Judgment :- The petitioner prays for a writ of certiorari to call for the records relating to the orders passed by the first respondent, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Tirunelveli in PSA No.1 of 1995 dated 25.9.1995 and quash the same. 2. The petitioner is a spinning Mill. The second respondent was employed with the writ petitioner and he was subjected to disciplinary proceedings under charges of misconduct. Pursuant to the enquiry, final orders were passed on 8.12.1983 ordering that the period of suspension from 23.11.1993 to 8.12.1993 will be treated as a substantive punishment. It was therefore consequently ordered that wages will not be paid for the said period of suspension. However, the petitioner approached the first respondent claiming that he was entitled to the payment of substantive allowance during the relevant period. 3. The first respondent agreeing with the claim held that the employee was entitled to substantive allowance during the said period. Hence the writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner after stating the facts, refers to the Standing Order 22(3) which is as follows: "A workman on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for the purpose be suspended for a period not exceeding 30 days or dismissed, but the said workman shall not be entitled to any notice or compensation in lieu of the said notice." 5. The learned counsel contents that the said provision entitles the management to impose the period of suspension as a substantive punishment. In the order of the Management, it was made clear that the period during which the petitioner was placed under suspension viz., from 23.11.1993 to 8.12.1993, shall be treated as substantive punishment and that for the said period he will not be entitled to subsistence allowance or any compensation. The learned counsel also relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Umesh Chandra Misra Vs. Union of India 1993 Supp.(2) SCC 210. 6. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondent. A perusal of Standing Order 22(3) as extracted above would show that the management is entitled to impose as a substantive punishment, the period of suspension itself. Therefore, the said punishment is a codified punishment which the management is entitled to impose. 6. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondent. A perusal of Standing Order 22(3) as extracted above would show that the management is entitled to impose as a substantive punishment, the period of suspension itself. Therefore, the said punishment is a codified punishment which the management is entitled to impose. That being so, the observation by the first respondent that there was no prohibition for payment of subsistence allowance for the said period, is erroneous and cannot be sustained. When once it is accepted that the period of suspension is imposed as substantive punishment, then there is no question of granting any subsistence allowance for the said period. The contention of the learned counsel finds settled in the judgment of the Supreme Court as cited above. The Supreme Court has dealt with the similar contention and held that the argument that the employee would be entitled at least to the subsistence allowance was misconceived, because the period was directed to be treated as suspension by way of punishment. The Supreme Court made it clear that it was not suspension pending enquiry which alone can entitle the employee the subsistence allowance. When suspension was also one of the punishments imposed on the employee, he will not be entitled to any subsistence allowance during the said period. With the result, the impugned order of the first respondent cannot be sustained. Writ petition is allowed.