JUDGMENT : 1. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner against the respondents on 11.10.2004 with the prayer that by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned transfer order dated 30.9.2004 (Annexure 1) passed by the respondent No. 2 Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur by which the petitioner was transferred from Bhopalgarh District Jodhpur to Raniwada District Jalore on ground of his consent, be quashed and set aside. 2. The case of the petitioner as put forward by him in this writ petition is as follows : The petitioner is substantively working on the post of LDC under the control of Tehsildar, Bhopalgarh Distt. Jodhpur. The case of the petitioner is that though the respondent No. 2 Divisional Commissioner has power to transfer the petitioner, but a bare perusal of impugned transfer order Annexure 1 dated 30.9.2004 would reveal that the petitioner was transferred because he himself sought his transfer. According to the petitioner, he had never given his consent as contained in the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 and therefore, the said transfer order Annexure 1 is bad in law and it should be set aside as it was based on insertion of false statement.A reply to the writ petition was filed by the respondent and their case is that through impugned transfer order Annexure 1, the petitioner was transferred from Bhopalgarh to Raniwada on ground of administrative exigencies. However, due to inadvertence, the word "swecha se" was mentioned in column No. 7 of the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 and since it was a bonafide mistake, therefore, from this point of view, the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 should not be quashed.It has been further submitted by the respondents that in pursuance of the impugned transfer order Annexure 1, the petitioner had been relieved from his office on 8.10.2004. Furthermore, a complaint was filed by the villagers against the petitioner and a copy of which is marked as Annexure R/1 and because of that complaint, he was transferred and apart from this, the petitioner was working at a particular place at Bhopalgarh for the last nine years and from this point of view also, if the petitioner was transferred on ground of administrative exigency, his transfer cannot be said to be mala fide. Hence, no interference is called for with the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 and this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents and gone through the record of the case. 4. There is no dispute on the point that through impugned transfer order Annexure 1 dated 30.9.2004, the petitioner has been transferred from Bhopalgarh to Raniwada and there is also no dispute on the point that in column No. 7 of the impugned transfer order Annexure 1, it has been mentioned that the petitioner was transferred because of his consent. 5. There is also no dispute on the point that the insertion of word "swecha- se" in column No. 7 of the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 has been made by the respondents inadvertently as in their reply they have admitted that this a bonafide mistake, but the transfer of the petitioner was made because of administrative exigencies. 6. There is also no dispute on the point that as per reply of the respondents. in pursuance of the impugned transfer order Annexure 1, the petitioner has been relieved on 8.10.2004. 7. There is also no dispute on the point that the petitioner was working at Bhopalgarh for the last nine years. 8. There is also no dispute on the point that a complaint Annexure R/1 was received by the competent authority against the petitioner. 9. The question for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances just mentioned above, if in the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 dated 30.9.2004, the word "swecha se" has been wrongly mentioned by the respondents, then the transfer order Annexure 1, which is said to be passed on administrative exigencies, can be sustained or not. 10. To appreciate the above question, legal aspect in respect of transfer has to be kept in mind.On transfer 11. The word 'transfer' means the movement of a Government servant from one headquarter station in which he is employed to another such station either : (a) to take up the duties of a new post, or (b) in consequence of change of his headquarters. 12. Transfer in relation to service, reduced to simple terms, means a change of place of employment within an organization. It is an incident of public service and generally, does not require the consent of the employee. 13. 12. Transfer in relation to service, reduced to simple terms, means a change of place of employment within an organization. It is an incident of public service and generally, does not require the consent of the employee. 13. Why a person is transferred, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Vardha Rao v. State of Karantaka (AIR 1986 SC 287) , has noted that continued posting at one station or in one department is not conducive to good administration. The Hon'ble Supreme Court pointed out that such continued posting creates vested interest and that even from the British times the general policy has been to restrict the period of posting for a definite period. 14. In Chief General Manager (Telcom), N.E. Telecom Circle v. Rajendra Chandra Bhattacharjee, ( AIR 1995 SC 813 ) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that no Government servant has any legal right to insist for being posted at any particular place and he has no choice in the matter of posting. 15. The Government employee holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain in a particular place of posting itself and cannot claim, as a matter of right, the posting in that place even on promotion. Vide Union of India v. N.P. Thomas, ( AIR 1993 SC 1605 ). 16. It is an accepted principle that in public service transfer is an incident of service. It is also an implied condition of service and the appointing authority has a wide discretion in the matter. The Government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilise the services of its employees. Further, the Government is to run the administration and is in a better position to decide when and where an employee is to be posted. 