Judgment :- V.S. Sirpurkar, J. An order dated 12-3-2003, passed by the State Government (through its' Secretary, Public (SC) Department), directing the detention of one Thiru S.Premnazir, son of Thiru Sharif, under the provisions of Sec.3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (in short 'COFEPOSA') and directing his detention with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods in future is in challenge in this writ petition. 2. From the grounds, it is revealed that on 12-12-2002, the said Premnazir, holder of an Indian passport, arrived from Singapore at Chennai by Singapore Airlines Flight SQ 410. He had two hand-baggage when he was proceeding to Customs table for clearance. He was intercepted by the plain-clothed customs-officer and was questioned about the contents of his baggage. He replied that he had brought electronic goods worth Rs.40,000/-. However, on the further search of the baggage, which was ultimately undertaken, huge quantity of smuggled goods like Intel Pentium IV Processors-29 Nos.; Casio SF 3700 ER 64 KB Digital Diary - 70 Nos.; Citizen CT 500 calculators - 55 Nos.; Samsung R 220 Cellphones - 30 Nos.; Samsung N 620 Cellphones (without antenna) 10 Nos.; and Pioneer car stereos 15 Nos. were found. Not only this, but on opening the car stereo cabinets, it was found that therein also 128 MB and 256 MB RAMs (98 Nos. of 128 MB RAMs and 196 Nos. of 256 MB RAMs) were kept concealed. 2.1. All these smuggled goods were seized and a voluntary statement was recorded wherein, he accepted that being a poor person, he was advised by his friend one Kumar that he should go abroad and bring foreign goods and handover and that for very trip, he used to get Rs.2,500/-. He has to go to Singapore where a person used to come with the goods and these goods were supposed to be carried by him and reached Kumar. It is also further stated in the grounds that it was confirmed from the Singapore Airlines that he had traveled from Singapore to Chennai by SQ 410 on 12-12-2002 and that he had booked one piece checked in baggage under Tag No.SQ 196891. However, it was later on found that the address given by him to the Airlines was found to be false. However, it was later on found that the address given by him to the Airlines was found to be false. It was, therefore, deduced that he was engaged in smuggling activity and was arrested and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate EO-I, Egmore, Chennai. He had also filed a bail application, which was dismissed and, therefore, a second bail application was filed, which was also dismissed later on. However, in his third bail application he was released on bail on condition to deposit a sum of Rs.25,000/- and on executing a bond of Rs.10,000/- with two sureties and with further condition that he should not leave the Chennai limits without the prior permission of the court. 2.3. From all, it was found that the total value of the goods, which was attempted to be smuggled by him was about Rs.8,00,000/-. On these grounds, an order came to be passed, as stated above. 3. Learned counsel, Shri Jabbar, appearing for the petitioner/detenu, challenged this order firstly contending that this detention order, which was served on the detenu on 19-3-2003, came to be referred to the Advisory Board on 29-4-2003 and after the Advisory Board approved the detention, the further order under Sec.8(f) of COFEPOSA was passed on 2-6-2003, confirming detention. Learned counsel, however, points out that before the order under Sec.8(f) was passed, on 2-5-2003, a notice came to be served on the detenu under Sec.124 of the Customs Act for confiscation of the goods. He contends that a reply to the show-cause notice was given on 14-5-2003. He, however, points out that either this show-cause notice or the reply thereto were not placed before the Government before passing the order under Sec.8(f). He, therefore, contends that the order under Sec.8(f) was passed, without taking into consideration the show-cause notice or the reply thereto sent by the detenu in which he had clarified his position. Learned counsel says that the said show-cause notice as also the reply thereto was only in connection with the reasons for the detention and had a direct nexus with the detention order. According to the learned counsel, therefore, these two documents were bound to be considered and the non-consideration thereof has vitiated the order passed by the State Government on 2-6-2003 and thereby his detention is illegal. 4. According to the learned counsel, therefore, these two documents were bound to be considered and the non-consideration thereof has vitiated the order passed by the State Government on 2-6-2003 and thereby his detention is illegal. 4. As against this, learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that firstly, it was not true that the said show-cause notice was not before the State Government. There is an affidavit filed by way of reply-affidavit that the said show-cause notice had reached the Government. Learned Public Prosecutor, however, contended that it was not necessary to place either the notice or the reply to the show-cause notice and that there is no such necessity in law. He further argues that, at any rate, the said reply was not even a 'relied upon' document because it is obviously a 'post-detention document' and, as such, it had no nexus with the detention and that it was not incumbent upon the State Government to consider the document before passing the order under Sec.8(f). Learned Public Prosecutor submits that there is no necessity either under the Act or under any of the provisions of the Constitution to consider such a reply. 5. The basis of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is the reported decision by the Division Bench of this Court in K.V. JESUDASAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (1989 Crl. L.J. 637). In that decision, the Division Bench of this Court had held that the documents, which are even post-detention documents, if they have a nexus with the subject of detention, they were bound to be kept before the Advisory Board and if the detaining authority or the Government, as the case may be, does not place such a document before the Advisory Board, the non-consideration thereof by the Advisory Board would vitiate the detention. The decision in Jesudasan case, cited supra, was followed consistently. 