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2004 DIGILAW 183 (ALL)

Krishna Gopal v. Dilip Singh

2004-01-30

K.N.OJHA

body2004
K. N. OJHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed for quashing order dated 25/8/2003 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Etawah and order dated 27/2/2003 passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Etawah for further direction to the respondents not to interfere in the peaceful possession of the petitioner over the land in dispute. ( 2 ) HEARD Sri A. K. Saxena learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the record. ( 3 ) THE writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage. ( 4 ) WHEN the writ petition was filed, it was reported by this office that period of limitation for filing writ petition was upto 23/11/2003, while writ petition was filed on 12/11/2003. Thus it is barred by time. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no period of limitation for a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance has been placed on judgment of this court reported in Raj Kumar and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh and others, in which it has been laid down by this court that neither in Indian Limitation Act nor in Allahabad High Court Rules, the period of limitation of filing writ petition has been prescribed. Thus, the normal period of limitation of 90 days does not apply to the writ petition filed in this court. In this case, the revision was decided by learned Sessions Judge, Etawah on 25/8/2003. Some time would have taken place in receiving copy of the order and filing writ petition. Thus, the delay in filing instant writ petition is not such which can amount to latches on the part of the petitioner. Hence the writ petition cannot be held to be barred by time and it is be considered on merit. ( 5 ) A perusal of the order passed by both the courts below shows that accor-ding to petitioner, he moved application before Sub Divisional Magistrate, Etawah on 15/3/2000 that he is in possession of plot Nos. 338, 333 and 334 situate in Mauja Sarai Ekdil, district Etawah. It is alleged that Salik Ram was original bhumidhar of the plots. He had no son. He left Smt. Shanti Devi, his daughter behind him. Smt. Shanti Devi is cousin daughter of the petitioner, who was left by her husband about 35 years before. Since then she was residing with the petitioner. It is alleged that Salik Ram was original bhumidhar of the plots. He had no son. He left Smt. Shanti Devi, his daughter behind him. Smt. Shanti Devi is cousin daughter of the petitioner, who was left by her husband about 35 years before. Since then she was residing with the petitioner. Smt. Santi Devi died on 6/10/1999 and during her life time, the petitioner was looking after her above mentioned disputed land. On her death the petitioner became legally entitled for the land, but the respondents contested the claim of the petitioner on the ground that Smt. Shanti Devi had executed Will deed on 2/9/1991 in their favour and their names were mutated in revenue record on 18/2/2000 under order of Consoli-dation Officer, Badpura, district Etawah. The Consolidation Officer decided the case in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. Appeal was preferred by the petitioner which is pending before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. On the issue of possession dispute did take place between the parties. Application was moved by the petitioner for proceeding under section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure, but the Sub Divisional Magistrate concerned rejected the application by order dated 27/3/2003 on the ground that names of the respondents had been recorded in revenue record by order of Consolidation officer. The petitioner preferred revision bearing Krishan Gopal v. Dilip Singh and others which was dismissed on 25/8/2003 by learned Sessions Judge, Etawah. Hence this writ petition has been filed. ( 6 ) IT has been alleged that when the appeal in respect of the rights and interest of the parties is pending between the parties in the court of Settlement Officer of Consolidation, the application under section 145 Cr. P. C could not be rejected because rights of the parties have not been finally decided and the order of consolidation officer passed in favour of the respondents has not become final. It is also submitted that a publication under section 52-A of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act did take place on 5. 5. 1999. Hence the application under section 145 Cr. P. C. can be entertained by the Sub Divisional Magistrate and it was not to be rejected on the ground that consolidation is pending. Annexure-6 copy of reply of enquiry has been filed in which it was reported that State Government issued Notification on 5. 6. 5. 1999. Hence the application under section 145 Cr. P. C. can be entertained by the Sub Divisional Magistrate and it was not to be rejected on the ground that consolidation is pending. Annexure-6 copy of reply of enquiry has been filed in which it was reported that State Government issued Notification on 5. 6. 1999 under section 52 of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act for closure of consolidation operation in village Sarai Ekdil, district Etawah. On this basis it is submitted that now there is no hurdle if the Sub Divisional Magistrate proceeds under section 145 Cr. P. C. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to petitioner himself, as is alleged in paragraph 13 of the writ petition that appeal is pending between the parties in respect of the disputed plots before Settlement Officer of Consoli-dation, Etawah even though the publi-cation for closing the operation of the consolidation has taken place on 5. 6. 