JUDGMENT : B.S. Chauhan, J. The Petitioner, Dr. Diwarkar Singh has approached this Court by means of the present writ petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Respondents not to appoint regularly selected candidate Dr. Sudha Singh on the post of Lecturer (Hindi) in Raja Shree Krishna Dutt Post-Graduate Degree College, Jaunpur, where the Petitioner claims to have been appointed on daily wage basis. 2. Heard Shri T.P. Singh, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri Siddharth Singh, on behalf of the Petitioner and the learned standing counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 3. It is stated on behalf of the Petitioner that a vacancy on the post of Lecturer (Hindi) fell vacant due to retirement of one Shri Devendra Pratap Upadhyay in Raja Shree Krishna Dutt Post-Graduate Degree College, Jaunpur (hereinafter called the institution), affiliated with the Purvanchal University. The aforesaid vacancy was advertised by the Management of the institution. In pursuance thereof, the Petitioner applied and was selected for appointment as Lecturer (Hindi) on daily wage basis vide appointment letter dated 26th July 2004 (Annexure-4). In the meantime, in pursuance of the advertisement published by the U.P. Higher Education Service Commission (hereinafter called the U.P.H.E.S.C.) selection for appointment on various posts of Lecturer was conducted, and in pursuance thereof, Dr. Sudha Singh has been selected for appointment as Lecturer (Hindi) in Raja Shree Krishan Dutt Post-Graduate Degree College, Jaunpur. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that since there are vacancies available on the post of Lecturer (Hindi) in other Degree Colleges of the State of U.P., Dr. Sudha Singh be accommodated in some other institution, and the working of the Petitioner may not be disturbed. 4. It is further contended that in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bramho Samaj Education Society and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. JT 2004 SC 569, the U.P.H.E.S.C. has no right to make selection on the posts of Teachers in aided Degree Colleges, and consequently, the appointment of Dr. Sudha Singh is illegal and unsustainable. The management has an undefeasible right to make the appointment on the post of Teachers in the institution without any interference of the U.P.H.E.S.C. or the State Government. 5. The contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner are devoid of merit. Sudha Singh is illegal and unsustainable. The management has an undefeasible right to make the appointment on the post of Teachers in the institution without any interference of the U.P.H.E.S.C. or the State Government. 5. The contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner are devoid of merit. From the appointment letter which has been issued in favour of the Petitioner and as admitted in para 5 of the writ petition, the appointment offered to the Petitioner was subject to the condition that he would continue so long as a regularly selected candidate recommended by U.P.H.E.S.C. is not appointed. Since the Petitioner has accepted the appointment with open eyes on the aforesaid conditions it is not open to the Petitioner to challenge the said condition and question the appointment of Dr. Sudha Singh on the recommendations of the U.P.H.E.S.C. Even otherwise, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Brahmo Samaj Education Society (supra) is clearly distinguishable. The legality and validity of the U.P. Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1980, has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the various judgments. It has been further held that Section 16 of the aforesaid Act specifically provided that the appointment on the post of Teachers in aided and recognised Degree Colleges shall be made only on the recommendations of the U.P.H.E.S.C., and the appointment made contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid Act would be null and void. [Vide Dr. Keshav Ram Pal v. U.P. Higher Education Service Commission, Allahabad and Ors. 1986 UPLBEC 262 Kamlesh Kumar Sharma Vs. Yogesh Kumar Gupta and others, (1998) 3 SCC 45 and Kiran Gupta and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2000 (4) AWC 3223 (SC)]. The case in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 2003 SC 355 , on which much reliance has been placed by the Apex Court in Brahmo Samaj Education Society (supra) was a case dealing with the rights relating to minority institutions. 6. It is settled legal propositions that the person, who has been appointed on ad hoc basis with the conditions stipulated in his appointment letter, his services could be terminated at any time. The Petitioner does not have a right to claim any relief if is services are terminated in terms of the letter of appointment. 7. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Vs. The Petitioner does not have a right to claim any relief if is services are terminated in terms of the letter of appointment. 7. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Vs. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691 , the Apex Court has categorically held as under: Under the service jurisprudence a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accordance with the relevant service rules and the terms of contract of service. 8. In a case like the instant, the Court has to be satisfied as to what is the legally justiciable right of the Petitioner which has been infringed and for which the Petitioner can resort to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Curt in Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1958 SC 36 , has held that "A person can be said to acquire a lien on a post only when he has been confirmed and made permanent on that post and not earlier" and further held that "a Government servant holding a post temporarily does not have any right to hold the said post." In Ravindra Kumar Misra Vs. U.P. State Handloom Corpn. Ltd. and Another, (1987) SCC 739 Supp, the Apex Court has taken the same view. 9. A temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of temporary servants. Similarly, in Triveni Shankar Saxena Vs. State of U.P. and others, (1992) 1 SCC 524 Supp; Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies, Lucknow, U.P. and Another Vs. Prakash Chandra Saxena and Another, (1994) 5 SCC 177 Ram Chandra Tripathi Vs. U.P. Public Services Tribunal IV and Others, (1994) 5 SCC 180 Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Devendra Kumar Jain and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 638 and Kaushal Kishore Shukla (supra), the Apex Court has categorically held that incumbent to a post who has been given appointment on temporary basis, terminable without notice, has no right to hold the post and he is not entitled for any opportunity of hearing before his services are dispensed with as his termination does not amount to forfeiture of any legal right. 