JUDGMENT Dilip Gupta, J.—The judgment and order dated 23.5.2003 of a learned Judge of this Court dismissing Writ Petition No. 54360 of 2002 has been impugned in this special appeal. 2. The dispute in the writ petition out of which the present special appeal arises relates to the admission to the Bachelor of Technology (Electrical and Electronics Course) in the Academic Session 2001-02. In the State of Uttar Pradesh, the admissions to the Regional Engineering Colleges, Government Funded Engineering Colleges as well as Private Engineering Colleges are regulated by the U.P. Technical University (hereinafter referred to as the University), which has been established under the U.P. Technical University Act, 2000. The said University conducts an Entrance Test known as the U.P. State Engineering Admission Test popularly called as "UP-SEAT" and on the basis of the marks obtained at the aforesaid Entrance Test the candidates are admitted in the different Engineering Colleges/Institutes. For the Academic Session 2001-02 the Entrance Test was conducted by the UP-SEAT 2001. 3. Under Section 19 of the U.P. Technical University Act, the Academic Council of the University is the Principal Academic Body responsible for the maintenance of standard of instructions, education and examination of the University. The Academic Council has framed Ordinances in this regard and clauses 2.1(a) and 2.2 which are relevant for the purposes of the controversy involved in the present case are quoted below : "2.1 For admission through entrance examination: (a) For admission to B.Tech Ist Semester, a candidate should have passed the 10+2 examination of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. or its equivalent with Mathematics. Physics and Chemistry as subjects. For Agriculture Engineering Branch a candidate with Agriculture subjects at 10 + 2 level is also eligible. 2.2. For direct admission made at Institution/College level after entrance examination counselling : The eligibility criteria for direct admission on seats remaining vacant after entrance examination counselling shall be such as may be notified by the State Government/University from time to time". 4. For Agriculture Engineering Branch a candidate with Agriculture subjects at 10 + 2 level is also eligible. 2.2. For direct admission made at Institution/College level after entrance examination counselling : The eligibility criteria for direct admission on seats remaining vacant after entrance examination counselling shall be such as may be notified by the State Government/University from time to time". 4. The University did not notify the criteria for direct admission on the seats remaining vacant after the entrance examination counselling but the State Government by the order dated 18th October, 2001, notified the criteria by providing that the vacancies should be published in prominent newspapers and the Institute should invite only those candidates who have passed the Intermediate Examination or equivalent examination with 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics but the process of admission should be completed by 25th October, 2001 and the Controller of Examination of the University should be accordingly informed. 5. The petitioner appeared at the aforesaid entrance test but his name did not appear in the list dated 20th June, 2001, containing the names of candidates provisionally selected for admission. However, since certain seats still remained vacant, the Institute could make direct admissions in view of Clause 2.2 of the Ordinances, quoted above. 6. Pursuant to the advertisement issued by the Bharat Institute of Technology, Meerut (hereinafter referred to as the Institute) for direct admission, the petitioner was admitted to the B.Tech Course by the said Institute in January, 2002 and he pursued his studies and appeared at the 1st Semester and 2nd Semester Examinations of the 1st year. The Examination Form for the 3rd Semester was, however, not forwarded by the Institute since his admission had been cancelled. The petitioner, therefore, submitted a representation to the Secretary, Technical Education and when no action was taken, he filed a writ petition in this Court, being Writ Petition No. 49479 of 2002 which was disposed of with a direction that the representation may be decided. The representation was then rejected by means of the order dated 10th December, 2002, which was challenged by the petitioner in the writ petition out of which the present special appeal arises. The representation was then rejected by means of the order dated 10th December, 2002, which was challenged by the petitioner in the writ petition out of which the present special appeal arises. In the order dated 10th December, 2002, it was clearly stated that since the petitioner had obtained less than 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics his admission had been cancelled and the University was also intimated of this fact by the Institute by means of the letter dated 14th November, 2002. In the writ petition, an interim order was initially granted on 19th December, 2002, that the petitioner may be provisionally permitted to appear at the third semester examination scheduled to commence from 22nd December, 2002, but it was further provided that in case the writ petition was dismissed the Examination Fee would not be permitted to be refunded. 7. A counter-affidavit was filed by the University clearly mentioning that it was mandatory for the candidates to have secured at least 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics before they could even be considered for direct admission in the B.Tech Course. The said eligibility criteria, as was provided under the Government order dated 18th October, 2001, was duly published in the newspaper Hindustan Times published from Delhi and Patna and since the petitioner did not possess the eligibility criteria his admission had been rightly cancelled. A counter-affidavit was also filed by the Institute mentioning that the petitioner had practiced fraud in securing admission since he had supplied a forged mark-sheet which indicated that he had obtained more than 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics and when this was detected, the admission was cancelled. The learned Judge after carefully considering the various submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties dismissed the writ petition holding that since the petitioner did not possess the requisite minimum eligibility criteria his admission was per se illegal. The learned Judge also directed that an inquiry should be conducted to investigate as to how the petitioner and other such candidates had been admitted by the Institute. 