1999. Mention of some sections of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 is relevant for the purpose of this case. ( 8 ) SECTION 5 of the Act Conte-mplates that upon the publication of the notification under sub-section (2) of Section 4 in the Official Gazette, the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified thereunder till the publication of notification under Section 52 or sub-section (1) of section 6, as the case may be, ensure in the area to which the notification under sub-section (2) of section 4 relates. Upon the said publi-cation of the notification under sub-section (2) of Section 4 every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the Court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated. ( 9 ) SECTION 11 of the Act contem-plates that any party to the proceedings under Section 9-A aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer or the Consolidation officer under that section, may within 21 days of the date of the order, file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, who shall, after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned, give his decision thereon which, except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, shall be final and not be questioned in any court of law. (2) The Settlement Officer, Consoli-dation, hearing an appeal under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction, anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force notwithstanding. ( 10 ) SECTION 52 of the Act envisages that (1) As soon as may be after fresh maps and records have been prepared under sub-section (1) of Section 27, the State Government shall issue a notification in the official gazette that the consolidation operation have been closed in the unit and village or villages forming part of the unit shall then cease to be under consolidation operations: Provided that the issue of the notification under this section shall not affect the powers of the State Govern-ment to fix distribute and recover the cost of operations under this Act. ( 11 ) 1-A. The notification issued under sub-section (1) shall be published also in a daily newspaper having circu-lation in the area and in such other manner as may be considered proper. (2) Notwithstanding anything con-tamed in sub-section (1), any order passed by a court of competent juris-diction in cases of writs filed under provisions of the Constitution of India, or in cases of proceedings pending under this Act on the date of issue of the notification under subsection (1), shall be given effect to by such authorities as may be prescribed and consolidation operations shall, for that purpose, be deemed to have not been closed. ( 12 ) THUS, Section 52 (2) of the Act makes it manifest clear that even though notification for closing operation of consolidation has been made by the State Government under Section 52 of the Act, but any order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction in cases of writs filed under the provisions of the Consti-tution of India, or in cases of proceedings pending under the Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 on the date of issue of the notification under section 52 (1) of the Act shall be given effect to by such authorities may be prescribed and the consolidation operation shall, for that purpose, be deemed to have not been closed. Thus, for the purposes of the disputed plots when appeal is pending before Settlement Officer of Consolidation, the consolidation will not be taken to have been closed and the Settle-ment Officer of Consolidation is still com-petent to proceed with the appeal and decide the rights and interest of the parties including their claims of posse-ssion. When the Consolidation Officer has recorded evidence, appeal is pending before Settlement Officer of Con-solidation, rights and interest of the parties can be decided, additional evidence, if any may also be recorded, case is pending before a competent court of law and alternative remedy is available to the petitioner where he can seek his remedy, if both the courts below have held that the case cannot proceed under section 145 Cr. P. C as it is barred by Section 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, the orders are in accordance with the provisions of the Act. ( 13 ) IT has been held in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. that when Code is a self contained and itself provides for appealable/revisable forum, the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked. ( 14 ) SIMILAR view has been reite-rated in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. , R. Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura and Shivgoinda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra. ( 15 ) IN Wirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, and Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that writ should not generally be entertained if statute provides for remedy of appeal and even if it has been admitted, parties should be relegated to the appellate forum. ( 15 ) IN Wirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, and Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that writ should not generally be entertained if statute provides for remedy of appeal and even if it has been admitted, parties should be relegated to the appellate forum. 9 ( 16 ) IN Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh , the Hon ble Apex Court has held that if the statute itself provides for a remedy of revision, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. 10 ( 17 ) IN KS. Rashid and Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and others, it has been held by Honble the Apex Court that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. The said power is limited. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discre-tionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kota, holding that the power of issuing writs are purely discretionary and no limit can be placed upon that discretion. However, the power can be exercised alone with recognised line and not arbitrarily and the Court must keep in mind that the power shall not be exercised unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensue and in other cases the parties must be relegated to the courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense. ( 18 ) IN Union of India v. T. R. Verma, Constitution Bench of the Honble the Supreme Court has held that it is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to persue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. ( 19 ) IN instant case, when statutory remedy available to the petitioner has not been exhausted and appeal in respect of disputed landed property is pending before Settlement Officer of Consoli-dation, who is still competent to decide the rights and interest of the parties, it is not in accordance with the well recognised principles of application of writs to exercise the discretion in favour of the petitioner. In MT. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar and others, the Honble Supreme Court has held that it is well settled that where there is another remedy provided, the High Court must properly exercise its discretion in declining to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 20 ) THEREFORE, when alternative efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner, the writ is not maintainable and is dismissed at the admission stage. Petition dismissed. . .