Judgment K.S. Rathore, J.-Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a limited Company carrying on the business of manufacturing / dealing in re-rolling steel mainly tore steel. The petitioner Company is having its branch at Dharuhera (Haryana) and Head Office at New Delhi. 2. A survey of the petitioner Company premises was conducted by the Anti Evasion Wing of the Commercial Taxes Department on 23.09.2003. Simultaneously, a raid was also made by the Sales Tax Authorities of Delhi at business premises at Delhi and against the three disgruntled ex-employees of the petitioner Company. During the course of raid, the Commercial Taxes Authority of Rajasthan has obtained Photostat copies of the documents allegedly seized by the Delhi Sales Tax Authorities from their Delhi office as well as from the three ex-employees. 3. For the purposes of verification of the seized record, a notice was issued to the petitioner by the Respondent No. 2 - The Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Anti Evasion, Rajasthan, Jaipur. In response to the notice, the petitioner appeared before the respondents alongwith the record. The petitioner also filed preliminary objections on 011.2003 with regard to associating the ex-employees without any authority of law. 4. A notice was issued by the Respondent No. 2 seeking clarification in respect of the queries raised therein. The petitioner filed a detailed reply on 10.02.2004. 5. After considering the reply / objection of the petitioner, the Assistant Commissioner passed the assessment order by which Rs. 10,79,65,597/-was demanded from the petitioner. Aggrieving and dissatisfying with the assessment order and demand notice dated 10.08.2004, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition. 6. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.M. Mehta referred Section 29(7) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act which specifically provides that “the assessing authority after affording an opportunity of being heard shall assess a dealer to the best of his Judgment and determine the tax payable by him.” He further submits that in the present case, the assessment order has been passed merely on the basis of seized record seized from the residence of the three disgruntled ex-employees of the petitioner Company at Delhi. The petitioner had also requested the Assistant Commissioner to provide opportunity to cross-examine all the persons from whose residences the alleged documents were seized by the Delhi Sales Tax authorities and on the basis of which the illegal demand has been created. 7. The petitioner had also requested the Assistant Commissioner to provide opportunity to cross-examine all the persons from whose residences the alleged documents were seized by the Delhi Sales Tax authorities and on the basis of which the illegal demand has been created. 7. It is also submitted that the Respondent No. 2 has failed to appreciate the fact that for manufacturing tore steel to the extent of Rs. 75,78,25,713/-, they would require iron steel scrap which could be transported in not less than 3500 trucks and again for selling the aforesaid quantity same number of trucks would be required. Since not a single case of suppressed purchase of iron steel scrap and/or sales of tore steel was ever detected by the department during the financial year 2001-02, therefore, the alleged demand has been created merely on presumptions without any basis. 8. For manufacturing the additional quantity of tore steel worth Rs. 75,78,25,713/-the petitioner Company requires additional electricity and as the consumption of electricity for the year under consideration is the normal consumption, therefore, the entire liability has been created arbitrarily simply on the basis of the alleged record seized from the residences of the three disgruntled ex-employees of the petitioner Company and on presumptions, surmises and conjectures. 9. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.M. Mehta has given much emphasis on the principle of natural justice and by submitting the factual aspect of the case, he submits that in the present case, the respondents have violated the principle of natural justice as the respondents denied the right to cross-examine their three disgruntled ex-employees. To strengthen his submissions, he placed reliance on the Judgment rendered in case of M/s. Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zila Parishad now Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar, reported in AIR 1969 SC 556 in para 3, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-“It is a well-established proposition of law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant he should be required to pursue that remedy and not to invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of a statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ. It is true that the existence of a statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ. But, as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmad vs. Municipal Board, Kairana, 1950 SCR 566 = AIR 1950 SC 163 , “the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs” and where such remedy exists it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a writ petition unless there are good grounds therefore. But it should be remembered that the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies before a writ is granted is a rule of self -imposed limitation, a rule of policy, and discretion rather than a rule of law and the Court may therefore, in exceptional cases issue a writ such as a writ of certiorari notwithstanding the fact that the statutory remedies have not been exhausted. