The Management of Thirumayam Rural Electric Cooperative Society Limited v. Tmt. S. Packiam & Others
2004-02-11
P.SATHASIVAM, S.R.SINGHARAVELU
body2004
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- S.R. Singharavelu, J. As against the order dated 8.4.1996 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Tiruchirapalli) made in W.C. No.39/1995, the Management of Thirumayam Rural Electric Cooperative Society Limited has preferred this appeal. 2. This proceedings is in relation to the awarding of compensation for the death of a workman by name Silaiappan, who was a Helper in the employment of the appellant. 3. The accident had happened at 12.05 p.m. on 1.8.1993 at Kadathanpatti village, while Silaiappan had been climbing the electric post in order to render service of power(fuse of call work), accidentally he had come into contact with the live wire, sustained injuries and had lost his life. 4. Before the Deputy Commissioner, the claimant Packiam was examined as P.W.1 and another Helper Alagu Raja along with Ravi, who had accompanied the deceased person during the course of a particular job, have been examined as P.Ws.2 and 3. The Junior Engineer Mr. Nagarathinam was examined as R.W.1 on the side of the appellant. 5. Ex.P.1 is the copy of the FIR; Ex.P.3 is the Post Mortem Certificate, Ex.P.4 is the Death Certificate of the deceased and Ex.P.5 Legal heirship Certificate issued in favour of the claimant. 6. There was an award of Rs.79,760/- and in the process of calculation and in the amount of award, there is no dispute. The whole dispute is about the liability and we are confining ourselves with the same. 7. Regarding the fact of accident, there is no dispute and even according to Ex.P.6 Report of the Engineer, it is mentioned that Silaiappan died, "while attending the fuse off call for S.C. No.658 at LOC No. 165, accidentally came into contact with live wire and got electrocuted by virtue of post attend FOC". 8. Counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that it is a case covered under Section 3(1)(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act and had contended that inasmuch as the deceased employee had invited the peril on his own accord, inasmuch as he had neglected, to wear the hand gloves, to change the insulator and to tie himself with a rope as a safety measure. According to him, these three acts of negligence made him to suffer the loss of life. It was argued that, had these precautions been followed, the accident would not have occurred.
According to him, these three acts of negligence made him to suffer the loss of life. It was argued that, had these precautions been followed, the accident would not have occurred. He further contended that it is the normal duty of every prudent employee to have adopted to the above safety measures. Therefore, the learned counsel wanted to cover the action of the deceased as wilful disobedience and disregard of the safety measures and that such action of the deceased is directly attributable to negligence. 9. In fact, the words "directly attributable", "wilful disobedience", and "wilful removal or disregard" are very much found under Section 3(1)(b). But here is a case where there is no evidence to show the voluntary attitude of disobedience and voluntary act of disregard. Even in Tenancy legislation, while incorporating the word "wilful default" the term "supine indifference", would be in the surface. In this case, if there is evidence that somebody else had cautioned him or even informed him to wear hand gloves, to change the insulator and to tie himself with rope and if the employee had rejected such advice, then we may say that such act of the employee was distinctively indifferent so as to form an opinion that the peril was invited. 10. True, it is that nobody need to get advise as every prudent employee of regularly doing the job, will have to remember these precautions. But when we have to attach "wilful act of disobedience", we require some sort of evidence indicating the voluntary defiance of safeguards whereby the employee entangled himself in the accident. Such of the evidence of reminding him of all the precautions by any one of the co-employees or the superior officers, who were very much available during the course of accident has not been pointed out. 11. Therefore, we will not be able to say that the act is "wilful disobedience". Further, not all acts of inadvertence may be covered under negligence. Mere act of inadvertence should not be brought under the cover of negligence and especially in a social welfare legislation, like the present enactment when we have to give liberal construction of the proviso. The finding of the Officer, viz., the Deputy Commissioner of Labour was right in giving suitable construction of the words available under Section 3(1)(b). 12.
Mere act of inadvertence should not be brought under the cover of negligence and especially in a social welfare legislation, like the present enactment when we have to give liberal construction of the proviso. The finding of the Officer, viz., the Deputy Commissioner of Labour was right in giving suitable construction of the words available under Section 3(1)(b). 12. Above all, as pointed by the learned counsel for the employee, the proviso to Section 3(1) reads " Provided that the employer shall not be so liable........ (b) in respect of any injury not resulting in death" 13. So, in the case of injury, not resulting in death alone, Section 3(1) will get applied so as to exclude the liability of the employer. If it is a case of death, then Section 3(1)(b) may not be squarely applicable. So, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. We find no other ground to interfere with the order of the Deputy Commissioner and the appeal is dismissed. No costs.