Judgment Ajay Kumar Mittal, J. 1. (20th February, 2004) - These appeals are directed against order dated 18.1.1994 passed by learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 11812 and 13881 of 1993. 2. For the sake of convenience, the facts are being taken from Letters Patent Appeal No. 124 of 1994 (Rishi Parkash and Ors. v. Director Consolidation of Holdings and Ors.). The parties to the litigations belong to village Medawas, Tehsil and District Gurgaon. The scheme of consolidation of holdings in the villages was prepared in the year 1952-53 wherein no passage was given to any proprietor for his individual holding. This was done on the consensus of the proprietors of the village, who had agreed not to have separate passage to their respective fields, but had opted to use the boundaries of their respective fields for their ingress and outgress. This decision was signed by some of the respectables of the village including Balwant Singh father of Rishi Parkash, and Nandan, who was related to appellants Nos. 3 to 5 in the present appeal. The passage aforesaid was used by the proprietors of the village. 3. After almost 40 years of finalisation of consolidation proceedings, the appellants filed application dated 3.2.1993 under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (for short, the Act) before Director of Holdings, Haryana (respondent No. 1) with the prayer that they may be provided passage to their holdings. The same was accepted by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 26.8.1993 and the matter was sent to Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Rohtak, with the direction that passage be given to the owner of every field so that they can easily perform agricultural operations on their holdings. 4. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 challenged the order passed by respondent No. 1 in C.W.P. No. 1 1812 of 1993 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge along with C.W.P. No. 13881 of 1993. 5. Shri Sudhir Mittal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants assaulted the order of the learned Single Judge by arguing that order dated 26.8.1993 passed by respondent No. 1 could not have been set aside only on the ground of delay. 5. Shri Sudhir Mittal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants assaulted the order of the learned Single Judge by arguing that order dated 26.8.1993 passed by respondent No. 1 could not have been set aside only on the ground of delay. He pointed out that there is no limitation for filing a petition under Section 42 of the Act for modification of the consolidation scheme for providing a path which had not been provided at the time of consolidation in the year 1952-53. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of this Court in The Director of Consolidation of Holdings, Jullundur and Anr. v. Johri Mall Karori Mall, A.I.R. 1961 Punjab and Haryana 208: and a judgment of the Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat, Village Kanonda, Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Rohtak v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Haryana, Chandigarh and Ors., 1990 P.L.J. 213 (S.C.) and argued that the learned Single Judge committed a serious illegality by upsetting an equitable direction given by respondent No. 1. He further argued that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge about the existence of the path for ingress and outgress to the fields of the appellants is patently erroneous. Shri Mittal emphasized that the appellants had filed petition under Section 42 of the Act when they were prevented by the private respondents from using the existing passage and, therefore, they could not have been non-suited on the ground of delay. 6. Shri Jaswant Singh, learned Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana appearing for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and Shri R.K. Jain, Advocate appearing for the private respondents countered the arguments of Shri Sudhir Mittal and submitted that, even though, no limitation is prescribed for filing a petition under Section 42 of the Act, the aggrieved person has to file the same within a reasonable time and a petition filed after 40 years of the finalisation of the consolidation proceedings was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. They further argued that it was not a case for providing path under the consolidation scheme as the proprietors themselves had agreed to use the boundaries of their fields as passage for ingress and outgress to their respective fields and therefore, respondent No. 1 did not have the jurisdiction to entertain their application. 7. We have thoughtfully considered the respective arguments. 8. 7. We have thoughtfully considered the respective arguments. 8. The question whether an application filed for amendment or modification of the consolidation scheme can be filed after a long time-gap was considered by the Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat, Village Kanondas case (supra) and Gram Panchayat, Kakran v. Additional Director of Consolidation and Anr., J.T. 1997(8) S.C. 430 and it has been held that even though, the limitation prescribed in Rule 10 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949 is not applicable to an application filed under Section 42 of the Act, the competent authority cannot entertain an application/petition filed under that section after long lapse of time. The proposition of law laid down in Gram Panchayat, Kakrans case (supra) reads thus:- "Even where no period of limitation is prescribed, the party aggrieved is required to move the appropriate authority for relief within a reasonable time. In fact, this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat, Village Kanonda v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, J.T. 1989(4) S.C. 357=1989 Suppl.(2) S.C.C. 465=1990 P.L.J. 213 dealing with Rule 18 itself, said that when no limitation is prescribed for an application under Section 42 dealing with confirmation of the scheme, the application should be made within a reasonable time and this question will have to be decided on the facts of each case. In that case, the delay of about 3 years and 8 months in filing an application under Section 42 by the Panchayat was held to be not unreasonable. In the present case, however, the delay is of 40 years. We have tried to ascertain from the 2nd respondent whether there is any explanation for this unreasonable and inordinate delay. But no satisfactory explanation appears to be there for this inordinate delay in making the application under Section 42. xxx xxx xxx xxx But even if Rule 18 is not directly attracted, an application which is made after such inordinate delay ought not to have been entertained." 9 The aforesaid decision was followed by a Division Bench in Jaswinder Kaur v. Additional Director of Consolidation and Anr. (2003-2)134 P.L.R. 160 and the order passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation granting path to respondents Nos. 3 to 5 in that case was set aside. 10. Another Division Bench of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 7249 of 2001 -Biru Ram and Ors. (2003-2)134 P.L.R. 160 and the order passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation granting path to respondents Nos. 3 to 5 in that case was set aside. 10. Another Division Bench of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 7249 of 2001 -Biru Ram and Ors. v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab and Ors., decided on 9.10.2003 (wherein one of us, G.S. Singhvi, J. was a member), by applying the ratio of the above noted decisions held as under:- "We hold that respondent No. 1 did not commit any illegality by dismissing the application filed by the petitioners under Section 42 of the Act on the ground of unexplained delay of 34 years." 11. In this case, the petition under Section 42 of the Act was filed after almost 40 years of the finalisation of the consolidation proceedings and the only explanation given by the appellants was that the passage for ingress to their fields has been blocked. The learned Single Judge, after going through the record, rejected the plea of the writ petitioners (appellants herein) by making the following observations:- "The consolidation proceedings in village Medawas took place in the year 1952-53 and no passage was given to the proprietors for their individual fields. May be, that this was not the position with regard to all the proprietors of the village but insofar as petitioners and respondent Nos. 3 to 10 are concerned, it is proved that they had no separate path provided to their respective fields. This fact is duly proved from Annexure P1, authenticity of which has not been even remotely disputed by the respondent-State. It is true that insofar as respondent Nos. 3 to 10 are concerned, they have taken various objections with regard to Annexure P1 but it is the stand of the State which would be more relevant for returning a finding as to whether Annexure P1 did come in existence and, as referred to above, respondent-State has candidly admitted the existence of Annexure P1 in the written statement filed by it. Mr. Aggarwal has also shown me the consolidation scheme that came into being at the time of consolidation proceedings way back in the year 1952. The scheme while dealing with the paths mentions that the paths and other places of common benefits would continue as before and would not be closed. At this stage even if the petition filed by respondent Nos. The scheme while dealing with the paths mentions that the paths and other places of common benefits would continue as before and would not be closed. At this stage even if the petition filed by respondent Nos. 3 to 10 under Section 42 of the Act of 1948 is also looked at, it will reveal that it is pleaded therein that "at the time of consolidation in the village no path was provided to the KURRAH of petitioners. It is further pleaded that there was a thoroughfare in the North but no passage was provided to the KURRAH of petitioners. Infact, the parties mutually left the land in between their Kurrahs so as to use it as passage and the same was still in existence on the spot. However, the respondents have become dishonest and inimical towards the petitioners due to local party politics and they were threatening to block the said passage by way of rising construction on the dolls of the fields. The utility of the agricultural land was vanished due to non-provision of the passage." From the facts as have been detailed above, it is thus proved on records of the case that it was not a matter of providing passage to a field which provision was not got in the consolidation scheme. On the other hand, the passage as was in existence, was left for use of respective land-holders and, in particulars petitioner and respondent Nos. 3 to 10. It was, thus, a case for restoration of path that might have been closed down by the petitioners. This Court in Mear Chand v. State of Haryana and Ors., 1971 P.L.J. 562 (supra) held that "from the bare reading of Section 42, I have no hesitation in holding that the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to order removal of encroachment on the path in exercise of his powers under that Section." It requires to be mentioned that the Deputy Commissioner in that case was exercising the powers under Section 42 of the Act of 1948. The facts of the case aforesaid reveal that there was no dispute that path No. 57 was provided in the scheme of consolidation prepared under the Act. The facts of the case aforesaid reveal that there was no dispute that path No. 57 was provided in the scheme of consolidation prepared under the Act. It was also an admitted case that about the alleged encroachment on path No. 57 respondent No. 2 and some others filed a complaint under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the proceedings in that complaint were stayed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate vide order dated January 19, 1967. Instead of getting the matter settled from the Civil Court, the respondents of the said case had filed an application under Section 42 of the Act of 1948 on which the impugned order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner. It was in the circumstances aforesaid that this Court had held as has been extracted above. Mr. Sihota, learned counsel may be absolutely right in contending that if no path is provided under the consolidation scheme, then the authorities constituted under the Act of 1948 would always have jurisdiction to provide a path and that being so, there is no limitation whatsoever but the facts of the present case reveal that path was actually provided in the scheme, even though it was not with regard to respective holdings of the parties. In these circumstances, there was no choice for the respondent Nos. 3 to 10 but for to have knocked the doors of the civil court for getting the existing path restored if the same had been blocked. It shall even now be open to respondent Nos. 3 to 10 to agitate the matter before Civil Court. In as much it is the case of the petitioners themselves that path was in existence, the Civil Court while dealing with the matter would decide the controversy in the light of the said admission." 12. We entirely agree with the learned Single Judge and hold that respondent No. 1 could not have entertained, much less allowed, the petition filed by the appellants under Section 42 of the Act after 40 years of the finalisation of the consolidation proceedings. 13. We are further of the view that the finding of fact recorded by the learned Single Judge that the proprietors had agreed to give up their right to passage is based on correct appreciation of facts brought on record and there is on reason to disagree with him. 13. We are further of the view that the finding of fact recorded by the learned Single Judge that the proprietors had agreed to give up their right to passage is based on correct appreciation of facts brought on record and there is on reason to disagree with him. In our opinion, it was not a case of providing passage by modifying the consolidation scheme. Rather, it was a case of blocking the passage by private respondents. Therefore, the only remedy available to the appellants was to file a civil suit. This Court in Mehar Chand v. State of Haryana and Ors., 1971 P.L.J. 562 has held that the Additional Director has no jurisdiction to order removal of encroachment on the path provided in the scheme of consolidation prepared under the Act in exercise of his powers under Section 42 of the Act and that proper remedy for the aggrieved party in such situation is to approach the civil Court or the criminal Court. Thus, the second contention of the learned counsel is devoid of merit and is liable to be rejected. 14. No other point has been argued. 15. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeals are dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.