GOPALAKRISHNA TAMADA, J. ( 1 ) DEFENDANTS 1 and 2 in O. S. No. 27 of 1981 on the file of the Court of Subordinate judge, Gudivada, are the appellants in the above appeal. While so, being aggrieved by the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the ante adoption agreement set up by the plaintiff is not true, the plaintiff filed the cross-Objections. The suit is filed for eviction of defendants 1, 2 and 4 to 8 from the plaint a schedule property (R. C. C. building in 180 square yards of site bearing Municipal door No. 15/143 in Gudivada town); for delivery of possession of the same to the plaintiff; for past and future profits; and for possession of plaint b schedule silver articles from defendants 1 and 3 or their value as fixed by the court and for giving true and correct account of the amounts and other movables belonging to the deceased Smt. Chitta Seethamma by defendants 1 and 3. The case of the plaintiff is that plaintiff and the 1st defendant are stepbrothers and sons of the 3rd defendant. 2nd defendant is the son of 1st defendant. 9th defendant is the wife of Smt. Chitta Seethamma s brother. Defendants 4 to 8 are the tenants of plaint a schedule property. Plaintiff is the adopted son of Chitta Seethamma under a registered adoption deed dated 5-7-1961 (Ex. A-1 ). Originally, Smt. Chitta Seethamma was the owner of the plaint schedule property and also terraced shop rooms bearing Nos. 9/62, 9/63, 9/64 and 9/64a in Gudivada town. Prior to the execution of Ex. A-1-adoption deed, out of love and affection towards the plaintiff and D-1, who are the grand sons of her sister, Seethamma executed a gift deed dated 5-5-1961 (Ex. A2) gifting the terraced shops bearing Nos. 9/62, 9/63 to the plaintiff and the shops bearing Nos. 9/64 and 9/64a to the 1st defendant and also delivered possession of the same to them. It is the further case of the plaintiff that in the last week of June 1961, Seethamma wanted to adopt the plaintiff and proposed to the 3rd defendant that she would give all her movable and immovable properties owned and possessed by her and that she would make the plaintiff Karta of all the properties. Believing the said representation, the 3rd defendant agreed to give the plaintiff in adoption to Seethamma. Believing the said representation, the 3rd defendant agreed to give the plaintiff in adoption to Seethamma. Thereafter, the adoption was duly performed and an adoption deed (Ex. A-1) was accordingly executed. Seethamma managed the properties during the minority of the plaintiff and also thereafter. ( 2 ) BY the date of adoption, Seethamma was having cash of about Rs. 20,000/-, gold ornaments, silver articles besides other household articles and the plaint a schedule site with a thatched shed therein. After the adoption, the plaintiff was in the care and custody of Seethamma. Thus, the plaintiff became owner and was entitled to the beneficial interest in all the properties of Seethamma. It is his further case that he acquired title to the plaint a schedule property by adverse possession also. In or about 1970, Seethamma removed the thatched shed in plaint a schedule site and constructed a building with 9 rooms. She retained two rooms for her own use and occupation and leased out the other seven rooms to defendants 4 to 8 on monthly rental. Since 1972, the plaintiff lived with the 1st defendant at Hyderabad and D-1 was looking after all the affairs of the plaintiff as he was under the care and protection of the 1st defendant. It is the further case of the plaintiff that on account of the persuasions of defendants 1, 3 and 9, Seethamma executed a Will on 16-8-1977 (registration extract of the said Will is marked as Ex. A-4 by the plaintiff and the original will is marked as Ex. B-12 by the defendants) in a sound and disposing state of mind giving a limited life estate to the 9th defendant in the eastern half of the plaint a schedule building and the vested remainder right to the plaintiff; and also bequeathing the western portion of the building in favour of the plaintiff, which she wanted to take effect immediately after her death. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, it is averred that Seethamma lost her coherence and speech and that her health condition gradually deteriorated. After Seethamma was removed to the 1st defendant s house in Hyderabad, in the 1st week of January 1978, the plaintiff was regularly attending to her needs. Seethamma was an illiterate. ( 4 ) WITH the health condition which was prevalent at that time, Seethamma was not in a position to execute any document. After Seethamma was removed to the 1st defendant s house in Hyderabad, in the 1st week of January 1978, the plaintiff was regularly attending to her needs. Seethamma was an illiterate. ( 4 ) WITH the health condition which was prevalent at that time, Seethamma was not in a position to execute any