ORDER 1. The appellants who have been convicted under the Contempt of Courts Act for criminal contempt by the High Court have been sentenced to one-month simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs 5000. In these statutory appeals, the said conviction and sentence has been challenged by the appellants on various grounds including that they have not made the derogatory statement attributed to them. But we do not think it is necessary for us to go into that question since the appellants are entitled to succeed in these appeals on a technical ground. 2. Under the Contempt of Courts Act, the petition seeking the f punishment for contempt can be invoked by a party only with the prior written consent of the Advocate General of the State under Section 15 of the said Act. This position in law is now well settled by judgments of this Court in the cases of State of Kerala v. M.S. Mani1 and Bal Thackrey v. Barish Pimpalkhute2 wherein it is held that prior written sanction of the Advocate General under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act is a mandatory g requirement for invoking the contempt jurisdiction of the court by a private party. 3. In the instant appeals, it is not disputed that the complainants before the High Court did not obtain such prior permission from the Advocate General. It is also not disputed that contempt proceedings have not been initiated by the High Court suo motu either under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution. This is clear from the following facts: (a) The contempt petitions howhere state that such a sanction has been obtained by the complainants. (b) The show-cause notice issued by the High Court though contained an alternate clause as to invoking of suo motu contempt jurisdiction by the High Court, the same has been struck off indicating that the cognizance of contempt complaint was taken at the instance of a private party. (c) Nowhere in the body of the impugned judgment the High Court has indicated that it was exercising suo motu jurisdiction in regard to the alleged contempt by the appellants. 4. (c) Nowhere in the body of the impugned judgment the High Court has indicated that it was exercising suo motu jurisdiction in regard to the alleged contempt by the appellants. 4. In the said factual background, and there being no dispute raised from any side that the initiation of contempt was at the instance of the private party and there being no prior consent of the Advocate General, these appeals are liable to be allowed on that sole ground. 5. For the reasons stated above, the conviction and sentence imposed on d the appellants become unsustainable. Accordingly they are set aside and these appeals are allowed.