JUDGMENT : Arun Kumar Goel, J. – 1. When this matter came up for hearing today, a serious contention by way of preliminary objection was raised by Shri Jaswal on behalf of the respondents. According to him, this Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain this writ. Because no part of cause of action arose in favour of the petitioner within the jurisdiction of this Court and how this Court has jurisdiction, there is not a murmur in the whole of the writ petition. Thus, according to him, without going into other questions, this writ petition merits dismissal on this short ground alone. 2. On the other hand, Shri N.K. Sood, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that this objection needs to be rejected. According to him, petitioner had filed an earlier writ petition, being CWP No. 617 of 1998. Then under the orders of this Court, revision filed by him was disposed of by the Authority concerned on 16-6-1999. Therefore, respondents are estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of this Court. Further according to Mr. Sood, plea of jurisdiction has not been raised as a defence in the reply filed to the writ petition. Lastly after five years of admission of this writ, throwing out the same on the plea of lack of jurisdiction will be too harsh to his client. 3. In order to deal with the question of jurisdiction, which in my considered view goes to the root of the case, it is necessary to refer to a few facts. These are as under :- Petitioner is governed by the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 and the Rules framed thereunder in the year 1987. His last posting was at Assansole Division in the State of West Bengal. He was involved in a murder case there. For this act, he was suspended on 8-3-1992. Similarly, for his wilful absence w.e.f. 29-11-1992 to 21-1-1993, departmental action by way of enquiry was envisaged against him and a show cause notice was thus issued to him. Being not satisfied with his reply, full-fledged enquiry was conducted. He was found guilty. Therefore, on 29-4-1996, vide Annexure P-I, petitioner was dismissed from service. 4. Against this action, he filed statutory appeal. Appellate Authority dismissed the same on 16-1-1997. Again, feeling aggrieved of and dissatisfied with the said order, he preferred a revision under law. Being not satisfied with his reply, full-fledged enquiry was conducted. He was found guilty. Therefore, on 29-4-1996, vide Annexure P-I, petitioner was dismissed from service. 4. Against this action, he filed statutory appeal. Appellate Authority dismissed the same on 16-1-1997. Again, feeling aggrieved of and dissatisfied with the said order, he preferred a revision under law. This was disposed of after intervention of this Court, when direction was issued by this Court in CWP No. 617 of 1998. 5. It is in this background, that the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the action of respondents dismissing his revision, appeal and also his dismissal from service. Another fact on which learned counsel for parties are not at variance and that needs to be noticed here is, that the alleged act for which he was departmentally dealt with and found guilty, is alleged to have been committed in the State of West Bengal. Appeal was dismissed by respondent No. 3 in the State of West Bengal. Revision was dismissed by respondent No. 2 at Delhi. Therefore, on these admitted facts, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that no part of cause of action arose in favour of the petitioner within the State of Himachal Pradesh within the meaning of either under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, or on the analogy of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, so as to maintain this writ petition in this Court. 6. Faced with this situation, Mr. Sood, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, urged that his client resides within the jurisdiction of this Court and his earlier writ petition was disposed of by this Court. Therefore, objection regarding jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition shall be deemed to have been waived of. When a reference is made to Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, its perusal expressly and in no uncertain terms speaks of the Court, which will have the jurisdiction. Therefore, objection regarding jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition shall be deemed to have been waived of. When a reference is made to Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, its perusal expressly and in no uncertain terms speaks of the Court, which will have the jurisdiction. For ready reference, Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India is extracted herein below : "Article 226 (2) - The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." 7. As already observed, admittedly no cause of action arose in favour of the petitioner within the State of Himachal Pradesh. Simply because in the earlier petition this objection was not raised and the parties accepted the order of this Court in CWP No. 617 of 1998, in my view will not confer jurisdiction on this Court. 8. Suffice it to say in this behalf that by consent, acquiescence or otherwise, parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a Court, which it otherwise lacks, as is in the present case. 9. In the case of S.S. Mittal v. Bar Council of India, (1972)1 ILR H.P. Series 38, where even the impugned order was conveyed within the jurisdiction of this Court, it was held that this Court will not have jurisdiction. What was held in paragraph 8 and is relevant for the purpose of this case is extracted herein below : "8. In the present case, the order was made by the Bar Council of India in the presence of the petitioner at Delhi. It was, therefore, communicated to him at Delhi. It took effect at Delhi, and its taking effect was not postponed to the moment when a copy of the order was served on the petitioner at Simla." 10. In Oil Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994)4 SCC 711 : (1994 AIR SCW 3287) while dealing with the question of jurisdiction, it was held as under (at p. 3290) : "5. In Oil Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994)4 SCC 711 : (1994 AIR SCW 3287) while dealing with the question of jurisdiction, it was held as under (at p. 3290) : "5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause - notwithstanding anything in Article 32 - and provides that every High Court shall have power "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, "within those territories" directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at best its case in the writ petition. "6. It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, Lord Waston said: "........ the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, Lord Waston said: "........ the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asked the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour." Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must he answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court." 11. Similarly, in State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties, (1985)3 SCC 217 : ( AIR 1985 SC 1289 ) while dealing with as to what is meant by cause of action, it was observed as under (at p. 1291): "6. On February 21, 1979, there was a meeting at the Secretariat in the Urban Development and Housing Department between officers of that Department and those of the Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur. It was clarified on behalf of the Improvement Trust that the notified land in its entirety was needed for implementation of the development scheme of the Trust. The Improvement Trust accordingly by its letter dated March 5, 1979 requested the State Government that necessary orders be passed for acquisition of Khasra No. 383 in village Madrampura measuring 14 bighas 16 biswas and a Notification to that effect issued under Section 52 (1) of the Act. The Improvement Trust accordingly by its letter dated March 5, 1979 requested the State Government that necessary orders be passed for acquisition of Khasra No. 383 in village Madrampura measuring 14 bighas 16 biswas and a Notification to that effect issued under Section 52 (1) of the Act. It was pointed out that a public notice under Section 52 (2) of the Act as regards the notified land had already been issued by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur dated June 25, 1975, and the necessary procedure as laid down in sub-section (3) thereof followed. As a result of this, the State Government issued the impugned notification dated February 8, 1984 under Section 52 (1) of the Act and the notified land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The State Government in their special leave petition have explained that the notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act could not be issued till February 8, 1984 because the Government were primarily thinking of making the land available for construction of residential houses before making provisions for construction of a three star or five star hotel but noting came out of the said proposal as there was no response from the respondents. 