ORDER 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal is filed aggrieved by the judgment and decree made by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 352 of 1983. The impugned judgment is a common judgment disposing of Second Appeals Nos. 352 and 393 of 1983. As already stated above, in this appeal, the challenge is only to the judgment and decree made in Second Appeal No. 352 of 1983. The High Court formulated the following substantial questions of law in Second Appeal No. 352 of 1983: "1. Whether the lower appellate court is right in holding that the suit d is not barred by limitation and in this connection failed to appreciate the ruling of this Court in Joseph Carlos Xavier Louis Anthony Benedict Aldo Costa v. Stanislaus Costal? 2. Whether the interpretation of Section 15 of the Wakf Act placed by the lower appellate court is correct?" 3. A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that although the High Court formulated the aforementioned two substantial questions of law, but neither is there consideration nor discussion nor finding on the second substantial question of law so formulated. As regards the first substantial question of law, the High Court has, in para (17), stated thus: "The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation, and f held that Section 10 of the Limitation Act has no application. The same was set aside in appeal. But according to me, the lower appellate court has not taken into consideration the decision in Joseph Carlos Xavier Louis Anthony Benedict Aldo Costa v. Stanislaus Costal by a Division Bench of this Court. Para 22 of the judgment supports the case of the appellants herein. In this case, the plaintiff has not come to court as one of the legal heirs of the founder, but he claimed only as muthavalli, as if g. the plaint property is dedicated and vested in trust. In view of the earlier decision in Exts. B-2 and B-4 such an argument is also not maintainable. Consequently, SA No. 352 of 1983 has to be allowed and I do so. The judgment of the lower appellate court is set aside and Second Appeal No. 352 of 1983 is allowed with cost." 4. In view of the earlier decision in Exts. B-2 and B-4 such an argument is also not maintainable. Consequently, SA No. 352 of 1983 has to be allowed and I do so. The judgment of the lower appellate court is set aside and Second Appeal No. 352 of 1983 is allowed with cost." 4. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the High Court did not consider the second substantial question of law and even as regards a the first substantial question of law, the discussion made in para (17) really does not decide the question. No reasons are recorded, except saying that "(I)n this case, the plaintiff has not come to court as one of the legal heirs of the founder, but he claimed only as muthavalli." Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment, so far as it relates to Second Appeal No. 352 of 1983, cannot be sustained. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents was not in a position to dispute that the High Court did not consider and decide the second substantial question of law. As far as the first substantial question of law is concerned, there is discussion though not elaborate, touching the controversy. 6. Having perused the impugned judgment and taking into considerationthe submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, we think it is just and appropriate that the High Court should consider both the substantial questions of law afresh in the light of the material placed on record and taking into consideration all the contentions that may be advanced on behalf of the parties. In this situation, we set aside the impugned judgment and remit Second Appeal No. 352 of 1983 to the High Court for disposal afresh onmerits in the light of what is stated above. We may add that the judgment rendered by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 393 of 1983 remains undisturbed. 7. The civil appeal is, accordingly, allowed. 8.No costs.