PRAKASH KRISHNA, J. This is plaintiffs appeal. It arises out of original suit No. 44 of 1983 instituted for the specific performance of an agreement dated 21st February, 1976 with respect to the properties described in Schedule Ka-4 of the plaint for a sum of Rs. 20,000. The said agreement was executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 2. The suit was instituted on the pleas inter alia that the defendant No. 1 Ram Manohar is the sole tenant of the land given in Schedule K-1 and has a half share in the property given in Schedule K-2 and 1/4th share in Schedule K-3 as Bhumidhar. On 21-2-76 the defendant No. 1 executed an agreement to sell all his plots and share in the land described in the aforesaid schedule for the sum of Rs. 20,000 out of which Rs. 18,000 was paid as earnest money in the presence of the witnesses and was immediately put in possession over the land. It was further agreed that a sale deed shall be executed by the defendant No. 1 on or before 31st March, 1983 and at the time of execution of the sale deed the balance Rs. 2,000 shall be paid to him. The village was under consolidation operation at the time of execution of the agreement; it was agreed by the defendant No. 1 that he would transfer the pots allotted to him during the consolidation operation in lieu of his old plots. The defendant No. 1 has failed to execute sale-deed in pursuance of the agreement in question, the necessity to file present suit arose. 3. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 by filing a separate written statement. Other defendants namely defendants No. 2 to 5 filed their separate written statements. 4. The main defendant of defendant No. 1 was of total denial of the agreement in question. He pleaded that he did not execute any agreement dated 21-2-76 or on any other date in favour of the plaintiff. In para 21 of the written statement it was stated that the plaintiff is the younger brother of the defendant No. 1 and plaintiff was doing pairvi on his behalf before the Consolidation Court and in that connection the defendant No. 1 used to sign blank Vakalatnamas and blank papers. In para 21 of the written statement it was stated that the plaintiff is the younger brother of the defendant No. 1 and plaintiff was doing pairvi on his behalf before the Consolidation Court and in that connection the defendant No. 1 used to sign blank Vakalatnamas and blank papers. It is quite possible that the plaintiff having obtained his signatures has manufactured or prepared some fabricated agreement of sale. The allegation that he did receive any consideration was also denied. He claimed his possession as Bhumidhar of the disputed plot and denied the plaintiffs allegation regarding delivery of possession to him. In para 25 of the written statement it has been further pleaded that on 10th of August 1983 he has executed a sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2, Jag Mohan, for a sum of Rs. 30,000 and the possession has also been delivered to him. The plaintiff had full knowledge about the said transaction. 5. The other defendants filed their written statement on similar pleas as those raised by the defendant No. 1. Evidence was led by the parties. The trial Court struck the following 6 issues: (1) "whether defendant No. 1 Ram Manohar entered in agreement with plaintiff Ram Kishore on 21-2- 1976 to sell his properties mentioned in lists 1,2 and 3 in para 1 of the plaint in favour of the plaintiff in lieu of Rs. 20,000 ? (2) Whether an amount of Rs. 18,000 was paid as earnest money by the plaintiff to the aforesaid defendant No. 1 ? (3) Whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform of his part of contract with which defendant No. 1 is resiling on reasonably? (4) Whether defendants Nos. 2 to 5 got executed the deeds of sale in their favour from defendant No. 1 in lieu of consideration in good faith and without notice to the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, if any? (5) Whether the suit is not properly valued and the Court fee paid is insufficient? (6) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?" 6. The issues No. 1, 2 and 3 have been decided against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant No. 1. The issue No. 4 was decided in favour of the defendant No. 1 and the suit was dismissed by the Special Judge Banda by its judgment and decree dated 27-4-85. The issues No. 1, 2 and 3 have been decided against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant No. 1. The issue No. 4 was decided in favour of the defendant No. 1 and the suit was dismissed by the Special Judge Banda by its judgment and decree dated 27-4-85. 7. Aggrieved the plaintiff has come up in the first appeal. Heard Shri V. K. S. Chaudhary, the Senior Counsel for the appellant and Shri I. N. Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents. 8. The main argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the findings recorded by the Court below on issues No. 1, 2 and 3 are perverse and against the material on record. The said findings are against the pleadings of the defendants. Elaborating his argument it was submitted that the Court below has based its judgment not on legal evidence but on surmises and conjectures. 9. Under the aforesaid issues the Court below has found that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the agreement in question is a genuine document. 