Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the Principal of the MSS Wakf Board College, Madurai. The petitioner has challenged the order of suspension dated 27-09-2003 on the ground that any suspension which exceeds the period of two months is bad in view of Section 19(3) of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges Regulation Act (“Act” in short) and he should be restored to service. An ex parte order of stay was granted and the College filed two petitions to vacate the stay and to suspend the ex parte order. When the interim petitions came up, by consent, the main writ petition itself was taken up for final disposal. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the first respondent is a minority college. While certain provisions of the Act do not apply to the first respondent by virtue of Section 24 in Association of University Teachers v. State of Tamil Nadu (1991 I L.W. 180, the Division Bench of this Court held that Section 24(3) insofar as it excludes the application of Section 19(3)(a) and (b) of the Act to a minority college is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, Section 19(3)(a) and (b) apply to the respondent college, though it is a minority institution It was submitted, that if that is so, the respondent has no authority to keep the petitioner under suspension beyond the period stipulated in Section 19(3) and therefore, the writ petition must be allowed. 3. The learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. R. Muthukumarasamy, appearing on behalf of the respondents would submit that, while it is true that the Division Bench held Section 19(3)(a) and (b) apply to minority institution, the matter has been taken up to the Supreme Court. In State of Karnataka v. Dr. T.M.A. Pai Foundation ( 2003 (6) SCC 790 ), the various orders of the High Courts were set aside and the matters remitted for fresh consideration. Independent of that, it was submitted that the petitioner had been charged with committing acts of misconduct which included sexual harassment and therefore, the petitioner had to be suspended from acting as Principal since the complainants apprehended adverse consequences if the petitioner were to resume charge as “Principal”. Independent of that, it was submitted that the petitioner had been charged with committing acts of misconduct which included sexual harassment and therefore, the petitioner had to be suspended from acting as Principal since the complainants apprehended adverse consequences if the petitioner were to resume charge as “Principal”. It was also submitted that the necessity to restrain the petitioner from acting as “Principal” was even more urgent because the independent enquiry officer had found him guilty of several of the charges. The learned Additional Advocate General drew the nice distinction between the three kinds of suspension, suspension as punishment, suspension pending enquiry, and suspension which amounts to forbidding the servant from doing the work while keeping in tact the masters obligation. For this purpose, he relied on V.P. Gindroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1970 SC 1494 ) and the Supreme Court considered the various kinds of suspension and observed as follows: “Three kinds of suspension are known to law. A public servant may be suspended as a mode of punishment or he may be suspended during the pendency of an enquiry against him if the order appointing him or statutory provisions governing his service provide for such suspensions. Lastly he may merely be forbidden from discharging his duties during the pendency of an enquiry against him which is also called suspension. The right to suspend as a measure of punishment as well as the right to suspend the contract of service during the pendency of an enquiry are both regulated by the contract of employment or the provisions regulating the conditions of service. But the last category of suspension referred to earlier is the right of the master to forbid his servant from doing the work which he had to do under the terms of the contract of service or the provisions governing his conditions of service at the same time keeping in force the masters obligations under the contract. In other words the master may ask hi s servant to refrain from rendering his service but he must fulfil his part of the contract”. 4. It is indeed depressing that persons at the helm of educational institutions should be charged with acts of sexual harassment. In Avinash Nagra v. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti etc. ( 1997(5) Supreme 306 ), the case involved a teacher who was found guilty of harassing the student. 4. It is indeed depressing that persons at the helm of educational institutions should be charged with acts of sexual harassment. In Avinash Nagra v. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti etc. ( 1997(5) Supreme 306 ), the case involved a teacher who was found guilty of harassing the student. His complaint was that the principles of natural justice were violated in the enquiry and that he must be permitted to cross-examine the students. The Supreme Court rejected his appeal on the ground that the rules provide that in special circumstances a detailed enquiry could be dispensed with and also that in a situation like this it will he hazardous to make the student subject to detailed enquiry. The following paragraphs are relevant: ‘It is axiomatic that percentage of education among girls, even after independence, is fatham deep due to indifference on the part of all in rural India except some educated people. Only of late, some middle class people are sending the girl children to co-educational institutions under the care of proper management and to look after the welfare and safety of the girls. Therefore, greater responsibility is thrust on the management of the schools and colleges to protect the young children, in particular, the growing up girls, to bring them up in disciplined and dedicated pursuit of excellence. The teacher who has been kept in charge, bears more added higher responsibility and should be more exemplary. His/her character and conduct should be more like Rishi and as loco parent is and such is the duty, responsibility and charge expected of a teacher. The fallen standard of the appellant is an iceberg in the discipline of teaching, a noble and learned profession; it is for each teacher and collectively their body to stem the rot to sustain the faith of the society reposed in them. Under those circumstances, the conduct of the appellant is unbecoming of a teacher, much less a loco parent is and, therefore, dispensing with regular enquiry under the rules and denial of cross-examination are legal and not vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice”. 5. In The Secretary, Sri Ramakrishna Vidyalayam High School v. The State of Tamil Nadu (1990 Writ L.R. 62), M. Srinivasan, J., (as he then was) dwelt on the exalted position a teacher holds. Of course, this judgment was overruled by the Division Bench. 