JUDGMENT P.K. Balasubramanyan, C.J. 1. These appeals arise from a dispute regarding the management of a mosque between the managing committee of Eqra Mosque registered under the Wakf Act and the Eqra Masjid Welfare Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. For convenience, we shall hereinafter refer to the two rival parties, as the Wakf Committee and the society committee. These appeals arise from CWJC Nos. 4323 of 1998 (R) and 4822 of 1998 (R). The Wakf Committee and another in CWJC No. 4323 of 1998 challenged the order of the Minister Incharge, Minority Welfare; Government of Bihar, dated 12.5.1998 allegedly in exercise of powers under Section 43(4A) of the Wakf Act, 1954. The order writ petition, CWJC No. 4822 of 1998, was filed by the Secretary of the Wakf Committee challenging the registration granted to the Masjid Eqra Welfare Society under Section 3 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The learned Single Judge, in the judgment under appeal, after hearing both sides, allowed both the writ petitions to the extent of setting aside the order of the Minister in charge, Welfare and also setting aside the certificate of registration granted under the Societies Registration Act. At the same time, the learned Single Judge refused to uphold the plea of the Wakf Committee that the certificate of registration given under the Wakf Act to it was liable to be upheld. The learned Single Judge held that there was a serious dispute whether the property in question was a wakf property or not and it could not also be decided properly in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But the learned Judge was inclined to hold that no adequate material was available to find a wakf by user or a wakf by dedication. The learned Single Judge left the parties to have their disputes resolved in a properly constituted suit in a civil court. Feeling aggrieved by the setting aside of the order of the Minister and the certificate of registration under the Societies Registration Act, the society committee and its members have filed the appeals, LPA Nos. 215, 223, 224 and 225 of 2003. Feeling aggrieved by the setting aside of the order of the Minister and the certificate of registration under the Societies Registration Act, the society committee and its members have filed the appeals, LPA Nos. 215, 223, 224 and 225 of 2003. The Masjid Committee in its turn has filed LPA No. 651 of 2003 challenging the decision of the learned Single Judge to the extent he has found that the registration of the Eqra Mosque under the Wakf Act was not valid and leaving the parties to approach a civil court for getting that question adjudicated upon. 2. Certain residents of the locality decided to come together and to purchase certain lands. 8 persons subscribed to a Memorandum of Association dated 27.3.1983 with an intention to establish a society. Under two sale deeds, one dated 26.8.1987 and the other dated 16.5.1988, two separate pieces of lands were purchased in the names of some of the members. The sale deeds did not disclose the purpose for which the purchases-were being made. A ground floor consisting of 37 shop rooms was originally constructed in the year 1990. They were let out on rent. Subsequently, three other floors were constructed and they housed a mosque and its adjuncts. On 2.11.1996, an application was made before the concerned authority under the Societies Registration Act for registering the Society. On 20.11.1996, one Kalimuddin who was not one of the purchasers under the two sale deeds, filed an application before the Wakf Board under the Wakf Act, 1954 for registering the mosque as a wakf. The Chairman of the then Wakf Board passed an order on 20.11.1996 granting registration to the Wakf and constituting a committee referred to hereinbefore as the Wakf Committee. The Registrar of Societies accepted the application for registration under the Societies Registration Act and granted, registration as a society on 2.12.1996. On 5.12.1996, the Secretary of the Wakf Board stayed the order of the Chairman dated 20.11.1996 granting registration under the Wakf Act. On 18.12.1996, the Chairman of the Wakf Board set aside the order of the Secretary staying the grant of registration by the Chairman. The order of the Chairman was challenged before the Patna High Court in CWJC No. 238 of 1997. Simultaneously, one of the members of the Society Committee filed an appeal as Appeal No. 4 of 1996 against the order of the Chairman. The order of the Chairman was challenged before the Patna High Court in CWJC No. 238 of 1997. Simultaneously, one of the members of the Society Committee filed an appeal as Appeal No. 4 of 1996 against the order of the Chairman. By the Wakf Committee, an objection was raised in that writ petition to the effect that since the matter was pending in appeal before the Minister, in charge Minority Welfare, the writ petition was not maintainable since that appeal was an efficacious alternative remedy. The Patna High Court accepted that submission and disposed of the writ petition directing the appeal, Appeal No. 4 of 1996, to be heard and finally disposed of. That appeal was disposed of in the presence of both the parties and after hearing them. The Minister set aside the order of the Chairman granting registration under the Wakf Act. It was in that situation that the Wakf Committee and one of its members, filed