document. Therefore, the Wills which are purported to have been executed by Seethamma in January or April 1978 could not have been executed by her. It is alleged that those wills must have been forged by defendants 1, 3 and 9. Seethamma died on 24-7-1979. After the death of seethamma, defendants 1, 3 and 9 took away the cash and b schedule properties along with them for safe custody. The immovable properties, including the plaint a and b schedule properties, devolved on the plaintiff. When the plaintiff asked defendants 1 and 3 to give true and correct account of all the properties of Seethamma, defendants 1, 3 and 9 proclaimed that Seethamma executed a Will on 23-1-1978 (Ex. B-5) bequeathing the suit schedule properties and her other properties to the 1st defendant and that she also executed another Will on 12-4-1978 (Ex. B-13) bequeathing all her properties, including the suit property, in favour of the 2nd defendant. According to the plaintiff, those Wills are not genuine. ( 5 ) THE attestations of the plaintiff and one M. Venkateswara Rao were taken on some document by the 1st defendant in the Registrar s Office, Hyderabad, on a working day in a hurried manner representing that Seethamma was executing a power of attorney and without intimating them the true nature and contents of the document. Hence, the suit. ( 6 ) THE 3rd defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement and defendants 1 and 2 adopted the same. It is their case that Seethamma never represented that she would give all her properties to the plaintiff or that she would make him Karta in respect of her properties. There was no ante adoption agreement between D-3 and Seethamma before the adoption that she would give away all her properties to the plaintiff. Even after the adoption, the plaintiff did not live with Seethamma continuously but he was always with the 3rd defendant or the 1st defendant. There was no ante adoption agreement between D-3 and Seethamma before the adoption that she would give away all her properties to the plaintiff. Even after the adoption, the plaintiff did not live with Seethamma continuously but he was always with the 3rd defendant or the 1st defendant. It is their case that adoption deed cannot operate either as settlement deed or gift in respect of all the properties of seethamma. Seethamma was managing her properties on her own. It was only when her health condition deteriorated, she entrusted the management of the properties to the 3rd defendant. Seethamma was not prevailed upon to execute will dated 16-8-1977 (Ex. B-12) and that she executed the same with her free will. The contention that Seethamma s health condition deteriorated after the execution of Ex. B-12-will was denied by the defendants. The defendants contended that she was all through in a perfect health condition. Seethamma executed the Will (Ex. B-5) in a sound and disposing state of mind. The plaintiff attested the said will as one of the attestors. Seethamma executed her last Will on 12. 4. 1978 (Ex. B-13) and that Seethamma was in a sound and disposing state of mind when she executed the said Will. The said will was attested by persons who were working as Sections Officers in A. G. s Office. ( 7 ) IT is a genuine and valid document. Seethamma was attacked with paralysis about three months before her death. It is, therefore, contended that by virtue of the bequests under the Will dated 12-4-1978 (Ex. B-13), plaint a schedule property has vested in the 2nd defendant from the time of the death of Seethamma. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek for recovery of possession of the same. On the above pleadings, the following issues were framed for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for eviction of defendants 1, 2 and 4 to 8 from the a schedule properties and recovery of possession of the same? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the past net profits of Rs. 8,350/- prayed for with interest against D1 and D3 to D8 so far as plaint a schedule property is concerned? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to future profits prayed for against defendants 1, 2 and 4 to 8? 4. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the past net profits of Rs. 8,350/- prayed for with interest against D1 and D3 to D8 so far as plaint a schedule property is concerned? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to future profits prayed for against defendants 1, 2 and 4 to 8? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to delivery of b schedule properties against D1 and D3 or in the alternative its value at Rs. 3,250/- with subsequent interest prayed for? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of accounting against defendants 1 and 2? 6. To what relief? additional Issues framed on 11-3-1983: 7. Whether the ante adoption agreement pleaded in the plaint is true, valid and binding on the deceased Chitta Sitamma, the adoptive mother of the plaintiff and above the defendants 1 and 2? ( 8 ) WHETHER the plaintiff became the owner of and was entitled to the beneficial interest in all the properties of late Ch. Sitamma, the adoptive mother of the plaintiff? ( 9 ) WHETHER Sitamma the adoptive mother of the plaintiff had right to alienate or dispose of the plaint schedule properties to the detriment of the plaintiff? ( 10 ) WHETHER the Will dt. 12. 4. 1978 said to have been executed by late Ch. Sitamma is true and is duly executed and attested according to law and in a sound and disposing state of mind and out of her free will and is binding on the plaintiff? additional Issues framed on 16-9-1988: 1. Whether the Will dated 22-1-1978 is true and valid? 2. Whether the plaintiff acquired title to plaint a schedule property by adverse possession? on behalf of the plaintiff, P. Ws. 1 to 3 were examined and Exs. A-1 to A-12 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D. Ws. 1 to 6 were examined and Exs. B-1 to b-14 were marked. On a consideration of the entire evidence on record, the court below decreed the suit, directing defendants 1 and 2 to deliver possession of the plaint a schedule property to the plaintiff, subject to the tenancy of defendants 4 to 8. It further directed defendants 1 and 2 to pay past profits of Rs. B-1 to b-14 were marked. On a consideration of the entire evidence on record, the court below decreed the suit, directing defendants 1 and 2 to deliver possession of the plaint a schedule property to the plaintiff, subject to the tenancy of defendants 4 to 8. It further directed defendants 1 and 2 to pay past profits of Rs. 8,330/- to the plaintiff along with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the suit (20-1-1981) till the date of payment, and also the future profits from the date of suit till the date of delivery of possession of suit A schedule property and the quantum of future profits was left to be decided on a separate application. The 1st defendant was further directed to deliver item no. 2 of b schedule property or its market value as on the date of the decree along with interest at 6% per annum, to the plaintiff. The rest of the suit claim was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said decree and judgment, the present appeal and the cross objections are filed. ( 11 ) HEARD both sides and perused the impugned judgment of the court below. According to the plaintiff, prior to his adoption, Seethamma represented before his father (D. 3) that she would give all her properties and would make the plaintiff Karta of all her properties, and believing the said representation D-3 agreed to give plaintiff in adoption to Seethamma. The plaintiff now tries to build up a case on the strength of the said alleged ante adoption agreement contending that being the adopted son of Seethamma, he became Karta in respect of all the properties of Seethamma and that therefore from the date of his adoption under Ex. A-1 Seethamma was not competent to make any bequest in favour of others in respect of the suit property. But, except the above self-serving statement, there is no evidence to prove the said ante adoption agreement and that the only person who is competent to speak about the alleged ante adoption agreement is the natural father of plaintiff i. e. , 3rd defendant, but the 3rd defendant categorically denied in his evidence about the existence of any such agreement. The plaintiff, however, tried to highlight the recitals in Ex. The plaintiff, however, tried to highlight the recitals in Ex. A-1 adoption deed wherein it is recited that plaintiff became Karta in respect of suit properties owned by Seethamma from that time onwards and contended that the said recitals would prove the earlier agreement. Even if it is assumed that seethamma intended plaintiff to act as Karta in respect of her properties, by the said recital it cannot be interpreted to mean that plaintiff became absolute owner of the suit property. At the most he can be treated as a manager of the suit property from the date of Ex. A-1. Therefore, the finding arrived at by the court below disbelieving the ante adoption agreement need not be disturbed in this appeal. ( 12 ) VTHE other document upon which strong reliance is placed by the plaintiff is ex. A-4, the registration extract of the Registered Will dated 16-08-1977 alleged to have been executed by Seethamma. The original Will was produced by the defendants and marked as Ex. B-12. Under the said Will, Seethamma bequeathed the eastern half of the suit schedule property (admeasuring 90 square yards) to the 9th defendant to be enjoyed during her lifetime and thereafter creating vested remainder right in favour of the plaintiff, and the remaining western portion of the suit property (admeasuring 90 square yards) in favour of the plaintiff absolutely