10. In Ravi S. Naik and Sanjay Bandekar Vs. Union of India and others, (1994) 2 SCC 641 Supp, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in such cases even principles of natural justice do not require to be observed. The Court placed reliance on the observations made in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation, 1971 (2) All ER 1278, wherein it has been observed as under: A breach of procedure, whether called a failure of natural justice or an essential administrative fault cannot give him a remedy in the Courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The Court does not act in vain. 11. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni (1997) 8 SCC 461 , the Apex Court explained the difference of a permanent employee and an employee holding the post on probation and held that the services of a probationer cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause. "This is based on the principle that a substantive appointment to a permanent post in a public service confers substantive right to the post and the person appointed on that post becomes entitled to hold a lien on that post." However, interpreting/enforcing the terms of appointment, which provided for discharge of the said probationer from service at any time during the period of probation or extended period of probation, without any notice or without assigning any cause, the Court held that as his termination was in consonance with the terms and conditions of his appointment letter, he cannot be heard raising grievance. 12. In State of Punjab and others Vs. Surinder Kumar and others, (1992) 1 SCC 489 , the Apex Court has held that the Court must seek the adherence to the terms and conditions of the appointment and there is no reason why terms and conditions of appointments cannot be enforced in a contract of service. 13. In Hindustan Education Society and another Vs. Sk. Kaleem Sk. Surinder Kumar and others, (1992) 1 SCC 489 , the Apex Court has held that the Court must seek the adherence to the terms and conditions of the appointment and there is no reason why terms and conditions of appointments cannot be enforced in a contract of service. 13. In Hindustan Education Society and another Vs. Sk. Kaleem Sk. Gulam Nabi and others, (1997) 5 SCC 152 , the Apex Court has held that where the rules specifically provide for permanent appointment on probation for a specific period and an employee is appointed without stipulating any condition regarding probation, the inference is to be drawn that he was not appointed in substantive capacity. In Avinash Nagra Vs. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 534 , the Apex Court has held that a society can terminate the services not only of a temporary employee but also of a permanent employee by giving him one month's notice or three months' pay and allowances in lieu thereof if the terms of appointment and rules so permit and such termination may be valid in a given case even if the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. 14. In Chandra Deo Gautam Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2001) 9 SCC 401 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the termination of services of temporary employee does not require interference on being removed on any ground as it does not cast any stigma or aspersion on him. In Nazira Begum Lashkar and Ors. v. State of Assam AIR 2001 SC 102 , the Apex Court held that where appointment neither confers any right nor any equity in favour of the employee, as the appointment was purely temporary and could be terminated without notice, no grievance can be entertained by such employee. More so, he cannot claim any equitable relief from any Court. 15. Similar view has been reiterated in Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1991 SC 1145 Karnataka State Private College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (1992) 2 SCC 29 ;Punjab State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Baldev Singh (1998) 5 SCC 450 2001 (2) AWC 1291 (SC) Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. A.P. Bajpai and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 433 and Dhananjay Vs. Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Jalna, (2003) 2 SCC 386 16. State of Karnataka and Others, (1992) 2 SCC 29 ;Punjab State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Baldev Singh (1998) 5 SCC 450 2001 (2) AWC 1291 (SC) Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. A.P. Bajpai and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 433 and Dhananjay Vs. Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Jalna, (2003) 2 SCC 386 16. It has further been held in these cases that termination of the services of the temporary employees under the relevant Rules does not cast any stigma and it remains termination simpliciter. 