JUDGMENT Mrs. Poonam Srivastava, J.—Heard Sri Umesh Narain Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Hem Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. There are three connected writ petitions. Writ Petition No. 12713 of 1998 has been filed for quashing the order dated 14.3.1998 (received on 21.3.1998) issued by Member Secretary Cadre Authority, Co-operative Bank Centralized Services dismissing the petitioner from service as Senior Manager, District Co-operative Bank and to quash the entire disciplinary proceedings beginning from the order of suspension dated 2.1.1997 and also the charge-sheet dated 6.1.1997. The second relief claimed in the writ petition is for reinstatement of the petitioner as ‘Officer on Special Duty’ District Co-operative Bank, Agra, with full back wages with interest at bank rates and all other benefits. 3. In Writ Petition No. 2499 of 1995, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 8.9.1994, communicated by Member Secretary, Cadre Authority Co-operative Bank Centralized Service vide letter dated 10.10.1994, whereby the petitioner was absorbed in the Centralized Services and Writ Petition No. 1245 of 1995 has been preferred for quashing the order of transfer dated 1.11.1994 and the consequent relieving order dated 10.11.1994 (Annexures-12 and 13 to the said writ petition). All the three writ petitions are related to each other and are being decided by a common judgment. Counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged between the parties in all the three writ petitions. 4. The Co-operative Bank Centralized Services Rules, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules’) was framed in exercise of powers under Section 122 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. Initially only the post of Secretary of the Bank was included within the purview of the Rules but after an amendment in the Rules vide notification dated 12th September, 1983, four additional posts of Chief Accountant, Manager, Executive Officer and Development Officer were also included. 5. The facts giving rise to the present dispute are that the petitioner was appointed on 14.5.1963 as Office Assistant in Agra District Co-operative Bank (hereinafter referred as the ‘Bank’) and he was confirmed on the said post on 14.5.1964. On 16.10.1964, the petitioner was promoted as Executive Officer and was confirmed after completion of one-year probation on 16.10.1965. On 25.8.1966, the petitioner’s service was terminated by resolution of the Board of Directors of the Bank. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was allowed on 3.9.1966 by the Registrar. On 16.10.1964, the petitioner was promoted as Executive Officer and was confirmed after completion of one-year probation on 16.10.1965. On 25.8.1966, the petitioner’s service was terminated by resolution of the Board of Directors of the Bank. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was allowed on 3.9.1966 by the Registrar. Co-operative Societies U.P. Subsequently the order dated 3.9.1966 was recalled by the Successor Registrar on 17.10.1967, which was challenged in a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed in limine on 24.10.1967. The petitioner filed special leave petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was allowed on 23.8.1972 holding that the order dated 17.10.1967, withdrawing the earlier order is void and respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages and all the benefits accrued to him during the aforesaid period. In pursuance to the order dated 23.8.1972, the petitioner was allowed to join only on 10.10.1975, despite the fact he had submitted his joining report on 25.8.1972. However, the petitioner was given all his arrears of salary after he was permitted to join. 6. The service of the petitioner was once again terminated by the Administrator/District Magistrate on 10.10.1977 at the behest of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies without any enquiry. The petitioner once again challenged the order of termination dated 10.10.1977 in Writ Petition No. 1992 of 1977 which was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court on 2.9.1985. The Court directed the respondents to reinstate the petitioner. During the intervening period when the petitioner was out of job consequent to the order of termination dated 10.10.1977, the petitioner was transferred to District Co-operative Bank, Mainpuri, on 24.7.1984, the transfer order was cancelled by the Member Secretary vide order dated 5.11.1984. In fact the original order of the transfer was cancelled by subsequent order on 18.2.1985 (Annexure-II to the Writ Petition No. 12713 of 1998). 