Judgment :- This Appeal is directed against the Judgment of Acquittal (dated 22.07.1996) of the XVII Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai, acquitting the Respondents for the offence punishable under Sec.506(ii) I.P.C in C.C.No.7487 of 1987. 2. We may briefly refer to the facts, out of which the present Appeal has arisen:- Deceased / Accused – Rajasekaran and the Complainant – Krishnasamy are Brothers. A-1-Dharanibai Ammal is the Wife of Rajasekaran. A-2 and A-3 are the Daughter and Son of Rajasekaran. Accused Rajasekaran died even before framing of the Charge. 3. The Complainant and his Brother were pitted against each other on the enjoyment of the House Property in Door No.63, Burkit Road, T.Nagar, Chennai. The Complainant has filed the Complaint alleging that his Brother-Rajasekaran and his family members have forcibly and illegally occupied the house. Regarding the enjoyment of the house, there is persisting enmity between the parties. 4. This Complaint, filed under Sec.506(ii) I.P.C relates to the occurrence on 30.03.1987 – 09.00 a.m. According to the Complainant, his Brother-Rajasekaran is alleged to have called A-3 and threatened to finish the Complainant. A-3 is alleged to have stated Alleging that the above wordy abuses amount to criminal intimidation and threat, the Complainant has filed the Private Complaint under Sec.506(ii) I.P.C. 5. The Complaint was forwarded to the Police for Investigation. The Police has referred the Complaint as mistake of fact. On recording the Sworn Statement of the Complainant, the case was taken on file under Sec.506(ii) I.P.C. in C.C.No.7787 of 1987. In the Trial Court, the Complainant was examined as P.W.1. Exs.P.1 to P.89 were marked. In consideration of the evidence, learned Magistrate pointed out that except the evidence of the Complainant, no other evidence is adduced to strengthen the allegations in the Complaint. Learned Trial Magistrate has further pointed out that the contradictions on the alleged threat in the contents of the Complaint and the version of the Complainant and that the evidence of Complainant is unreliable. Learned Magistrate has found that only Exs.P.1 to P.3 are relevant for determining the issue, Exs.P.4 to P.89 are irrelevant. Pointing out the contradictions in the evidence of Complainant and the averments in the Complaint and other circumstances, learned Magistrate acquitted the Accused by giving them benefit of doubt. 6. Aggrieved over the Acquittal, the Complainant has preferred this Appeal. Learned Magistrate has found that only Exs.P.1 to P.3 are relevant for determining the issue, Exs.P.4 to P.89 are irrelevant. Pointing out the contradictions in the evidence of Complainant and the averments in the Complaint and other circumstances, learned Magistrate acquitted the Accused by giving them benefit of doubt. 6. Aggrieved over the Acquittal, the Complainant has preferred this Appeal. Learned counsel for the Appellant / Complainant has submitted that the Trial Court has erred in not properly appreciating the evidence of threat meted out to the Complainant. Though many grounds are urged in the Memorandum of Grounds of Appeal, learned counsel for the Appellant has confined his arguments to the limited extent of appreciation of the evidence regarding P.W.1 and Exs.P.1 to P.3. 7. Onbehalf of the Respondents / Accused, it is contended that in view of glaring inconsistency in the version of the Complainant and the allegations in the Complaint. Learned Trial Magistrate has rightly acquitted the Respondents. He has further submitted that mere words of threat would not attract the ingredients of Sec.506(ii) I.P.C and that the Judgment does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference. 8. In consideration of the submissions of both sides, Judgment of the Trial Court and other materials on record, the only Point that arises for consideration is : “Whether the ingredients of Sec.506(ii) I.P.C is proved and whether the Acquittal suffers from any substantial error warranting interference?” 9. For the limited purpose of determining the contentious point, suffice it to refer to Exs.P.1 to P.3. The voluminous documents Exs.P.4 to P.89 relate to the dispute between the parties on enjoyment of the house in D.No.63, Burkit Road, T.Nagar, Chennai. For better appreciation of the subsisting deep seated enmity between the parties, as an illustrative example, we may refer to the allegations of threat emanating from the Complainant as is seen from Ex.P.33: “...various criminal offences physically liquidate me and illegally take over my property with the connivance of his brothers-in-law....” Conspire to Kill him ..... October 1986 Assault on Appellant /..... July 1986 Complainant Assault on the Friends ..... April 1986 Assault on the Servant..... April 1986 Theft of Articles .....October 1986 Complainant has further expressed apprehension that his Brother-Rajasekaran has employed rowdy elements to watch his movement to cause criminal assault to him and seeking for suitable action on that ground. 