17. In Dr. (Mrs.) Chanchal Goyal Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 3 SCC 485 , the Apex Court held that a person appointed on a tenure post or temporarily or on ad hoc basis does not have right to hold the post even if the person who has regularly been appointed has not joined the post for the reason that the person next to him or from the waiting list in the regular selection would have a right to join the post and in all circumstances, a temporary or ad hoc employee has to vacate the post so that the regular selected candidate may join. Even if an employee continued for a long time, that does not crystallize into any enforceable right nor such an employee can claim any lien over the said post unless he stands regularised. While deciding the said case, a very heavy reliance had been placed on the earlier judgments in J and K. Public Service Commission, etc. Vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan and others etc. (1994) 2 SCC 630 and Dr A.K. Jain and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (Supra) 18. In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Harish Balkrishna Mahajan,(Supra) Apex Court reiterated the law laid down in State of U.P. and Others Vs. Dr. Deep Narain Tripathi and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 456 Supp, observing that mere continuation for a long time by an ad hoc or temporary employee does not give him any legal right to hold the post. 19. In Nazira Begum Lashkar (supra), the Apex Court held that temporary or ad hoc appointment does not confer any legal right nor such an appointee can claim equity in his favour nor the equitable relief can be granted to him by the Court. Even if, he has worked for unusual long period, even on humanitarian considerations. 20. 19. In Nazira Begum Lashkar (supra), the Apex Court held that temporary or ad hoc appointment does not confer any legal right nor such an appointee can claim equity in his favour nor the equitable relief can be granted to him by the Court. Even if, he has worked for unusual long period, even on humanitarian considerations. 20. A person holding the post of temporary/ad hoc post is not a member of service in accordance with the statutory rules, therefore, he cannot have any right vested in the post. (Vide P.D. Aggarwal and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1987) 3 SCC 622 . Similar view has been reiterated in cases where the person was holding the tenure post by the Hon'ble Apex Court observing that by efflux of time appointment comes to an end automatically on expiry of the tenure of appointment, and such appointee cannot claim any relief either on the basis of equity, or human consideration, or in law. (Vide Director, Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. Vs. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, (1992) 4 SCC 33 and State of U.P. and Another Vs. Dr. S.K. Sinha and Others,.(Supra) The only relief/protection in law an ad hoc appointee can claim is that he should not be replaced by Anr. ad hoc as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and Another, (1987) 4 SCC 497 (1988) Supp. SCC 428 and State of Haryana and others Vs. Piara Singh and others etc. etc., (1992) 4 SCC 118 21. Therefore, the law on the issue can be summarised as under:- An ad hoc appointment means a stop-gap arrangement. The appointment is defeasible, and thus, incapable to create any legal right in favour of the appointee for the reason that such an appointment is made in administrative exigency, pending regular appointment, in public interest. As ad hoc appointment is made in public interest considering the administrative necessity, temporarily, or to meet a temporary necessity for a specific purpose, an ad hoc appointee cannot have any grievance whatsoever as he is not deprived of any right or interest vested in the post. He cannot claim to be a member of the service in accordance with the rules. The only protection law gives to an ad hoc appointee is, not to be replaced by Anr. ad hoc appointee. He cannot claim to be a member of the service in accordance with the rules. The only protection law gives to an ad hoc appointee is, not to be replaced by Anr. ad hoc appointee. Thus, he has to make accommodation to the regular appointee whenever he comes to join. 22. In view of the aforesaid legal propositions, no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is called for. Writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 23. In the instant case, it has been prayed that Dr. Sudha Singh, the regular appointee be restrained to join in place of the Petitioner. She has not been impleaded as Respondent. The petition itself suffers from non-joinder of parties and is liable to be dismissed on this ground. 24. It is settled law that a person who may be adversely affected by the order of the Court is a necessary party and no order can be passed adversely affecting him behind his back. (Vide Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia Vs. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786 Prabodh Verma and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (1984) 4 SCC 251 Ishwar Singh v. Kuldip Singh (1995) Suppl (1) SCC 179 Bhagwanti v. Subordinate Services Selection Board (1995) Suppl (2) SCC 663 Central Bank of India Vs. S. Satyam and others, (1996) 5 SCC 419 J. Jose Dhanapaul Vs. S. Thomas and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 587 and Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh AIR 1998 SC 331 Azhar Hasan and Others Vs. Distt. Judge, Saharanpur and Others, (1998) 3 SCC 246 Ram Swarup and Others Vs. S.N. Maira and Others, (1999) 1 SCC 738 Shri L. Chandrakishore Singh Vs. State of Manipur and Others, (1999) 8 SCC 287 B. Ramanjini and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2002) 5 SCC 533 and Ramrao and Others Vs. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association and Others, (2004) 2 SCC 76 25. In the instant case, Petitioner has worked only for a period of one month on a fixed salary rather honorarium. He was appointed with a clear stipulation that his service could be terminated any time without notice. Petitioner is a party to the said contract and he cannot be permitted to resile form the said terms and conditions incorporated in his appointment letter. Petitioner admittedly does not have any lien on the post. He was appointed with a clear stipulation that his service could be terminated any time without notice. Petitioner is a party to the said contract and he cannot be permitted to resile form the said terms and conditions incorporated in his appointment letter. Petitioner admittedly does not have any lien on the post. Nor he can ask that Dr. Sudha Singh may be adjusted in any other institution. 26. Thus, in view of the above, the writ petition is devoid of any merit and stands dismissed.