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595 , 605 = AIR 1958 SC 86 , 93, S.R. Das, C.J., speaking for the Court, observed:-“In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. II, P. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior Court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior Courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the Superior Court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. In The King vs. Postmaster General Ex-parte Garmichael, 1928 (1) KB 291 a certiorari was issued although the aggrieved party had an alternative remedy by way of appeal. It has been held that the Superior Court will readily issue a certiorari in a case where there has been a denial of natural justice before a Court of summary jurisdiction. The case of Rex vs. Wandsworth Justices Ex parte Read, 1942 (1) KB 281 is an authority in point. In that case a man had been convicted in a Court of summary jurisdiction without giving him an opportunity of being heard. It was held that his remedy was not by a case stated or by an appeal before the quarter sessions but by application to the High Court for an order of certiorari to remove and quash the conviction.” There are at least two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine with regard to the exhaustion of statutory remedies. In the first place, it is well-settled that where proceedings are taken before a Tribunal under a provision of law, which is ultra vires it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court under Article 226 for issuing appropriate writs for quashing them on the ground that they are incompetent, without his being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course.-(See: the decisions of this Court in Carl Still G.M.B.H. vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 1615 and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar, 1955 (2) SCR 603 = AIR 1955 SC 661 . In the second place, the doctrine has no application in a case where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. (See: 1958 SCR 595 , 605 = AIR 1958 SC 86 , 93.” 10. Mr. S.M. Mehta also placed reliance on the Judgment rendered by Calcutta High Court in case of Assistant Collector of Customs for Appraisement & Anr. vs. Soorajmull Nagarmull & Anr., reported in AIR 1952 Cal. 656 . (See: 1958 SCR 595 , 605 = AIR 1958 SC 86 , 93.” 10. Mr. S.M. Mehta also placed reliance on the Judgment rendered by Calcutta High Court in case of Assistant Collector of Customs for Appraisement & Anr. vs. Soorajmull Nagarmull & Anr., reported in AIR 1952 Cal. 656 . The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in para 65, 66 & 67 has held as under:- “(65) Lastly it was argued by the learned Solicitor General that in any event the Court should not grant a certiorari because the respondents had other remedies equally effective and convenient. As I have already pointed out, the appellants could have appealed to the Chief Customs authority under Section 188 and have applied to the Central Government in revision from any decision of that latter authority. These appeals and revisions are in the nature of appeals from Caesar to Caesar and might not be regarded with any great confidence by persons in the position of the respondents in this case. They were labouring under a serious grievance. They had been called upon to pay over Rs. 79,000/-additional duty and fined a sum of over of Rs. 4,50,000/-without ever having had a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case. However, there can be no doubt that these were remedies open to them. .(66) Further it appears to me that a suit would lie for the recovery of the additional duty which they had been called upon to pay and for a declaration that the fine was levied without jurisdiction or in proceeding which were wholly void for failure to observe the rules of natural justice. Such were the proceedings contemplated in ‘Ganesh Mahadev vs. Secy. of State’, 43 Bom. 221 in which it was held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to hear a suit was not ousted if it appeared that there had been no legal adjudication of the matter by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. Further, I think it is clear from the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in ‘Secy. of State vs. Mask & Co.’ 66 IA 222 (PC) that a suit would lie in circumstances similar to the present. .(67) The principles upon which a certiorari should be granted were discussed by Maugham L.J. (as he then was) in the case of `Errington vs. Minister of Health’. of State vs. Mask & Co.’ 66 IA 222 (PC) that a suit would lie in circumstances similar to the present. .(67) The principles upon which a certiorari should be granted were discussed by Maugham L.J. (as he then was) in the case of `Errington vs. Minister of Health’. 1935 (1) KB 249. At page 279 the learned Lord Justice observed:-“The only question that remains is whether the Court should come to the conclusion that the interests of the applicants have been substantially prejudiced by what has been done, because the quashing of the Order is, of course a matter of discretion of the Court. I do not think it has been proved that the statement which were made to the Ministry in fact affected the decision of the Minister, or of his officials, and I certainly have no reason to doubt that the officials were acting in what they thought to be the public interest. On the other hand, it seems to me a matter of the highest possible importance that where a quasi-judicial function is being exercised, under such circumstances as it had to be exercised here, with the result of depriving people of their properly, especially if it is done without compensation, the persons concerned should be satisfied that nothing unfair has been done in the matter, and that ex parte statements have not been heard before the decision has been given without any chance for the purpose concerned to refute those statements. That seems to me a matter of the greatest possible public importance, and, if I am right in the view that I have expressed as to the functions of the Minister being of a quasi-judicial character, I think it follows that in the special circumstances of this case, as I understand them to be, the Court has no option but to quash the Order, as my brother has suggested”. 