two writ petitions; one for setting aside the order of the Minister and the order for setting aside the certificate of registration granted under the Societies Registration Act. According to Mulla, in his Mohammedan Law, a Wakf can come into existence either by dedication or by user. Obviously, the user must be for such a length of time as to ripen into a right or as to lead to an inference of dedication or to an implied dedication. The learned Single Judge observed that there was neither a deed of dedication, nor user for the requisite period justifying the finding of a wakf by user. But considering the fact that the learned Single Judge was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the matter required a proper trial based on proper pleadings and after taking the evidence, oral and documentary, the learned Single Judge rightly left the question to be decided in a civil court in a properly fought out litigation. We may notice here that no wakf tribunal has been constituted under Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995. We may notice here that no wakf tribunal has been constituted under Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995. Even though at the time of hearing, a notification issued under Section 83(4) of the Wakf Act by the Governor of Bihar on 3.12.2003, obviously after 15.11.2000, the coming into force of the Bihar Reorganisation, Act was brought to our notice, that notification issued by the Governor of Bihar constituting a Wakf Tribunal cannot have any bearing in the State of Jharkhand. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Wakf Tribunal has excluded or ousted the jurisdiction of the civil Court. 3. In the appeals before us, certain documents were sought to be produced on behalf of the Wakf Committee seeking to show that coming into existence of the Wakf could be predicated. The decision of the Supreme Court in Syed Md. Salie Labbai v. Md. Hanifa 1976 (4) SCC 780 was also relied on in support of the argument that the existence of a Wakf could be predicated in this case. We must notice that the materials sought to be relied on were not even produced before the learned Single Judge and, therefore, he had no occasion to notice them. That apart, we do not think that exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, such a question should be or could be satisfactorily decided. In that situation, we reject the argument on behalf of the Wakf Commitee that the learned Single Judge ought to have upheld the plea of the creation of a wakf in this case. We are in respectful agreement with the learned Single Judge in holding that the parties should be left to the civil court seeking a proper decision, unless, of course, meanwhile, the wakf tribunal is created in this State. All that needs to be clarified is that no final decision or finding has been rendered by the learned Single Judge and all aspects would be open for decision before the civil court as and when the parties approach the same for a decision. 4. It was argued on behalf of the Society Committee that the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that the mosque could not have been registered under the Societies Registration Act. 4. It was argued on behalf of the Society Committee that the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that the mosque could not have been registered under the Societies Registration Act. We find that the learned Judge upheld the challenge of the Masjid Committee to the registration under the Societies Registration Act only based on the decision of the Patna High Court in Md. Yunus v. Inspector General of Registration, AIR 1980 Patna 138 taking the view that the expression "charitable purpose" as used in the Societies Registration Act did not embrace purposes which are religious or predominantly religious. It was held that the expression "charitable purpose" must be a purpose which has some element of general public benefit and not a religious purpose. Where, therefore, the main and predominant purpose of a society was religious, the Inspector General of Registration had no jurisdiction to register the society under Section 3 of the Societies Registration Act. It is argued that the Full Bench of the Patna High Court was not justified in taking this view in the light of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Anjuman Islamia v. Nasiruddin ILR 28 Allahabad 384 wherein it was held that a religious purpose may be a charitable purpose and a society for religious purpose will ordinarily be a society for charitable purposes. Charitable purposes are not restricted to the giving of alms or other charitable activities, but the words have a much wider legal meaning. Hence a religious society which has for its purpose the control, management and protection of the property appertaining to a certain public mosque, was a society which might legally be registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. This view had its echo in the decision of the Madras High Court in Md. Hussain v. M.M.J.M. Committee, AIR 1940 Madras 167 wherein it was held that where a society was formed for certain purposes whose paramount object was charitable was any the less a charitable society and the fact that some of the purposes may not be strictly charitable, but religious, does not render the society not a charitable society if the purpose was one intended to