of removal of the plaintiff has rightly been declared as null and void. He further contended that the plaintiff challenged the legality and validity of the order of removal itself and his suit was not confined to punishment passed in disciplinary proceedings only. He further contended that the plaintiff challenged the legality and validity of the order of removal itself and his suit was not confined to punishment passed in disciplinary proceedings only. So far as the interference by the civil court in the present is concerned, he has contended that the civil court has jurisdiction to see the legality of the order of removal from service. He has referred the judgments given in the cases viz. Chandra Kant Tuka Ram Nikam and ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad and another (2002) 2 SCC 542 ; Ram Sahan Rai v. Sachiv Samanaya Prabandhak and Anr AIR 2001 SC 1173 . Sirsi Municipality by its President, Sirsi v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis (1973) 1 SCC 409 ; and in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. AIR 1969 SC 78 . 16. Mr. Mridul has further contended that the judgment given by this Court in Mal Chand Punia's case is fully applicable and the learned lower court as well as the first appellate have rightly referred and applied the said judgment in the present case. Mr. Mridul further submitted that so far as other objections about the jurisdiction of the civil court is concerned, the defendants-appellants have not taken any such objection in their written statement, nor in their memo of appeal filed before the first appellate court. He contended that only objection about the jurisdiction, which was taken in the written statement was taken in para No. 16 about Section 10 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976. He contended that in view of Section 2(f) of the said Act, the order of removal from service could not have been challenged before the Service Appellate Tribunal as the same was not falling within the definition of "service matter" and as such the Service Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the order of removal. He further submitted that a specific issue No. 4 was framed by the lower court in this regard and even before recording the evidence, the said issue being legal one, was decided in favour of the plaintiff way back on 4.12.1989. He further submitted that a specific issue No. 4 was framed by the lower court in this regard and even before recording the evidence, the said issue being legal one, was decided in favour of the plaintiff way back on 4.12.1989. He further contended that this is a matter relating to the year 1986 and in case, the case is remitted back to the first appellate court on the ground that the judgment of the first appellate court is not a speaking one, then it will further delay the matter and the case of the plaintiff will further be prejudiced. He contended that although the judgment of the first appellate court is speaking one but still this Court feels that it is not so, then instead of remitting the case back, this Court can decide the appeal on merits after appreciating the evidence. He has read over the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 and also referred the documentary evidence including the order of removal of the plaintiff was not allowed to join service after the judgment passed by both the courts below and as per the judgment and decree dated 18.12.1993 passed by learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Bikaner, the period from the date of order of removal till the date of reinstatement will be treated as without pay leave or special leave. Mr. Mridul further submits that the plaintiff had already attained the age of superannuation, therefore, now he will be entitled only for pensionary benefits. 17. I have examined the respective contentions of both the parties and perused the pleadings and evidence of the case. 18. So far as first contention raised on behalf of the appellant about judgment of the first appellate court that the same is not speaking one, I find substance in the contention. The first appellate court has not discussed the facts and evidence of the present case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhukar v. Sangram as referred above held that the first appellate court should marshel and re-appreciate the entire aspect of the matter in minute detail. The court of first appeal being final court of fact should not merely reaffirm the judgment given by the trial court. Therefore, in view of the above position of law, the judgment of the first appellate court cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The court of first appeal being final court of fact should not merely reaffirm the judgment given by the trial court. Therefore, in view of the above position of law, the judgment of the first appellate court cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Now there are two options for me, either to decide the case here itself by appreciating the facts and law and/or by remitting the case back to the first appellate court to decide the appeal after re-appreciating the entire aspect of the matter. The impugned order of removal from service was passed in the year 1986 and a period of 18 years has already been elapsed. The case of the plaintiff will again he prejudiced in case the matter is remitted back to the first appellate court. Therefore. instead of remanding the case back, I prefer to decide the case finally. 19. The plaintiff in his statement has stated on oath that he was in service of State Government since 24th August, 1969. He was posted as Lecturer Anesthesia in April 1982 in S.P Medical College, Bikaner. He had submitted an application to the Principal, Medical College for going to Riyadh. The said application was forwarded to the State Government. The State Government forwarded the said application to the Government of India. The State Government did not give him any information about rejection of his application. He received one telegram in pursuance of the above application in December 1982, whereby he was called for interview at Delhi on 27th December, 1983, wherein he appeared and he was selected also. He was required to go on 23rd Janaury, 1983, otherwise his selection was liable to be cancelled. Therefore, he thought it proper that when the application was forwarded by the State Government, then it amounts to No objection by the State Government itself. He also produced the copies of the applications Ex.1 to Ex.6. The plaintiff also stated on oath that he received a notice Ex.16. He was suspended later on. He