7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and, therefore, the learned single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the petition filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution or to make the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order restraining the appellants from taking any steps to take possession of the land acquired. Under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the appellants were entitled to require the respondents to surrender, or deliver possession of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so, take immediate steps to secure such possession under sub-section (6) thereof. 8. The expression 'cause of action' is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure : The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. 8. The expression 'cause of action' is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure : The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice under Section 52 (2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52 (1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52 (1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52 (2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52 (1) of the Act. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52 (2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52 (1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52 (1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose." 12. To similar effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Satya Prakash v. State of U.P., (2000)9 SCC 421 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3566 ). 13. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in two recent decisions examined as to what is meant by cause of action and on that basis, rejected the plea of the appellants. In the case of M/s. Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, ( AIR 2004 SC 2321 ), Civil Appeal No. 9159 of 2003, decided on 28-4-2004, the appellant had raised loan from the State Bank of India at its Bhopal branch. The appellant-company had its registered office at Mumbai. A notice was issued by the bank for repayment of the said loan from Bhopal in terms of the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. A writ petition was filed challenging the vires of this Act in Delhi High Court. It was dismissed on the ground of lack of inherent jurisdiction. In appeal a contention was raised that constitutionality of a parliamentary Act being in question, Delhi High Court had the requisite jurisdiction. In this background, provisions of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India and provisions of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure were examined and then it was observed as to what is meant by cause of action. In this background, provisions of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India and provisions of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure were examined and then it was observed as to what is meant by cause of action. Supreme Court after following the decisions in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd., (1994)4 SCC 710 and Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002)1 SCC 567 : ( AIR 2002 SC 126 ) held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition, it must disclose integral facts pleaded in support of cause of action do constitute a cause, so as to empower the Court to decide the dispute and that the entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. 14. Again in National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. M/s. Haribox Swatram, 2004 (5) Supreme 538 : ( AIR 2004 SC 1998 ) identical question was gone into and then while allowing the appeal of the National Textile Corporation Limited, writ petition was dismissed. Further what is meant by cause of action, was also a subject-matter in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, (2000)7 SCC 640 : ( AIR 2000 SC 2966 ). 15. A learned single Judge of this Court in almost similar situation as in the present case, in Daleep Singh Thakur v. Union of India, CWP No. 560 of 1995, decided on 20-5-2003, took a similar view and dismissed the writ petition holding no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. 16. Faced with above facts, Shri Sood with a view to advance the case of his client urged that this writ petition was admitted as far back as in the year 1999 and now rejecting the same after a lapse of about 5 years holding that this Court lacks jurisdiction, will not be proper. As such, he prayed for decision of the case on merits. This plea cannot be accepted in the face of case law discussed herein above. Even if this argument is taken to its logical end, then in every case where a lis is admitted by the Court lacking inherent jurisdiction has got to be decided because of time gap. As such, he prayed for decision of the case on merits. This plea cannot be accepted in the face of case law discussed herein above. Even if this argument is taken to its logical end, then in every case where a lis is admitted by the Court lacking inherent jurisdiction has got to be decided because of time gap. Admission of a lis only shows that the matter needs to be examined by the Court in depth. Admission of a lis does not preclude a litigant from raising legal objection at the time of hearing of the case. That being the position, plea of Shri Sood, urged in this behalf is hereby rejected. 17. Now coming to the last plea that this objection is not set out as a defence in the reply filed to the writ petition. Ordinarily it is expected that the respondents should have raised the plea of jurisdiction in their reply. But if this plea is not raised in the reply, should this Court assume jurisdiction, which it otherwise lacks ? Answer according to me will be that, on the admitted facts as extracted herein above, question of jurisdiction going to the root of the case, and, therefore, its not being set up as a defence cannot and will not confer any jurisdiction on this Court which it otherwise lacked. 18. This submission of Mr. Sood can be viewed from another angle also. Where for extraneous reasons a functionary of respondent No. 1, intentionally does not raise the plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Court, in such a situation should the Court act like a mute spectator, or where no reply is filed, is the Court precluded from ensuring before a case is decided on its merit, to see whether it has got the jurisdiction to try the case or not ? Answer in my considered view would be that still this being purely a question of law, needs to be gone into. 19. No other point is urged. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is disposed of purely on the legal question of lack of inherent jurisdiction of this Court to have entertained the writ petition as admittedly no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. 19. No other point is urged. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is disposed of purely on the legal question of lack of inherent jurisdiction of this Court to have entertained the writ petition as admittedly no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. At the same time, it is observed that if petitioner approaches the Court of competent jurisdiction by or before 31-1-2005, in such a situation it is expected as well as hoped that the Court concerned will keep in view the fact of this writ petition having been filed and admitted in the year 1999 and then finally being disposed of purely on the question of jurisdiction alone. It is also expected of the respondents that if petitioner is otherwise able to make out his case for the grant of relief, if any, they will not bring delay and laches in his way to claim appropriate relief in accordance with law. Costs on parties.