11. With regard to maintainability of this writ petition against the order dated 10.8.2004 as this order is appealable and the remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the Judgment rendered in case of J.M. Bazi & Co. 11. With regard to maintainability of this writ petition against the order dated 10.8.2004 as this order is appealable and the remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the Judgment rendered in case of J.M. Bazi & Co. Gujarat vs. Commissioner of Customs, New Kandla & Anr., reported in 2001 (9) SCC 275 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “Normally, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 when adequate alternative remedy is available, but in the special facts of this case when the demand was raised and the same had been challenged on the ground that it was barred by time and where the demand is nearly of 46 lakhs of rupees which will have to be deposited before any appeal can be filed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction and determined the questions which were raised in the writ petition on merits. 12. Learned Counsel further placed reliance on the Judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Shashi Gaur vs. NCT of Delhi & Ors., reported in 2001 (10) SCC 445 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the service matter has held that “availability of the alternative remedy would not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.” 13. Mr. Mehta drawn my attention towards the factual matrix of the case and submitted that since the right of cross-examination has been denied, therefore, the authority has no jurisdiction to pass the order dated 10.08.2004 as observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India vs. Hindalco Industries reported in 2003 (5) SCC 194 that “if authority has jurisdiction in respect of one aspect but has no jurisdiction in respect of another aspect alleged in the notice, Court would be justified in interfering with the aspect in respect of which the authority had no jurisdiction.” 14. Further reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the Judgment rendered in case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors., reported in 1998 (8) SCC 1 . Further reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the Judgment rendered in case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors., reported in 1998 (8) SCC 1 . More particularly he referred Paras 14, 15, 16, 17 & 18 wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for any other purpose. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 15. In the instant case, learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to make out the case that on the basis of the documents which has been seized from the ex-employees of the petitioner Company at their residence were made basis, but the petitioner was not allowed to cross-examine the ex-employees. To this effect, he placed reliance on the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Kerala vs. K.T. Shaduli Yusuf , reported in 1977 Sales Tax Cases (39) 478. 16. To this effect, he placed reliance on the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Kerala vs. K.T. Shaduli Yusuf , reported in 1977 Sales Tax Cases (39) 478. 16. In case of Commercial Taxes Officer, Anti Evasion, Jaipur vs. M/s. Rajasthan Aluminium Industries, Jaipur & Anr., reported in RTC 86 Part 1, 65, the Division Bench of this Court has held “it is, settled law, that if a document prepared by a third party which may connect the assessee, is to be used against the assessee, then it is, incumbent upon the assessing authority to give ample opportunity to the assessee, in the present of the third party, who is the author of the document and also to cross-examine the author of such document and elicit such necessary facts from him as to how the entries came to be made by him, connecting the assessee in such a document. 17. The same view has been affirmed by this Court in case of C.T.O. Anti Evasion Zone Jaipur vs. M/s. Haryana Dal Mill, reported in 1991 Tax World 369. 18. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that since no opportunity was given to the assessee to cross-examine persons who furnished information, therefore, the order levying penalty is liable to be quashed. In support of his submissions he placed reliance on the Judgment s reported in 1988 Sales Tax Cases Vol. 71 page 153 & 1997 Sales Tax Cases Vol. 107 page 300. 19. Learned Counsel referred the impugned order dated 10.08.2004 wherein in para 12, the objections of the petitioner has been reproduced and in subsequent paras the objections have been considered, but not in true spirit of the objections. He further submits that against the three ex-employees complaint was filed on 29.04.2003 and the same was received by the Police Station Malviya Nagar, New Delhi on 30.04.2003. He also referred certain documents filed alongwith the rejoinder to show that services of the three ex-employees have already been dispensed with in the month of March, 2003 and payment of gratuity and leave encashment as well as notice period has already been made and the same has been received by the concerned employees. 