ORDER 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 2. The appellants filed the writ petition questioning the validity and correctness of the order dated 19-4-1996 made by the Additional Director, Consolidation, Mohali (Punjab). The respondents filed a petition under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (for brevity "the Act"). The Additional Director, Consolidation, by his order dated 19-4-1996, allowed the petition. The said order was challenged by the Gram Panchayat by filing CWP No. 9518 of 1996 and the same was dismissed by the High Court by order dated 13-9-1996. Gainst that order of the High Court, the Gram Panchayat filed SLP (C) No. 12635 of 1997. The same was dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits and noticing on the peculiar facts of the case. The Gram Panchayat filed yet another petition i.e. CWP No. 9863 of 1996 challenging the very order of the Additional Director dated 19-4-1996. That writ petition was also dismissed by the High Court by its order dated 12-7-1996. The matter did not rest at that. The Gram Panchayat pursued the matter further to this Court by filing SLP (C) No. 3128 of 1997. That SLP was also dismissed on 25-3-1997. The appellants herein filed CWP No. 11515 of 1996 challenging the validity and correctness of the very order dated 19-4-1996 passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation. The High Court, by the impugned order, dismissed the writ petition taking note of the facts stated above and particularly taking note of the fact that the order dated 19-4-1996 passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation had attained finality in view of the orders passed earlier by this Court. It may also be noted that a preliminary objection was taken by the Gram Panchayat, Respondent 4 herein, stating that the order dated 19-4-1996 passed by the Additional Director had attained finality. 3. It may also be noted that a preliminary objection was taken by the Gram Panchayat, Respondent 4 herein, stating that the order dated 19-4-1996 passed by the Additional Director had attained finality. 3. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that CWP No. 17632 of 1995 is pending before the High Court for adjudication, in which the appellants and one of the private respondents are also parties; the controversy required to be resolved in that writ petition is in a way similar to the controversy that is required to be examined in this appeal; in the writ petition, a ground was raised mentioning about CWP No. 17632 of 1995 and request was made to the High Court that the present writ petition could be heard along with CWP No. 17632 of 1995; the High Court committed an error in not hearing both the writ petitions together. The learned counsel added that in the light of an earlier judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab] the Additional Director, Consolidation committed a manifest error in passing the order dated 19-4-1996, without hearing the appellants. According to the learned counsel, the said order passed by the Additional Director, without complying with the directions given in the aforementioned decision of this Court, is bad in law. He further urged that the petition filed by Respondents 2 and 3 under Section 42 of the Act, almost after a period of 40 years, ought not to have been entertained at all on the ground of inordinate delay; the Additional Director had no jurisdiction to pass the order dealing with the question of title. a 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondents 2 and 3 made submissions supporting the impugned order. She urged that the appellants, in the writ petition did not claim that they were lessees of the land in question, pointing out to ground 8 in the writ petition to show that the appellants claimed as right-holders of the village. a 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondents 2 and 3 made submissions supporting the impugned order. She urged that the appellants, in the writ petition did not claim that they were lessees of the land in question, pointing out to ground 8 in the writ petition to show that the appellants claimed as right-holders of the village. It was also brought to our notice that in the writ petition the appellants took a stand that the land in question does b not vest in the Gram Panchayat and to this extent, linding of the Additional Director was correct; the question of deciding title did not arise as the application made under Section 42 of the Act by Respondents 2 and 3 was only with regard to repartition and Mutation Entry 386 that was made in favour of the Gram Panchayat. The learned counsel also submitted that the Additional Director, having regard to the documents placed on record and in c the light of the evidence, recorded a finding that Respondents 2 and 3 have been in continuous possession for a long time, which fact is clear from the jamabandi for the year 1951-52 as well; in paragraph 8 of the counteraffidavit, the respondents have specilically asserted that they had been in continuous possession and this fact is not denied in the rejoinder-affidavit filed by the appellants; since they had been in continuous possession, the question of delay cannot be put against them. There was no occasion for them to move the court earlier and at the earliest point of time when their possession was hreatened, they could approach the competent authority; the question of delay, in the light of the facts, was rightly not put against Respondents 2 and 3. The learned counsel also submitted that the land, which is the subject-matter of CWP No. 17632 of 1995, is different; the appellants could not challenge the order dated 19-4-1996, as they do not have any locus standi, right or interest over the land in question. 