7. It has been pointed out by the petitioner, when the order of transfer was cancelled on 5.11.1984 (Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition No. 12713 of 1998), the Secretary/ General Manager, Agra District Co-opreative Bank Limited passed the following order : “Sri D.N. Parashar, who is not absorbed in the cadre of Kay Personnel, is hereby directed to work as Officer on Special Duty for review of verification of over-dues, Deposit Drive and prepare/suggest scheme for development of the Bank. Sd. S. P. Singh Rathore Secretary/General Manager Agra Distt. Sd. S. P. Singh Rathore Secretary/General Manager Agra Distt. Co-operative Bank Ltd., Agra.” This order is also a part of record and has been annexed as Annexure-2 to the said writ petition. It has further been averred in the writ petition that the petitioner after taking over charge as Officer on Special Duty, detected certain embezzlement and forgery and an officer was placed under suspension for a brief period. It has been alleged by the petitioner that senior officers of the Bank and department were annoyed and once again terminated the service of the petitioner on 14.7.1988, on the ground that he has not given any option for becoming a member of the centralized service as required under the Rules and the order of termination was passed under Rule 9 (ii) (a) of the Rules. This order was challenged in a Writ Petition No. 18975 of 1988 which was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 2.2.1993. The respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner within two weeks from the date of the order entitling him for all the consequential benefits and arrears to be paid along with interest at the rate of 12%. The Division Bench of this Court recorded a finding that Rule 9 (ii) postulates that the services of those employees could only be determined from the date of a notice in writing as contemplated under the said Rule, i.e., when the employee of the Bank gives an option of not becoming a member of the centralized service. It was further held that since the petitioner had not given any such option declining to become a member of the centralized service, his service could not be determined and there was no applicability of the provisions of Rule 9 (ii) (a) of the Rules. The respondents approached the Apex Court by filing a S.L.P. No. 3769 of 1993 which was also dismissed and the order in Writ Petition No. 18975 of 1988 by the Division Bench of this Court became final. The petitioner has contended that after dismissal of the S.L.P. he was permitted to join after great persuasion. In paragraph 20 of the writ petition, the petitioner alleges that he was not permitted to work on any of the posts under the centralized services. However, this has been denied in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit. The petitioner has contended that after dismissal of the S.L.P. he was permitted to join after great persuasion. In paragraph 20 of the writ petition, the petitioner alleges that he was not permitted to work on any of the posts under the centralized services. However, this has been denied in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit. The stand taken by the respondents is that the petitioner was permitted to work on the post of centralized services and was getting his salary of the pay scale of the post of Executive Officer/Senior Manager. It is averred that the post of Executive Officer, Senior Manager, Development Officer and Chief Accountant were included in the centralized services after amendment in the Rules. The petitioner was served with a letter dated 22.11.1993 by the respondent No. 2 asking him to give his option for becoming a member of the centralized service. Copy of the said letter dated 22.11.1993, has been annexed as Annexure-9 to the writ petition. The petitioner gave a reply on 6.12.1993, asking the respondent No. 2 to let him know the specific provision of law and rules under which the petitioner is required to submit his option. Finally on 10.10.1994 the respondent Bank passed an order absorbing the petitioner in the centralized service on the post of Senior Manager (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), which is the subject matter of Writ Petition No. 2499 of 1995. This Court declined to grant an interim order on the said writ petition but invited a counter-affidavit. This petition is before us. 8. The petitioner was transferred from District Co-operative Bank, Agra to District Co-operative Bank, Siddharthnagar, vide order dated 1.11.1994, which was served on the petitioner on 9.11.1994 (Annexure-11 to the writ petition). The petitioner was relieved on 10.11.1994 but the Chairman, District Co-operative Bank, Siddharthnagar, where the petitioner was transferred, expressed his inability and refused to permit the petitioner to join for the reason that there is no post of Senior Manager at Siddharthnagar. The order of transfer was once again challenged in Writ Petition No. 1245 of 1995 which is also being decided simultaneously. The impugned order of dismissal was passed for non-compliance of the order of transfer and petitioner was suspended on 2.1.1997, charge-sheet was served on 6.1.1997 and Sri L.M. Chaubey, General Manager (Administration) was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The order of transfer was once again challenged in Writ Petition No. 1245 of 1995 which is also being decided simultaneously. The impugned order of dismissal was passed for non-compliance of the order of transfer and petitioner was suspended on 2.1.1997, charge-sheet was served on 6.1.1997 and Sri L.M. Chaubey, General Manager (Administration) was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The