5. In The Secretary, Sri Ramakrishna Vidyalayam High School v. The State of Tamil Nadu (1990 Writ L.R. 62), M. Srinivasan, J., (as he then was) dwelt on the exalted position a teacher holds. Of course, this judgment was overruled by the Division Bench. However, the following extracts are pertinent and therefore, they are extracted: “51. It is very lamentable state of affairs that in this country, a teacher who was considered as equal to God, should fall from the high pedestal to thelowest level. Our scriptures command the students to consider the teacher as a God (Acharya Devo Bhava). The term “Acharya” in Sanskrit means a person who not only teaches lessons to students, but also ensures good conduct of his pupils. The more important part of the definition is that he shall himself practice what he preaches. In Sanskrit language, the term “Guru” also means teacher. The syllable “Gu” represents darkness (symbolising ignorance). The syllable “Ru” represents the removal thereof. Thus, a Guru is so called as he removes the darkness and ignorance from the mind of the students. In fact, there is a saying that it is only with the blessings of a teacher that a person blossoms into a full man,” 6. It is true that the petitioner has the right to challenge the finding of guilt. In this case one must balance his right to resume charge against the right of the students or teachers who have complained of sexual harassment. In WHO report 1998 it is stated that “womens health is inextricably linked to their status and society. It benefits from equality and suffers from discrimination”. The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which India has acceded to, up holds the right of the women to the highest standards attainable of physical and mental health and the right to attain just and favourable conditions of work and the Convention calls upon all States to take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women. The convention wants that the States may also be responsible for private acts if they avail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate or punish the act of violence. The convention wants that the States may also be responsible for private acts if they avail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate or punish the act of violence. The Directive Principles of State Poli cy as adopted in Articles 39, 42 and 43 of the Constitution of India and the Fundamental Duties underscore the importance of protecting the dignity of women and ensuring that she has just and humane conditions in employment amongst other rights. In the Article, “Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade (1986)” in Femnism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1987) p. 103-116 the following extract is relevant: “Most victims of sexual harassment, if the incidence data are correct, never file complaints. Many who axe viciously violated are so ashamed to make that violation public that they submit in silence, although it devastates their self-respect and often their health, or they leave the job without complaint, although it threatens their survival and that of their families. If, on top of the cost of making the violation known, which is painful enough, they know that the entire range of their sexual experienc es, attitudes, preferences and practices are to be discoverable, few such actions will be brought, no matter how badly the victims are hurt. Faced with a choice between forced sex in their jobs or schools on the one hand and forced sexual disclosure for the public record on the other, few will choose the latter. This cruel paradox would effectively eliminate much progress in this area. Put another way, part of the power held by perpetrators of sexual harassment is the threat of making the sexual abuse public knowledge. This functions like blackmail in silencing the victim and allowing the abuse to continue. It is a fact that public knowledge of sexual abuse is often worse for the abused than the abuser, and victims who choose to complain have the courage to take that on. To add to their burden the potential of making public their entire personal life, information that has no relation to the fact or severity of the incidents complained of, is to make the law of this area implicitly complicit in the blackmail that keeps victims from exercising their rights and to enhance the impunity of perpetrators. To add to their burden the potential of making public their entire personal life, information that has no relation to the fact or severity of the incidents complained of, is to make the law of this area implicitly complicit in the blackmail that keeps victims from exercising their rights and to enhance the impunity of perpetrators. In effect, it means open season on anyone who does not want her entire intimate life available to public scrutiny. In other contexts, such private information has to be found intrusive, irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. To allow it to be discovered in the sexual harassment area amounts to a requirement that women be further violated in order to be permitted to seek relief for haying been violated. I also will never understand why a violations severity, or even its likelihood of occurrence, is measured according to the character of the violation, rather than by what was done to them. For feminist jurisprudence, the sexual harassment attempt suggests that if a legal initiative is set up right from the beginning, meaning if it is designed from womens real experience of violation, it can make some difference. To a degree womens experience can be written into law, even in some tension with, the current doctrinal framework. Women who want to resist their victimization with legal terms that imagine it is not inevitable can be given some chance, which is more than they had before. Law is not everything in this respect, but it is not nothing either. Perhaps the most important lesson is that the mountain can be moved. When we started, there was absolutely no judicial precedent for allowing a sex discrimination suit for sexual harassment. Sometimes even the law does something for the first time” In view of the severity of the complaints this writ petition must be seen from this perspective. 7. Section 19(3)(a) and (b) of the Act reads thus: “Section 19(3)(a): “No teacher or other person employed in any private college shall be placed under suspension, except when an inquiry into the gross misconduct, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under sub-section (1) of Section 18, of such teacher or other person is contemplated. 