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2004 DIGILAW 219 (PAT)

Jagat Maya Devi v. State Of Bihar

2004-02-24

S.K.KATRIAR

body2004
Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. Heard Mr. Shashi Shekhar Dwivedi for the petitioner, and Mr. V.K. Bhagat, learned SC (Ceiling for the respondents. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 15.1.2003 (Annexure-3), passed by Mr. C. Ashok Vardhan, learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, in case No. 29 of 2001 (Jagat Maya Devi V/s. State of Bihar, in purported exercise of powers u/s. 32 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), whereby he has held that the revision application before him was not maintainable. 2. According to the writ petition, the petitioner is the land-holder and proceedings under the Act were started against her. The learned Additional Collector (Ceiling), Darbhanga, being the first authority, i.e. Collector under the Act, passed the final order on 12.8.1997 (Annexure-1), in Land Ceiling case No. 349 of 1977-78 (State of Bihar V/s. Mostt. Jagat Maya Devi). Aggrieved by this order, the land-holder preferred appeal before the learned Collector of the district of Darbhanga which was registered as Ceiling Appeal No. 50/97-98 (Smt. Jagat Maya Devi V/s. State), and was disposed of by order dated 10.5.2001 (Annexure-2). Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner preferred revision application in terms of sec. 32 of the Act before the Board of Revenue which has been rejected by the impugned order whereby it has been held that the revision application is not maintainable because the petitioner has approached the revisional authority without exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal available to her before the Commissioner. 3. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is bad in law, inasmuch as the statutory remedy of appeal has already been exhausted and, therefore, the revisional application was competent. He relies on the judgment reported in 1975 PLJR 542 (Ram Bilas Mahto V/s. Addl. Member). 4. Learned standing counsel does not dispute the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 5. I have perused the impugned order and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. sec. 2(b) of the Act defines Collector under Act and reads as follows :- - "2. Member). 4. Learned standing counsel does not dispute the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 5. I have perused the impugned order and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. sec. 2(b) of the Act defines Collector under Act and reads as follows :- - "2. (b) "Collector" includes an Additional Collector or any other officer not below the rank of Sub-Deputy Collector, appointed by the State Government to discharge all or any of the functions of a Collector under this Act." Sec. 30 provides for appeal, which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference:- - "30. Appeals.--(1)(a) An appeal shall lie from any final order passed by any officer vested with the power of the Collector under this Act other than the Collector of the district to the Collector of the district or any other officer specially authorised in this behalf by the State Government within thirty days of such an order." (b) An appeal shall lie from any final order passed by the Collector of the district to the Commissioner of the Division within thirty days of such order: Provided that no appeal shall lie against orders passed u/s. 5 and sec. 29 before the final publication of the draft statement under Sub-sec. (1) sec. 11 : Provided further that appeal against order passed u/s. 5 and sec. 29 shall be filed within thirty days from the date of final publication under Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 11. (2) An appeal under this section shall be heard and disposed of in the prescribed manner." It is manifest from a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions that the Act makes a clear distinction between the Collector under the Act to discharge all or any of the functions of the Collector under the Act, and the Collector of the district, who constitute two different steps in the hierarchy of quasi-judicial authorities created by the Act. The usual conception that the Collector of the district includes the Additional Collector and, in other situations, the District & Sessions Judge includes the Additional District & Sessions Judge, has no application in the context of the Act, having been displaced by the provisions of the Act. The usual conception that the Collector of the district includes the Additional Collector and, in other situations, the District & Sessions Judge includes the Additional District & Sessions Judge, has no application in the context of the Act, having been displaced by the provisions of the Act. 6 It thus appears to me on a combined reading of the aforesaid provisions that in a situation where the final order under the Act has been passed by the Additional Collector, being the first authority exercising powers of the Collector under the Act, the appeal in terms of sec. 30(1)(a) of the Act, shall lie before the Collector of the district. The Act provides for another kind of situation, namely, where the powers of the first authority has been exercised by the Collector of the district who has passed the final order, the appeal shall lie before the Commissioner of the Division in terms of Section 30(1 )(b) of the Act. In the scheme of the Act, in my view, only one appeal has been made available to the aggrieved party followed by the revision. In that view of the matter, particularly in a situation where admittedly the appeal before the Collector of the district was competent, the observations made in the impugned order that the petitioner ought to have preferred appeal before the Commissioner of the Division appears to me to be erroneous in law. The effect of the impugned order is tantamount to conferring two appeals which the scheme of the Act does not sanction. The impugned order is, therefore, fit to be set aside. 7. In the result, this writ petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside, and it is hereby held that the Revision Application No. 29 of 2001 before the Board of Revenue is maintainable. The same shall be disposed of by the Board of Revenue in accordance with law. Let a copy of this order be handed over to Mr. V.K. Bhagat, learned Standing Counsel (Ceiling), to be forwarded to the learned Member, Board of Revenue, for circulation amongst the Additional Members. 8. Before I part with the records, I must express my feeling of displeasure at the manner in which the learned Addl. Member had disposed of the preliminary issue, before him without feeling the necessity to examine the provisions of law governing the issue. 8. Before I part with the records, I must express my feeling of displeasure at the manner in which the learned Addl. Member had disposed of the preliminary issue, before him without feeling the necessity to examine the provisions of law governing the issue. I would have been satisfied had he examined the relevant provisions of law and come to his conclusions, the impugned order shows the unhappy tendency on the part of the learned Addl. Member to dispose of matters summarily, creating an impression that he does not purposely go into the depth of the matter to avoid the work involved in it burdening this Court with clearly avoidable matters, an aspect of the matter I have discussed in my earlier judgments arising out of his orders. He should exercise his quasi-judicial functions in a responsible manner.