9.20. Per contra learned A.A.G. Mr. Mohd. Rafiq raised the preliminary objections regarding maintainability of the present petition. Mr. 9.20. Per contra learned A.A.G. Mr. Mohd. Rafiq raised the preliminary objections regarding maintainability of the present petition. Mr. Rafiq submits that in the present writ petition the petitioner is challenging the assessment order and demand notice dated 10.08.2004. The order of assessment has been directly challenged by the petitioner before this Court in extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without availing alternative efficacious remedy of the appeal under Section 84 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and further remedy of another appeal under Section 85 of Rajasthan Sales Tax Act 1994 by way of second appeal before the Tax Board. Only in the matter has been decided against the petitioner in both the appeal, then they should approach this Court by way of filing revision petition under Section 86 of the Act 1994. Since the petitioner has not availed the alternative efficacious statutory remedy available to him, this present petition deserves to be dismissed only on this count alone. 10.21. Learned A.A.G. Mr. Rafiq has emphatically denied the allegations alleged by the petitioner and submits that the survey was conducted by Anti-Evasion Wing to the Commercial Taxes Department of Rajasthan in the Corporate Office of the petitioner Company at New Delhi and factory premises at Khuskhera on 23.09.2003 on the basis of a definite information received by them that the petitioner was indulging in large scale tax evasion. In raid/survey conducted, the sales tax officer of Delhi State as well as Rajasthan seized large number of documents from the Delhi residences of the petitioner’s employees namely Shri Ashok Sharma and H.L. Maheshwari and Shri Ram Narayan Agarwal. It is also disputed that the aforesaid employees were disgruntled ex-employees of the petitioner Company. He submits that still they were in employment when the residences were searched and the unaccounted documents were seized. 22. Mr. Rafiq further submits that modus operandi of the petitioner was that while much more quantity of steal and iron used to be sold by them in the market but only a part of it was accounted for in the regular Books of Accounts and thus the tax liability of Rs. 10,79,65,597/-was fastened on the petitioner. 23. So far as the right of cross-examination is concerned, Mr. Rafiq submits that theory of cross-examination has been subsequently propounded only in order to avoid heavy tax liability. 10,79,65,597/-was fastened on the petitioner. 23. So far as the right of cross-examination is concerned, Mr. Rafiq submits that theory of cross-examination has been subsequently propounded only in order to avoid heavy tax liability. By seeing the quantum of tax, it can be visualized as to how much money the petitioner may have made by adopting foul tactics in tax evasion. 24. It is also emphatically denied that any FIR has been lodged by the petitioner with the Police Station, Malviya Nagar, New Delhi as Police Station Malviya Nagar, New Delhi has categorically informed that no such FIR has been lodged in this regard and no such complaint was received from M/s Rathi Bars Ltd. at Police Station. The documents, which are placed along with the writ petition are said to be forged one. 25. Mr. Rafiq also disputed with regard to the documents, which shows that the services of the employees were dismissed w.e.f. 31.03.2003 and submits that all these documents are prepared afterwards to avoid tax liability. 26. Mr. Rafiq also drawn my attention towards the several documents, which are submitted along with the reply to the writ petition as well as along with the Addl. Affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents to show that the documents prepared by the petitioner are forged one. 27. On the issue of alternative remedy, which is available to the petitioner under Section 84 before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and Second appeal before the Rajasthan Tax Board under Section 85, he placed reliance on the following Judgment s:- (1) CivilAppeal No. 4575/1997 State of Raj. & Ors. vs. M/s. Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. & Ors., wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-“We have heard the matter at length and we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have entertained the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution when the complete machinery for adjudication of dispute regarding determination of valuation of the property is provided for in the Indian Stamp Act, as amended by the State of Rajasthan. Section 3 of the Act provides instruments chargeable with duty. Section 27 provides that the facts affecting duty to be set forth in instruments sought to be registered. Section 47-A of the Act provides for instruments under valued and how to be valued. Section 3 of the Act provides instruments chargeable with duty. Section 27 provides that the facts affecting duty to be set forth in instruments sought to be registered. Section 47-A of the Act provides for instruments under valued and how to be valued. It further provides that when the registering authority has reason to believe that market value of the property