only charge against the petitioner was of non-compliance of the transfer order. It is submitted in the writ petition that the petitioner had given his reply to the charge-sheet to the enquiry officer on 18.1.1997 but the enquiry was moving at snails speed and hence another Writ Petition No. 37977 of 1997 was filed. A Division Bench of this Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction that the enquiry shall be completed within a period of two months. It was further directed that the petitioner will appear on 21.11.1997 and submit a detailed reply, which he did. The reply has been annexed as Annexure-26 to the writ petition. It appears that no evidence was led as it has been stated in paragraph 49 of the writ petition. The representative of the department informed the inquiry officer that there was no necessity to give or adduce any evidence since the charge-sheet is on record before the enquiry officer along with the entire evidence. Thereafter the inquiry officer submitted this report on 17.2.1998 to the cadre authority. The Administrative Committee in its meeting dated 19.2.1998, proposed the punishment of dismissal. A show cause notice dated 20.2.1998, vide notice No. 3725 was given to the petitioner. The petitioner on receipt of the said show cause notice, requested for a copy of the enquiry report. It has been stated in paragraph 50 of the writ petition that since the petitioner did not opt to be absorbed in the centralized service and the absorption order is subjudice, the petitioner cannot be treated to be a member of the centralized service and as such the cadre authority is not the appointing authority. These facts have been denied in paragraph 28 of the counter-affidavit. It has been submitted on behalf of respondents that the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice on account of non-supply of the inquiry report and the order of dismissal was passed which is under challenge. These facts have been denied in paragraph 28 of the counter-affidavit. It has been submitted on behalf of respondents that the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice on account of non-supply of the inquiry report and the order of dismissal was passed which is under challenge. The petitioner had also requested for personal hearing but since his father expired on 24.2.1998 and the thirteenth day ceremony was to be performed on 9.3.1998, the petitioner could not present himself on the date fixed for personal hearing and the order of dismissal was passed. The order of dismissal has been challenged on a number of grounds. 9. Writ Petition No. 2499 of 1995, relating to the question of absorption of the petitioner in the centralized services is being taken up first. The order dated 8.9.1994 communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 10.10.1994 has been sought to be quashed. The controversy raised by the petitioner is that he was not working on any of the posts included in Rule 3 of the Rules. Initially when the rule was framed in the year 1976, the post of Secretary was only included in the centralized services but subsequently by Notification No. 3625/XII-C-1-83-7(27)-1978, dated 12th September, 1983, the post of Chief Accountant, Manager, Executive Officer and Development Officer of the Bank were also included within the purview of the Co-operative Bank’s centralized services. The petitioner’s contention is after the transfer order was cancelled on 5.11.1984, an order was passed on 18.12.1985 (Annexure-2) whereby the petitioner was directed to work as Officer on Special Duty for review, verification of over dues, deposit drive and prepare/suggest scheme for development of the bank. It is thus contended that the petitioner was working as Officer on Special Duty and his services were not included in the centralized services and he cannot be absorbed. The petitioner has also raised his grievance that no date has been mentioned in the impugned order as to from which date his service stands absorbed in the centralized service. The objection of the petitioner is that one Sri R.S. Agnihotri was provisionally absorbed on 12.9.1983 and finally on 22.12.1983, w.e.f. 12.9.1983 by means of a letter of the cadre authority whereas in the present case no such date is mentioned. The objection of the petitioner is that one Sri R.S. Agnihotri was provisionally absorbed on 12.9.1983 and finally on 22.12.1983, w.e.f. 12.9.1983 by means of a letter of the cadre authority whereas in the present case no such date is mentioned. The third objection raised by the petitioner is that there is no post of Senior Manager in the District Co-operative Bank and the nomenclature ‘Senior Manager’ used by the respondents in the impugned order is illegal, 10. We have given careful consideration to all the objection raised by the petitioner relating to the question of his absorption. We feel that the impugned order does not call for any interference on the grounds raised by the petitioner. It may be recalled that an order was passed terminating the service of the petitioner under Rule 9 (ii) (a) of the Rules for not giving his option after the centralized service rules came in