after the lifetime of Seethamma. Both parties admitted the execution of Ex. B-12 by Seethamma and the contents thereof. But, although the plaintiff disputed the power of Seethamma to execute Ex. B-12, later on i. e. , during the course of his further examination in Court, accepted the contents of and the bequests made in Ex. B-12. The Court below, having held that Seethamma was competent to execute Ex. B-12 as owner of the suit property, curiously recorded a finding that the constructions in the suit land having been raised with the income derived from the property of the plaintiff (gifted to him under ex. A-2), the construction in the suit property does not exclusively belong to seethamma and, therefore, Seethamma had no power to execute Ex. B-2-Will or any other Will. But, the said finding of the Court below appears to be perverse. ( 13 ) NO doubt, Seethamma was in management of the plaintiff s property covered by ex. A-2), the construction in the suit property does not exclusively belong to seethamma and, therefore, Seethamma had no power to execute Ex. B-2-Will or any other Will. But, the said finding of the Court below appears to be perverse. ( 13 ) NO doubt, Seethamma was in management of the plaintiff s property covered by ex. A-2-gift deed during the minority of the plaintiff but that does not mean that Seethamma utilized the amount realised from out of the said gifted property for raising constructions in the suit land. There is also no concrete evidence to prove that Seethamma utilized the plaintiff s money for raising constructions in the suit land. Merely because D. Ws. 1 and 3 deposed that Seethamma did not inform them the source of income for constructing shop rooms in the suit property, it cannot be presumed that Seethamma utilized only the plaintiff s money for raising the construction. Therefore, the finding of the court below that the suit property does not exclusively belong to Seethamma is based on mere surmises and conjectures. However, the said finding of the court below and as a matter of fact even the effect of Ex. B-12 became dilated in view of the subsequent dispositions made by Seethamma in Exs. B-5 and B-13-Wills. If an authority is needed for the proposition that a second Will disposing of the whole estate revokes a former disposition, we would refer to the Judgment of the Privy council in HENFREY Vs. HENFREY [ (1842) 4 Moore PC 29], which was quoted with approval in IYYAPPAN Vs. CHAKKUNNI by a learned Judge of the Madras High Court being Member of a Division Bench, whose judgment differing with the view taken by the other learned Judge of the Division Bench was ultimately referred to a full Bench. Therefore, in view of the above settled legal position, both parties confined their argument with regard to the genuineness or otherwise of the subsequent dispositions, viz. , Exs. B-5 and B-13. ( 14 ) VBEFORE examining the genuineness of Exs. B. 5 and B. 13, let us first examine the legal position regarding the requirements of proving a Will. Therefore, in view of the above settled legal position, both parties confined their argument with regard to the genuineness or otherwise of the subsequent dispositions, viz. , Exs. B-5 and B-13. ( 14 ) VBEFORE examining the genuineness of Exs. B. 5 and B. 13, let us first examine the legal position regarding the requirements of proving a Will. Under Section 67 of the Evidence Act, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such handwriting under Sections 45 and 47 of the said Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Section 68 of the Evidence Act provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a Court of law. Similarly, Sections 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act are also relevant. Thus the question whether the Will set up by the profounder is proved to be the last Will of the testator has to be decided in the light of the above provisions. In h. VENKATACHALA Vs. B. N. THIMMAJAMMA, the Supreme Court had laid down the requirements of proving a will. The observations at paragraph 19, 20 and 21 of the said judgment are apposite and read thus:". . . . The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. . . . . ""there may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and unless it is satisfactorily discharged, Courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and unless it is satisfactorily discharged, Courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. ""apart from the suspicious circumstances above referred to in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. . . . " ( 15 ) ON the anvil of the above legal position, we shall proceed to examine whether the propounder of the Will-Ex. B-5 was able to prove its execution as required under the law. Under Ex. B-5, Seethamma bequeathed the suit property and also the property in plot No. 160 in Sreepuram Colony, Hyderabad, in favour of the 1st defendant (D. W. 3 ). The contents of Ex. B. 5 show that Seethamma executed the Will out of her free will and in a sound and disposing state of mind. It was recited therein that as she had no sons or daughters, she adopted the plaintiff on 5-7-1961 and also gifted the property in 9th ward, Gudivada. While referring to her earlier Will-Ex. B-12 dated 16. 