7. Section 19(3)(a) and (b) of the Act reads thus: “Section 19(3)(a): “No teacher or other person employed in any private college shall be placed under suspension, except when an inquiry into the gross misconduct, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under sub-section (1) of Section 18, of such teacher or other person is contemplated. “Section 19(3)(b): No such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry is not completed within that period such teacher or other person shall, without prejudice to the inquiry be deemed to have been restored as teacher or other employee: Provided that the competent authority, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period of two months, for a further period not exceeding two months, if, in the opinion of such competent authority, the inquiry could not be completed within the said period of two months for reasons directly attributable to such teacher or other persons.” 8. In this case the petitioner was served with a copy of the meeting held on 19-07-2003 by which he was informed that it was decided to take action in respect of the allegations levelled against the petitioner. Thereafter, a resolution was passed by the Governing Body of the College to authorise the Chairman/Secretary and Correspondent to take necessary disciplinary action. On 24-07-2003, the petitioner received an order from the first respondent stating that he was involved in grave acts of misconduct involving moral turpitude etc. He was placed under suspension from service with immediate effect and paid subsistence allowance. Against this order, the petitioner filed W.P. No. 20955 of 2003. This was allowed by this Court on 21-08-2003 and the order of suspension dated 24-07-2003 was quashed. Against that, the first respondent filed WA No. 2737 of 2003. Pending appeal, the impugned order of suspension was passed by the Governing Body on 27-08-2003. Therefore, the writ appeal was dismissed as infructuous. A retired District Judge was appointed as Enquiry Officer and the Enquiry Officers report was submitted on 05-12-2003. According to the petitioner, since the enquiry was not completed within 27-10-2003 (i.e. two months) the suspension cannot remain in force. Therefore, the writ appeal was dismissed as infructuous. A retired District Judge was appointed as Enquiry Officer and the Enquiry Officers report was submitted on 05-12-2003. According to the petitioner, since the enquiry was not completed within 27-10-2003 (i.e. two months) the suspension cannot remain in force. The competent authority has the power to extend the period by two months, stating the reasons for such extension if the enquiry could not be completed within the period of two months. Though the enquiry has been completed within such extended period of two months it is nobodys case that the competent authority had extended the period giving reasons therefor. Therefore, we will have to take it that there was no extension as per the proviso to the section. The question is, whether on this ground the petitioner should be reinstated into service. The affidavit filed in the vacate stay petition refers to charges of sexual harassment perpetrated against the women teaching staff and according to the counter the charges of sexual harassment had been held to be proved. The first respondent has referred to the apprehension of these teachers that if the petitioner is restored to service he will act in a manner detrimental to their interest and to the institution. 9. These factors must be kept in mind while deciding the matter. In the Zimbabwe Declaration of the International Judicial Colloquium it was stated that Judges and lawyers have a duty to familiarise themselves with the growing international jurisprudence of human rights and particularly with the expanding material on the protection and promotion of the human rights of Women. 10. In State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty (1995 I LLJ 568), the employee was suspended for financial irregularities and misappropriation to the tune of 163.50 lakhs. The question whether the Tribunal should have interdicted the orders of suspension was considered and the Supreme Court referred to Balvantray Ratilal Patel v. The State of Maharashtra (1968 II LLJ 700) wherein it was observed that when an officer is suspended in this sense it means that the Government merely issues a direction to the officer that so long as the contract of subsisting and till the time the officer is legally dismissed he must not do anything in the discharge of the duties of his office and because the contract is subsisting the employee shall obey the direction. The order of suspension also has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. Reference was also made to AIR 1970 SC 1494 (cited supra). So even if the power to order suspension does not exist, then the order of suspension which is passed by the master only forbids the servant to work without affecting the relationship of master and servant and the master will have to pay the servants wages. The Supreme Court held that it is settled law that orders of suspensions are passed taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct and the nature of evidence and that there can be no general law in this regard but each case must be decided on its own facts. It also observed that, “In other words in to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending enquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the enquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or enquiry etc.” 11. In this case, the nature of the complaint also justifies the apprehensions of the respondent that the petitioner should not be allowed to attend office as the “Principal”. There is support for the respondents even in the language used in Section 19(3)(b) since it only says that the teacher shall be deemed to have been restored. Perhaps advisedly the legal fiction was introduced instead of using the words “the teacher shall be restored.” The Legislature perhaps foresaw a situation where the teacher would not be permitted to work but would be entitled to subsistence allowance at the rate prescribed if the period of suspension is prolonged. Of course this point was not argued and therefore, no finding is given with regard to the effect of the word “deemed” in the section. The order of suspension cannot be quashed since the failure to extend the period of suspension by giving reasons will not render the order void ab initio. Of course this point was not argued and therefore, no finding is given with regard to the effect of the word “deemed” in the section. The order of suspension cannot be quashed since the failure to extend the period of suspension by giving reasons will not render the order void ab initio. It will only result in the petitioner being deemed to have been restored as “Principal”. The mandamus asked for cannot also be granted as prayed for since the period of suspension has not been extended beyond the period of two months. However, the petitioner will be entitled to his full emoluments as if he has been restored to service on the expiry of two months from 27-08-2003. But the respondent is entitled to restrain the petitioner from discharging his duties as “Principal”. 12. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs. The learned counsel for the petitioner requests that some time frame should be fixed for the payments of the emoluments in arrears. Four months time is granted.