existence. The order was challenged in Writ Petition No. 18975 of 1988 and the order has been annexed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition. The Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner stood promoted to the post of Executive Officer on 25.8.1966 and the post of Executive Officer was included in the U.P. Centralized Bank Services on 12.8.1993 and hence the petitioner was not required to give his option for becoming a member of such service. Rule 9 (ii) of the Rules was applicable to such employees who gave their option for not being included in the service and gave an intimation of their intention within 30 days of the commencement of the Rules. In that case alone the petitioner’s service could be determined from the date of such notice. This Court clearly ruled that where an employee has not opted or declined to join the centralized service, his service cannot be terminated under these rules and he continues in service. The petitioner had availed of the benefit, inasmuch as he availed the fruits of the Division Bench decision and was taken back in service by the Bank. He cannot say now that he is not a member of the centralized service as he did not give his option. The rules required an option from the employees only if they did not wish to join the centralized service. He cannot say now that he is not a member of the centralized service as he did not give his option. The rules required an option from the employees only if they did not wish to join the centralized service. In fact the impugned order is an order of final absorption in the centralized service and the petitioner cannot get any benefit of the order dated 18.2.1985, where he has been described as an ‘Officer on Special Duty’. Besides, in the counter-affidavit the respondents have taken the stand prior to 12th September, 1983, i.e., the date on which other posts were included by virtue of the amended Rules. All he employees who were working on the said post stood absorbed in the centralized service w.e.f. the date on which the amended Rules came in existence. The petitioner was working on the post of Executive Officer on the date of his termination. Hence after his reinstatement, he will be an Executive Officer of the Bank. The change in the nomenclature will not make any difference. The petitioner will be deemed to have joined the centralized service provisionally, as admittedly he had not given any option to the contrary, as required by Rule 9 (ii). We feel that the petitioner’s objections are ill-founded. The Rules require an option only in the event an employee does not wish to join, but since the Rules are silent regarding an option in the event one wants to be a part of the centralized service the only conclusion is that the officers working in the bank at the time when the Rules came into force and the posts were included, the officer concerned has accepted to be an employee of the services. So far as the inclusion of the post of ‘Senior Manager’ in Rule 3 of the Rules is concerned, the petitioner was working on the post of Executive Officer. Even otherwise, the post of Manager is included after the amendment in 1983 and there appears to be no difference in the two names ‘Manager’ or ‘Senior Manager’. We are hence of the opinion the petitioner cannot get any benefit if he has been addressed as ‘Senior Manager’. The service of the petitioner was governed by the U.P. Co-operative Service Regulation, 1975. We are hence of the opinion the petitioner cannot get any benefit if he has been addressed as ‘Senior Manager’. The service of the petitioner was governed by the U.P. Co-operative Service Regulation, 1975. Under Regulation 5 it is specifically provided that no appointment or promotion shall be made by any officer of the Bank or committee of management without prior approval of the U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board. The Secretary/General Manager of the Bank has no power to create the post of Officer on Special Duty or make appointment on the said post which was non-existent. It has specifically been denied that the Board of Directors of the District Co-operative Bank Limited, Agra, passed any such resolution or authorized the secretary to direct the petitioner to join as Officer on Special Duty by means of order dated 18.2.1985. The said order is void and it would be deemed that the petitioner was working on the post of Executive Officer as before 1985 on 12th September, 1983. In the circumstances, the objection regarding not mentioning the date on which the petitioner was provisionally absorbed in the service has no force and he will be deemed to be absorbed in the centralized services w.e.f. 12th September, 1983, on the date of inclusion of the post of Executive Officer in the centralized services. In the circumstances, the impugned order in Writ Petition No. 2499 of 1995 suffers from no illegality or error of law. The order of absorption is a valid order and therefore the petition stands dismissed. 