8. 1977 it was recited that since then, her adopted son and Chinthalapati Annapurnamma (D-9) were not doing any service to her and subjected her to difficulties, and that there were also many changes in her family life since the execution of Ex. B. 12-will. It is further recited that since some time prior to Ex. B. 5, D-1 was doing all services to her and looking after her in all respects. She thought that she would be safe in his hands and that she could spend her life peacefully. She also expressed confidence in him. ( 16 ) UNDER these circumstances, Seethamma intended to cancel the earlier Will Ex. B-12 and execute Ex. B-5-Will and a recital to the above effect can be seen in Ex. She thought that she would be safe in his hands and that she could spend her life peacefully. She also expressed confidence in him. ( 16 ) UNDER these circumstances, Seethamma intended to cancel the earlier Will Ex. B-12 and execute Ex. B-5-Will and a recital to the above effect can be seen in Ex. B-5. ( 17 ) SEETHAMMA further recited in Ex. B-5 that after her death, D-1 would take over the suit property and plot No. 160 for himself and his heirs with absolute rights. The 3rd defendant (D. W. 1) is the scribe of Ex. B-5. The plaintiff signed as attesting witness and also as identifying witness. One Mr. Suleman is the other attesting witness and identifying witness. But, he was not examined. ( 18 ) ACCORDING to the defendants, Seethamma was in a sound and disposing state of mind by the date of Ex. B-5 and she executed the said Will out of her own free will. D. W. 1 deposed about the execution of Ex. B-5 by Seethamma. He stated that seethamma executed Ex. B. 5 revoking Ex. B-12 and he scribed it as per her instructions. He further stated that P. W. 1 and one document writer are the attestors of Ex. B. 5 and the same attestors identified Seethamma before the Sub registrar at the time of registration of Ex. B. 5 and that Seethamma was in a sound and disposing state of mind when she executed Ex. B. 5 Will. He further deposed that he read over the contents of Ex. B. 5 to Seethamma and after understanding the same she put her thumb mark in it. According to him, both the plaintiff and the 1st defendant were present throughout and P. W. 1 knows about the contents of Ex. B. 5. He stated that he never misrepresented to plaintiff that Ex. B. 5 is a power of attorney and without knowing the contents of Ex. B. 5, himself and 1st defendant never obtained the signature of P. W. 1 in it. He categorically stated that till the death of Seethamma, she was in a sound and disposing state of mind. In his cross-examination, he deposed that Seethamma herself presented Ex. B. 5 before the Sub Registrar for registration. The 1st defendant and plaintiff were also present when Ex. B. 5 was registered. He categorically stated that till the death of Seethamma, she was in a sound and disposing state of mind. In his cross-examination, he deposed that Seethamma herself presented Ex. B. 5 before the Sub Registrar for registration. The 1st defendant and plaintiff were also present when Ex. B. 5 was registered. D. W. 3, who accompanied Seethamma at the time of execution of Ex. B-5, corroborated the evidence of D. W. 1 in this regard and stated that P. W. 1 was present when seethamma affixed her thumb impression on Ex. B-5 and Seethamma saw P. W. 1 signing on Ex. B-5. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of D. Ws. 1 and 3 regarding the execution of Ex. B-5. Thus, we are of the view that the defendants were able to prove the due execution of Ex. B-5. ( 19 ) BUT, disputing the attestation on Ex. B-5 the plaintiff contended that he subscribed his signature on Ex. B-5 without knowing the nature and contents of ex. B-5 and therefore the attestation made by him is not a proper attestation and that as the other attestor has not been examined, the execution of Ex. B-5 must be held to be not proved. According to the plaintiff, on that day he was asked by the 1st defendant to come to the Sub-Registrar s office and on his request he signed on some document. He deposed that he does not know the contents of ex. B-5. But, the said statement of plaintiff appears to be unconvincing and strange. No man of ordinary prudence would subscribe his signature on a mere request without knowing the nature and contents of the document. It is not as if plaintiff is not worldly-wise. He is not an illiterate person and he was working as an employee in A. G. s Office at Hyderabad. Therefore, it is rather unusual to assume