17. The State, as an employer, has power to transfer its employees even without an express provision or term to that effect. If there are statutory provisions including rules governing transfer then the employer has to exercise the power of transfer according to such rules. If, however, transferability is governed only by executive instructions or guidelines, it appears that the employer can deviate from such instructions or guidelines in the exigencies of administration. 18. If there are statutory provisions including rules governing transfer then the employer has to exercise the power of transfer according to such rules. If, however, transferability is governed only by executive instructions or guidelines, it appears that the employer can deviate from such instructions or guidelines in the exigencies of administration. 18. Generally, the exercise of the power of transfer is not dependent upon the consent of the employee and for that, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India ( AIR 1982 SC 149 ) , may be referred to. 19. It may be stated here that matter of transfer falls within the domain of executive and for the purpose of administrative exigencies transfer order may be needed. It is also for a good and healthy administration. Transfer order can also be made in public interest and for administrative reasons. Exigencies of administration or administrative exigency only means the need or demand for running a good administration. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.B. Shukla v. Union of India ( AIR 1979 SC 1136 ) , observed that the responsibility for good administration is that of the Government. The maintenance of an efficient, honest and experienced administrative service is a must for the due discharge of that responsibility. Therefore, the Government alone is best suited to judge as to the existence of exigencies of such a service requiring appointments by transfer. 20. It may further be stated here that whether the transfer was for the needs of good and efficient administration or in public or administrative interest or in the exigencies of service, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. It may further be stated here that it is not obligatory on the part of the employer to comply with the principles of natural justice before making an order of transfer. 22. Since transfer is an incident of service, an order of transfer cannot be said to have any adverse civil consequences and therefore, it is not necessary to comply with the principles of natural justice i.e. give an opportunity of hearing before exercising such power. 22. Since transfer is an incident of service, an order of transfer cannot be said to have any adverse civil consequences and therefore, it is not necessary to comply with the principles of natural justice i.e. give an opportunity of hearing before exercising such power. In this respect, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Director of School Education v. O. Karuppa Thevan, 1996(1) SLR 225 (SC) , may be referred to.Thus, on transfer, it can be concluded:- (i) That transfer is an incident of service and it does not require the consent of the employee. (ii) That a public servant has no vested right to seek transfer to a location of his choice. (iii) That transfer can be made on administrative exigencies and in public interest. (iv) That transfer can be made for good and efficient administration. (v) That continued posting at one station is not conducive to good interest. (vi) That continued posting of a public servant at a particular place creates vested interest and therefore, after a reasonable period at a particular place, he should be transferred even though he may be a good administrator, expert and skilled in his branch, honest and hard worker. (vii) That it is not obligatory on the part of the employer to comply with the principles of natural justice before making an order of transfer. 24. Before proceeding further, something should be said about scope of judicial review by the Court in the matter of transfer made by the concerned authorities.Scope of Judicial Review25. Transfer being an incidence of service normally Court should be reluctant to interfere but the transfer order must be for bonafide grounds. Power must be exercised honestly, reasonably and bonafide. In many cases of transfer there will be inconvenience - degree may be different considering the individual condition. But personal inconvenience cannot be a ground to agitate.26. Personal or family hardships are not sufficient grounds for resisting an order of transfer.27. A transfer is likely to cause hardship to a transferee. But the preponderance of judicial opinion is that an order of transfer is not liable to be struck down on that score alone. In this respect, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Roy v. Union of India, ( AIR 1993 SC 1236 ) , may be referred to.28. But the preponderance of judicial opinion is that an order of transfer is not liable to be struck down on that score alone. In this respect, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Roy v. Union of India, ( AIR 1993 SC 1236 ) , may be referred to.28. As already stated above, transfer is an incidence to service whether it is expressed or not in the Service Rule. Government is to run the administration and is in a better position to decide when and where an employee is to be posted and it has wide discretion in the matter. However, this power must be exercised honestly, bonafide and reasonably. It should be exercised in public interest. If the exercise of power is based on extraneous consideration or for achieving an alien purpose or an oblique motive, it would amount to mala fide and colourable exercise of power. Frequent transfers, without sufficient reasons to justify such transfers cannot but be held as mala fide. A transfer is mala fide when it is made not for professed purpose such as normal course or in public or administrative interest or in the exigencies of service but for other purpose that is to accommodate another person for undisclosed reasons. It is the basic principle of rule of law and good administration that even administrative actions should be just and fair.29. In Mrs. Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1991 SC 532 ) , Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, ( AIR 1993 SC 2444 ) , N.K. Singh v. Union of India, (1994)6 SCC 98 and State Bank of India v. Anjan Sanyal, (2001)5 SCC 508 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the following principles pertaining to transfer policy:- (1) That an order of transfer of an employee is a part of the service conditions and such order of transfer is not required to be interfered with lightly by a Court of law in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction unless the Court finds that either the order is mala fide or that the service rules prohibit such transfer or that the authorities, who issued the order, had not the competence to pass the order. (2) That the Court should not interfere with the transfer orders which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. 30. On mala fide, it can be said that the principal test of a due and proper exercise of the power is to ask the question : Was the transfer made for real administrative exigency ? In finding the answer the Court might have to pierce the veil of the transfer order and see what was the operative reason for the transfer. If the findings reveal a nexus with administrative necessity, the exercise of the power will be upheld. If, however, the operative reason has no such nexus then the transfer will be vulnerable. In the latter case it will be a mala fide use of power and will take within its sweep all situations where the nexus with administrative exigencies is absent. It needs to be emphasised that in the present context mala fide is not limited to the personal malice of the authority making the transfer. Mala fide has two components i.e. malice in law and malice in fact.31. It may not be always possible to establish malice in fact in a straight cut manner. In an appropriate case, it is possible to draw reasonable inference or mala fide action from the pleadings and antecedent facts and circumstances. But for such inference there must be firm foundation of facts pleaded and established. Such inference cannot be drawn on the basis of insinuation and vague suggestions. For that, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Roy (supra) may be referred to.32. It may further be stated here that frequent transfer of an employee shows lack of application of mind, executive highhandedness and becomes punitive in character and also mala fide.33. It may further be stated here that transfer cannot be resorted because of misconduct for in that case the transfer itself becomes a punishment. If an employee is found to be guilty of any misconduct, the best course would be to initiate departmental proceeding and impose punishment after due process. Transfer cannot be a substitute of punishment. It may further be stated here that transfer cannot be resorted because of misconduct for in that case the transfer itself becomes a punishment. If an employee is found to be guilty of any misconduct, the best course would be to initiate departmental proceeding and impose punishment after due process. Transfer cannot be a substitute of punishment. Lord Denning MR in Merricks v. Nott-Bower, (1964)1 All England Reporter 717 at 720 , observed that "the range of punishment does not include transfer from one place to another. There is no power to transfer by way of punishment". The principle was recognised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Syndicate Bank's case ( AIR 1966 SC 1283 ) and has been applied by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P v. Jagdeo Singh ( AIR 1984 SC 1115 ). 34. As already stated above, there may not be statutory rules on transfer though there are guidelines in respective department. The Court have unequivocally held that the Service Rules bind both the master and servant but as the guidelines are non-statutory, the Appointing Authority is not under obligation to follow the same. As transfer is an incidence of service, non- observance of guidelines will not vitiate the transfer, if the same is not vitiated by other factors like the same being mala fide or arbitrary and not made on administrative exigencies. Guidelines are not enforceable. In this respect, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P v. Ram Naresh ( AIR 1970 SC 1263 ) , may be referred to.35. However, if there are statutory provision including rules governing transfer then the employer has to exercise the power of transfer according to such rules. If a transfer order has been made in violation of a statutory rule or regulation, it will be illegal. In this respect, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Roy (supra) may be referred to.36. In the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Courts should not interfere with transfer orders which are made in the public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are in violation of mandatory/statutory rules or on ground of mala fide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or other. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or other. He is liable to be transferred from one place to other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal right. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of the executive instructions or orders, the Court ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead an affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department. If the Courts continue to interfere with the day to day transfer orders issued by the Government against its subordinate officers there will be a complete chaos in the administration which would not be conducive to the public interest.37. It is settled law that a transfer which is an incident of service not to be interfered with by the Courts unless it is shown to be clearly arbitrary or vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norms or principle governing the transfer. (See Abani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 169). 