5.1. Obviously, the decision in Jesudasan case, cited supra, will be of no help to the petitioner because in this case, the documents in question came into existence only after the meeting of the Advisory Board. Learned counsel, however, goes a step ahead and contends, on the basis of this decision and the decisions following the same, that such documents would have to be placed even before the State Government which passes the order under Sec.8(f) of COFEPOSA. Learned counsel, however, goes a step ahead and contends, on the basis of this decision and the decisions following the same, that such documents would have to be placed even before the State Government which passes the order under Sec.8(f) of COFEPOSA. The argument is that proviso to Sec.10 gives the power to the State Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any time and, therefore, if these documents had been placed before the State Government, it could have revoked the detention instead of passing the confirmation order. Learned counsel wants us to read this provision along with Sec.11, which is an empowering provision for the State and the Central Government to revoke the detention orders. 5.2. It is no doubt true that Jesudasan case, cited supra, was followed in a number of decisions. One such decision is RAJESWARI v. JOINT SECRETARY TO STATE GOVERNMENT ( 2000 (III) CTC 97 ), to which one of us (V.S. Sirpurkar, J.) was a party. However, one thing is certain that in all those decisions, in which the decision in Jesudasan case was followed, the detention order was quashed because of the failure on the part the concerned authorities to place the relevant documents before the Advisory Board. There is, however, no decision available which suggests that the non-placement of such documents before the State Government, before it passes an order under Sec.8(f), confirming the detention, would in any manner invalidate the detention. Learned counsel also referred to few of the decisions, reported as well as unreported. However, in all those judgments, it is found that the detention order was quashed on the ground that the relevant documents were not placed before the Advisory Board. It is nowhere held that the non-placement of the documents before the appropriate Government, before the order under Sec.8(f) was passed, would result in invalidating the detention and, indeed, that could not be for the simple reason that the Advisory Board is an authority created under Art.22(4) of the Constitution of India for judging as to whether there is any sufficient cause for detention, if the detention were to be beyond three months' period. So also, Secs.8 and 9 COFEPOSA provide for the matters being referred to the Advisory Board where the detention is for a period longer than three months. So also, Secs.8 and 9 COFEPOSA provide for the matters being referred to the Advisory Board where the detention is for a period longer than three months. Therefore, it is but natural that where some relevant document, though of post-detention nature, are not to be placed before the Advisory Board, the Constitutional protection available to the detenu would be breached. That would also be in breach of Secs.8 and 9 and more particularly in view of the specific language of Sec.8(c) of COFEPOSA whereunder, the materials supporting the detention order have to be placed before the Advisory Board. At that stage, the Advisory Board examines the necessity of the detention and, therefore, it is axiomatic that any document which would have the relevance with the detention should be placed before the Advisory Board but, such is not the position with the order passed under Sec.8(f). There, the appropriate Government is given the power to confirm the detention order and to continue the detention of the person for such a period as it thinks fit. Of course, if the Advisory Board does not find the sufficient reasons, there is no discretion left with the appropriate Government and the detention has to be revoked. 5.3. Coming to the argument based on Sec.10 and its' proviso, all that is provided is to give the maximum period of detention. Proviso to Sec.10, which is worded as under: "Provided that nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of the appropriate Government in either case to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time" suggests only to recognize the power of the Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time. It only suggests that the maximum limit of detention in Sec.10 does not control the power of the appropriate Government in Sec.11. Therefore, the proviso does not either cast a duty in the Government nor can it be read so as to create any right in the detenu. In our opinion, the reliance of Mr. Jabbar on this provision is totally uncalled for and it cannot take his case any further. 5.4. The argument that because of the proviso, the appropriate Government is bound to consider the whole case for determining whether the detention should be revoked or the order should be modified is clearly incorrect as that is not the import of the language. Jabbar on this provision is totally uncalled for and it cannot take his case any further. 5.4. The argument that because of the proviso, the appropriate Government is bound to consider the whole case for determining whether the detention should be revoked or the order should be modified is clearly incorrect as that is not the import of the language. If there is no duty in the Government then, there is no question of there being a further duty in the Government to consider the subsequent documents, which are not even relied upon. That is not the import of Sec.8(f) also. All that the appropriate Government has to do after the report from the Advisory Board is to consider the materials and the report of the Advisory Board. Then, it is up to the Government to either confirm the order or to discontinue the detention by revoking the same. What should be considered at that stage has been pointed out by the Apex Court in the decision in VIJAY KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA (1988 SCC Crl. 293). 