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2004 DIGILAW 1784 (RAJ)

Mook Badhir Balak or Balika Badhir Bal Vikas Kendra Jhalawar Road, Kota v. Judge Labour Court Kota

2004-12-14

SHIV KUMAR SHARMA

body2004
Judgment S.K. Sharma, J.-The petitioner (for short ‘employer’) seeks to set aside the award dated August 7, 1996 of Labour Court Kota, whereby the reference made to it under Section 10(1)(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘Act’) was answered and it was held that removal of the respondent No. 2 (for short ‘workman’) from the services by the employer was bad in law and she was entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service with 50% back wages. 2. On reference being made under Section 10(1)(g) of the Act, the workman filed statement of claim stating therein that she was appointed as Assistant on January 1, 1976 with the employer. Her salary was increased from time to time. On April 14, 1982 when the workman went on duty she was not allowed to sign on the attendance register and with effect from April 14, 1982 her services were terminated. 3. The employer submitted reply to the statement of claim raising preliminary objection that since the workman does not come within the definition of workman, she was not entitled to seek protection under the Act. It was also pleaded that the workman had filed civil suit, which was ultimately withdrawn by her. Since, the workman was appointed on the post of Teacher and she did not fulfill the requisite qualification, she was not entitled to remain in the service. The workman filed affidavit, on which she was cross examined. Whereas Ganeshilal Raniwala filed affidavit on behalf of the employer and he was also cross-examined. Learned Judge, Labour Court on hearing final submissions answered the reference as indicated herein above. 4. Learned Counsel for the employer urged that since the workman approached the Labour Court after a long delay, she was not entitled to any relief . 5. A look at the reply filed by the employer in the Labour Court goes to show that no objection regarding the delay was raised by the employer. Even at the time of making oral submission no such submission was canvassed. In such a situation the employer can not now be permitted to raise such objection for the first time in this Court. 6. Even at the time of making oral submission no such submission was canvassed. In such a situation the employer can not now be permitted to raise such objection for the first time in this Court. 6. The next submission of learned Counsel for the employer is that the Labour Court has not decided another objection of the employer that the ‘teacher’ could not have been termed as ‘workman’ within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Act. Having scanned the evidence adduced in the Labour Court, I find that in the impugned award learned Labour Court has considered the evidence in detail and held that function that were actually performed by the employee comes within the definition of workman. In Andhra Scientific Co. Ltd. vs. A. Seshagiri Rao, AIR 1967 SC 408 , Three Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “When a Labour Court, has on a consideration of the evidence come to the conclusion as regards the functions that were actually being performed by an employee that he comes within the definition of workman in Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act the High Court will not interfere under Article 226 except in cases where there is a clear error on the face of the record. What functions were actually being performed by the employee is a question of fact.” I do not find any error on the face of the record in the findings of Labour Court and no interference, therefore, is called for. 7. Learned Counsel for the employer placed reliance on Miss. A. Sundarambal vs. Government of Goa, Daman & Diu, AIR 1988 SC 1700 and canvassed that a teacher does not fall within the definition of expression of workman. Relevant para 10 reads as under:- “......We are of the view that the teachers employed by educational institutions whether the said institutions are imparting primary, secondary, graduate or post-graduate education cannot be called as ‘workman’ within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. Imparting of education which is the main function of teachers cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. Imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. Imparting of education which is the main function of teachers cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. Imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. A teacher educates children, he moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes them fit to become responsible citizens....” In the instant case, the workman was neither appointed in educational institution nor she was imparting education, she was assigned the work to assist deaf and dumb children. Thus, I find no merit in the submission of learned Counsel. I however find force in the contention that since workman did not controvert the fact that after her termination she was gainfully employed, she was not entitled to back wages. 8. For these reasons, the writ petition is partly allowed to the extent that the workman shall not be paid back wages as awarded by the learned Labour Court and to this extent the impugned award is modified. The workman is, however, entitled to be reinstated in service with continuity of service. The employer should ensure compliance of the award within thirty days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.