( 1 ) THE facts in L. P. A. No. 69 of 1998 are that it is arising out of A. S. No. 2350 of 1982. A. S. No. 2350 of 1982 was filed to challenge the judgment in O. S. No. 281 of 1980 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Kakinada. The parties shall be referred to as plaintiff and defendants. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff in the suit contended that the suit property was self-acquired property of the 1st defendant and 1st defendant had offered to sell the property to the plaintiff who had agreed to purchase the same. An agreement was executed between the parties on 23. 07. 1980 and it was agreed by the 1st defendant to sell the property to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 5,000/- was paid as an advance on the date of agreement itself. The remaining balance consideration of Rs. 35,000/- had to be paid at the time of registration and registration had to be done on or before 23. 08. 1980. It was also stipulated in the agreement that in case if plaintiff fail to obtain registration within the prescribed time, the plaintiff would be required to pay the remaining amount with an interest at the rate of 24% per annum. It was also agreed that if the defendants fail to execute the agreement by refusing to receive the amount, they would pay Rs. 300/- per month towards damages for depriving the plaintiff from use and occupation of the suit property. The plaintiff contended that inspite of her and her husbands requests to accept the remaining consideration and execute the sale deed, the defendants did not receive the sale consideration nor executed the sale deed. The defendants however on several occasions promised to do the needful but failed. On 11. 9. 1980 and on 12. 9. 1980 the defendants were requested by plaintiffs husband on behalf of the plaintiff to execute the sale deed, but the 1s defendant asked the plaintiff to come after some time. In spite of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform her part of the contract, the defendants were postponing the same on one pretext or the other. Thereafter, the plaintiff issued a notice calling upon the defendants to carryout their part of the contract. The plaintiff again went to the defendants on 15. 9. In spite of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform her part of the contract, the defendants were postponing the same on one pretext or the other. Thereafter, the plaintiff issued a notice calling upon the defendants to carryout their part of the contract. The plaintiff again went to the defendants on 15. 9. 1980 and requested them to execute the sale deed, but the defendants did not do so. The plaintiff therefore, filed the suit. ( 3 ) AFTER service on the defendants, the defendants No. 1 and 2 filed their separate written statements. Mainly two defences were taken by the defendants; one was that the defendant No. 1 who had executed the agreement, was not mentally fit to execute the agreement at the time when the agreement was executed. Another defence which was taken was that the property was joint between the defendants No. 1 and 2 and therefore the 1st defendant could have not executed the agreement in favour of plaintiff for the property in question. ( 4 ) ON the basis of these pleadings the trial Court framed the following issues:1. Whether the contention of the defendants in para 3 of the written statement that he executed the agreement when he was not in sound health and mentally week and therefore, the agreement is un-enforceable is true? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of the suit agreement or in the alternative for damages? 3. Whether the 2nd defendant is bound by the agreement dt. 23-7-1980 executed by the 1st defendant on his behalf and on behalf of the 2nd defendant? 4. To what relief? ( 5 ) ON all the issues the trial Court found a case in favour of plaintiff. However, an additional issue with regard to the damages was decided against the plaintiff. Thereafter, an appeal was filed. The appeal was heard by a learned single Judge of this Court who had agreed with the findings of the trial Court and upheld the decree. We have gone through the evidence. We are convinced that there is no evidence produced by the defendant No. 1 to show that on the date of agreement he was not mentally sound. Since two Courts have already evaluated the evidence on this score therefore, although we have gone through the evidence, we are not making an exercise in evaluating the evidence once again. We are convinced that there is no evidence produced by the defendant No. 1 to show that on the date of agreement he was not mentally sound. Since two Courts have already evaluated the evidence on this score therefore, although we have gone through the evidence, we are not making an exercise in evaluating the evidence once again. The 2nd contention was that the property was joint between defendants No. 1 and 2. This contention was also considered by both the Courts and both the Courts came to the conclusion that no evidence at all was produced by the defendants to prove that the property was joint. As a matter of fact, the defendants had claimed that some ancestral property had been sold by the 1st defendant and after getting the consideration in that sale, the suit property had been purchases. But this had not at all been proved according to the trial Court and according to the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge went even to the extent of holding, even if it is accepted that the property was joint between defendants No. 1 and 2 who were father and son, even then there is sufficient evidence on record to show that the property had been sold for the benefit of the family as the daughters and he wanted to marry them therefore he had sold the property. Therefore, these two questions stand decided by the trial Court as well as by the learned single Judge. ( 6 ) NOW, the only contention that has been raised before us by the learned counsel for appellants is that the decree of specific performance in this case would not be equitable. According to him, in terms of Section 16 of Specific Relief Act, 1963, it is not always necessary for a Court to pass a decree for specific performance if a case is proved and the equities would have to be gone into. He submits that the agreed price was Rs. 40,000/- in the year 1980 and only a small proportion of amount i. e. Rs. 5,000/- had been paid to the appellants/defendants, but the price of the property has gone steeply high and for a meager amount of Rs. 5,000/- having been accepted by his clients about 30 years before, it will be unjust to deprive them of the property by paying them a balance amount of Rs. 5,000/- had been paid to the appellants/defendants, but the price of the property has gone steeply high and for a meager amount of Rs. 5,000/- having been accepted by his clients about 30 years before, it will be unjust to deprive them of the property by paying them a balance amount of Rs. 35,000/ -. This is one side of the story. But the other side of the story is that the defendants had accepted Rs. 5,000/- in the year 1980, but did not give the possession to the other side. Although plaintiff had paid Rs. 5,000/- almost three Decades before, the defendants enjoyed the benefits of that amount as well as the benefits of the suit property and till date they continue with the possession of property. Therefore in this factual situation, this Court has to consider whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of specific performance or not. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the parties have placed before us various judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court. The appellants reliefs on Ram Awadh (dead) by L. Rs. and Others Vs. Achhaibar Dubey and another AIR 2000 SC 860 and Toufiq Ali Mirza and another Vs. smt. Baderunnisa 2002 (5) ALT 628 (DB ). We have no quarrel with the principles laid down in both these judgments. The judgment of Supreme Court referred to above relates to readiness and willingness. There is no evidence before us which would suggest that the plaintiff at any point of time was not ready and willing. In fact se had pleaded that she was ready and willing and during the course of her evidence she had shown to the Court that she was ready and willing to execute the agreement and do whatever was required of her to be done in terms of agreement. It is true that at the time of the filing of the suit, she had not deposited the balance amount, but immediately after the decree was passed by the trial Court in the year 1982 i. e. almost 22 years before, she had deposited the balance amount. ( 8 ) ON the other hand the learned counsel for respondent has placed before us a decision reported in Nirmala Anand Vs. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd. and others 2002 (8) SCC 146 . We are reproducing the following portion from Para 6 of that judgment: 6. ( 8 ) ON the other hand the learned counsel for respondent has placed before us a decision reported in Nirmala Anand Vs. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd. and others 2002 (8) SCC 146 . We are reproducing the following portion from Para 6 of that judgment: 6. It is true that grant of decree of specific performance lies in the discretion of the court and it is also well settled that it is not always necessary to grant specific performance simply for the reason that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that the court in its discretion can impose any reasonable condition including payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while granting or refusing decree of specific performance. Whether the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific performance only on account of the phenomenal increase of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be, in a given case, one of the considerations besides many others to be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the pendency of the litigation. While balancing the equities, one of the considerations to be kept in view is as to who is the defaulting party. ( 9 ) THOUGH it is settled that a decree for specific performance cannot be granted on mere asking and only on showing that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree, but it is also a fact that because of rise in prices a decree to the plaintiff could not be refused since we have seen that the defendants in this case after receiving part of the consideration had also enjoyed the property for three Decades. Therefore, if they are asked to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff, we do not think the equities would be against them because for no reason whatsoever, by avoiding the execution of sale deed, they enjoyed the property for three Decades. Therefore, if they are asked to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff, we do not think the equities would be against them because for no reason whatsoever, by avoiding the execution of sale deed, they enjoyed the property for three Decades. It is true that the plaintiff after getting her property, may have some added advantage because of the price escalation, but all the more, defendants had also enjoyed the property without justification for a period of 30 years. In the judgment 3rd cited above, the Supreme Court had also held that the Courts would be within their rights if they ask either of the parties to pay the increased amount. ( 10 ) DURING the course of trial we had suggested to the parties to compromise. The plaintiff was ready to pay an amount of Rs. 25,000/- over and above the consideration amount towards the defendants, which the defendants refused and invited a judgment on merits. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any case in favour of the appellant/defendants, but since the plaintiff had agreed to pay an amount of Rs. 25,000/- and taking note of the escalation of prices and all other circumstances surrounding the case, while upholding the decree passed by the learned single Judge, we modify it to the extent that over and above the consideration amount agreed, the plaintiff shall pay an amount of Rs. 25,000/- to the defendants for execution of the decree. The learned counsel for respondent had already brought a Demand Draft for Rs. 25,000/-, but the learned counsel for appellants submits that he cannot receive the same without instructions from his clients. Therefore, the Demand Draft be handed over to the Registrar (Judicial), which shall be kept in his custody. If the defendants/appellants comes forward to claim the same within a period of one month, it shall be handed over to them. If not, then after expiry of the period of one month, it shall be returned to the respondent/plaintiff. The decreed by drawn. This appeal is disposed of accordingly, accordingly/no orders as to costs. ( 11 ) THIS L. P. A. is much worse. The facts are same, the defendants are same but the plaintiff is different. If not, then after expiry of the period of one month, it shall be returned to the respondent/plaintiff. The decreed by drawn. This appeal is disposed of accordingly, accordingly/no orders as to costs. ( 11 ) THIS L. P. A. is much worse. The facts are same, the defendants are same but the plaintiff is different. The only difference in this case is that there was not only an agreement of sale, but sale deed had been executed, the full consideration had been paid but still the defendants did not give the possession therefore, a suit for possession was filed, which was resisted mainly on two grounds that the defendant was not mentally sound and that the property was joint between defendants No. 1 and 2. Both these pleas were rejected while deciding L. P. A. No. 69 of 1998 therefore, both these contentions cannot be accepted in this appeal also. The other contentions which were raised in that appeal are not available in this appeal because the sale had been completed almost 30 years before by executing the sale deed therefore, no interference in the order is called for although it is a fact that the property had been sold and a sale deed had been executed by the defendants and the possession had not been handed over and the property was enjoyed by the defendants all these years without any justification whatsoever. Therefore, the learned single Judge and the trial Court were right in awarding the rent for all these years for use and occupation. But we are conscious of the fact that if the defendants are asked to pay the rent for 30 years, they would be paying more than what they had received as consideration for the sale 30 years before. ( 12 ) THEREFORE, in the interest of justice and equity, we modify that judgment and decree also to the extent that the plaintiff shall not be entitled to the rent for use and occupation for the period till the decree was passed by the trial Court. And after the decree, obviously there was no justification for the defendants to continue with the possession. The decree and judgment is modified accordingly. This appeal is disposed of accordingly modified decree be drawn. No order as to costs.