( 1 ) THIS intra Court appeal has been preferred by unsuccessful petitioner of W. P. No. 1657/2002 passed by learned single Judge on january 30, 2003. Appellant herein had approached the writ Court with a prayer for quashment of the order passed by respondent no. 1 on July 25, 2002, whereby it declined to make reference to the Tribunal under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act ). ( 2 ) THE facts material for deciding the said appeal are mentioned in short as under: ( 3 ) APPELLANT was appointed with Food corporation of India on the post of Messenger by order dated February 4, 1984. His services were confirmed by order dated August 17, 1985 with retrospective effect from February 13, 1985. The appellant herein was suffering from ulcerative colitis and neurosis since december 6, 1988 and was taking expensive medical treatment at M. Y. Hospital, Indore. On account of aforesaid ailment it appeared that he also used to get bouts of depression and was not enjoying sound mental health. Under one of such bouts he tendered his resignation on january 16, 1989 but specifically prayed therein that the same be made effective from april 18, 1989. Before the said effective date, since he had recovered, he had submitted another application with his employer Food; corporation of India on July 23, 1989 seeking permission for withdrawal of the resignation. The said application was submitted at the office of Food Corporation of India at Ujjain. Despite the said withdrawal being submitted by the appellant, the resignation was accepted by his employer, which was communicated to him vide letter dated August 17, 1989. The appellant was on leave from March 27, 1989 to April 12, 1989 which was also sanctioned by the employer. Since according to the appellant, the resignation tendered by him was withdrawn much before the date it was to be made effective, he should have been allowed to perform his duties on the post of Messenger. He filed an application under Section 10 of the act before the appropriate Government. ( 4 ) NOTICE of the said application was issued to respondent No. 2 appellant's employer by the appropriate Government. Both parties submitted their claims. He filed an application under Section 10 of the act before the appropriate Government. ( 4 ) NOTICE of the said application was issued to respondent No. 2 appellant's employer by the appropriate Government. Both parties submitted their claims. The employer specifically mentioned as under in its reply:"on the basis of resignation dated January 16, 1989 and letter dated April 17, 1989, his resignation was accepted vide order dated April 17, 1989 and the first party (appellant herein) received all retiral benefits. " ( 5 ) AFTER receiving this reply appellant also submitted rejoinder to which further reply was submitted by respondent No. 2 employer. Thereafter the appropriate Government examined the matter and refused to refer the dispute for adjudication. The reason for which the appropriate Government found it fit to refuse to refer the dispute for adjudication are mentioned hereinbelow:"it is reported that Shri Mukesh Singh S/o hindu Singh has resigned from the services on his own. He could not prove any unfair labour practice/mala fide intention of management in his case. " ( 6 ) IT was this order which was subject matter of challenge by present appellant before the learned single Judge by filing a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of india. The learned single Judge has dismissed the petition at the threshold without issuing any notices to the respondents but placing reliance on replies filed by respondent No. 2 herein employer before the appropriate Government. Learned single Judge has held that appellant herein had himself tendered the resignation which was accepted also and thereafter he has also accepted the retiral benefits. Thus, in the opinion of learned single Judge when appellant had tendered the resignation, which was accepted also, pursuant thereto retiral benefits were also received, there was no question left to be decided by the Tribunal and nothing was, therefore, to be adjudicated upon. Hence writ petition was dismissed. ( 7 ) WE have accordingly heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. ( 8 ) WE are afraid that the reasons for dismissal of appellant's writ petition by the learned single Judge do not appeal to us at all. The factual position which have been mentioned by the learned single Judge also do not appear to be made out specifically even after going through the record. ( 8 ) WE are afraid that the reasons for dismissal of appellant's writ petition by the learned single Judge do not appeal to us at all. The factual position which have been mentioned by the learned single Judge also do not appear to be made out specifically even after going through the record. No doubt, it is true that respondent has mentioned that post retiral benefits were also given to the appellant but the details thereof are conspicuously absent from it. The date, the manner in which retiral benefits were paid have not at all been mentioned. It appears that bald allegation without any substantial evidence in support thereof was made by respondent No. 2, but the learned single Judge accepted the same which ultimately resulted into rejection of appellant's writ petition. Today also when we confronted shri S. K. Pawnekar appearing for respondent no. 2 with regard to the date of payment, the mode of payment and the amount actually paid, he was not able to answer the same. ( 9 ) APART from this, there is yet another angle to the matter. Admittedly, the appellant's resignation was to come into force only with effect from April 18, 