10. At this stage the facts which are not in dispute and the attending circumstances of the case be noticed to arrive at a correct conclusion. Indisputably the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 are brothers. The plaintiff in his deposition as PW/1 has stated that the defendant No. 1 is unmarried. They are living separately. They are cultivating their fields separately. One lady Sultania was residing with the defendant No. 1 prior to the sale deed. After the sale deed the defendant No. 1 is residing at Sultanias place. In the very next sentence in cross examination it was stated that Sultania used to visit Ram Manohar, the defendant No. 1. The defendants No. 2 and 3 are sons of Smt. Sultania. Shri V. K. S. Chaudhary, the learned Senior Counsel argued that Smt. Sultania was Mistress of the defendant No. 1. Her caste has been shown as Beria, which according to him means prostitute. Elaborating his argument further it was submitted that in the array of the parties against the names of defendants No. 2 and 3 their fathers name has not been mentioned and only this much has been mentioned that they are sons of Sultania. Her caste has been shown as Beria, which according to him means prostitute. Elaborating his argument further it was submitted that in the array of the parties against the names of defendants No. 2 and 3 their fathers name has not been mentioned and only this much has been mentioned that they are sons of Sultania. An argument was built up on this basis by the learned counsel for the appellant that Smt. Sultania was kept of defendant No. 1. Keeping a woman without marriage is a sin. The lust produces sin. Transfer of entire holding by defendant No. 1 to other defendants was the result of the sin committed by the defendant No. 1. Therefore the said transfer is invalid. In the ordinary course of succession the plaintiff might have succeeded to the property left by the defendant No. 1 being younger brother and the only heir. 11. The defendant No. 1 has hotly contested the suit by filing written statement and examining himself. His case was of total denial of the execution of the sale agreement and receipt of any money under the agreement in question. It was for the plaintiff to establish the genuineness of agreement in question. The agreement in question in dated 21st February, 1976 and is Ex. 6. Its attesting witnesses are one Maha Veer and Sukkha. Maha Veer was examined but Sukkha was not examined. Maha Veer is common relation of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. He is son of the maternal uncle of the parties. Great emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the appellant that from the statement of Maha Veer the execution and genuineness of the sale agreement, Ex. 6, is proved. He submitted that although Maha Veer is resident of another village but that village is only one or two furlongs away from the village of parties. The Court below has found that the genuineness of the agreement in question is not proved in view of various attending circumstances of the case. The plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are brothers but are living separately from the time of their father. DW/1 Ram Manohar has stated that he is living separately for the last 50 years from the time of his father and has supported the pleadings. The plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are brothers but are living separately from the time of their father. DW/1 Ram Manohar has stated that he is living separately for the last 50 years from the time of his father and has supported the pleadings. He has categorically stated that the agreement in question dated 21-2-76 was not executed by him nor did he receive any consideration from the plaintiff. A bare perusal of the oral statement of the defendant No. 1 clearly shows that there is no cross examination on the point of execution of the sale agreement or payment of consideration. The cross examiner has done the cross examination with a view to establish that the defendant No. 1 can put his signatures. In that view of the matter he was confronted by number of earlier documents signed by him. The trial Court has come to the conclusion that a person may be able to make his signatures but it does not mean that he is literate. No attempt was made by the cross examiner to prove that the document in question was executed by the defendant No. 1 freely and voluntarily and he received the consideration (Rs. 18,000) from the plaintiff at the time of its execution. The failure of cross examiner to cross examine the DW/1 Ram Manohar on the question of execution of document and payment of sale consideration goes a long way against the plaintiff. It was strenuously contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that Maha Veer being the common relation of the parties he has stated about the execution of the document in question, the Court below committed illegality in holding otherwise. If the Court below was of any doubt it should have asked the plaintiff to examine and prove the signature of Ram Manohar with the help of handwriting expert. The Court below should have compared the admitted signatures of Ram Manohar on Vakalatnama and the written statement with the disputed one. Reliance was placed upon Emperor v. Jhabbarmal and others, AIR 1928 Allahabad 222, on head (A ). The said case has hardly any relevance to the facts of the present case. The said case arose out of criminal proceedings. The order of acquittal for an offence under Section 500 I. P. C. was passed and its validity was under challenge. Reliance was placed upon Emperor v. Jhabbarmal and others, AIR 1928 Allahabad 222, on head (A ). The said case has hardly any relevance to the facts of the present case. The said case arose out of criminal proceedings. The order of acquittal for an offence under Section 500 I. P. C. was passed and its validity was under challenge. The reliance was placed on the following passage: "it is a practice of Allahabad High Court in appeal to give little or no weight to the allegations or charges of a defendant or accused if they ought to have been put to the plaintiff or complainant or his witness and have not been so put. A plaintiff or complainant has absolute right to know exactly the allegations or charges upon which the opposite sides are going to rely and they must be put to him or to his appropriate witnesses clearly, specifically and with utmost clearness, so that he may have opportunity of admitting them wholly or in part, or denying them wholly or in part and or calling witnesses to rebut such allegations or charges as he denies. " 12. The plaintiff was fully aware that the execution of the sale agreement Ex. 6 was specifically denied by the defendant in the written statement. Not only this it was also specifically pleaded by defendant No. 1 that he did not receive any amount under the alleged agreement. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff-appellant was not aware of the contents of the allegations upon which the defendant No. 1 was going to rely. 13. The learned counsel then placed reliance upon last sentence of paragraph No. 16 of Sitam Ram Bahu Patil v. Ram Chandra Nago Patil, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1712. The said portion reads as follows: "therefore, a mere proof of admission, after the person whose admission it is alleged to be has concluded his evidence, will not be of no avail and cannot be utilized against him. " 14. The reading of contents of paragraph No. 16 of the aforesaid ruling as a whole clearly shows that the aforesaid observation was made in connection with the provisions of Indian Evidence Act relating to admission is not conclusive proof. The Supreme Court has referred in that case Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shriniwas Pandit, AIR 1915 Privy Council 7. " 14. The reading of contents of paragraph No. 16 of the aforesaid ruling as a whole clearly shows that the aforesaid observation was made in connection with the provisions of Indian Evidence Act relating to admission is not conclusive proof. The Supreme Court has referred in that case Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shriniwas Pandit, AIR 1915 Privy Council 7. The aforesaid ruling has no application to the facts of the present case and is quite distinguishable. The Court below has not based its conclusion upon any admission either made by the plaintiff or the defendant. 15. For the same reasons the judgment of the Supreme Court given in Sanwat v. D. D. C. , 1984 A. W. C. 616 (para 2) has no application in the present case. 16. The learned counsel assailing the findings of the trial Court further on issues No. 1, 2 and 3 submitted that its observation that the plaintiff is a person of very ordinary means and status, is wrong. The trial Court has taken into consideration that the plaintiff is a man of ordinary means and status and therefore the claim of plaintiff that he had ready money amounting to Rs. 18,000/- is hollow or empty. This circumstance was criticized by the learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that the land of the village in question is very fertile and irrigation facilities are available in the village. The said submission of the learned counsel is of no substance and is against the oral testimony of the plaintiff himself. The plaintiff in his deposition has stated that he has no other source of income except the agricultural income. The plots belonging to him have no irrigation facilities and are single cropped. Therefore the observation of the Court below that the plaintiff has no financial capacity to pay Rs. 18,000/- is correct. 17. It has been found by the Court below that the possession was not delivered to the plaintiff as claimed by him nor he advanced Rs. 18,000/- as earnest money and the vendees (other defendants) still continued to be in possession over the fields and their names have been already mutated in the revenue records. The trial Court has rightly taken into consideration the fact that out of the total consideration of Rs. 20,000/-, Rs. 18,000/- as earnest money and the vendees (other defendants) still continued to be in possession over the fields and their names have been already mutated in the revenue records. The trial Court has rightly taken into consideration the fact that out of the total consideration of Rs. 20,000/-, Rs. 18,000/- was paid according to the plaintiff but the time was fixed for execution of the sale deed upto 31st March, 1983. The alleged agreement is dated 21st February, 1976. When a major portion of the sale consideration was paid as advance money it is strange why a period of about 8 years was fixed for payment of Rs. 2,000/-, the remaining amount. To this an explanation was offered by the plaintiff that the village had come under the consolidation operation. During the consolidation operation holdings could be transferred after obtaining permission from the Settlement Officer Consolidation as provided under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. There is no absolute bar for transfer of holdings during the consolidation operation. Fixation of such a long period creates suspicion and doubt about the genuineness of the agreement in question dated 21st February, 1976. The observation of the Court below that the parties demanding such an appreciable time for fulfilling commitments does not seem to be reasonable, cannot be said without any substance. 18. Therefore the findings of the Court below under issues No. 1, 2 and 3 are born out from the evidence on record. The findings do not suffer from any legal or factual infirmity. They are based on the correct appreciation of evidence on record. 19. In addition to above there is another reason not to grant any relief to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has come forward with a case that the possession was also delivered to him at the time of the execution of the agreement in question. This has not been found so by the Court below. The learned counsel could not challenge the finding of the possession. There is no evidence on record to establish that the possession was delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant No. 1 at the time of the execution of the agreement in question. The grant of relief for specific performance of an agreement to sell is a discretionary relief. The learned counsel could not challenge the finding of the possession. There is no evidence on record to establish that the possession was delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant No. 1 at the time of the execution of the agreement in question. The grant of relief for specific performance of an agreement to sell is a discretionary relief. The discretion lies with the Court to grant or not to grant a decree for specific performance of contact of sale even if the plaintiff successfully establishes the agreement in question; the discretion still rests with the Court. Decree for specific performance is a equitable relief. It is fairly settled that a person who seeks equity must come to the Court with clean hands. The plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands as his allegation regarding the possession has been found to be incorrect. 20. In view of the above there is no merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed. But no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .