JUDGMENT Kamal Kishore, J.—This is the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 6.4.2004, passed by the opposite party No. 1, contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition, setting aside the judgment dated 21.1.2004, passed by the learned Prescribed Authority. 2. The petitioner preferred an application under Section 21 (i) (a) of the U. P. Rent Control Act 13 of 1972 for vacation of the tenant (respondent, Sri Deepak Bhatnagar) from the premises in question situate at 289/121, Moti Nagar, Lucknow, of which the petitioner is an absolute owner. The tenancy had originally been granted to the father of the respondent, Sri Deepak Bhatnagar on a monthly rent of Rs. 110 and upon death of the original tenant, first the mother of the respondent became the tenant and after her death the respondent himself came to occupy a portion of the premises consisting of 2 rooms, one storeroom, verandah, kitchen, latrine and bathroom. Presently the respondent No. 2 is residing in the said accommodation with his wife, children and sisters. 3. I have heard arguments and have gone through the record. 4. The fact that the tenancy had originally been granted to the father of the respondent Sri Deepak Bhatnagar on a monthly rent of Rs. 110 and on the death of the original tenant, the mother of the respondent became the tenant and after her death respondent came to occupy a portion of the premises in question, has not been disputed and the same finds from the evidence on record. 5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that the need of the petitioner landlord is not genuine and the petitioner landlord is seeking demolition and re-construction for his pecuniary advantage and not for his personal use, hence the petition filed by the petitioner landlord is liable to be dismissed. This argument advanced by the learned counsel for the tenant/opposite party No. 2 is not tenable. A proposed map of construction was filed before the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate court after taking into consideration the material on record held that need of landlord was bona fide. The findings of comparative hardship were also recorded in favour of landlord by both the courts below. 6. A proposed map of construction was filed before the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate court after taking into consideration the material on record held that need of landlord was bona fide. The findings of comparative hardship were also recorded in favour of landlord by both the courts below. 6. The first point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the release application was filed under both the sub-clauses of Section 21 (1) i.e., clause (a) and clause (b). Hence the courts below should have decided the case under clause (b) meaning thereby that tenant should have been given an option of taking on rent reconstructed shops. Sometimes learned advocates while drafting the release application do not keep in mind fine distinction between the two clauses. Release application filed under clause (a) may be filed for two purposes. First is when landlord requires the buildings in its existing form. The other is requirement for reconstructed portion after demolition and reconstruction. For later requirement, it is immaterial whether existing constructions are in dilapidated condition or not, as has been held by this Court in the ruling in Shanti Devi (Smt.) and others v. Sri Pradeep Kumar, 2003 (2) ARC 383. 7. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the ruling in Harrington House School v. S. M. Ispahani and another, (2002) 5 SCC 229 , that genuine desire of landlord to earn economic advantage is a relevant factor in his favour. Demolition and reconstruction-optimum utility-held, putting tenanted property to, would be a legitimate reason for demolition and reconstruction—Such utility includes creation of more housing and/or space for commercial activities. 8. The learned lower appellate court has grossly misred, misapplied and misinterpreted the provisions of Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ; and has also failed to apply and follow the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Harrington House School, (2002) 5 SCC 229 and Shanti Devi v. Swami Anand, (2003) 2 SCC 26 and has acted in disregarding the same by falling upon an obsolete principle which is in contradistinction to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said cases. The petitioner hastens to add that the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court ; is binding upon all Courts ; and the learned court below had no jurisdiction or authority to disregard the same and take a contrary view. 9. From a reading of the said judgment and order dated 6.4.2004 it would be apparent that a hyper technical view has been taken and an untenable distinction has been sought to be made while referring to Section 14 (a) and (b) of T. N. Buildings (Lease Control Act), 1960 and Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act. The most relevant provision of the section which was in consideration before the learned appellate court, has been ignored reserting to exercise of jurisdiction not vested in him and apparently with a predetermined disposition, as would be apparent from a bare reading of the Section 21 (1) (a) itself, which is being reproduced herein below for convenient perusal : “(1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely : (a) That the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself ; or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust.” 10. In a case of like nature, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dismissed the tenant’s appeal in the ruling in Shanti Devi (Smt.) and another v. Swami Ashanand and another, 2003 (2) SCCD 746 : (2003) 2 SCC 26 that Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, is very widely worded. Demolition and reconstruction for occupation by the landlord himself either for residential purpose or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling is permissible. The words “profession, trade or calling” are very wide and include therein all activities wherein a person may usefully and/or gainfully engage himself. 11. The writ petition is hereby allowed. Demolition and reconstruction for occupation by the landlord himself either for residential purpose or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling is permissible. The words “profession, trade or calling” are very wide and include therein all activities wherein a person may usefully and/or gainfully engage himself. 11. The writ petition is hereby allowed. The judgment and order dated 6.4.2004 passed by opposite party No. 1 is quashed, while the order dated 21.1.2004 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority is restored. The opposite party No. 2 is directed to evict the premises in question within a period of one month from today.