38. As already stated above, matter of transfer falls within the domain of executive and for the purpose of administrative exigencies transfer order may be needed. It is also for a good and healthy administration, but when the administrative exigencies are not established, the transfer order is liable to be set aside.39. An order of transfer is to satisfy the test of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, otherwise the same will be treated as arbitrary. Frequent transfers without sufficient reasons show arbitrariness and also mala fide. Although it is the managements' prerogative to decide "who should be transferred and where", the decision must be taken for administrative needs.40. One of the elementary principles of administrative law is that the authority which has to exercise the power is obliged to apply its mind before such exercise. It cannot abdicate its obligation to do so and act at the instance of another authority which is not authorised to exercise the power. In other words, it is the competent authority alone which has to apply to its mind and make the order.41. It may be stated here that every order is required to be issued by the competent authority, so also in the case of transfer. The power of transfer can only be exercised by the competent authority. In other words, it is the competent authority alone which has to apply to its mind and make the order.41. It may be stated here that every order is required to be issued by the competent authority, so also in the case of transfer. The power of transfer can only be exercised by the competent authority. If the transfer order was not issued by the competent authority, the same is liable to be set aside.42. In Om Parkash Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (1992)1 LLJ 422 (Raj.) , where the transfer order was issued by the Director Ayurveda at the instance of Minister/Private Secretary to the Minister and this Court set aside the transfer order on the ground that the competent authority i.e. Director has not applied his mind regarding administrative exigencies.43. In A.K. Vasudevan v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1982(1) SLR 446) , it has been held that transfer of an incumbent at the instance of MLA to accommodate a person of his choice is not for public interest. In this respect, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ganesh Dass Singh (1995 Supp (3) SCC 214) , may also be referred to.44. It is well settled that a transfer order which is made to accommodate another employee is not a bonafide exercise of power. If the transfers are made in order to adjust particular persons with no reasonable basis, such type of transfers can be termed as mala fide one and liable to be quashed.45. If the order of transfer was passed not for administrative exigencies, but for extraneous consideration, the same is liable to be set aside. The transfer will be vitiated if it is directed at the instance of vested interests.46. In the case of Rajendra Chandra Bhattacharjee (supra), in absence of a legal and statutory right of the transferee, judicial review of the transfer of such an employee was held to be unjustified. Furthermore, in absence of strong and compelling grounds rendering the transfer order improper or unjustified, such an order was held not subject to judicial review.47. Thus, from the above discussion, it can be concluded that in the following cases, the Court can lay its hand for judicial review:- (i) That where the transfer order was not issued the competent authority. (ii) That were the transfer order suffers from the vice or arbitrariness. Thus, from the above discussion, it can be concluded that in the following cases, the Court can lay its hand for judicial review:- (i) That where the transfer order was not issued the competent authority. (ii) That were the transfer order suffers from the vice or arbitrariness. (iii) That where the transfer order was found punitive in character. (iv) That where the transfer order was found vitiated by mala fides. (v) That where the transfer order was found to be based on extraneous consideration. (vi) That where the transfer was directed at the instance of vested interests. (viii) That where the transfer was made in order to adjust or accommodate particular persons with no reasonable basis. (viii) That where the administrative exigencies in passing the transfer order were not established. (ix) That where the transfer order was found to be made in violation of the mandatory/statutory rules or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer. 48. In the background of the above legal position, if in the column No. 7 of the impugned transfer order Annexure 1, the word "Swecha se" has been wrongly or inadvertently mentioned by the respondents, in my considered opinion, if otherwise the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 is not suffering from any basic infirmity or illegality, that should not be quashed because of the simple reason that in case of transfer, consent of the transferee is not required.49. No doubt the petitioner has not given his consent for transfer, but since complaints were made against him and he was working at a particular place at Bhopalgarh for the last about nine years continuously, therefore, in these circumstances, it cannot be said that the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 should be set aside merely on the ground that due to inadvertence, the word "swecha se" has been mentioned by the respondents. Putting the word "swecha se" would not affect the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 if the same otherwise passes the test of standard of valid transfer order. In the present case, the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and it also cannot reasonably be inferred that the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 was vitiated by mala fides or based on extraneous consideration or it was made against the rules and rather it appears that the same was passed by the competent authority on administrative exigencies. The petitioner has failed to point out strong and compelling grounds rendering the impugned transfer order Annexure 1 improper or unjustified. Hence, no interference is called for with the impugned transfer order Annexure 1.50. For the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this writ petition and the same deserves to be dismissed.Accordingly, this writ petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed. No order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******