ORDER 1. Delay condoned. 2. Applications for substitution are allowed. 3. Heard counsel for the parties. 4. The appellants before us filed the suit for eviction against the original defendant who was respondent herein, and after whose death his legal representatives have been brought on record. The premises in question are a tenement measuring 250 sq feet in the city of Ratnagiri which was let out long ago on a monthly rental of Rs 40. The eviction was sought on the ground of bona fide need as well as on the ground of default in payment of rent. Appellant 1 herein who had filed the application for eviction and was Plaintiff 1 sought the eviction from the premises in question for bona fide need since it was required for the use of Appellant 3 who is her son, and since she was staying in only one room with her son. Therefore, the premises in question were required by her. 5. The trial court decreed the eviction petition on both grounds. The appellate court confirmed the decree only on the ground of default in payment of rent, and negatived the plea based on bona fide personal need. The appellants and the respondents both approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and challenged the order of the appellate court. The High Court ultimately reversed the order of eviction passed by the appellate court on a finding that there was a partition in the family of the plaintiffs and therefore, the notice issued after the partition on 1-10-1991 demanding rent and seeking vacation of the premises by the defendant on that ground was incompetent. The revision preferred by the landlord was dismissed. 6. Having gone through the judgment of the High Court, we find that there is no clear finding on the question of default in payment of rent. It can safely be stated that the finding regarding default in payment of rent has not been set aside by the High Court but the eviction petition was dismissed on the ground that the notice demanding arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy was incompetent. 7. We have perused the definition of landlord in sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The definition of a landlord is as follows: "5. 7. We have perused the definition of landlord in sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The definition of a landlord is as follows: "5. (3) landlord means any person who is for the time being receiving, or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant, and includes any person not being a tenant who from time to time derives title under a landlord and further includes in respect of his subtenant, a tenant who has sub-let any premises; and also includes in respect of a licensee deemed to be a tenant by Section IS-A, the licensor who has given such licence, and in respect of the State Government, or as the case may be, the government allottee referred to in sub-clause (b) of clause (I-A) deemed to be a tenant by Section 15-B, the person who was entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant immediately before the coming into force of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control, Bombay Land Requisition and Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1996;" 8. It was not disputed before us that the premises in question have fallen to the share of Plaintiff 3 in the partition amongst the members of the family. It is also not disputed that the rent was in fact being paid to Plaintiff I who is Appellant 1 before us. Having regard to the inclusive definition of landlord under the Act it will be difficult to sustain the judgment of the High Court and therefore, this appeal must be allowed. 9. However, having regard to the fact that the respondents have lived in the premises for several years and the original tenant has also died, it is fair to give some reasonable time to the respondents to vacate the premises. The counsel for the parties left the matter to us to determine the time to be granted to the respondents to vacate the premises. 10. The counsel for the parties left the matter to us to determine the time to be granted to the respondents to vacate the premises. 10. Having considered all aspects of the matter, we direct that the respondents be given time till 31-5-2006 to vacate the premises subject to their filing the usual undertaking before this Court within a period of four a weeks from today. 11. These appeals are disposed of accordingly.