8. The learned Judge also directed that an inquiry should be conducted to investigate as to how the petitioner and other such candidates had been admitted by the Institute. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant Sri Chotey Lal Pandey submitted that once the petitioner had been admitted by the Institute, it was estopped in law from cancelling the admission particularly for the reasons that the petitioner was unaware of the requirement of having at least 50% marks in aggregate in physics, Chemistry and Mathematics and that he was also not at fault since the mark-sheet which he had submitted to the Institute indicated that he had obtained less than 50% marks. Elaborating his arguments he submitted that even though this requirement was published in most of the newspapers but in one of the newspaper this requirement was not published and since the petitioner had applied on the basis of the advertisement issued in the said newspaper, no fault can be attributed to him and, therefore, the Institute was not justified in cancelling his admission. He further submitted that he had been permitted to pursue his studies under the interim orders passed by this Court and, therefore, the learned Judge should not have dismissed the writ petition. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that the petitioner had obtained admission on the basis of a forged mark-sheet, which indicated that he had obtained more than 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics and, therefore, no relief should be granted by this Court and in any view of the matter since admittedly the petitioner had obtained less than 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics he could not have been admitted in view of the criteria laid down in the Government order dated 18th October, 2001 and, therefore, the admission had rightly been cancelled. He further submitted that the aforesaid requirement was duly published in the newspapers and mere appearance at the examination under the interim orders of this Court, once the Court comes to the conclusion that the initial admission itself was against the mandatory requirements, would not confer any benefit on the petitioner. 10. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials available on record. 11. 10. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials available on record. 11. The primary question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether the Institute was justified in cancelling the admission of the petitioner. 12. There were two methods of securing admission to the B.Tech course. One was by appearing at the Entrance Examination conducted by the UP-SEAT 2001 and the other was by direct admission for the seats remaining vacant even after the counselling for the Entrance Examination. The petitioner had appeared at the Entrance Examination conducted by the UP-SEAT 2001 but his name did not appear in the list of selected candidates. He, therefore, resorted to the second method also by seeking admission directly in the Institute. As seen above, Ordinance 2.2 clearly provides that the eligibility criteria for seeking admission directly in the Institute shall be such as may be notified by the State Government/University from time to time. The State Government issued an order dated 18th October, 2001, notifying the criteria by providing that the vacancy should be published in prominent newspapers and the Institute should invite the candidates who have passed the Intermediate Examination or Equivalent Examination with 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics and the Controller of Examination of the University should then be informed about the admissions. Admittedly, the petitioner/appellant had not obtained 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics. He could not, therefore, be considered for admission in the Institute. He was, however, wrongly admitted by the Institute in January, 2002. 13. The records reveal that after the petitioner had been admitted by the Institute, certain formalities were required to be completed for obtaining the enrolment in the University and for this purpose the Enrolment Form was required to be filled in by the petitioner so that it could be sent to the University. In the said Enrolment Form the petitioner deliberately left that column blank in which he was required to indicate the marks obtained by him in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics and nor did he annex a copy of the mark-sheet of the Intermediate Examination. This prompted the University to make enquiries about the percentage of marks obtained by the petitioner and then it was revealed that the petitioner had actually obtained less than 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics. This prompted the University to make enquiries about the percentage of marks obtained by the petitioner and then it was revealed that the petitioner had actually obtained less than 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics. The admission was cancelled by the Institute in November, 2002, as soon as it was brought to its notice that the petitioner did not possess the required percentage of marks. 14. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and others v. Lata Arun, JT 2002 (5) SC 210, examined the cancellation of admission of a candidate to the General Nursing and Midwifery and Staff Nurse Course on the ground that the respondent did not possess the eligibility criteria. The High Court had allowed the writ petition and the special appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court was also dismissed. The Supreme Court, however, allowed the appeal and held that the High Court was in error in issuing directions to the appellants to treat the respondent as a candidate possessed of all the prescribed qualification and to declare the result. 