has not been truly set forth in the instrument he may refer the matter to the Collector for determination of the market value. An aggrieved party is free to challenge the order of the Collector by revision before the Board of Revenue and further reference to the High Court is also provided. Thus, we find there is a complete code for adjudication of dispute regarding the duty payable by the respondents and under such circumstances the writ petition ought not to have been entertained and decided on merits.” (2) Thesame view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadhana Lodh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., reported in 2003 (3) SCC 524 , which is as under:-“The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the Tribunal. Section 149(2) of the Act limits the insurer to file an appeal on those enumerated grounds and the appeal being a product of the statute it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act (See: National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Niwlletta Rohtagi). This being the legal position, the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to the High Court to entertain a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even if where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and Judgment of a District Judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even if where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and Judgment of a District Judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under Section 115 CPC has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. As a matter of illustration, where a trial Court in a civil suit refused to grant temporary injunction and an appeal against refusal to grant injunction has been rejected, and a State enactment has barred the remedy of filing revision under Section 115 CPC, in such a situation a writ petition under Article 227 would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, where the State Legislature has banned a remedy of filing a revision petition before the High Court under Section 115 CPC, no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.” (3) In the case of State of U.P. & Anr. vs. Chemtreat Chemicals & Anr., reported in 2002 (10) SCC 593 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-“Constitution of India - Article 226 - Question of fact-Proper forum for determination of -Sales tax matter -Whether the commodity sold by the respondents fell in the category of dementhol oil or not-None of the authorities dealing with that aspect - In such circumstances, High Court’s decision under Article 226 classifying the said commodity under Entry 64 of U.P. Government notification dated 111.1971 on the basis of its earlier decision which related to classification of menthol, held, bad- Matter remitted to assessing authority for determination in accordance with law-U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (15 of 1948), Section 3-A”. 28. 28. In the case of Sheela Devi vs. Jaspal Singh, reported in 1999 (1) SCC 209 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-“Constitution of India - Article 226 - Maintainability- Alternative remedy/exhaustion of remedies- Held, High Court wrongly exercised its writ jurisdiction on question of fact when alternative statutory remedy of revision was available-Respondent still free to avail the alternative remedy - Rent Control and Eviction - U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (13 of 1972), Section 18 - Right of revision under”. 29. In the case of Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Ors., reported in 1996 (1) SCC 327 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-“Constitution of India- Article 226 - Maintainability - Non-exhaustion of alternative remedy- Basic facts disputed by petitioner - Premature petition -Show-cause notice issued by Bihar State Housing Board calling upon respondent 1 to explain why not an order of eviction be passed against him for his unauthorized living in a portion of a house allotted by the Board on hire-purchase basis to Respondent 4 - Respondent 1 instead of showing cause straightway filing writ petition before High Court disputing the basic fact that respondent was still a tenant-hirer of the Board and not owner-purchaser of the house allotted to him - Held, the basic fact on which jurisdiction to initiate proceedings against Respondent 1 depended, was required to be investigated and adjudicated upon by the competent authority - Therefore, Respondent 1 should have first filed objection and placed relevant material before the authority concerned and only after adjudication of the matter writ petition would be maintainable - High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition of Respondent 1 which involved disputed questions of fact -Neither any fundamental right of the petitioner infringed nor the constitutionality of any statute involved nor could it be said that the notice was a nullity or totally without jurisdiction - Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982 - Bihar State Housing Board (Management and Disposal of Housing Estates) Regulations of 1983.” 30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Kishore & Ors. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Kishore & Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., reported in 1993 (1) SCC 22 , has held, that as regards the contention on behalf of the Corporation that though an appeal may have to be thrown out the assessee will always have remedy under Article 226, the resort to Articles 226 and 227 should be discouraged when there is an alternative re