Judgment :- By consent, the main writ petition itself is taken up for disposal. 2. The writ petitioner was working as a Sweeper-cum-Water Carrier in the second respondent's office from 2.1.1986 on a monthly salary of Rs.150/-. He continued to work as such till 15.3.1989. He made a request to the second respondent to regularize his services. The second respondent asked him to submit an application with medical certificate. But, even after that, his services were not regularized. On the contrary, petitioner was orally informed that he was not required to work on and from 15.3.1989. No records were given and no notice was issued to him. So, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute praying for his reinstatement. The Industrial Tribunal dismissed his claim and therefore, this writ petition has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the mere fact that the petitioner was a part-time worker will not deprive him of his rights under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the definition of workman in the Act also includes a part-time workman. The fact that the petitioner has worked from 1986 to 1989 has not been denied by the second respondent; they only say that he has worked on an ad hoc basis. According to the learned counsel, even the evidence would show that the petitioner had been working as a Sweeper-cum-Water Carrier and therefore, he was entitled to all the protection under the I.D. Act. Learned counsel relied on the following decisions in support of his case:- 1973 (II) L.L.J. 495 [Silver Jubilee Tailoring House vs. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments] 1991 (II) L.L.N. 737 [K. Duraisamy vs. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board] 1996 (II) L.L.N. 1261 [Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation vs. Faily Ram] 4. Learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the petitioner worked for only one or two hours in a day and therefore, he was free to seek his employment elsewhere during the rest of the working hours; such a person cannot claim regularization since regularization of service is governed by rules and regulations. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioner was only an ad hoc worker and therefore, he cannot claim any of the benefits of the I.D. Act. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioner was only an ad hoc worker and therefore, he cannot claim any of the benefits of the I.D. Act. According to him, the petitioner was not entitled to any notice and therefore, the Industrial Tribunal had rightly dismissed his claim and this award needs no interference. Learned counsel relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions: 1991 (I) L.L.J. 501 [Yashwant Singh Yadav vs. State of Rajasthan] A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 1713 [Chanchal Goyal vs. State of Rajasthan] 5. Before the Conciliation Officer, the second respondent had stated that the petitioner was engaged in their Divisional Office as a part-time Sweeper-cum-Water Carrier on contract basis. But, there is no evidence to show that the petitioner was engaged as a contract labourer. In the counter affidavit, the second respondent had stated that the petitioner was employed as Sweeper-cum-Water Carrier on ad hoc basis only and that he had worked intermittently. The tenor of the counter clearly indicates that what the second respondent was objecting to is the claim of the petitioner to a permanent post. 6. In the oral evidence, the petitioner has stated that he joined work on 2.1.1986 and he worked as Water Boy-cum-Sweeper and that he would stay in the office till 5 o' clock in the evenings. According to him, his work involved serving tea to all the employees in the second respondent company and placing the ledgers on the respective tables, etc. In the counter, the second respondent has not challenged the petitioner's claim that he worked from morning till evening and the only question that is put to him is that he has not stated so in the claim petition. The petitioner had replied as follows: The petitioner's evidence that he had worked from 2.1.1986 till 15.3.1989 has also not been challenged in cross-examination. The petitioner has denied the suggestion that he worked only for two hours in the office everyday. 7. The Assistant Manager-Personnel of the second respondent has given evidence as M.W.1. In his chief examination, he has stated that the petitioner would work for about 1 hour everyday. He has also agreed that his job involved taking out the files etc. The questions asked in chief examination are only with regard to the petitioner's claim for permanency. 7. The Assistant Manager-Personnel of the second respondent has given evidence as M.W.1. In his chief examination, he has stated that the petitioner would work for about 1 hour everyday. He has also agreed that his job involved taking out the files etc. The questions asked in chief examination are only with regard to the petitioner's claim for permanency. There is nothing in the chief examination to indicate that the petitioner has not worked from 2.1.1986 to 15.3.1989. A vague answer is given in cross-examination that though the petitioner has worked from 2.1.1986, it was not continuous; no details are given. M.W.1 has admitted that he has not produced any records to show that the petitioner was only an ad hoc employee. 8. The Industrial Tribunal also seems to have focused its attention on whether a person such as the petitioner should be regularized in service. Whereas, the prayer of the petitioner in the claim petition is only for reinstatement with back wages. This is seen from the following paragraph of the award: "Whether such a person should be regularized in service is a point to be decided in this case. Under normal course, an employee of a quasi Government Organisation like the Insurance Company could be recruited only through some procedure and rules. The petitioner cannot be appointed by passing the rules and procedure." When petitioner has not claimed regularization in the claim petition, that question is not one to be considered at all. 9. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the second respondent in A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 1713 also dealt with a claim for regularization, with which we are not concerned. As regards the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in 1973 (II) L.L.J. 495 , the Supreme Court has held that the fact that a worker is not obliged to work for a whole day is not material while considering his case. That was a case arising under the Shops and Establishments Act. As regards the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in 1973 (II) L.L.J. 495 , the Supreme Court has held that the fact that a worker is not obliged to work for a whole day is not material while considering his case. That was a case arising under the Shops and Establishments Act. The Supreme Court observed, "There is, of course, no reason why a person, who is employed only part-time, should not be a servant and it is doubtful whether regular part-time service can be considered even prima facie to suggest anything other than a contract of service" and "Therefore, even if he accepts some work from other establishments or does not work whole time in a particular establishment, that would not in any way derogate from his being employed in the shop where he is principally employed". 10. In these circumstances, the prayer in the writ petition must be granted. But, since even according to the petitioner, his services have not been regularized and he has been employed as a part-time employee, the question of continuity of service may not arise and he is entitled to be reinstated with back wages. If the petitioner makes an application for regularization, that shall be considered by the second respondent in accordance with its rules and regulations. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.