15. In the case of Regional Officer, CBSE v. Ku. Sheena Peethambaran and others, 2003 (5) AWC 4286 (SC) : 2004 (1) SCCD 460 : (2003) 7 SCC 719 , the Supreme Court considered the withholding of the Examination Form of a candidate for the High School Examination on the ground that she had not passed the Class IX examination. The High Court initially by an interim order had permitted the candidate to appear at the Class X examination and ultimately had allowed the writ petition also. It was held by the Supreme Court that the candidate did not fulfil the conditions for appearing at the Class X examination and, therefore, it set aside the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition by observing as follows : "In the background of the law as laid down by this Court, we find that in the case in hand the fact situation was even worse as compared to the decision cited above. The student, namely, respondent No. 1 had failed to clear her Class IX examination which was a necessary requirement as provided under the bye-laws of the Board so as to be entitled to appear in Class X examination conducted by the Board. The student, namely, respondent No. 1 had failed to clear her Class IX examination which was a necessary requirement as provided under the bye-laws of the Board so as to be entitled to appear in Class X examination conducted by the Board. Despite notice, no one has put in appearance on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 to indicate any fact or circumstance so as to take any different view. Condoning the lapses or overlooking the legal requirements in consideration of mere sympathy factor does not solve the problem, rather breeds more violations in the hope of being condoned. It disturbs the discipline of the system and ultimately, adversely affects the academic standards." 16. In A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Government of A.P., (1986) 2 SCC 667 , the Supreme Court observed: "We cannot by our fiat direct the University to disobey the statute to which it owes its existence and the regulations made by the University itself. We cannot imagine anything more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the Court to disobey the laws." 17. In the case of Gurdeep Singh v. State of J. & K. and others, AIR 1993 SC 2638 , the Supreme Court examined the selection of a candidate who was ineligible to be admitted. It quashed his selection and made the following observations in paragraph 9 of the judgment : "What remains to be considered is whether the selection of respondent No. 6 should be quashed. We are afraid, unduly lenient view of the Courts on the basis of human consideration in regard to such excesses on the part of the authorities, has served to create an impression that even where an advantage is secured by stratagem and trickery, it could be rationalised in courts of law. Courts do and should take humane and sympathetic view of matters. That is the very essence of justice. But considerations of judicial policy also, dictate that a tendency of this kind where advantage gained by illegal means is permitted to be retained will jeopardize the purity of selection process itself; engender cynical disrespect towards the judicial process and in the last analyses embolden errant authorities and candidates into a sense of complacency and impunity that gains achieved by such wrongs could be retained by an appeal to the sympathy of the Court. Such instances reduce the jurisdiction and discretion of Courts into private benevolence. This tendency should be stopped. The selection of respondent No. 6 in the sports category was, on the material placed before us thoroughly unjustified. He was not eligible in the sports category. He would not be entitled on the basis of his marks, to a seat in general merit category. Attribution of eligibility long after the selection process was over, in our opinion is misuse of power. While we have sympathy for the predicament of respondent No. 6, it should not lose sight of the fact that the situation is the result of his own making. We think in order to uphold the purity of academic processes, we should quash the selection and admission of respondent No. 6. We do so though, however, reluctantly." 18. In view of the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions we do not have the least hesitation in holding that the Institute was justified in law in cancelling the admission of the petitioner/appellant on the ground that he did not possess the requisite minimum eligibility criteria for being admitted to the B.Tech Ist Year course. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended that he was unaware of the aforesaid requirement and, therefore, in such circumstances his admission should not have been cancelled. In support of his submissions, he contended that though the advertisement inviting application was published in many newspapers containing the requirement of having 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics but in one such newspaper this condition was not mentioned and it was on the basis of the advertisement published in this newspaper that the petitioner/ appellant had applied. 20. This submission of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot also be accepted. 