T. MEENAKUMARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga reddy District dated 24-9-1999 made in o. P. No. 128 of 1996 dismissing the same. ( 2 ) THE appellant is the husband. He filed the above O. P. under Section 13 (1) (ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, the Act) for dissolution of the marriage between him and the respondent by a decree of divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. ( 3 ) THE brief averments in the O. P. are as follows: The marriage between the appellant and the respondent took place on 6-3-1965 at Gudivada as per Hindu rites and custom and after the marriage they came down to eluru to live with his aged parents. It is stated that out of the said wed lock they were blessed with a daughter and three sons. According to the appellant, after the marriage he found that the respondent was behaving in a highly violent manner and used to pick up quarrels and threaten him that she would kill herself by jumping from the terrace or by pouring kerosene on herself. It is also his case that she used to illtreat his aged parents. The appellant further stated that due to the said extraordinary violent behaviour of the respondent, he used to spend sleepless nights and he also got himself transferred from Eluru to various places. But, there was no change in the attitude of the respondent and she was mentally torturing him. It is also his case that she used to suspect his fidelity and abuse him. According to him, she used to come to his office and abuse the lady colleagues and the appellant before them. It is also his contention that she used to visit his friends house to abuse them as well as their wives. The appellant further stated in the O. P. that he tried to adjust with the nature of the respondent and finally when it became unbearable and intolerable for him to bear with the respondent as well as her cruel mentality towards him, he was constrained to file O. P. No. 381 of 1988 before the iv Additional Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad for divorce and since 1989 they are living separately. According to him, even the reconciliation proceedings failed. According to him, even the reconciliation proceedings failed. The appellant further stated that during the pendency of the above O. P. an agreement was entered into between them on 6-11-1989 wherein they agreed to live separately, apart from other terms being that the respondent has no objection for the appellant to remarry in India; that the respondent will continue to be the legally wedded wife of the appellant; that the consent given in condition No. 1 will not be prejudicial to her rights conferred by law; that the appellant is at liberty to reside wherever he wishes; that the appellant will pay Rs. 15007- p. m. to the respondent towards her maintenance and the maintenance her children; that the appellant will not have any claim whatsoever on the house property standing in the name of the respondent; that the appellant undertakes not to leave to any foreign country for permanent stay and in case he wishes to do so, he must deposit a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- with any nationalised Bank in the name of the respondent; that the appellant will withdraw O. P. No. 318 of 1988. According to the appellant the house constructed at Saroornagar was given to the respondent from the date of the agreement and from then onwards she is in possession and enjoyment of the said property and that he is also paying maintenance at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per month from the date of the agreement. It is also stated that from the date of the said agreement, they are living separately. According to the appellant, the terms of the agreement are opposed to public policy and opposed to law inasmuch as in one clause the respondent agrees that the appellant can remarry in India and in another clause she says that she will continue to be his legally wedded wife, which cannot be permitted under law. The appellant further stated that the respondent is living away from him without any reasonable cause and thus she has deserted him. The appellant further stated that the respondent is living separately from the year 1989, which is more than 6 years and hence the respondent deserted him continuously for a period of 6 years preceding the presentation of the application. The appellant further stated that the respondent is living separately from the year 1989, which is more than 6 years and hence the respondent deserted him continuously for a period of 6 years preceding the presentation of the application. According to the appellant all the above acts of the respondent constitute cruelty and desertion within the meaning of those terms occurring in Section 13 of the act. Hence the O. P. ( 4 ) THE respondent-wife opposed the above O. P. by filing a counter affidavit denying and disputing the allegations made against her by the appellant in the O. P. Ghe denied having suspected the fidelity of the appellant. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the appellant did have extra-martial relationship but she ignored the same for a long time. She denied having gone to the office of the appellant and abused any lady colleagues of the appellant. According to her, the appellant drafted the agreement dated 6-11-1989 and obtained her signatures on it. She further stated that the said agreement is opposed to public policy and void ab initio. It is also her case that the said agreement was never acted upon and the appellant never paid any amounts mentioned in the agreement. It is her specific contention that the appellant obtained her signatures on the agreement only to contract a second marriage. It is stated in the counter that the appellant will be often coming and living with her and at times going out and residing separately from her. It is also stated that the appellant cannot take advantage of the terms of the agreement which are favourable to him and leave those which are not favourable to him. According to her, the said agreement is void and cannot be enforced. She categorically stated that she is always willing and ready to join and live with the appellant provided he realizes and conducts himself and live with her happily. It is also her case that it is the appellant who treated her with cruelty and deserted her and he cannot take advantage of his