11. Writ Petition No. 12713 of 1998 related to the dismissal of the petitioner on the charge of non-compliance of the transfer order, which is the subject matter of Writ Petition No. 1245 of 1995. Both the petitions are being taken up together. This order of termination against the petitioner appears to be the fourth order. On the three previous occasions the orders were set at naught either by this Court or by the Apex Court and the petitioner was given all consequential benefits and was reinstated. In addition to the legal grounds challenging the termination order raised in this petition, the order is also alleged to be mala fide. A perusal of the writ petition shows that no individual officer has been impleaded and no one has been made a party in individual capacity. In addition to the legal grounds challenging the termination order raised in this petition, the order is also alleged to be mala fide. A perusal of the writ petition shows that no individual officer has been impleaded and no one has been made a party in individual capacity. We find that the ground of mala fide is a general one without any specific allegations against any one and in the circumstances this cannot be taken into consideration for setting aside the order of dismissal. It is well-settled that the ground of bias should specifically be pleaded and substantiated. In absence of such a pleading against any particular person or persons, and without such person being made a party, the allegation of the mala fide cannot be looked into. Bare sweeping allegations are not sufficient. 12. The charge against the petitioner is violation of the transfer order transferring the petitioner from Agra to District Co-operative Bank, Siddharthnagar and that he had not joined at the place of his transfer. The petitioner has given detailed reasons in the writ petition for non-compliance of the transfer order after he was relieved within 24 hours on 10.11.1994, in pursuance to the order dated 1.11.1994. The Branch Manager at Siddharthnagar expressed his inability to permit him to join as there was no vacant post of Senior Manager in the Bank. It is also submitted that the salary of Senior Manager at Siddharthnagar which was a ‘C’ class Bank, was lower than that drawn by the petitioner at District Co-operative Bank, Agra. A letter was written by the Chairman District Co-operative Bank Limited, Siddharthnagar to the Member Secretary cadre authority that there are two posts of senior manager at Siddharthnagar occupied by Sri B.B. Pandey and Sri Jaswant Singh. The letter dated 19.11.1994, has been annexed as Annexure-13 to the writ petition. The petitioner being aggrieved by the transfer order, preferred a writ petition which is also being decided simultaneously. It is also contended that the cadre authority could not assume the powers of an appointing authority specially when the order of absorption dated 10.10.1994, without any option given by the petitioner was under challenge. Now since the order dated 10.10.1994, has been upheld, the challenge in the writ petition on this ground that the cadre authority had no jurisdiction to decide the matter is not tenable and the arguments are rejected. Now since the order dated 10.10.1994, has been upheld, the challenge in the writ petition on this ground that the cadre authority had no jurisdiction to decide the matter is not tenable and the arguments are rejected. It is also submitted that the cadre authority was not constituted in accordance with law. A perusal of Rule 4 (c) is quoted below : “In the event of any post of a member of the authority or of the Committee remaining unfilled for any reason it shall have no effect on the validity of any action of the authority, or the committee, as the case may be.” 13. In the circumstances, the ground regarding constitution of the cadre authority being not in accordance with law, has no force and hence the jurisdiction of the cadre authority cannot be challenged. It is wrong to say that the cadre authority has no jurisdiction to pass the order which is impugned. 14. The termination order dated 14.3.1998, has been challenged also on the ground that petitioner was not given a copy of the enquiry report along with the show cause notice. It has come on the record that the enquiry did not proceed and as such another Writ Petition No. 37977 of 1997 was preferred for quashing the suspension order. A Division Bench of this Court directed the petitioner to appear before the Enquiry Officer on 21.11.1997 and the Enquiry Officer was asked to decide the matter within a period of two months after affording an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the departmental witness and adduce evidence in his defence. The order has been annexed as Annexure-25 to the said writ petition. The Enquiry Officer asked the representative of the department (Cadre Authority) to lead evidence and inform the witnesses in pursuance to the direction of the High Court. However, the cadre authority by a letter No. 3152, dated 10.12.1997, declined to lead any evidence and informed the Enquiry Officer that it is not necessary to adduce any witnesses or to give any evidence as all the evidence has been annexed with the charge-sheet (vide paragraph 49 of Writ Petition No. 12713 of 1998). The Enquiry Officer submitted its report to the respondents. A show cause notice was issued