5. We have considered the respective submissions made by the learned counsel. The learned counsel also submitted that the land, which is the subject-matter of CWP No. 17632 of 1995, is different; the appellants could not challenge the order dated 19-4-1996, as they do not have any locus standi, right or interest over the land in question. 5. We have considered the respective submissions made by the learned counsel. The contention that the High Court committed an error in not hearing CWP No. 11515 of 1996 along with CWP No. 17632 of 1995 and on that account, the appellants may suffer, being parties in pending CWP No. 17632 of 1995, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that it appears, no such request was made before the High Court for hearing both the writ petitions together. This apart, the subject-matter of both the writ petitions is different. Further, when the very order dated 19-4-1996 passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation has reached this Court twice, as indicated while narrating the facts and that order having attained finality, the appellants cannot be permitted to challenge the very order again where the Gram Panchayat claiming that the land vested in them is "s"ami/at de"", failed. The contention of the appellants that the appellants claimed as lessees under a Gram Panchayat, also has no merit. In the writ petition filed, they have claimed as right-holders. The Gram Panchayat, having lost the case throughout in earlier two rounds of litigation and the appellants claimed right under the Gram Panchayat, do not have any case. It may be stated here itself that the decision of this Court in Swaran Singh I mentioned above, in our view, also does not help the appellants. That was a case where this Court a directed that all the tenants may be heard before passing any order. The fact that the appellants have claimed as right-holders and they do not claim as tenants, the question of hearing them did not arise. The question that the Additional Director, Consolidation had no jurisdiction to decide the title to the property, is not specifically raised in the writ petition, although feebly contended as a ground in the writ petition, as to locus standi and that theDirector had no jurisdiction. The question that the Additional Director, Consolidation had no jurisdiction to decide the title to the property, is not specifically raised in the writ petition, although feebly contended as a ground in the writ petition, as to locus standi and that theDirector had no jurisdiction. This argument also cannot be accepted, looking to the facts of this case, because Respondents 2 and 3 approached the competent authority under Section 42 of the Act challenging Mutation Entry 386 made in favour of the Gram Panchayat and further the case proceeded on the basis that the land was not "shamilat deh" but on the basis of the records that it was "shamilat deh hasab rasad zar khewat". Since the question of titlewas not the subject-matter decided by the Additional Director, Consolidation, the argument that he had no jurisdiction to decide the case also cannot be accepted and the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants dealt with the question of title. The last contention, that is to be dealt with, is the question of delay. The learned counsel, on the basis of the decision of this Court in Gram Panchayat, Kakran v. Addl. Director of Consolidation2 urged that the application filed by Respondents 2 and 3 after a long time of 40 years ought not to have been entertained. In the decision aforementioned, this Court in paragraph 4 observed that though Rule 18 does not prescribe any period of limitation, but the party ought to have approached the authority within a reasonable time. That case was decided taking note of the fact, no satisfactory explanation was available to explain the inordinate delay. In the case on hand, it is clear that Respondents 2 and 3, as found by the Additional Director, Consolidation, on the basis of the records, they had been in continuous possession and they could approach the authority when their possession was threatened. It was not a case to be thrown out on the ground of delay. Added to this, before the High Court, it appears to us from the impugned order that the question of delay was not urged. Above all, when the validity of the order dated 19-4-1996 has been upheld, not once but twice by this Court, it is too late in the day to annul that order. It must be observed that the Gram Panchayat has been taking varying stands. Above all, when the validity of the order dated 19-4-1996 has been upheld, not once but twice by this Court, it is too late in the day to annul that order. It must be observed that the Gram Panchayat has been taking varying stands. Before the High Court they opposed the appellants; before this Court they strongly supported the appellants. It is strange that the Gram Panchayat took such an inconsistent stand having lost twice before this Court challenging the very order dated 19-4-1996. This being the position, we do not find any merit in the appeal. Consequently, it is dismissed. No costs.