ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of india. The petitioners herein are the defendants, who seek to assail the orders in ia No. 22 of 2002 in A. S. No. 30 of 1998, dated 9-4-2003 on the file of the Court of iv Additional District Judge, (Fast Track court), Karimnagar District, allowing the application filed under Section 151, read with Order 41, Rule 27 (b) of the Code of civil Procedure, seeking to permit the plaintiff to adduce additional evidence. ( 2 ) THE contention of the petitioners is that AS No. 30 of 1998 was not heard on the date of application in IA No. 22 of 2002, which was filed on 18-2-2002 and when the impugned order dated 9-4-2003 passed by Second Additional District Judge as full Additional charge of IV-Additional district Judge and the Court can decide to permit additional evidence under the provisions of Order-41, Rule 27 CPC after the hearing of appeal, if the Court requires the additional evidence is necessary to decide the appeal and the material on record is not sufficient to pronounce a judgment, therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. Order 41, Rule 27 (2) CPC reads as under:"whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the court shall record the reasons for its admission" ( 3 ) THE petitioners submit that they have opposed in their counter-affidavit that the petition filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable under Order-41, Rule 27 of cpc as the evidence sought for is not at all additional evidence. Further the only remedy, which was only available to the plaintiff is to reopen the case or to file an appeal or revision when the lower Court closes the evidence. On the basis of the above stated facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Judge allowed the application and passed the impugned order on 9-4-2003, which reads as under:"petition filed to summon the doctor for the purpose of cross-examination, counter filed. Heard. On the basis of the above stated facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Judge allowed the application and passed the impugned order on 9-4-2003, which reads as under:"petition filed to summon the doctor for the purpose of cross-examination, counter filed. Heard. Petition allowed" ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners argued that the learned Judge has not given any reason and it is manifestly clear from the impugned order that the court below did not record any reasons for allowing the said application and non-compliance of mandatory provisions would render the impugned order illegal and is not sustainable in law. He further submit that the learned Senior Civil Judge, Karimnagar, by a common judgment dismissed O. S. No. 144 of 1991 and O. S. No. 92 of 1996 dated 15-7-1998 respectively and questioning the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 92 of 1996, dated 15-7-1998, the appeal in AS no. 30 of 1998 itself is not maintainable. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on a decision of this Court in Smt. T. Manemma v. Booki Shivanna, 2003 (1) ALD 760 = 2003 (1) An. WR 182 (AP), wherein this Court held at Para Nos. 4, 5 and 8 as under: in the impugned order the Appellate Court did not state anywhere that recording of additional evidence is necessary to enable it to pronounce the judgment or for any other substantial cause. The Appellate Court merely stated that in the circumstances explained by the petitioner therein, he is appointing a Commissioner. This is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with an application filed under Order-XLI Rule 27 cpc. As already pointed out, in the impugned order the Appellate Court did not say that examination of the Handwriting Expert is necessary to enable the Appellate Court to pronounce judgment. The Appellate Court did not also mention any substantial cause whatsoever for allowing the petition concerned. Therefore, the impugned order is not covered by the provision in Order XLI, rule 27 (1 ) (b) CPC. The lower Appellate Court did not give any reasons for allowing the said petition. It did not apply its mind and satisfy itself that for the effective disposal of the appeal pending before it, the additional evidence sought to be adduced before the Appellate court is essential for the disposal of the appeal. The lower Appellate Court did not give any reasons for allowing the said petition. It did not apply its mind and satisfy itself that for the effective disposal of the appeal pending before it, the additional evidence sought to be adduced before the Appellate court is essential for the disposal of the appeal. For all the reasons stated above, court is satisfied that the impugned order is bad in law and it is liable to be set aside. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners also relied on a decision of the supreme Court in The Land Acquisition officer, City Improvement Trust, Bangalore v. H. Naranaiah, etc. , AIR 1976 SC 2403 , wherein the Supreme Court held at Para 28 as under: the Karnataka High Court had, however, not complied with provisions of Order 41, rule 27 of the CPC, which require that an appellate Court should be satisfied that the additional evidence is required to enable them either to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. It has recorded no reasons to show that it had considered the requirements of Rule 27, order 41 of the CPC. We are of opinion that the High Court should have recorded its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its existence by leading other evidence. ( 7 ) HEARD Mr. P. V. Narayana Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioners and miss. P. Aruna, learned Counsel for the respondent. ( 8 ) COMING to the facts of the case, when the plaintiff- respondent herein was unsuccessful before the Trial Court, came forward with a petition IA No. 222 of 2002 at a very belated stage even though the appeal was pending from 1998, contending that in view of the special circumstances, set out in the affidavit, to permit him to lead additional evidence by summoning Dr. V. Suryanarayana Reddy, PW-7, for cross-examination. ( 9 ) BE it noted. Dr. V. Suryanarayana reddy was examined as PW-7 to disprove the Will executed by late Neelamrna - first defendant in favour of the third defendant on 23. 6. 1993 under Ex. B-5 in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Karimnagar. V. Suryanarayana Reddy, PW-7, for cross-examination. ( 9 ) BE it noted. Dr. V. Suryanarayana reddy was examined as PW-7 to disprove the Will executed by late Neelamrna - first defendant in favour of the third defendant on 23. 6. 1993 under Ex. B-5 in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Karimnagar. The plaintiff-respondent herein filed a medical certificate along with the case sheet marked as Exs. A-8 and 9, issued by the said doctor in proof of the fact that the said Neelamrna was undergoing treatment as in-patient in Sudha Nursing Home, karimnagar between 3. 6. 1993 and 26. 6. 1993 and that she was operated on 10. 6. 1993 and was discharged on 26. 6. 1993. It is further the case of the plaintiff that when the Advocate Commissioner had examined pw-7, on commission in the hospital, though the advocate for the defendants-petitioners herein came there, yet he left the hospital without cross-examining the doctor. Thereafter, the Commissioner had filed the deposition of the Doctor along with her report and on the application of the petitioners herein, PW-7 was summoned to give evidence, but the defendants did not take further steps to secure his attendance when he did not turn up and thus PW-7 was not cross-examined by the petitioners herein and the Trial Court found fault with the plaintiff - respondent herein for not securing the presence of PW-7 and discarded his evidence, which resulted in miscarriage of justice. ( 10 ) THE contention of the defendants petitioners herein is that on their application the Court below issued summons to PW-7 to appear before the Court, but he intentionally and deliberately failed to appear despite diligent efforts made by the defendants and, therefore, the Trial Court, for the reasons recorded in Paragraph 46 of its judgment, is right in not considering his evidence. It is further their case that the provision of Rule 27 or Order 41 of CPC are not applicable to the instant case, as the evidence sought to be let in, is not additional evidence and the only remedy available to the plaintiff is to file a petition to re-open the case or to "file an appeal or revision and, therefore, in the appeal, PW-7 cannot be permitted to be cross examined by the plaintiff and this is nothing but filling up the lacunae pointed out by the Trial court in its judgment. ( 11 ) MR. P. V. Narayan Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioners herein submits that after hearing the appeal, if the Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, then only it shall order for production of additional evidence. He further vehemently contends that sub-rule (2) of Rule 27 mandates reasons to be recorded by the Appellate Court for allowing the additional evidence to be produced before it, but a plain reading of the order impugned, makes it clear that no reasons were recorded by the Lower appellate Court and therefore, the order is liable to be set aside being contrary to the provisions of law. ( 12 ) SINCE the arena of controversy revolves round Order 41 Rule 27 of the code of Civil Procedure, for better understanding it is apposite to extract the said provision. ". . . Production of additional evidence in appellate Court: (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate court. But if. . . (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time of when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the court shall record the reasons for its admission. . . (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the court shall record the reasons for its admission. . . "a glance of this provision makes it clear that the parties to an appeal shall only be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate Court, if the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted; or the party seeking to produce additional evidence establishes that inspite of his due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed or that the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, then only such additional evidence is allowed to be produced or witness to be examined. Prima facie, it bars the parties from producing additional evidence, but if the Court is satisfied by the explanation given by the parties, it may allow such oral evidence or document to be admitted as additional evidence, but a duty is cast on the Appellate Court to record reasons for such admission of additional evidence. Though sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 disentitles the parties from letting in additional evidence, save for the contingencies enumerated in (a) and (aa) thereof, but on satisfactory explanation before the