own faults. She denied all the material allegations made against her by the appellant in the O. P. and prayed that the petition be dismissed. ( 5 ) THE appellant filed a rejoinder denying the allegation that the agreement dated 6-11-1989 was never acted upon. She denied all the material allegations made against her by the appellant in the O. P. and prayed that the petition be dismissed. ( 5 ) THE appellant filed a rejoinder denying the allegation that the agreement dated 6-11-1989 was never acted upon. He further stated that the stamp paper for drafting the said agreement was purchased in the name of the respondent by her counsel and it was drafted at their behest and they all signed in the presence of their counsel. He denied having treated the respondent with any cruelty and deserted her. He denied the allegation that he has no concern for his wife and children. According to him, with his influence he got employment for his eldest son in the year 1984 and 1985 who worked till 1997 and thereafter when he wanted to go to Australia to secure employment and studies, with great difficulty and securing loans from the banks, he sent his son to australia who could not put up there and ultimately came back to India. According to him, after the agreement dated 6-11-1989 the house property worth Rs. 7 lakhs has been given to the respondent and she is enjoying the rents derived from the tenants. ( 6 ) THE respondent filed an additional counter contending that the agreement dated 6-11 -1989 was actually drafted by the appellant. She further stated that she is even now ready and willing to condone the extra marital relationship of the appellant and ready to forget all the insults suffered by her if the appellant is willing to come and join her and lead a normal life. She denied the allegation that the appellant financed the two children to go to Australia. She further stated that the appellant never paid the maintenance amount to her regularly. ( 7 ) BEFORE the Court below, the appellant examined himself as P. W. 1, one mr. D. V. Jagapathi, a child hood friend of his a P. W. 2, one Mr. V. S. Chalapathi one of his previous office colleagues as P. W. 3 and mr. M. Gandhi, the advocate who appeared on his behalf in the earlier O. P. , as P. W. 4 and marked Exs. A-1 to A-11. The respondent examined herself as R. W. 1 and her daughter as R. W. 2 and Exs. B-1 to B-3 were marked on their behalf. M. Gandhi, the advocate who appeared on his behalf in the earlier O. P. , as P. W. 4 and marked Exs. A-1 to A-11. The respondent examined herself as R. W. 1 and her daughter as R. W. 2 and Exs. B-1 to B-3 were marked on their behalf. ( 8 ) THE Court below, on a consideration of the entire evidence placed before it and after hearing both the learned counsel for the parties, held that the appellant failed to prove any of the grounds of cruelty or desertion urged by him for dissolving the marriage between the parties by a decree of divorce and consequently dismissed the O. P. by order dated 24-9-1999. Hence, this appeal by the aggrieved husband. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant, assailing the validity of the impugned order, contended that the court below failed to appreciate the evidence in the proper perspective and came to erroneous conclusions and hence the order of the court below is liable to be set aside. ( 10 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the order of the Court below. ( 11 ) THE question that falls for consideration and decision in this appeal is whether the appellant is able to prove any of the grounds of cruelty and desertion urged by him for dissolving the marriage by a decree of divorce? ( 12 ) BEFORE we proceed to consider the rival contentions of both the parties, let us first examine what is cruelty and desertion with reference to decided cases. ( 13 ) TREATING the petitioner with cruelty is a ground for divorce under Section 13 (1) (i-a) of the Act. The word cruelty has not been defined under the Act, but in relation to matrimonial matters it is contemplated as a conduct of such type which endangers the living of the petitioner with the respondent. Cruelty consists of acts which are dangerous to life, limb or health. Cruelty for the purpose of the Act means where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to have inflicted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health. ( 14 ) CRUELTY may be physical or mental. Cruelty for the purpose of the Act means where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to have inflicted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health. ( 14 ) CRUELTY may be physical or mental. Mental cruelty is the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the other. "cruelty", therefore, postulates a treatment of the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other. ( 15 ) IT is impossible to give a comprehensible definition of cruelty, but when reprehensible conduct or departure from normal standard of conjugal kindness causes injury to health or an apprehension of it, it is, cruelty. The change of law brought about by the Hindu Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 deserves notice. Prior to the said Amendment Act, cruelty was not a ground for claiming divorce under the Act, and it was a ground only for claiming judicial separation under Section 10. By the said Amendment Act, cruelty was made a ground for divorce, evidently in recognition of the changing mores of life. ( 16 ) IN V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat the supreme Court had an occasion to deal with the question, what is mental cruelty? Their lordships of the Supreme Court, after referring to various decisions and the provisions of the Act, held that mental cruelty in Section 13 (1) (ia) can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other and the parties cannot reasonably also be expected to live together or that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It was also considered to be not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the wronged party. It is not necessary to prove that mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to be social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living part and all other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. It was observed therein that what is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case and it is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case and if it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made. ( 17 ) CRUELTY for the purpose of section 13 (1) (i-a) is to be taken as a behaviour by one spouse towards the other, which causes reasonable apprehension in the mind of the latter that it is not safe for him or her to continue the matrimonial relationship with the other. Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to the behaviour or behavioural pattern by the other. Unlike the case of physical cruelty, mental cruelty is difficult to establish by direct evidence. It is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of matrimonial life have been living. The inference has to be drawn from the attending facts and circumstances taken cumulatively. In case of mental cruelty it will not be a correct approach to take an instance of misbehaviour in isolation and then pose the question whether such behaviour is sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty. The inference has to be drawn from the attending facts and circumstances taken cumulatively. In case of mental cruelty it will not be a correct approach to take an instance of misbehaviour in isolation and then pose the question whether such behaviour is sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty. The approach should be to take the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference whether the petitioner in the divorce petition has been subjected to mental cruelty due to conduct of the other, ( 18 ) IN N. G, Dastane (Dr.) v. S. Dastane it was held that normally the burden lies on the petitioner to establish his or her plea that the respondent had meted out cruelty to the petitioner and that the standard of proof required in matrimonial cases under the Act is not to establish the charge of cruelty beyond reasonable doubt but merely one of weighing the various probabilities to find out whether the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the said fact alleged. ( 19 ) "desertion", for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other s consent and without reasonable cause. In other words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations i. e. not permitting or allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties. The proof of desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalises the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. If a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion,. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. If a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion,. ( 20 ) FOR the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi ). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. ( 21 ) DESERTION is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both the anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If, in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi coexist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the animus deserendi coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with the intention, express or implied, of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like any other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court, and Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court, and Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi. ( 22 ) ON the anvil of the above well settled legal position, we have to examine the facts obtaining in the present case. ( 23 ) IT is the case of the appellant that after the marriage with the respondent he found that she was behaving violently and used to pick up quarrels with him and his mother unreasonably and also threaten him that she would kill herself by jumping from the terrace or by pouring kerosene on herself. It is also his contention that she used to suspect his fidelity and hence used to come to his office and abuse him and the lady colleagues. He reiterated the same in his evidence. The appellant as P. W. 1 stated that the respondent used to quarrel with his colleagues and his family members even at lucknow and she used to abuse him and create nuisance in the locality. He also stated that she used to go to the houses of his colleagues and abuse them and their wives. In his evidence he categorically stated that the O. P. No. 381 of 1988 filed by him earlier was dismissed for default as he did not pursue the same and that during the pendency of the said O. P. an agreement was entered into between him and the respondent on 6-11-1989. Though he stated that one S. Savitri is his colleague, he denied the suggestion that he had any extramarital relationship with her. He also denied having written a letter to her on 19-12-1990. Though he admitted that he went to USA twice on trade union activities, he denied the suggestion that he went to USA to live with savitri. In his evidence P. W. 1 categorically stated that there is no scope of reconciliation. He denied the suggestion that the said Savitri demanded divorce from the respondent to marry her and hence the present application is filed. In his evidence P. W. 1 categorically stated that there is no scope of reconciliation. He denied the suggestion that the said Savitri demanded divorce from the respondent to marry her and hence the present application is filed. Though the appellant both in his application for divorce as well as in his evidence stated that the respondent used to come to his office and abuse him in the presence of his colleagues which amounts to cruelty and that she also used to abuse the lady colleagues, no other independent evidence is adduced to prove the said contentions. It is also his evidence that she used to visit the houses of his colleagues only to abuse them and their wives. But no other independence evidence is adduced in this behalf. ( 24 ) P. W. 2 is said to be a childhood friend of P. W. 1. According to him, the appellant used to inform him that his marital life with the respondent was not cordial and that he used to stay in his house for one or two days saying that the respondent abused and quarrelled with him. He categorically stated that the appellant and the respondent never visited his house together at any time and that he never witnessed the behaviour of the respondent with the petitioner and that he came to know about the same through p. W. 1 only. He further stated that he knows