that a man of ordinary prudence would simply subscribe his signature in a document in a public office, that too in the office of a Sub- registrar, without bothering to know the nature and contents of such document or the implications of subscribing the signature thereon. Therefore, it is rather unusual to assume that a man of ordinary prudence would simply subscribe his signature in a document in a public office, that too in the office of a Sub- registrar, without bothering to know the nature and contents of such document or the implications of subscribing the signature thereon. As a matter of fact, his own evidence would disclose that before subscribing his signature the plaintiff made due enquiries with Seethamma by asking her about the proceedings in the Sub registrar office that day and then only he signed in Ex. B-5. Therefore, it cannot be said that he signed in Ex. B-5 even without knowing its nature and the contents thereof. In view of the above discussion, it must be held that the attestation done by P. W-1 on Ex. B-5 is a valid one. In view of the fact that the defendants are able to prove the attestation by one of the two attestors, the non-examination of the other attestor is not at all fatal. ( 20 ) THE plaintiff further contended that Seethamma was not in a sound and disposing state of mind at the time of execution of Ex. B-5 and that she did not execute the document out of her free will. But there is absolutely no evidence to substantiate the said contention and on the other hand the plaintiff s own evidence would establish that Seethamma was in a sound and disposing state of mind at that time. In his evidence he stated that when he went to the Sub registrar s office and signed in Ex. B-5, he found Seethamma there. ( 21 ) ACCORDING to him, Seethamma had no difficulty in identifying the plaintiff. She had also answered the queries put by the plaintiff and later on affixed her thumb impression on Ex. B-5 in his presence. If really Seethamma was suffering with any ailment on that day, the plaintiff would have noticed the same and spoken to about the same in his evidence. But, he has not uttered even a single word in his evidence to the effect that when he met her in the Sub-Registrar s office she was suffering with any particular ailment. If really Seethamma was suffering with any ailment on that day, the plaintiff would have noticed the same and spoken to about the same in his evidence. But, he has not uttered even a single word in his evidence to the effect that when he met her in the Sub-Registrar s office she was suffering with any particular ailment. The very fact that Seethamma went all the way from the place of her residence to the Sub Registrar s office itself shows that she was in a sound and disposing state of mind. However, placing strong reliance on Ex. A. 5-letter dated 20-1-1978 said to have been addressed by D. 1 to the father-in-law of the plaintiff (P. W. 3) wherein the 1st defendant alleged to have informed P. W. 3 that the health condition of seethamma was not good, the plaintiff contended that the said admission of D. 1 would clearly establish that Seethamma was not in a sound and disposing state of mind as on the date of execution of Ex. B. 5. But, the 1st defendant disputed the contents of Ex. A-5 and also the signature found therein. He contended that ex. A-5 has been brought into existence only for the purpose of the present suit. ( 22 ) ADMITTEDLY, Ex. A. 5-letter was written by P. W. 1 and not by the 1st defendant. According to P. W. 1, the 1st defendant was in the habit of dictating letters to him and on that day as the 1st defendant was in a hurry to go on tour to an outstation, he dictated the contents to P. W. 1 and he wrote them on a paper and that thereafter the 1st defendant subscribed his signature. Even though the 1st defendant disputed the signature in Ex. A-5, The court below took up the job of comparing the said signature on its own and held that the signature found in ex. A-5 belongs to D. 1 and that the contents in Ex. A. 5 would go to show that seethamma was not in a sound and disposing state of mind. But the said finding, in our considered opinion, cannot be sustained for more than one reason. ( 23 ) THE alleged letter is written on a white paper and there are no postal stamps thereon. It is not an inland letter. A. 5 would go to show that seethamma was not in a sound and disposing state of mind. But the said finding, in our considered opinion, cannot be sustained for more than one reason. ( 23 ) THE alleged letter is written on a white paper and there are no postal stamps thereon. It is not an inland letter. Therefore, it has to be presumed that the said letter was sent in a postal envelope which bears the postage stamps and also the seals of the two post offices. Had the postal envelope also been produced into court, then the authenticity of Ex. A-5 cannot be