Appellate court, they are permitted to let in additional evidence, upon recording reasons for such admission. ( 13 ) THE intention of the sub-rule, evidently, is that a party who, for the reasons mentioned in the sub-clause, was unable to produce the evidence in the Trial court, should be enable to produce the same in the Appellate Court. The sub-rule mentions the conditions which must be complied with by the party producing the additional evidence, namely, that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him in the Trial Court. It is not one of the conditions that the party seeking to introduce additional evidence must have also been one who has led some evidence in the Trial Court. Such a view amounts to introducing an additional condition not contemplated by the sub-rule. It is not one of the conditions that the party seeking to introduce additional evidence must have also been one who has led some evidence in the Trial Court. Such a view amounts to introducing an additional condition not contemplated by the sub-rule. All that is required is that the conditions mentioned in the body of the sub-rule must be proved to exist. This principle of law was interpreted by the Supreme court in a decision Jaipur Development authority v. Kailashwati Devi, AIR 1997 sc 3243 . ( 14 ) THAT apart, the jurisdiction of the court to admit additional evidence cannot be exercised in favour of a party who has deliberately withheld evidence from the courts below, and after a decision is recorded against him to enable him to fill up the lacuna in his evidence. It is a settled principle of law that the admissibility of additional evidence under Order 41 rule 27 (1) of CPC, cannot be said to depend upon whether or not the Appellate court required it to enable it pronounce judgment, the evidence could have been tendered in the Trial Court and the petitioner having not been vigilant in producing it then. When a party had sufficient opportunity for producing a witness for cross-examination or for exhibiting a document, in the Trial Court and it is not as if the trial has prevented him from doing so, therefore, the document cannot be either marked or the witness can be summoned for cross-examination in the appellate Court. I am fortified in these views by the decision of Madras High Court in P. Palaniswami Gounder (dead) and others v. C. Swaminathan, AIR 1997 mad. 160 . ( 15 ) APPLYING these principles to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, the plaintiff - respondent ought to have filed the petition under Order 41 Rule 27 (1 ) (aa) CPC instead of Section 27 (1 ) (b ). As stated earlier, sub-rule l (aa) contemplates that the party seeking to produce additional evidence, shall establish that inspite of exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed. Admittedly, nothing is mentioned as to what steps the parties have taken to secure the presence of PW-7 for cross-examination. Admittedly, nothing is mentioned as to what steps the parties have taken to secure the presence of PW-7 for cross-examination. When PW-7 was examined on commission, though the advocate for the petitioners was there, yet he left without cross-examining the doctor. The petitioners Counsel ought to have sought deferment of cross-examination of the doctor for the time being, but when they chose to cross-examine the doctor and they have filed a petition to summon the doctor and though summons were issued, PW-7 did not turn up. The plaintiff -respondent submits that inspite of due diligence, he could not produce PW-7 for cross-examination, though opportunity was given during pendency of the suit in the trial Court. IA No. 22 of 2002 was filed under Rule 27 (1 ) (b) CPC or Order 41 which contemplates that the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined and sub-rule (2) of Rule 27 mandates that reasons be recorded for admitting such additional evidence. The Lower Appellate court, with cryptic 17 worded order, allowed the petition, which is in utter violation of the intent of Legislature and the provisions of the Code. Therefore, for non-assigning of any reason clinching to the request of the plaintiff- respondent herein, I am of the considered view that the order cannot sustain. Time and again, this Court and the apex Court have been impressing upon the judicial Officers, who are incharge of deciding the rights of the parties, to adhere to the rule of law. The order impugned herein is a glaring example of misplaced sympathy for the respondent herein, inasmuch as it does not speak under what circumstances, the Court below has so leisurely allowed the petition without assigning any reasons. Further I am satisfied that the impugned order ought to have been passed under Rule 27 (1 ) (aa) instead of under rule 27 (l) (b ). Further I am satisfied that the impugned order ought to have been passed under Rule 27 (1 ) (aa) instead of under rule 27 (l) (b ). ( 16 ) THEREFORE, the impugned order passed by the learned Lower Appellate court is a result of non-application of mind, as was laid down by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. T. Manemma s case and it gives scope for the petitioner herein to fill in the lacunae pointed out by the lower Court, which is not the intent of legislature. Therefore, for non-compliance of provision under sub-rule (2) of Rule 27, the impugned order cannot sustain and is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. The civil revision petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.