one Savitri the colleague of P. W. 1 but he does not know about their relationship. We are at a loss to understand how this evidence of P. W. 2 would in any way help the appellant to prove that the respondent behaved with him cruelly and deserted him. ( 25 ) P. W. 3 is said to be the previous colleague of P. W. 1. He deposed that he never witnessed the personal attitude of the respondent towards the appellant and he came to know about the same only through p. W. 1. He further stated that the respondent is cruel towards her husband and prior to 1988 the appellant used to sleep in the nights in his house stating that the relationship between him and his wife is not cordial. How the respondent is cruel towards the appellant etc. , there is no explanation in his evidence. The evidence of P. Ws. He further stated that the respondent is cruel towards her husband and prior to 1988 the appellant used to sleep in the nights in his house stating that the relationship between him and his wife is not cordial. How the respondent is cruel towards the appellant etc. , there is no explanation in his evidence. The evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 is interested and cannot be relied upon. Further, their evidence would in no way help the case of the appellant. ( 26 ) P. W. 4 is the advocate who appeared for the appellant in O. P. No. 381 of 1988 before the Court below. He stated that he along with the counsel for the respondent finalized the terms of agreement as per the wishes of the parties and reduced the same into writing and it is Ex. A-1. He stated that both the parties are living separately since the last 15 days from the date of his deposition. ( 27 ) THUS, except the self-serving testimony of P. W. 1 there is absolutely no other independent evidence to show that the respondent treated him cruelly and deserted him. ( 28 ) ON the other hand, it is the evidence of R. W. 1, the respondent-wife, that she never quarrelled with the appellant, never abused or threatened him and her relationship with elders was always cordial. She further stated that the appellant had extra-marital relationship with his colleague s. Savitri from 1970 onwards. She categorically stated that during the year 1988 the appellant went to USA and stayed there for about 20 days and at that time the said S. Savitri was also at USA. It is her evidence that after returning from America he filed the first divorce petition and during the pendency of the said petition they entered into an agreement and that O. P. was dismissed for default. She further stated that Ex. A-1, agreement, was got prepared by the appellant. Her evidence also would go to show that during he pendency of the first divorce petition, she found the letter dated 19-12-1990 written by the appellant to Savitri in his papers and she took the Photostat copy of the said letter and kept the original in the same place. A-1, agreement, was got prepared by the appellant. Her evidence also would go to show that during he pendency of the first divorce petition, she found the letter dated 19-12-1990 written by the appellant to Savitri in his papers and she took the Photostat copy of the said letter and kept the original in the same place. It is also in her evidence that during the pendency of the said divorce petition, the appellant also filed a petition to evict her from his house. She categorically stated that she has no objection if the appellant is ready and willing to join her and that she is not willing for dissolution of the marriage. ( 29 ) R. W. 2 is the daughter of R. W. 1. According to her evidence, the relationship between the appellant and the respondent was cordial, that her father had illegal contact with one Savitri for the last 20 years and that she came to know about the said fact when her parents were exchanging words with regard to the same. She further stated that Ex. B-3, the letter dt. 19-12-1990, is in the handwriting of his father. In the cross-examination she stated that S. Savitri left India about 11 years back and that she is a spinster and she has no children. Thus, the evidence of R. Ws. 1 and 2 would clearly go to show that there was no cruelty on the part of the respondent and that she never deserted the appellant. ( 30 ) WE had an occasion to go through ex. B-3, which is said to be the letter purported to be written by the appellant to s. Savitri who is residing at America. In view of the observations of the trial Court that ex. B-3 was not proved properly, we are not inclined to express any opinion with regard to the contents of Ex. B-3. ( 31 ) IT is well settled that the standard of proof required in a case of cruelty or desertion need not be over-emphasised. Though strict proof of beyond reasonable doubt, as required in a criminal case is not necessary, the preponderance of probabilities atleast should indicate that the respondent treated the appellant with cruelty and deserted him or that a matrimonial offence has been committed. Though strict proof of beyond reasonable doubt, as required in a criminal case is not necessary, the preponderance of probabilities atleast should indicate that the respondent treated the appellant with cruelty and deserted him or that a matrimonial offence has been committed. In this case, except the self-serving testimony of P. W. 1 that the respondent behaved cruelly towards him and that she deserted her, there is absolutely no other independent evidence adduced by the appellant to prove the same. When the appellant contends that Ex. A-1 agreement is opposed to law and public policy, he cannot take advantage of some of the conditions of the said agreement which are favourable to him and leave the other conditions which are not favourable to him and he cannot be permitted to aprobate and reprobate. ( 32 ) AS could be seen from the material available on record, it is he who is living away from the respondent. Hence, he cannot take advantage of his own faults. ( 33 ) VIEWED from any angle, the appellant has utterly failed to prove any of the grounds of cruelty and desertion urged by him for dissolving the marriage by a decree of divorce. The Court below while refusing to grant the relief to the appellant has given cogent and convincing reasons in support of its order and hence it does not call for any interference. ( 34 ) IN the result and for the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.