without annexing copy of the enquiry report. The Enquiry Officer submitted its report to the respondents. A show cause notice was issued without annexing copy of the enquiry report. The enquiry was completed and the report was submitted to the Administrative Committee which considered it in its meeting dated 19.2.1998. The report of the Enquiry Officer proposed to dismiss the services of the petitioner and a show cause notice No. 3725 was issued affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner on 9.3.1998. The petitioner has submitted that since there was no copy of enquiry report, he had no knowledge of its contents and in the circumstances he was unable to give reply to the show cause notice. The impugned order of termination has been challenged on the ground of violation of natural justice. The respondents have strongly denied the allegation in the counter-affidavit and it is contended that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on account of non-supply of copy of the enquiry report. It has been submitted in paragraph 28 of the counter-affidavit that the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice due to non-supply of the enquiry report. The entire record was before the Enquiry Officer during the course of enquiry and the only charge was of disobedience of the transfer order and various subsequent orders directing the petitioner to join at the place of his transfer which were blantatly disobeyed by the petitioner. The petitioner had taken the stand before the enquiry officer as well as the Bank authorities that the transfer order was not passed by the competent authority and he was not a member of the centralized service of the Bank. The petitioner continued to harp on his old tune that the orders of absorption, transfer and suspension have been challenged in the High Court and are subjudice and the transfer order is a nullity and has no effect. It has specifically been stated in the counter-affidavit that the enquiry officer afforded full opportunity to the petitioner and after considering his reply to the charge-sheet, the enquiry report was forwarded. It was the petitioner who had sought a direction from this Court for completing the disciplinary proceedings within two months which was to expire on 16.3.1998 and the enquiry was completed within the prescribed period in compliance of the direction of this Court. It was the petitioner who had sought a direction from this Court for completing the disciplinary proceedings within two months which was to expire on 16.3.1998 and the enquiry was completed within the prescribed period in compliance of the direction of this Court. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the denial of giving a copy of the enquiry report has not caused any prejudice to the petitioner. The various letters annexed with the counter-affidavit dated 23.3.1995 CA-2, 29.5.1995 CA-3, 27.10.1995, CA-4 and 30.9.1995 CA-5 are all letters sent by the Bank to the petitioner directing him to join at the place of his transfer, i.e., Co-operative Bank, Siddharthnagar. In fact the last two letters dated 27.10.1995 and 29.5.1995 are by way of warning to the petitioner informing him that in the event he fails to join at Siddharthnagar, departmental proceedings will be taken against him. The petitioner cannot say that he had no information or intimation that the post of Secretary/Managing Director was vacant at Siddharthnagar. The petitioner was asked to join till an alternative arrangement is made in future. In reply to the letters written by the Bank annexed with the counter-affidavit, the petitioner gave reply on 15.6.1995 and 2.11.1995, that he has filed writ petitions challenging the order of the cadre authority finally absorbing him in the centralized service and transfer order in the Hon’ble High Court and the Bank has also filed their counter-affidavit and as such the transfer order has become ineffective. The two letters of the petitioner have also been annexed as Annexures-6 and 7 to the counter-affidavit. A perusal of the two letters shows the determination of the petitioner to disobey the transfer order despite repeated reminders. He continuously failed to join even after a lapse of one year merely on the pretext that he had filed a writ petition against the transfer order. 15. It is well-settled that mere filing of a writ petition does not amount to a stay order. Since the petitioner did not obtain a stay order in the aforesaid writ petition he was bound to comply with the transfer order, which he did not do. 16. Looking to the facts given in the counter-affidavit, we feel that the petitioner has behaved in a defiant manner and wilfully shown complete disregard to the various letters, directions and the orders of the cadre authority. 