was reinstated during the pendency of the enquiry. He further stated that his order of removal from service is illegal and he has been discriminated from the similarly situated persons. He further stated that he has given the details of similarly situated persons in pare 12 of he plaint. He also stated that the case of Dr. G.K. Gupta is equivalent to his case. He further stated that his order of removal from service is illegal and he has been discriminated from the similarly situated persons. He further stated that he has given the details of similarly situated persons in pare 12 of he plaint. He also stated that the case of Dr. G.K. Gupta is equivalent to his case. He stated that Dr. J.P. Gupta was awarded a penalty of withholding of some grade increment and was not removed from service. He also stated that another doctor S.D. Sharma was granted No Objection Certificate subsequently and his case was regularised. He also stated that his case similar to that of Dr. 1.D. Kachhawaha, Dr. N.K. Jugtawat, Dr. Mahesh Upadhayay, Dr Dilip Shankhala and no one was removed from service. In cross-examination also, he has stated that he was discriminated with other similarly situated doctors. However, he admitted that he went Riyadh without obtaining "No Objection Certificate" from the State Government. 20. The defendants examined OW-1 Dr. Subhash Chandra. DW-1 has stated that he knows plaintiff Dr Mahesh Chandra. He and Dr. Mahesh Chandra worked together in Sardar Patel Medical College and P.B.N. Hospital. Dr Mahesh Chandra-plaintiff is not in service at present as he was removed from service in 1986. He stated that Dr. Mahesh Chandra was in Government service since January 1983 and thereafter he went Saudi Arab. He further stated that plaintiff Dr Mahesh Chandra Dhadhich went foreign without permission of the State Government. Dr. Dhadhich remained in foreign about 8 years. The plaintiff was served with a charge sheet, but no reply to the charge sheet was given. OW-1 Dr. Subhash Chandra has stated that the plaintiff Dr. Mahesh Chandra Dhadhich gave an application for P.L. Initially for 50 days and again for 63 days. Thereafter he gave an application for extension of leave. However, initially leave was granted for 120 days, but subsequently leave was not granted and application for extension of leave filed by the plaintiff was rejected. Thereafter, letters were given to him for joining duties, but he did not join the duty. In cross-examination, DW-1 stated that an application is to be filed through proper channel for going to abroad. The plaintiff had filed an application to Ministry of Home Affairs. Government of India through proper channel. He denied the fact that the plaintiff was called in Delhi for interview for going to Riyadh. In cross-examination, DW-1 stated that an application is to be filed through proper channel for going to abroad. The plaintiff had filed an application to Ministry of Home Affairs. Government of India through proper channel. He denied the fact that the plaintiff was called in Delhi for interview for going to Riyadh. He reiterated that plaintiff Dr. Dadhich went foreign without permission of the State Government. He was put a question in cross-examination about case of Dr. Mahesh Upadhayay, Dr. D. Kachhawaha, Dr. S.D. Sharma. He stated that he is not aware of the case of Dr. Mahesh Upadhayay as record is lying in Secretariat. He stated that Dr. D.D. Kachhawaha went foreign after obtaining No Objection Certificate. He also stated that Dr. S.C. Sharma was given No Objection Certificate for pass port and only thereafter he went abroad. He admitted that Dr. J.P. Gupta went foreign without No Objection Certificate. He denied the fact that as to on which year Dr. J.P Gupta went foreign. He denied the knowledge about the case of Dr. H.R. Sharma. 21. From the statement of PW-1 and DW-1, there is no dispute that plaintiff Dr. Mahesh Chandra went Riyadh without obtaining No Objection Certificate from the State Government. The plaintiff in his plaint also pleaded that he had no time to obtain No Objection Certificate as he had already been selected and he was required to go. otherwise his selection was liable to be cancelled. The application for extension of leave filed by plaintiff had already been rejected long back. Therefore, in these circumstances, the charge framed against him about wilful absent was fully proved in the present case. The learned lower court has wrongly decided first part of issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. The first appellate court has not discussed the evidence and pleadings of the case and only on the basis of the judgment of this Court in case of Dr. Malchand Punia's case, dismissed the appeal of the defendant-appellant. Therefore, I reverse the finding of the lower court in respect of first part of issue No. 1 which has been affirmed by Appellate Court and hold that the charge framed against the plaintiff-respondent was fully proved. Malchand Punia's case, dismissed the appeal of the defendant-appellant. Therefore, I reverse the finding of the lower court in respect of first part of issue No. 1 which has been affirmed by Appellate Court and hold that the charge framed against the plaintiff-respondent was fully proved. However, so far as second part of issue No. 1 about discrimination in respect of punishment in view of pare 12 of the pleadings is concerned, I find from the statement of PW-1 as well as DW-1 that the other similarly situated persons were not removed from service, but either their cases were regularised by issuing No Objection Certificate subsequently after returning from abroad or they were awarded lesser punishments like withholding of some grade increments. This Court in the case of Dr. Malchanu Punia v. State of Rajasthan called the record of various doctors and examined the same. This Court has given reference of those cases along with charges and punishments awarded in the said matters. The record of Dr.J.P. Gupta was also examined by this Court in the case of Dr Malchand Punia and a reference of it was given. This Court mentioned that there was a charge of wilful absent against Dr. J.P Gupta and the same was proved. but a punishment of withholding of two annual grade increments without cumulative effect was imposed vide order dated 26th June, 1986. The plaintiff Dr. Mahesh Chandra has stated on oath about the case of Dr. J.P. Gupta. Therefore, it appears that order of penalty of removal from service in the case of the plaintiff-respondent is inadequate. 22. Another contention raised on behalf of the appellant about jurisdiction of the civil court in interfering in the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority is concerned, I find that this is a clear case of arbitrariness and discrimination on the part of defendant. The action of defendant is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in this connection are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 23. Another contention raised on behalf of the appellant about judgment given in the case of Dr. Subodh Kumar by this Court, is concerned, the same is given in the facts and circumstances of that case. 23. Another contention raised on behalf of the appellant about judgment given in the case of Dr. Subodh Kumar by this Court, is concerned, the same is given in the facts and circumstances of that case. The next submission on behalf of the appellant about jurisdiction of the civil court to sit as a court of appeal is concerned. it is relevant to mention that in the written statement, the defendant-appellant did not raise any objection except an objection about maintainability of the suit in view of provisions of Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal), Act, 1976. The contention of the appellant is that the order of removal challenged in the present suit was appellable before Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act 1976, the said contention of the appellant cannot be accepted in view of Section 2(f) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act 1976 which defines the service matters. wherein order of removal is not included. Therefore, the said order of removal of service could not have been challenged before Service Appellate Tribunal by way of an appeal. Learned Counsel for the appellant has referred the judgments as mentioned above, which relates to industrial Disputes Act, wherein the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred, but no such judgment is cited wherein the jurisdiction of civil court is barred particularly when appeal could not have been filed before Service Tribunal in view of Section 2(f) of Act of 1976. Therefore, this contention on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted. The civil court was competent to entertain and decide the suit in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 24. The next contention raised on behalf of the appellant that suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation is also not tenable in view of the fact that in the present case, order of suspension was not challenged but the order of removal dated 6.8.1986 was challenged and the present suit was filed on 9.12.1986 which was well within the period of limitation. 25. In view of the above discussions, the question of law framed by this Court on 24.7.1996 is decided in favour of the plaintiff. 26. In view of my finding about issue No. 1 above in favour of the Defendant-appellant. I hold that charge against the plaintiff-respondent about wilful absent is proved. 25. In view of the above discussions, the question of law framed by this Court on 24.7.1996 is decided in favour of the plaintiff. 26. In view of my finding about issue No. 1 above in favour of the Defendant-appellant. I hold that charge against the plaintiff-respondent about wilful absent is proved. However, in view of my above discussion that plaintiff was proved that he has been discriminated from the persons similarly situated and it is a clear violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, I am satisfied that punishment of removal from service in the present matter is inadequate and too harsh. Now the question arises as to Whether I should modify the order of punishment by reducing its quantum, or should remit the case back to the disciplinary authority for awarding punishment in the present matter. 27. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others AIR 1996 Supreme Court Page 484 , the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 18 has held that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. In para 21 of the said judgment, it has further been held that power to do complete justice also inheres in every court. 28. In Regional Manager & Disciplinary Authority, State Bank of India & Anr. v. S. Mohammed Gaffar 2002(2) Apex Court Judgments Page 305 (SC) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that imposition of penalty is too harsh that it shock the conscience of the High Court then it can interfere in the order of punishment also. 29. The plaintiff has proved by evidence that in the matter of punishment, he has been discriminated from the persons similarly situated. In the earlier part of the judgment, I have already held that this is a clear case of discrimination and arbitrariness on the part of defendant and it is a clear case of violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The impugned order of removal from service was passed in the year 1986 and a period of about 18 years has elapsed. The impugned order of removal from service was passed in the year 1986 and a period of about 18 years has elapsed. The matter remained pending in three courts. The plaintiff has already attained the age of superannuation and he appears to be a senior citizen. Therefore, I do not think it fit and appropriate to remit the case back to the disciplinary authority for passing an appropriate penalty order against the delinquent. In these special circumstances and as an exceptional and rare case, while holding the plaintiff-respondent guilty of the charge, I modify the order of punishment awarded to the plaintiff-respondent. The order of removal from service of the plaintiff-respondent is modified and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, an order of compulsory retirement of the plaintiff-respondent with proportionate pension is passed, which will be paid from the date of superannuation. The plaintiff will not be entitled to any other benefit like arrear, allowance, increment or seniority etc. till the date of his retirement. 30. The appeal of the defendant-appellant is partly allowed. The impugned judgments and decree passed by both the courts below are set aside. The suit of the plaintiff-respondent is partly decreed to the extent that an order of removal from service will be converted into an order of compulsory retirement of the plaintiff-respondent with proportionate pension, which will be paid from the date of attaining the age of superannuation of the plaintiff. The plaintiff will not be entitled to any other benefit like arrears, allowances, increment or seniority etc. till the date of attaining the age of superannuation. There will be no order as to costs.Appeal Partly allowed. *******