1989. Thus, in any case appellant would have continued in the employment of respondent No. 2 till April 18, 1989. If this was the factual position then there was no question of payment of any retiral dues to the appellant before expiry of the said date. If at all the retiral dues were to be paid, same could have been paid only after April 18, 1989. ( 10 ) DESPITE our critical examination of the record neither anything could be pointed out nor we could find anything in the record with regard to the date of payment of retiral dues, the mode of its payment and the amount actually paid. Thus the very question whether the resignation tendered by appellant herein was accepted by respondent or before its acceptance, the same was withdrawn by the appellant is the question, which requires adjudication by the Tribunal. The aforesaid question requires tendering of evidence by both parties and only after appreciating the said evidence the Tribunal alone could have arrived at the conclusion whether the resignation tendered by appellant to respondent No. 2 was already accepted or the same was withdrawn before its acceptance. The aforesaid question requires tendering of evidence by both parties and only after appreciating the said evidence the Tribunal alone could have arrived at the conclusion whether the resignation tendered by appellant to respondent No. 2 was already accepted or the same was withdrawn before its acceptance. ( 11 ) BY the impugned order passed by learned single Judge the doors of justice have been closed for the present appellant, at the very threshold. Such an approach appears to be erroneous. The question posed before learned single Judge in the writ petition in fact has been answered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh and another v. State of Bihar and others, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1565 : 1989 (3) SCC 271 : 1989-II-LLJ-558, in which it has been held as under at p. 561:"14. Applying the principle laid down by this Court in the above decisions, there can be no doubt that the Government was not justified in deciding the dispute. . . . . " ( 12 ) IN the same para 14 it has been further held as under:"14. . . . . . . FURTHER, the Government should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a view to declining reference and courts will always be vigilant whenever the government attempts to usurp the powers of the Tribunal for adjudication of the valid disputes, and that to allow the Government to do so would be to render Section 10 and section 12 (5) of the Act nugatory. " ( 13 ) THE ratio of the aforesaid case is clear and in no ambiguous terms, it holds that the appropriate Government has only to prima facie examine existence of an industrial dispute required for adjudication by the Labour court/tribunal but no power has been conferred on the said appropriate Government to itself consider the merits of the matter and then decide it one way or the other. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court order dated July 25, 2002 and the order passed by learned single Judge in appellant's writ petition cannot be sustained in law. The same are hereby set aside. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court order dated July 25, 2002 and the order passed by learned single Judge in appellant's writ petition cannot be sustained in law. The same are hereby set aside. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel for respondent No. has vehemently placed reliance on three Judge bench judgment of the Supreme Court i bombay Union of Journalists and others v. State of Bombay and another reported in AIR 1964 SC 1617 : 1964-I-LLJ-351. We have critically examined the judgment. In the judgment, it has been mentioned by the lordships that it is no doubt desirable that the party concerned should be told clearly and precisely the reasons why no reference is may because the object of Section 12 (5) of the Act appears to be to require the appropriance government to state its reasons for refusing make a reference, so that the reason should stand public scrutiny. From the impugrged order dated July 25, 2002 (Annexure P/6)find that while declining to refer the dispute adjudication the appropriate Government not assigned any reasons whatsoever much to say 'precisely. The tenor of the said or shows it does not contain any reasons of court in our opinion it only contains the conclusion thus, the judgment of the Supreme Court in bombay Union (supra) does not render any help to advance case of the respondents in any manner whatsoever. Apart from this we have also noticed that the judgment of Bombay union (supra) was not at all considered by the supreme Court in its later judgment of Telco convoy Drivers (supra ). ( 15 ) IN our considered opinion the later judgment of the Supreme Court still continues to hold the field as nothing contra could be brought to us by learned counsel for respondent no. 2, for his subsequent arguments. ( 16 ) IN the light of discussion mentioned hereinabove we hereby quash the order dated july 25, 2002 (Annexure P/6) as also the order passed by learned single Judge in W. P. No. 1657/2002 and direct that the appropriate government shall consider the matter afresh in light of the judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of Telco Convoy Drivers (supra) and then decide if a dispute for adjudication in accordance with law to the Tribunal arises or not. Thus, this appeal stands allowed to the extent mentioned hereinabove with costs throughout. Counsel's fee Rs. 1,000. Thus, this appeal stands allowed to the extent mentioned hereinabove with costs throughout. Counsel's fee Rs. 1,000. 00 to be paid by respondents. .