5.5. In Vijay Kumar's case, cited supra, the question came as to whether it was necessary for the confirming authority under Sec.8(f) to give reasons for the confirmation. In paragraph 38, it is observed as under: "The expression 'as it thinks fit' in Section 8(f) of the Act indicates that the concerned authority after considering the report of the Advisory Board may fix any period for detention. The authority is not required to give any special reason either for fixing the maximum period prescribed under Sec.10. The opinion of the Advisory Board and the grounds of detention are the only basis for confirming and continuing the detention, for any period, even up to the maximum period." (emphasis supplied) The observations clearly point out that firstly, there would be no necessity to give reasons while passing the confirmation order under Sec.8(f) and also the matters to be taken into consideration for confirming and continuing the detention. If, firstly, the opinion of the Advisory Board and, secondly, the grounds of detention are the only basis then, the documents, with which we are concerned in this case, cannot be the part of either the opinion of the Advisory Board or the grounds for detention. 5.6. Learned counsel then invited our attention to a decision in R. KESHAVA v. M.B. PRAKASH (2000 AIR SCW 4496). 5.6. Learned counsel then invited our attention to a decision in R. KESHAVA v. M.B. PRAKASH (2000 AIR SCW 4496). In that case, it was urged that the representation made by the detenu before the Advisory Board was not forwarded by it to the appropriate Government and, therefore, the constitutional right of the detenu under Art.22(5) was breached, invalidating his detention. Learned counsel points out that in that case, the Supreme Court had gone to the extent of issuing notices to the Principal Secretary to the Government of Karnataka, who had not complied with the directions and these directions were to intimate to the Supreme Court as to what all records were with the Government/what all records were considered by the Government before passing the order of confirmation. From this, learned counsel argues that it suggests that the appropriate Government is duty-bound under Sec.8(f) to consider all the records as otherwise the Supreme Court would not have required that information about the records considered by the Government to be placed before it. From this, learned counsel argues that, therefore, all the documents till that date were material documents and were bound to be placed before the appropriate authority, which were duty bound to consider them. 5.7. We have gone through the decision very closely. In the first place, this is not the import of the observations of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has very specifically held in paragraph 14 that the State Government is not bound by the report of the Advisory Board and the user of the word 'may' in Sec.8(f) suggests that it does not cast a duty upon the appropriate Government to necessarily accept the opinion expressed by the Advisory Board. The Supreme Court had held in that case that even when the Advisory Board had not placed the representation made to it before the State Government that did not affect the detention at all. If the non-consideration of the representation made by the detenu, through the Advisory Board, at the stage of Sec.8(f) was not found to be fatal, less said the better about the document involved in this case, which was a mere reply to the show-cause notice under Sec.124 of the Customs Act. 5.8. If the non-consideration of the representation made by the detenu, through the Advisory Board, at the stage of Sec.8(f) was not found to be fatal, less said the better about the document involved in this case, which was a mere reply to the show-cause notice under Sec.124 of the Customs Act. 5.8. Learned counsel feebly tried to argue that from the counter-affidavit it was clear that though the said show-cause notice was before the Government, the reply thereto was deliberately not put and that was obviously not a fair procedure and thereby the right of the petitioner/detenu of a fair procedure has been breached. 5.8. In the first place, there is no such right as is being insisted upon by the learned counsel in the detenu firstly, because there was no duty in the appropriate Government to consider that reply and secondly, there is nothing to suggest that the confirmation order was based only on the said notice under Sec.124 of the Customs Act. Therefore, there would be no question of prejudice also. We, therefore, find no fault with the respondents in not placing the reply before the appropriate Government. 6. Learned counsel then argued that the detenu had filed an application for relaxing the bail conditions and that application came to be allowed on 28-2-2003 by directing the detenu to appear before the Customs Department on every Wednesday instead of every day. He further points out that in the order, it is mentioned that the prosecuting agency had not objected to the conditions being relaxed and, therefore, this fact should have been considered by the detaining authority as it was a very relevant fact, the non-consideration of which has affected the order itself. 6.1. It is seen from the grounds that in paragraph (xiii), the detaining authority has taken note of the relaxation petition by the detenu as also the counter filed thereto by the Department dated 28-2-2003. The detaining authority has also taken note of the order passed by the Court dated 28-2-2003. This suggests that the detaining authority had taken into account the order dated 28-2-2003. Even if the order, which was produced at the time of hearing, suggests that there was a concession on the part of the Prosecutor to relax the conditions, in our opinion, that circumstance by itself will be a totally irrelevant circumstance. This suggests that the detaining authority had taken into account the order dated 28-2-2003. Even if the order, which was produced at the time of hearing, suggests that there was a concession on the part of the Prosecutor to relax the conditions, in our opinion, that circumstance by itself will be a totally irrelevant circumstance. The detention was with an idea to prevent the detenu from engaging himself in the smuggling activities. Further, merely because it was agreed to that instead of reporting daily before the Customs authorities, he should report once in a week, that would per se not be a relevant circumstance or such a circumstance which was bound to be considered by the detaining authority while passing the detention order. In our opinion, the non-consideration of the circumstance would be of no consequence. Hence, we reject the contention raised. 7. No other contention was raised before us. 8. The writ petition has no merits. It is dismissed.