21. In the first instance of Ordinance itself provides that the eligibility criteria for seeking admission directly in the Institute shall be such as may be notified by the State Government/University from time to time. It was, therefore, for the petitioner to have made enquiries about the eligibility criteria. Even otherwise the eligibility criteria of obtaining 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics at the Intermediate Examination was also duly published in the newspaper Hindustan Times from Delhi and Patna. It was, therefore, for the petitioner to have made enquiries about the eligibility criteria. Even otherwise the eligibility criteria of obtaining 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics at the Intermediate Examination was also duly published in the newspaper Hindustan Times from Delhi and Patna. This apart, it is the specific case of the Institute that admission had been granted to the petitioner on the basis of a mark-sheet which indicated that the petitioner had obtained more than 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics. This mark-sheet was ultimately found to be forged and in fact the petitioner did not possess the requisite percentage of marks. This clearly indicates that for the purposes of seeking admission in the Institute directly, the petitioner was aware of the fact that it was necessary to obtain more than 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics otherwise he would not have supplied the mark-sheet indicating that he had obtained more than 50% marks. However, in any view of the matter ignorance of the Ordinances or the Government order cannot be a ground for contending that the admission should not have been cancelled as was clearly held by this Court in the case of Alok Kumar Bhardwaj v. Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh and others, (1994) 3 UPLBEC 2035, wherein it was observed that the petitioner must be deemed to be aware of the University Ordinance which permitted him four chances and no more to clear the First Semester Examination. 22. Learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that the Institute was not justified in contending that it had admitted the petitioner on the basis of mark-sheet supplied by him which indicated that he had obtained more than 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics since the mark-sheet in which he had produced before the Institute was the correct mark-sheet in which admittedly he had obtained less than 50% marks. Thus, his contention is that if he had placed the correct marks before the Institute then the Institute was not justified in asserting that any fraud had been played by the petitioner in securing his admission. 23. Thus, his contention is that if he had placed the correct marks before the Institute then the Institute was not justified in asserting that any fraud had been played by the petitioner in securing his admission. 23. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, contended that the petitioner had supplied a mark-sheet to the Institute which indicated that he had obtained 58% marks in Physics, 56% marks in Chemistry and 38% marks in Mathematics and it was on the basis of this mark-sheet, a photostat copy of which was also annexed with the counter-affidavit, that the petitioner had been admitted. Later on when it transpired that the petitioner had actually obtained only 58% marks in Physics, 58% marks in Chemistry and 28% marks in Mathematics his admission was cancelled. He, therefore, submitted that as it is a case where fraud had been resorted to for securing admission, no relief should be granted to the petitioner. 24. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Institute in the writ petition, it was clearly stated that the petitioner had supplied a photostat copy of the mark-sheet of Intermediate Examination which indicated that he had obtained 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics and it is only when the original mark-sheet was submitted by the petitioner in November, 2002, that it was revealed that the photostat copy of the mark-sheet supplied by him earlier was a forged document. The Institute, accordingly, cancelled the admission. It was further submitted that what was annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition was a copy of the duplicate mark-sheet of the Intermediate Examination which indicated that the petitioner had obtained less than 50% marks. The averments made in the counter-affidavit filed by the Institute do reveal that the petitioner had managed to secure the admission on the basis of a photostat copy of the forged mark-sheet. We have no reason to doubt the veracity of the averments made in the counter- affidavit particularly when no case of mala fide has been made out against the Institute and, therefore, undoubtedly fraud had been played upon the Institute. The question, therefore, that arises for our consideration is whether any relief should be granted to the petitioner in such a situation. 25. In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 All ER 341, the court of appeal stated the law thus: "I cannot accede to this argument for a moment. The question, therefore, that arises for our consideration is whether any relief should be granted to the petitioner in such a situation. 25. In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 All ER 341, the court of appeal stated the law thus: "I cannot accede to this argument for a moment. No Court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a Court, no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. The Court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever." 26. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court stated that fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal. 27. In Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. M/s. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and another, AIR 1994 SC 2151 , the Supreme Court observed that a writ court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should so act to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the Courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. Equity is always known to prevent the law from the clefty evasions and new sub-tleties invented to evade law. 28. In Union of India and others v. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 100, the Supreme Court, after placing reliance upon and approving its earlier judgment in the case of District Collector and Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram and another v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655 , observed as under : "If by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a court of law as the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer." 29. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others, 2000 (2) AWC 1349 (SC) : (2000) 3 SCC 581 , the Supreme Court observed that "Fraud and justice never dwell together" (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. 30. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others, 2000 (2) AWC 1349 (SC) : (2000) 3 SCC 581 , the Supreme Court observed that "Fraud and justice never dwell together" (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. 30. In the case of Ram Preeti Yadav v. U. P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education and others, 2003 (5) AWC 4449 (SC) : (2003) 8 SCC, it was observed by the Supreme Court that fraud deprives a person of all the advantages or benefits obtained by him and delay in detection of or in taking action raises no equity in favour of the petitioner. The facts of the case were that the petitioner on the basis of a provisional mark-sheet issued in 1986 took admission in B.A. without disclosing the fact that his result had been withheld. He passed the B.A. and M.A. Examination and also got employment as a Teacher in an Intermediate College. In the year 1993 some inquiry was made about the passing of the Intermediate Examination and then the Principal was informed on 16th October, 1996, that the result of the petitioner of the Intermediate Examination of the year 1984 had been cancelled. The writ petition was filed in the High Court raising various grounds including the ground that the cancellation after more than 10 years was wholly arbitrary and once he had passed the B.A. and M.A. Examination and secured appointment as a teacher, equity demanded that the order be set aside. A learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition and the special appeal was also dismissed. The Supreme Court, however, set aside the judgment and upheld the action of the Board in cancelling the result of the Intermediate Examination. 31. Thus, in view of the proposition of law laid down in the aforementioned cases it has to be held that the petitioner/appellant is not entitled to any relief in view of the fact that he had produced a forged mark-sheet for securing admission. 32. 31. Thus, in view of the proposition of law laid down in the aforementioned cases it has to be held that the petitioner/appellant is not entitled to any relief in view of the fact that he had produced a forged mark-sheet for securing admission. 32. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that no presumption can be raised that fraud was committed by the petitioner and in support of this contention, he relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Tarkeshwar Lal and others v. University of Gorakhpur and others, 1984 UPLBEC 1437. In the said case, on the basis of the result of LL.B. IInd Year the petitioners had been admitted to the LL.B. IIIrd Year and though they had appeared at this examination also, later on the LL.B. Part-II examination was cancelled on the ground that the petitioners had committed fraud by conniving with the Dealing Assistant in interpolating the Tabulation Chart of LL.B. IInd Year examination. The Division Bench of the High Court held that not only it cannot be presumed that the petitioners themselves were responsible for such interpolation but the University was also estopped from cancelling the result of LL.B. Part-II Examination. Reliance placed upon the aforesaid decision of the Allahabad High Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not justified since the Supreme Court in the appeal filed by the University against the aforesaid decision being Civil Appeal Nos. 692, 693, 719, 720 and 721 of 1980, University of Gorakhpur and others v. Kanhaiya Prasad Tripathi and another, by its judgment and order dated 2nd August, 1991 set aside, the judgment of the High Court and held as follows : "After hearing the learned counsel for the appellants, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court is not correct as no question of estoppel could arise against the University if admission to examination was obtained on misrepresentation. In this view, we allow the appeals and set aside the orders of the High Court with no order as to costs." 33. In this view, we allow the appeals and set aside the orders of the High Court with no order as to costs." 33. At this stage reference may also be made to a judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Satish Kumar Rai and others v. Gorakhpur University, AIR 1981 All 377 , in which it was held : "In the instant case, we are satisfied that as the petitioners themselves were responsible for the fraud played upon the University, they are not entitled to any right having accrued to them on the basis of mark-sheets issued subsequently. It is true, as was argued by the petitioners learned counsel, that the general rule is that he who pleads fraud must establish the same positively. Counsel urged that in the absence of any direct or circumstantial evidence to prove that the petitioners had a hand in the issuing of new mark sheets, no fraud could be presumed. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not correct. The general rule is that he who alleges fraud has the burden of establishing it. But, the law equally settled is that inferences of fraud may be drawn from the circumstances inasmuch as production of direct evidence is not possible. It is for this reason that direct evidence is not insisted upon for proving it. Fraud is a transaction which may be proved by inferences reasonably drawn from an intrinsic evidence respecting the transaction itself. Elements of fraud are such as are not susceptible of proof by direct evidence, as it is not demonstrable physically. For that reasons it must of necessity be proved by circumstances shown to have been involved in the transaction in question." 34. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that no presumption should be drawn that the petitioner was responsible for the fraud. 