doubted. But, ex. A-5 is not accompanied by any such postal envelope. That apart, the 1st defendant is a literate person and there was no necessity for him to dictate a small letter to P. W. 1 and later on sign the same. Further, a bare look at the signature in Ex. A-5 and the way in which the signature was put therein raises so many doubts about its genuineness. When the 1st defendant disputed the signature on ex. A. 5, the court below ought to have sent the same to the handwriting expert for comparison. Therefore, the entire episode appears to be doubtful. For the above reason, Ex. A. 5 appears to be a got up document for the purpose of the suit and hence its contents cannot be looked into for any purpose. Consequently, the contention of the plaintiff advanced in this respect is rejected. ( 24 ) THE plaintiff further contended that right from the date of adoption he stayed along with Seethamma and did service to her, that the 1st defendant never did any service to her and that therefore the recital in Ex. B-5 to the effect that plaintiff did not render any service to Seethamma is apparently false and for this reason Ex. B-5 ought not to have been executed by Seethamma and that the same is a fabricated document. But, the said contention cannot be accepted in view of his own evidence in his cross-examination. P. W. 1 clearly stated that he stayed with Seethamma only for a short period after the adoption and that he stayed mostly with the 1st defendant for prosecuting his studies wherever he was working and even after his marriage he stayed with the 1st defendant in one house. P. W. 1 clearly stated that he stayed with Seethamma only for a short period after the adoption and that he stayed mostly with the 1st defendant for prosecuting his studies wherever he was working and even after his marriage he stayed with the 1st defendant in one house. His evidence would further establish that in fact it was Seethamma who rendered service to him when he fell sick once and that the plaintiff never did any service to her. According to P. W. 1, he was born on 20-12-1952 and if that is so, by the date of his adoption (5-7-1961) he was a boy of only 8 years of age. ( 25 ) ADMITTEDLY, some time after the adoption, he joined his brother (D-1) and prosecuted his studies while staying with his brother. He appeared for matriculation examination in 1971. Previously, he prosecuted 8th and 9th standards in Zilla Parishad High School, Miryalaguda during the years 1963 to 1966 while staying with his brother. His brother (D-1) came to Hyderabad in august 1970 and the plaintiff came to Hyderabad in 1972 and stayed with D-1. The plaintiff s marriage took place on 10-8-1975. After the execution of ex. B-12-Will dated 16-8-1977, Seethamma came to Hyderabad and stayed along with the 1st defendant. The above evidence is sufficient to hold that even though the plaintiff was adopted by Seethamma, he never lived with her nor did he render any service to her and on the other hand it was the 1st defendant who brought him up, and similarly, it was the 1st defendant who looked after the needs of Seethamma during the last phase of her life until her death. All the above circumstances might have prompted Seethamma to revoke the earlier will-Ex. B12 and execute ex. B5. Therefore, we are of the view that the contention raised by the plaintiff is without any basis. ( 26 ) THE contention of the plaintiff is that there was no reason for Seethamma to execute Ex. B-5 within five months after the execution of the earlier Will ex. B-12. The law is well settled that a testamentary intention is ambulatory till death and a will is in its nature a revocable instrument. Having due regard to the change in the family circumstances, Seethamma wanted to execute a new will and revoke the earlier will and accordingly she executed Ex. B-5. B-12. The law is well settled that a testamentary intention is ambulatory till death and a will is in its nature a revocable instrument. Having due regard to the change in the family circumstances, Seethamma wanted to execute a new will and revoke the earlier will and accordingly she executed Ex. B-5. Court s duty is to give effect to the intention of the testator but not to discover what the testator meant. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the court to delve much into all those circumstances under which the subsequent Will came into existence. Of course, if any suspicious circumstances are found, then the court should be cautious while scanning the evidence. In this case, the execution is not surrounded with any suspicious circumstance. The only one circumstance which is sought to be highlighted by the court below is the presence of D-1 and D-3 at the time of execution of Ex. B-5. But, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the presence of defendants 1 and 3 at the time of execution of Ex. B-5 cannot be said to be a suspicious circumstance. Because, admittedly, Seethamma does not have any male assistance in Hyderabad except the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 3 and she was solely dependant on defendants 1 and 3 for her daily needs. Therefore, there was no other alternative for her except to seek their assistance on the date of execution of Ex. B-5. Under those circumstances, it can be held that the presence of defendants 1 and 3 at the time of execution of Ex. B-5 cannot be termed as a suspicious circumstance. ( 27 ) THE court below, however, took the view that Ex. B-5 is not a valid document as the defendants were unable to explain so many suspicious circumstances and consequently disbelieved the said document. In our opinion, the approach of the court below is perverse and, therefore, the findings of the court below on ex. B-5 are wholly unsustainable and liable to be set aside. ( 28 ) THIS takes us to the other important document viz. , the Will dated 12. 4. 1978. (Ex. B. 13 ). According to the defendants, this is the last will and testament of seethamma. As could be seen from Ex. B. 13, though the document bears the date 12. 4. 1978, it was signed by Seethamma on 19. 4. , the Will dated 12. 4. 1978. (Ex. B. 13 ). According to the defendants, this is the last will and testament of seethamma. As could be seen from Ex. B. 13, though the document bears the date 12. 4. 1978, it was signed by Seethamma on 19. 4. 1978 and presented for registration on the same day. D. W. 1, the 1st defendant, deposed in his cross-examination that Seethamma executed Ex. B. 13 of her own free will. According to him, he got it typed as per the instructions of Seethamma on 12. 4. 1978. In the said Will, she made a reference to the earlier adoption deed and gift deed in favour of the plaintiff and also about Ex. B. 5. The contents of ex. B. 13 also show that 1st defendant was looking after her and doing her all services and she has love and affection towards his son, i. e. , D. 2. As the plaintiff was already given valuable property through gift deed and that he is in enjoyment of the same, she was not intending to bequeath any more property to the plaintiff. Therefore, she executed the present Will (Ex. B-13) in favour of d. 2 after canceling the earlier Will Ex. B. 5. It may not be out of place to mention here that Ex. B. 5 was executed after canceling the earlier Will Ex. B. 12. D. W. 5 and one C. Sasisekhar are the attestors of Ex. B-13. Both of them are section Officers in A. G. s office in Hyderabad. They also acted as identifying witnesses before the Sub Registrar. D. W. 5 has categorically stated in his evidence that he signed as an attestor in the Will and that himself and C. Sasisekhar identified Seethamma before the Sub Registrar at the time of registration of the Will. He further deposed that Seethamma affixed her thumb impressions on Ex. B. 13 in his presence and in the presence of Mr. C. Sasisekhar. ( 29 ) HE also stated that she was in sound and disposing state of mind at that time. Though he was cross-examined at length by the plaintiff, nothing useful could be elicited. Thus, the attestation of Ex. B-13 was successfully proved by the defendants. The evidence of D. Ws. C. Sasisekhar. ( 29 ) HE also stated that she was in sound and disposing state of mind at that time. Though he was cross-examined at length by the plaintiff, nothing useful could be elicited. Thus, the attestation of Ex. B-13 was successfully proved by the defendants. The evidence of D. Ws. 1 a nd 3 would further go to show that Seethamma was in a sound and disposing state of mind as on the date of execution of Ex. B-13 and until her death. Thus, the requirements of proving a Will as stated above are satisfied. Hence, it has to be held that Ex. B. 13 is a genuine document. ( 30 ) IN the light of the above discussion, we hold that Exs. B. 5 and B. 13, Wills, executed by Seethamma in respect of the suit schedule property are genuine documents and consequently the earlier Will Ex. B. 12 executed in favour of the plaintiff cannot be acted upon in view of the subsequent dispositions in favour of Defendants 1 and 2 and that Ex. B. 13-Will being the last will and testament of seethamma shall prevail over all her earlier dispositions. In view of the above findings, the finding of the court below that Exs. B. 12, B. 5 and B. 13 are not binding on the plaintiff, that Seethamma must be deemed to have died intestate and the plaintiff being the adopted son of Seethamma must be deemed to have inherited all her properties after her death, are liable to be set aside and they are accordingly set aside. ( 31 ) IN the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, dismiss the cross-Objections and set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the court below. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiff stands dismissed. No costs.