Judgment :- The petitioner/Employees' Welfare Union prays for a writ of Certiorari to call for the arbitration award dated 24.12.2001 in Arbitration Case No.1 of 2000 on the file of the third respondent and to quash the same. 2. The prayer itself signifies the issue to be dealt with in the writ petition, namely, the validity and enforceability of the award passed by the Arbitrator on the dispute which was referred to the Arbitrator, the third respondent, pursuant to an agreement entered into between the workers and the Management under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called the Act). There is no controversy over the position that the reference to the Arbitrator in this case is covered by the provisions of Section 10-A of the Act. 3. One of the contentions of the petitioner in seeking to set aside the award is that the agreement for reference to the Arbitrator was not published in the Gazette in terms of Section 10-A(3) of the Act. Learned senior counsel representing the petitioner contends that the non-publication of the award, as required, would render the award null and void. In support of the said contention, Mr.V.Prakash, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner Union, relies on the following judgments: (i) ROHTAS INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ANOTHER V. ROHTAS INDUSTRIES STAFF UNION AND OTHERS ( 1976 (I) LLJ 274 (SC)); (ii) KARNAL LEATHER KARAMCHARI SANGHATAN V. LIBERTY FOOTWEAR COMPANY & OTHERS (1989 (II) LLN 507 (SC)); (iii) RAMAKRISHNA KULWANTRAI STEELS (P) LIMITED V. THEIR WORKMEN (1971 (I) LLJ 882 (Madras High Court Full Bench); and (iv) KRISHNAVENI TRANSPORT & OTHERS V. SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR, MADRAS AND OTHERS ( 1989 (II) LLJ 245 ) (Madras High Court Full Bench). 4. The fact that there was no publication of the agreement as required under Section 10-A(3) of the Act is not disputed by the respondent-Management. But, according to Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel for the Management, though the award may be invalid under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the award will be enforceable as an award under private arbitration. Learned senior counsel relies on the observations of the Division Bench of this Court for the said proposition in MOORCO (INDIA) LTD. V. GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY ITS SECRETARY (1993 (1) CLR 492). Learned senior counsel relies on the following observations: "3. Learned senior counsel relies on the observations of the Division Bench of this Court for the said proposition in MOORCO (INDIA) LTD. V. GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY ITS SECRETARY (1993 (1) CLR 492). Learned senior counsel relies on the following observations: "3. The question which arose before the learned single Judge for his consideration was as to whether a writ of mandamus, as asked for, could issue. The well-settled proposition is that the Act, as such, does not countenance and make available its machinery for arbitration outside its purview. When there had been a non-compliance with sub-sec.(3) of Sec.10-A of the Act, it is not possible to characterise the decision rendered by the second respondent as one coming within the purview of the Act. In this context, it is relevant to take note of sub-sec.(4) of Sec.10-A of the Act also, and it reads as follows: " The arbitrator or arbitrators shall investigate the dispute and submit to the appropriate Government the arbitration award signed by the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case may be". Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.10-A of the Act is interlinked with sub-sec.(3) and only on satisfaction of the mandates of sub-sec.(3) of Sec.10-A, there could be an investigation into the dispute and making of the award by the arbitrator and then forwarding it to the appropriate Government, as per sub-sec.(4) thereof. Otherwise, the whole process will remain only in the realm of private arbitration falling outside the Act. Sec.17 could have reference only to publication of awards coming within the purview of the Act. Viewed from this angle, the learned single Judge was correct in discountenancing the prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus as asked for. The writ appeal directed against the order of the learned single Judge deserves dismissals and accordingly we dismiss it. No costs. " (emphasis supplied) 5. I have considered the submissions of both sides. 6. The fact that there was no publication of the agreement as required under Section 10-A(3) of the Act not being in dispute, the judgments of the two Full Benches of this Court, as enlisted above, are clear to the effect that the requirement of publication of the agreement in the Gazette is mandatory and that the non-compliance would render the award invalid and unenforceable. 7. The judgment of the Division Bench relied on by the Management in MOORCO (INDIA) LTD. 7. The judgment of the Division Bench relied on by the Management in MOORCO (INDIA) LTD. V. GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY ITS SECRETARY (1993 (1) CLR 492), as extracted above, also agrees with the said view, namely, that non-publication of the agreement would render the award as not enforceable under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. But the Division Bench went further and observed that the process undertaken will be only in the realm of private arbitration falling outside the Act. 8. Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel, relies on the observations, as underlined in the above extract, and contends that though the award may not be enforceable under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the award would be enforceable as under a private arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. 9. In reply, Mr.V.Prakash, learned senior counsel, contends that when once the provisions of Sections 10 and 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act are operative, there is no scope for treating the award as an award under private arbitration to suit the convenience of the Management. The award has to stand or fall on its own validity being an award under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. When the award itself is rendered null and void and consequently unenforceable, there is no scope for enforcing it as an award under private arbitration. 10. Prima facie, I am inclined to agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. 11. The arbitration agreement, as entered into between the parties, is traceable only under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The agreement is a statutory agreement and the award passed thereon will also be a statutory award enforceable or not, only in terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. If the award does not conform to the requirements under the Act, then the award becomes clearly invalid and unenforceable. The judgments of the two Full Benches of this Court, as mentioned above, are clear to the said effect. 12. But the observation of the Division Bench in MOORCO (INDIA) LTD. V. GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY ITS SECRETARY (1993 (1) CLR 492) raises a question as to whether such an award could be treated as an award on private arbitration and enforceable as a private award. 12. But the observation of the Division Bench in MOORCO (INDIA) LTD. V. GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY ITS SECRETARY (1993 (1) CLR 492) raises a question as to whether such an award could be treated as an award on private arbitration and enforceable as a private award. It is true that the Division Bench does not refer to the judgments of the two Full Benches of this Court. Even so, it is not possible to treat the view as per incurium, considering the fact that the two judgments of the Full Benches of this Court did not go into the issue as to whether the award which is found to be invalid and unenforceable under the Industrial Disputes Act could be treated as an award as one under private arbitration or not. It is also difficult to reconcile the judgment of the Division Bench with the specific observations contained in the judgments of two Full Benches. 13. In the above circumstances, I have no other alternative except to refer the issue for consideration by a larger Bench, subject to the orders of My Lord the Chief Justice. 14. Office is directed to place the papers before My Lord the Chief Justice for due reference to a larger Bench to consider the following issue: " Whether an award under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act which is rendered invalid due to non-compliance of the requirement under Section 10-A(3) of the Act, could be enforced by one of the parties as an award on private arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996? "