benefit the public or considerable portion of the public. It is not necessary to pursue this aspect further in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Hindu Public v. Rajdhani Puja Samithee, 1999 (2) SCC 583 ]. Therein, their Lordships after referring with approval to the decision of the Allahabad High Court and the Madras High Court, referred to above, stated the law as follows: "14. In our opinion, this contention is not well founded. More than ninety years ago, such a contention raised under Act 21 of 1860 was negatived by the Allahabad High Court in Anjuman Islamia of Muttra v. Nasiruddin. It was contended in that case that the registration of a society called "Anjuman Islamia" under Act 21 of 1860 was not permissible as the society was formed for "religious purposes only" and not for charitable purposes. The Allahabad High Court rejected the said contention and held that a society for religious purposes would ordinarily be a society for charitable purposes. A similar question arose before the Madras High Court in Khaji Muhammad Hussain Sahib v. Majiday Mahmood Jamait Managing Committee. A Division Bench consisting of Wadworth and Venkataramana Rao, JJ. held that Act 21 of 1860 was passed in 1860 when according to English Law, a gift for the advancement of religion or promotion of religious worship was treated as a charitable purpose and, therefore, a society formed for such a purpose would be a charitable society under Act 21 of 1860. The only condition was that it should be for the benefit of the public. No doubt, in some statutes enacted subsequent to Act 21 of 1860, the Legislature used the words "charitable" and "religious" but the definition of these words was expressly stated to be for the purposes of those Acts. The subsequent legislation, the Madras High Court held, would not be helpful in interpreting the word "charitable" in Act 21 of 1860. The real question was: "What did the term mean in 1860?" We are in agreement with the view of the Allahabad and Madras High Courts. In fact, Lord McNaughten in his celebrated judgment in CIT v. Pemsel said that charitable purposes which came within the language and spirit of the statute of Elizabeth (43 Eliz Ch. The real question was: "What did the term mean in 1860?" We are in agreement with the view of the Allahabad and Madras High Courts. In fact, Lord McNaughten in his celebrated judgment in CIT v. Pemsel said that charitable purposes which came within the language and spirit of the statute of Elizabeth (43 Eliz Ch. 4) could be grouped into four heads (i) relief of poverty, (ii) education, (iii) advancement of religion, and (iv) other purposes beneficial to the community not coming under any of the preceding heads. The words in Act 21 of 1860 are, therefore, to be understood as including religious purposes also. Point 1 is held against the society." 5. It is thus now clear that the view of the Patna High Court adopted by the Single Judge in Md. Yunus v. Inspector General of Registration, AIR 1980 Patna 138 cannot be taken as correct. The expression charitable purpose as used in the 1860 Act has to be understood widely so as to include religious purposes also. Moreover, on the facts of this case, it is seen that after purchasing the two pieces of land under the sale deeds which do not refer to the purpose for which the purchase is made, what was first done was to construct 37 shop rooms on the ground floor and letting them out to the tenants and also in the process taking some deposits or contributions from them. Thus, initially, the venture could be said to be a commercial venture in the sense that it was intended to earn an income. May be, that income was to be utilized for the purpose of constructing a mosque and for running the same in accordance with the tenets of Islam. It may, therefore, even be possible to say that this was not merely a religious purpose and fell within the ratio of the decision of the Madras High Court referred to above. Whatever it be, we need not pursue this further, since we are of the view that the question is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court quoted above. On the basis, the submission that the society could be validly registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 by the Registrar of Societies has to be accepted. Whatever it be, we need not pursue this further, since we are of the view that the question is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court quoted above. On the basis, the submission that the society could be validly registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 by the Registrar of Societies has to be accepted. We may observe that whether a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act for a charitable purpose can be held to be a Wakf is for the Civil Court to decide when it is called upon to do so or for the Wakf Tribunal to decide if it is created in the meanwhile. Therefore, to the extent the learned Single Judge held that no registration could have been granted under the Societies Registration Act, the same has to be reversed and the relief granted of quashing the certificate of registration has to be set aside. 