Judgment J.S.Khehar, J. 1. (16th February, 2004) - Civil Writ Petition No. 2475 of 1982 was taken up for final disposal alongwith CWP No. 2604 of 1982, 5351 of 1982, 5007 of 1984 and 5008 of 1984. All the aforesaid writ petitions were allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 11.12.1996 [Reported as (1997-1)115 P.L.R. 550 - Editor]. 2. The private respondents who were adversely affected by the judgment rendered in the instant writ petition on 11.12.1996 filed Civil Misc. No. 6047 of 1997 for setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 11.12.1996, on account of the fact that they had not been duly served. The aforesaid Civil Misc. No. 6047 of 1997 was allowed by the same learned Single Judge who had originally decided CWP No. 2475 of 1982 on 11.12.1996, by a detailed order dated 15.1.1998. Accordingly, judgment dated 11.12.1996 rendered in the instant writ petition was recalled and CWP No. 2475 of 1982 was restored to its original number for final disposal. 3. The controversy in the instant writ petition relates to allotment of evacuee property made in favour of respondent No. 3 by the Custodian. It is not a matter of dispute that the allotted evacuee property was shamilat land. In the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh and Ors., 1985 P.L.J. 463, it was concluded that shamilat land owned by evacuees, does not vest in the Custodian, but vests in the Gram Panchayat. On the basis of the aforesaid judgment, it would stand established that the evacuee land allotted to respondent No. 3 in 1981 remained the land and property of the Gram Panchayat. 4. Learned counsel for the private respondents has, however, invited the attention of this Court to a notification dated 8.4.1996 whereby Section 2 of the Punjab Act 18 of 1961 came to be amended insofar its applicability to the State of Haryana is concerned. As per the aforesaid amendment, Sub-clause (ii-a) was inserted in Section 2 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 . As per the aforesaid amendment, Sub-clause (ii-a) was inserted in Section 2 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 . The inserted sub clause which is relevant for the present controversy, is being extracted hereunder;- "(ii-a) was shamilat deh, but has been allotted to any person by the Rehabilitation Department of the State Department, after the commencement of this Act, but on or before the 9th day of July, 1985." On the basis of the aforesaid amendment, learned counsel for the private respondents asserts that the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Malwinder Singhs case (supra) had been rendered nugatory insofar as the controversy relating to the private respondents is concerned, inasmuch as property allotted prior to 9.7.1985 though shamilat land would not re-vest in the Gram Panchayat and would remain with the allottee. So as to authenticate the aforesaid conclusion, learned counsel for the private respondents invited the attention of this Court to the decision rendered in Puran v. Financial Commissioner (Appeal), Punjab and Ors., - 1996 P.L.J. 539, (wherein a similar amendment made for the State of Punjab) was subject matter of consideration. Therein a Division Bench of this Court in similar circumstances recorded a finding that shamilat land originally allotted by the Custodian prior to the cut off date would remain with the allottee and would not be deemed to be vested in the Gram Panchayat. 5. In the background of the factual position noticed above, the only recourse possible to the petitioner, in order to succeed is by following one of the two courses; firstly, to challenge the vires of the amendment extracted above; and secondly, to establish that the controversy in hand would not fall within the ambit of the said amendment. 6. It is not a matter of dispute that the vires of the provision extracted (above which has been relied upon, by the learned counsel for the private respondents) has not been challenged. This leads this Court to the last recourse open to the petitioner, namely whether or not the claim of the petitioner could be accepted despite the amendment relied upon by the learned counsel for the private respondents. The factual narration in the writ petition discloses that the land which has been allotted to the private respondents was originally Shamilat land, situated in the revenue estate of village Kherari. The factual narration in the writ petition discloses that the land which has been allotted to the private respondents was originally Shamilat land, situated in the revenue estate of village Kherari. In respect of the said land, mutation No. 1878 was sanctioned on 8.6.1981 whereby the land in question was mutated in favour of the Custodian Department. Out of the land mutated in favour of the Custodian Department, the land in question was allotted to respondent No. 3 and to other persons by the Custodian. In the written statement filed by the private respondents, in paragraph 2 of the preliminary objections, it has been expressed that the respondents had migrated to India from Pakistan during partition and the land in dispute was allotted to them in March 1981, by the Rehabilitation Department. The aforesaid factual position has not been disputed or controverted by filing a replication or by relying on any other material. In view of the above, it is inevitable to accept that the allotment made in favour of the private respondents was affected in March 1981. Since the aforesaid allotment was well before the cut off date i.e. 9.7.1985. There can be no doubt that amended provision i.e. Clause (ii-a) of Section 2 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 would clearly protect the ownership rights of the private respondents. 7. Despite the aforesaid conclusion, learned counsel while contesting the applicability of the aforesaid amendment to the controversy in hand relied on the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Shamsher Singh v. The Commissioner Jullundhur Division and Ors. 1986 P.L.J. 492 in order to assert that the amendment would not be applicable to this case as the controversy in hand was sub judice, and therefore, would be eclipsed from the effect of the amendment. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed pointed reliance on the conclusion drawn in para 6 of the aforesaid judgment. Para 6 is being extracted hereunder:- "Since the amendment is not retrospective, it cannot cover the case of the appellant. All the proceedings had been completed under the un-amended Section 3(8). Even the principle of the application of an amended law to the pending proceedings cannot be applied though the amendment had been made and enforced during the pendency of the writ petition. All the proceedings had been completed under the un-amended Section 3(8). Even the principle of the application of an amended law to the pending proceedings cannot be applied though the amendment had been made and enforced during the pendency of the writ petition. It is well settled that the proceedings in a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution are not in the nature of an appeal or revision. They are proceedings of an extraordinary nature. So, the principle that the appellate or revisional Court may take into account any change in law during the pendency of the proceedings is not attracted to the writ petitions. If any authority for the proposition is needed, then reference may be made to a recent Division Bench decision of this Court in Gram Sabha Salina v. Nahar Singh and Ors., 1983 P.L.J. 261." It is not possible for me to accept that proposition canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that an amendment made by the State Legislature would be inapplicable to a controversy pending adjudication before a Court. The aforesaid conclusion has not been drawn in the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner inasmuch as the entire action in the aforesaid case had taken place prior to the amendment referred to in the said judgment, 8 Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment in Veer Kaur v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1996-1)112 P.L.R. 298. Insofar as the reliance placed on the judgment rendered in Veer Kaurs case (supra) is concerned, the same is clearly misconceived in view of the fact that the judgment therein was rendered on 16.11.1995 i.e. without taking into consideration the amendment effected by the insertion of Clause (ii-a) in Section 2 of Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 . 9. Last of all, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it would be unfair to confirm the allotment made in favour of the private respondents and that some alternative land should be given to them. The instant plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also not acceptable. In view of the amendment relied upon by the private respondents, which necessarily entails that allotment made by the Custodian in favour of any person after the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 but before 9.7.1985 would stand protected. The instant plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also not acceptable. In view of the amendment relied upon by the private respondents, which necessarily entails that allotment made by the Custodian in favour of any person after the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 but before 9.7.1985 would stand protected. Thus viewed, the allotment made in favour of the private respondents in March 1981 stands confirmed by the amendment referred above. The same cannot be cancelled. So as to make an alternate allotment as has been suggested. 10. For the reasons recorded above, I find no merit in this petition. The same is accordingly dismissed.