10. October 1986 Assault on Appellant /..... July 1986 Complainant Assault on the Friends ..... April 1986 Assault on the Servant..... April 1986 Theft of Articles .....October 1986 Complainant has further expressed apprehension that his Brother-Rajasekaran has employed rowdy elements to watch his movement to cause criminal assault to him and seeking for suitable action on that ground. 10. In the above backdrop of the continuous and series of allegations levelled against the Respondents / Accused, this Appeal arising out of Acquittal is to be considered. In an Appeal against the Acquittal, the High Court would be slow to interfere unless reasonings are proved to be manifestly erroneous and suffers from serious infirmity. 11. It is to be seen whether the findings of the Trial Magistrate suffers from substantial error warranting interference. As noted earlier, only verbal abuses and threat is levelled against A-1 to A-3. A-3 is alleged to have attempted on the life of the Complainant. It is relevant to bear in mind that the Complaint filed by the Complainant was referred as mistake of fact. Excepting the evidence of Complainant, no other oral testimony is adduced to substantiate the allegations in the Complaint. The Complainant mainly relies upon Ex.P.1. Ex.P.1 is the letter from Rajasekar to A-2-Kannika Parameswari. In Ex.P.1, certain verbal words are made as noted below:- According to the Complainant, the word “Chitthappa” refers to him, and the Complainant seeks to draw the inference that the family of the Accused is bent upon finishing him. 12. Ex.P.1-Letter was written by Rajasekar to Kannika Parameswari. It is not known as to how the Complainant has got the copy of Ex.P.1. There is no specific mention of the name of the Complainant except generally saying “Chitthappa”. Any such utterances between the Accused Party cannot be said to have been addressed to the Complainant. 13. To attract Sec.506(ii) I.P.C., the essential ingredients of Criminal Intimidation as required under Sec.503 I.P.C is to be proved. Further, the Complainant is to prove that the threat was intended to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Further, the Complainant is to prove that the threat was intended to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Thus, mere apprehensions unaccompanied by an intention to cause an alarm would not be sufficient to attract Sec.506(ii) I.P.C. Sec.506(ii) I.P.C would be inapplicable unless the speech alleged would constitute Criminal Intimidation. 14. The allegations of threat made in the Complaint and the version of the Complainant that there had been wordy abuse to finish the Complainant is not sufficient to attract the ingredients of Sec.506(ii) I.P.C. The intention should be to cause alarm to the victim and whether he is alarmed or not is really of no consequence. But material has to be on record to show that intention was to cause alarm to that person. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring home the guilt of the Accused. Absolutely, there is no evidence that the Appellant intended to cause alarm that the Respondents / Accused have intended to cause alarm to the Complainant. 15. The allegations in the Complaint are unsupported by any other evidence. As rightly pointed out by the learned Trial Magistrate, the Complainant seems to be making improvements during the Chief-examination. In his his sworn statement, the Complainant has merely stated that A-3 as attempted to attack him. On the contrary, during his Chief-examination, the Complainant has stated that A-3 has attempted to throttle him and had actually beaten him. The version of the Complainant that A-3 had beaten him has not been stated either in the sworn statement or in the Complaint. The improvements on the overt act of A-3 assumes significance in view of subsisting enmity between the parties. The improvements and discrepancies in the version of the Complainant cannot lightly be brushed aside. 16. In proper appreciation of the contradictions and the discrepancies, learned Trial Magistrate rightly found that the essential ingredients of Sec.506(ii) I.P.C was not proved. The intentional insult and the attack is not proved by the Complainant beyond reasonable doubt. The findings and the reasonsings for Acquittal do not suffer from any erroneous approach. 16. In proper appreciation of the contradictions and the discrepancies, learned Trial Magistrate rightly found that the essential ingredients of Sec.506(ii) I.P.C was not proved. The intentional insult and the attack is not proved by the Complainant beyond reasonable doubt. The findings and the reasonsings for Acquittal do not suffer from any erroneous approach. No substantial ground is made out warranting interference in the Judgment of Acquittal by the Trial Court. This Appeal has no merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. For the reasons stated above, this Appeal is dismissed.