6. Now, the question is whether the learned Judge was justified in quashing the order of the Minister in charge of Welfare on the ground that the appeal before him was not maintainable. On behalf of the Society Committee, it was pointed out that the Chairman of the Wakf Board had no power to grant registration since an application for registration has to be made to the Wakf Board and there had to be an inquiry as contemplated by Section 25 of the Wakf Act, 1995 before the grant of registration. It is pointed out that Section 25 of the Wakf Act, 1954 corresponding to Section 36 of the 1995 Act specifies the documents that should accompany an application for registration and it also contemplates an inquiry by the Board as it thinks fit. The available materials show that an application was made by one Kalimuddin on 5.11.1996 and within ten days, the Chairman of the Board, and not the Board, granted the registration. To meet the challenge that the power Vested with the Board and not with the Chairman, what was argued on behalf of the Wakf Committee was that there was delegation of power to the Chairman in terms of Section 22 of the 1954 Act corresponding to Section 27 of the 1995 Act. It is true that the power of the Board, by a general or special order in writing, could be delegated to the chair-person or any other member or others specified in that section. It is true that the power of the Board, by a general or special order in writing, could be delegated to the chair-person or any other member or others specified in that section. But the Board in terms of Section 14 of the 1995 Act, corresponding to Sections 10 and 11 of the 1954 Act, is to consist of a chair-person and other members elected and nominated and the term of office of the members of the Board in terms of Section 15 of 1995 Act corresponding to Section 12 of 1954 Act, is only five years. What was argued on behalf of the Wakf Committee was that the delegation made in the year 1979 would continue indefinitely and even if the election of a new member and chairman had been made subsequently, the original delegation to the chairman by the erstwhile Board would continue. It may be noted that decisions are to be taken by the Wakf Board at meetings of the Board as indicated by Section 17 of 1995 Act, corresponding to Section 14 of 1954 Act and the decisions are to be taken by a majority of all the members of the Board present, subject to a casting vote in favour of the Chairman, in case of equality of votes. We think that it would be more appropriate to understand the power to delegate as being confined to the term of the members of that particular Board and not as one which will ensure until altered by a subsequently constituted Wakf Board. In a way, for the purpose of this case, even this aspect need not be finally pronounced upon. It is seen that the application was not accompanied by any deed of dedication and the purchase- deeds, that were relied upon, obviously showed that the purchasers were people different from one who had made the application for registration. Sub-section (7) of Section 25 of the 1954 Act, corresponding to Section 36 of the 1995 Act, contemplates an inquiry in respect of the genuineness and validity of the application and the correctness of the particulars given therein and it also contemplates, when an application is made by a person other than a person administering the wakf property, the giving of a notice of the application to the person administering the wakf property and insists that that person should be heard if he desires to be heard. We are not in a position to accept the argument of learned counsel for the Wakf Board that there was no obligation on the Wakf Board to make an inquiry and that when as application is made, the Wakf Board may conduct an inquiry only if it thinks that it is necessary. The use of the expression may relied upon by learned counsel, does not carry him far in this argument. It appears to us that in the context of the Act, the setting of the section and the rights that are decided, the word may could even be understood as shall, obliging the Wakf Board to conduct an inquiry before granting registration under the Wakf Act. Moreover, in this case, the purchase- deeds relied upon stood in the names of others and not in the name of the applicant and that necessitated the issuance of notices to the purchasers of the property by the Wakf Board before it could grant registration of wakf of that property and the constructions to be made thereon. Admittedly, in this case, no such notice was given and no inquiry was made. The registration was granted in undue haste, in about 10 days of the making of the application itself. Therefore, even on the short ground of violation of the principles of natural justice and not following the procedure laid down by the relevant sections of the Wakf Act, the registration granted by the Chairman to the Wakf Committee has to be held to be illegal and void. 7. It was argued on behalf of the Wakf Committee that the Minister was not an appellate authority under the Wakf Act and consequently, he had no jurisdiction to set aside the registration granted by the Chairman. Of course, going by the provision of the Act that is seen to be the position. 