16. Looking to the facts given in the counter-affidavit, we feel that the petitioner has behaved in a defiant manner and wilfully shown complete disregard to the various letters, directions and the orders of the cadre authority. A perusal of the enquiry report annexed as Annexure-CA-8 is quite eloquent of the insubordination of the petitioner. He refused to adduce any evidence in his defence and continuously took the stand that since the order of absorption and transfer have been challenged in a writ petition, there is no occasion to participate in the enquiry proceeding. The unjustified stand taken by the petitioner all along and disobedience of the various transfer orders is nothing short of a grave act of delinquency. The Apex Court has held in a number of decisions that the transfer of an employee of a public undertaking is an incident of service. He has no choice in the matter and transfer from one place to other is necessary in the public interest and efficiency in the administration. The transfer orders must be complied with and in case of difficulty, it is open to him to make a representation to the competent authority for modification, cancellation or alteration of the order. In the instant case, the petitioner has done nothing of this kind, on the contrary he has continuously challenged the authority. In Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atma Ram, 1989 (2) SCC 602 , the Supreme Court has ruled as under : “Since the respondent had not obtained any sanctioned leave for his absence, his absence from duty was unauthorized. No Government servant or employee of any public undertaking has a right to be absent from duty without sanction of leave, merely on account of pendency of representation against the order of transfer. Since the respondent continued to be absent from duty the Superintending Engineer by a registered post acknowledgment due letter dated April 24, 1974, informed the respondent that his request to postpone his transfer was rejected and he was directed to join his duty at Ukai and on his failure to do so disciplinary action would be taken against him. The Establishment Officer (P) of the Board, also informed the respondent by his letter dated May 6, 1974, that his representation against the order of transfer was not accepted and he was directed to obey the order of transfer. The Establishment Officer (P) of the Board, also informed the respondent by his letter dated May 6, 1974, that his representation against the order of transfer was not accepted and he was directed to obey the order of transfer. A copy of the letter was filed by the petitioner himself as Annexure-K to the writ petition in the High Court. But even thereafter, the respondent did not join his duties. Ultimately, the Chief Engineer of the Board took action against the respondent and discharged him from service with effect from March 31, 1974, by his letter dated May 27, 1974. The sequence of events and the correspondence which ensued between the officers of the Board and the respondent clearly show that the respondent disobeyed the order of transfer and he remained absent from duty in an unauthorized manner without obtaining sanction of leave. The aforesaid documents leave no room for any doubt that the respondent was reminded of his failure to join his duties at Ukai and he was further reminded that his unauthorized absence had exposed him to disciplinary action.” 17. In the present case also the various letters annexed with the counter-affidavit show that the respondents repeatedly informed him about his transfer but the petitioner stubbornly took the stand that a writ petition has been filed challenging the authority as well as the order of transfer which is subjudice before this Court and respondents have also filed their counter-affidavit and hence the transfer order has become a nullity. This is the only stand taken by the petitioner before the enquiry officer as well. Admittedly there was no stay order in both the writ petitions where he had challenged his absorption and the order of transfer. In absence of any stay order, the petitioner had no other alternative but to carry out the transfer order and there was no justification to avoid or evade the transfer order merely on the ground of pendency of the writ petition. Since the petitioner preferred not to comply with the transfer order, he deliberately, consciously and knowingly exposed himself to disciplinary action under the relevant rules. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the termination order was illegal as no enquiry was held. In our opinion sufficient opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. Since the petitioner preferred not to comply with the transfer order, he deliberately, consciously and knowingly exposed himself to disciplinary action under the relevant rules. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the termination order was illegal as no enquiry was held. In our opinion sufficient opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. Rules of natural justice are not a straitjacket formula vide Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Suvarna Board Mills, JT 1994 (5) SC 280 ; AIR 1985 SC 1416 , etc. In exceptional cases the principles of natural justice can be modified, or even excluded altogether, vide Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 (Para 101). In Satyendra Singh v. Director of Education, 2002 (3) AWC 1981 : 2002 (3) UPLBEC 2434 , it was held that personal hearing is not always necessary. In the present case personal hearing was in fact given to the petitioner on 9.3.1998 but he did not avail of it. We find no violation of natural justice in this case. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically argued that non-supply of the enquiry report has resulted in violation of principles of natural justice and the petitioner was not able to give any adequate reply to the show cause notice. We have considered this aspect carefully and gone through the record of the writ petition. We feel that the non-supply of the enquiry report would have made to difference whatsoever in this case. All the evidence on behalf of the petitioner or respondents were the letters which were already annexed with the charge-sheet and the petitioner had also replied to the said letter. He had full knowledge about the nature of the evidence before the enquiry officer. Admittedly he did not adduce any evidence in rebuttal. As such the stand of the department that non-supply of the enquiry report to the petitioner has not caused any prejudice whatsoever appears to be justified. The counsel of either parties have placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Managing Director E.C.I.L. v. B. Karuna Kar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 . As such the stand of the department that non-supply of the enquiry report to the petitioner has not caused any prejudice whatsoever appears to be justified. The counsel of either parties have placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Managing Director E.C.I.L. v. B. Karuna Kar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 . The Apex Court has ruled that no doubt refusal to furnish the copy of report of the enquiry officer to the delinquent employee amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity but in case the aggrieved employee, if he has not already secured copy of the enquiry report before coming to the Court or Tribunal as the case may be, he has to show how his case was prejudiced because of non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court comes to the conclusion that non-supply of the report made no difference to the ultimate findings and punishment given, the Court should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramjan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 , had held that the delinquent employee is entitled to get a report of the enquiry officer so as to enable him to make representation to the disciplinary authority. This decision has been modified in the case of Managing Director, E.C.I.L. (supra), where the Constitution Bench had expressed its view that non-supply of the enquiry report will not be fatal in each and every case. The Apex Court had held as under : “Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer’s report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunal should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished the Courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished the Courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishing, (and nor any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would he neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of the punishment.” 20. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the petitioner was holding a transferable post and under the conditions of service he was liable to be transferred. The petitioner was accordingly transferred to Siddharthnagar which he failed to comply for almost one year on the pretext that he had filed writ petitions in this Court. No interim order staying the order impugned in the writ petitions was operating and as such the petitioner had no other alternative but to abide by the order of transfer. Repeated reminders and warnings appear to have gone unheeded and failure to join his duty in spite of reminders and letters issued to him are sufficient and valid grounds for taking action against the petitioner. He acted in an irresponsible manner which led to his discharge from service. We feel that the impugned order in the writ petition calls for no interference whatsoever in discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226. The non-supply of the inquiry report has caused no prejudice to the petitioner. The copy of the enquiry report has been annexed with the counter-affidavit and the petitioner has not been able to give any reply in his rejoinder-affidavit as to what prejudice was caused on account of non-supply of the enquiry report which he has seen during the course of the proceedings. It appears to us it would have caused no serious prejudice to the petitioner and for these reasons we feel that the impugned order does not call for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly Writ Petition No. 12713 of 1998 is dismissed. It appears to us it would have caused no serious prejudice to the petitioner and for these reasons we feel that the impugned order does not call for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly Writ Petition No. 12713 of 1998 is dismissed. The Writ Petition No. 1245 of 1995 challenging the order of transfer has no merit for the reasons already discussed in the earlier part of the judgment and it also does not call for any interference and it is accordingly dismissed.