35. We, however, propose to examine the matter in the alternative also assuming that the petitioner was not responsible for the fraud. Even in such a situation it cannot be contended that the Institute was estopped in law from cancelling the admission of the petitioner. 36. 35. We, however, propose to examine the matter in the alternative also assuming that the petitioner was not responsible for the fraud. Even in such a situation it cannot be contended that the Institute was estopped in law from cancelling the admission of the petitioner. 36. In the case of B. L. Sreedhar and others v. K. M. Munireddy (dead) and others, JT 2002 (10) SC 363, the Supreme Court indicated what estoppel is by observing : "Estoppel is a rule of evidence and the general rule is enacted in Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short Evidence Act) which lays down that when one person has by his declaration, act or omission caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing.” 37. Estoppel is a product of an equitable doctrine as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) v. B. N. Bhattacharjee, AIR 1979 SC 1725 : "What in essence, is estoppel? Estoppel is a rule of equity which forbids truth being pleaded or representation, on which faith, another has acted to his detriment being retracted. Even extending the rule into the newfangled empire of promissory estoppel, it cannot go beyond the limits of the Law Revision Committee in England which Lord Denning allowed to blossom in the High Trees case. (1947) 1 MKB 130, also see "Discipline of Law by Lord Denning" p. 202. "We therefore recommend that a promise which the promisor knows, or reasonably should know will be relied upon by promisee, shall be enforceable if the promisee has altered his position to his detriment in reliance on the promise." 38. Estoppel presupposes equity in the representee. The further requirement is that he who raises an equitable estoppel must do equity himself. In a New Zealand case Re Goile Ex. P. Steelbuild Agencies Ltd., (1963) NZLR 66 (CA), a debtor arrived at an arrangement with his creditor whereby the creditor undertook to release him on payment forthwith of a sum smaller than due under the agreement. The debtor did not fulfil his part of the obligation despite persistent request of the creditor. In a New Zealand case Re Goile Ex. P. Steelbuild Agencies Ltd., (1963) NZLR 66 (CA), a debtor arrived at an arrangement with his creditor whereby the creditor undertook to release him on payment forthwith of a sum smaller than due under the agreement. The debtor did not fulfil his part of the obligation despite persistent request of the creditor. Thereupon, the creditor issued bankruptcy proceedings founded upon the original debt. This was opposed by the judgment-debtor and promissory estoppel was attempted to be set up in defence. The New Zealand Court held that the promise which was submitted as supporting the estoppel could not avail the judgment-debtor who had failed to perform his part of the bargain. He who seeks equity must do equity. As the judgment-debtor was found not to have acted in accordance with the promise, his defence was repelled. 39. It is also a settled proposition of law that estoppel cannot be raised to defeat the provisions of a statute and nor do the Courts issue any direction contrary to law. Thus, if the Ordinances /Government order prohibited the petitioner from securing admission in the B.Tech course if he had obtained less than 50% marks in aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics, the plea of estoppel cannot be raised by the petitioner/appellant and nor can this Court issue a direction to treat his admission as a valid admission. 40. The Supreme Court in the case of Dr. H. S. Rikhy and others v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1962 SC 554 , considered this aspect and laid down the law as follows : "In this connection, it is also convenient here to notice the argument that the Committee is estopped by its conduct from challenging the enforceability of the contract. The answer to the argument is that where a statute makes a specific provision that a body corporate has to act in a particular manner, and in no other, that provision of law being mandatory and not directory, has to be strictly followed. The statement of the law in paragraph 427 of the same volume of Halsburys Laws of England to the following effect settles the controversy against the appellants: "Result must not be ultra vires-A party cannot by representation, any more than by other means, raise against himself an estoppel so as to create a state of things which he is legally disabled from creating. Thus, a corporate or statutory body cannot be estopped from denying that it has entered into a contract which it was ultra vires for it to make. No corporate body can be bound by estoppel to do something beyond its powers, or to refrain from doing what it is its duty to do.........." 41. The same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheshwari v. State of U.P. and another, (1998) 2 SCC 502 , in which it was clearly held that estoppel cannot be raised to defeat the provisions of a statute. 42. In the case of M. I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu and others, 1999 (3) AWC 2508 (SC) : (1999) 6 SCC 464 , the Supreme Court again observed as follows : "Action of the Mahapalika in agreeing to the construction of an underground shopping complex in contravention of the provisions of the Act and then entering into an agreement with the builder against settled norms was wholly illegal and has been held to be so by the High Court. No doubt the Mahapalika is a continuing body and it will be estopped from changing its stand in the given case. But when the Mahapalika finds that its action was contrary to the provisions of law by which it was constituted there could certainly be no impediment in its way to change its stand. There cannot be any estoppel operating against the Mahapalika." 43. Thus, the plea of estoppel sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is misconceived and the action of the Institute in cancelling admission of the petitioner cannot be set aside on this ground. 