7. It was argued on behalf of the Wakf Committee that the Minister was not an appellate authority under the Wakf Act and consequently, he had no jurisdiction to set aside the registration granted by the Chairman. Of course, going by the provision of the Act that is seen to be the position. But we have to take note of the fact that when one of the persons interested in the Society approached the Patna High Court, with a writ petition challenging the registration granted by the Chairman, as CWJC No. 238 of 1997, the same was resisted by a member of the Wakf Committee by raising a plea that an alternate remedy by way of appeal before the Minister had been invoked by another member of the society committee and consequently, the Minister must be left to decide the appeal and there was no occasion for the court to interfere. This plea was upheld by the Patna High Court and the writ petition was disposed of directing the appeal to be heard and decided by the Minister. It was in that context that the Minister heard the appeal. It may be noted that one of the members of the Wakf Committee had also appeared and contested the proceedings before the Minister. The Minister had thereafter rendered the decision. In view of the fact that the question is being left open and in view of the further finding that the order of the Chairman granting registration was illegal and void for violation of natural justice, it is also not necessary to finally decide the aspect whether the Wakf Committee is estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction of the Minister to hear the appeal in view of the conduct in taking up the plea of alternate remedy before the Patna High Court and in view of its conduct in participating in the proceedings before the Minister and in resisting the claim of the Society Committee in the appeal. 8. We also feel that the effect of upholding the plea on lack of jurisdiction in the Minister would be to resurrect an order passed by the Chairman in violation of natural justice and of doubtful jurisdiction. In that view, we find that it is a fit case where we should refuse to uphold such a plea in the proceeding emanating under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. In that view, we find that it is a fit case where we should refuse to uphold such a plea in the proceeding emanating under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. Learned counsel for the Wakf Committee pointed out that the only dispute before the Minister was as to which was the committee that had to be Mutawalli of the mosque and there was no dispute raised that there was no wakf. Even if this be the position, now that the question has arisen and the learned judge has left it open for decision by the appropriate Civil Court and we find that the decision is bad in law, this aspect sought to be raised may not lead to a different conclusion. We have held that the registration of the Society under the Societies Registration Act was justified. In the face of that finding, obviously that Society had the claim to be in management of the affairs of the mosque and in the light of our finding that the Chairman had acted illegally in granting registration to the Wakf Committee, the logical corollary would be to find that the Society Committee had the right to be the Mutawalli of the mosque. This was, in fact, what was decided by the Minister, the decision that was challenged in the writ petition. We have, therefore, no difficulty in the light of our findings, to come to the conclusion that it is the Society Committee that is entitled to be in management of the affairs of the mosque and the properties purchased under the two sale deeds, until and unless there is any declaration to the contrary by a competent Civil Court, if it is approached in that behalf. 10. In the light of the reasoning as above, we have no hesitation in holding that it is the Society registered under the Societies Registration Act and its Managing Committee that has the right to be put in management of the affairs of the properties, including the shops, the buildings and the mosque. 11. Pending these appeals, in our view, that the property was in medio as it were in view of the findings rendered by the Single Judge, we had appointed the Committee of the Society registered under the Societies Registration Act as the receiver of the property in question including the mosque. 11. Pending these appeals, in our view, that the property was in medio as it were in view of the findings rendered by the Single Judge, we had appointed the Committee of the Society registered under the Societies Registration Act as the receiver of the property in question including the mosque. Now that we have upheld the right of the Society to be in management, subject to the result of any suit that may be filed in that behalf, it is necessary to direct that the receivership of the Society Committee will stand terminated and the Society Committee will assume possession and management of the properties in its own right, keeping true and proper accounts and discharging its obligations under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Society and its Managing Committee would be entitled to secure the premises of the shops and the mosque from interference by members of the Wakf Committee and their followers and to administer the properties and the mosque in accordance with law. The Society Committee will also be entitled to be in control of all the affairs of the mosque. 12. To the aforesaid extent, the appeals, LPA Nos. 215, 223, 224 and 225 of 2003 are allowed and the decision of the learned Single Judge modified and LPA No. 651 of 2003 is dismissed. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to suffer their respective costs.