44. In the end, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the petitioner/appellant had been permitted to appear at the examinations under the interim orders of this Court, we should take a sympathetic view of the matter and direct for declaration of the result. We are afraid we cannot agree to such a submission. 45. 44. In the end, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the petitioner/appellant had been permitted to appear at the examinations under the interim orders of this Court, we should take a sympathetic view of the matter and direct for declaration of the result. We are afraid we cannot agree to such a submission. 45. The Supreme Court in the case of Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kumar Bansal and another, AIR 1993 SC 2412 , commenced upon the sympathetic approach adopted at the time of final disposal of the petition on account of grant of interim order at the initial stage and observed as follows : "We are afraid that this kind of administration of interlocutory remedies, more guided by sympathy quite often wholly misplaced, does no service to anyone. From the series of orders that keep coming before us in academic matters, we find that loose, ill-conceived sympathy masquerades as interlocutory justice exposing judicial discretion to the criticism of degenerating into private benevolence. This is subversive of academic discipline, or whatever is left of it, leading to serious impasse in academic life. Admissions cannot be ordered without regard to the eligibility of the candidates. Decisions on matters relevant to be taken into account at the interlocutory stage cannot be deferred or decided later when serious complications might ensue from the interim order itself. In the present case, the High Court was apparently moved by sympathy for the candidates than by an accurate assessment of even the prima facie legal position. Such orders cannot be allowed to stand. The Courts should not embarrass academic authorities by itself taking over their functions." 46. In the case of C.B.S.E. and another v. P. Sunil Kumar and others, (1998) 5 SCC 377 , the institutions whose students were permitted to undertake the examination of the Central Board of Secondary Education were not affiliated to the Board and, therefore, were not entitled to appear at the examination. They were, however, allowed to appear at the examination in contravention of the Rules and Regulations of the Board under the interim orders granted by the Court. They were, however, allowed to appear at the examination in contravention of the Rules and Regulations of the Board under the interim orders granted by the Court. The High Court considered the matter sympathetically but the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and observed thus : "But to permit students of an unaffiliated institution to appear at the examination conducted by the Board under orders of the Court and then to compel the Board to issue certificates in favour of those who have undertaken examination would tantamount to subversion of law and this Court will not be justified to sustain the orders issued by the High Court on misplaced sympathy in favour of the students. In view of the aforesaid premises, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court as well as the interim orders issued by the single Judge in several petitions out of which the writ appeals arose and the writ petitions filed by the respondents stand dismissed." 47. In the case of Central Board of Secondary Education v. Nikhil Gulati, 1998 (2) AWC 1180 (SC) : (1998) 3 SCC 5 , the Supreme Court deprecated the practice followed by the High Court to issue direction but also observed that such aberrations should not be treated as a precedent in future but did not interfere with the ultimate direction of the High Court on the ground that fond hopes have been raised in the minds of the students and therefore it would be inappropriate to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. But this reasoning was not applied by the Supreme Court in the case of P. Sunil Kumar (supra). 48. In the case of Ku. Sheena Peethambaran and others (supra) the Supreme Court held as follows:— "This Court has on several occasions earlier deprecated the practice of permitting the students to pursue their studies and to appear in the examination under the interim orders passed in the petitions. In most of such cases it is ultimately pleaded that since the course was over or the result had been declared, the matter deserves to be considered sympathetically. It results in very awkward and difficult situations. Rules stare straight into the face of the plea of sympathy and concessions, against the legal provisions. 49. In most of such cases it is ultimately pleaded that since the course was over or the result had been declared, the matter deserves to be considered sympathetically. It results in very awkward and difficult situations. Rules stare straight into the face of the plea of sympathy and concessions, against the legal provisions. 49. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, we are not inclined to grant relief to the petitioner/appellant merely because of the fact that he had appeared at some of the Semester Examinations under the interim orders passed by the Court in the Writ Petition as well as in the Special Appeal. We cannot ignore the fact that the petitioner/appellant was clearly not entitled to be admitted to the B.Tech course since he did not even possess the requisite percentage of marks in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics for being considered for admission. The Courts cannot be swayed by sympathetic considerations particularly when admission is sought in such a highly technical course. Any direction by us for permitting such a candidate to continue his studies would be subversive of the academic discipline. 50. We, therefore, do not find merit in any of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The special appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. The interim orders stand vacated.