M. R. MARSHA, J. ( 1 ) THE counsel representing the unsuccessful appellant-defendant m/s. Bata India Limited had raised the following substantial questions of law in the present second appeal: (I) When there is a valid exercise of option of renewal can the landlord issue a quit notice? (II) Whether the suit instituted is not premature in the facts and circumstances of the case? ( 2 ) SRI M. R. Harsha, the learned counsel representing the appellant after pointing out the above substantial questions of law, had taken the court through the findings recorded by both the courts below and would contend that in view of clause No. 2 at page No. 13 of ex. A-1, when the option was exercised by the appellant-defendant-tenant in time, the landlord is bound to accept and to grant a renewal for a further period of five years. In this view of the matter, the suit itself is premature. The counsel also would submit that both the courts had erred in decreeing the suit for eviction, having observed that the option to have renewal was exercised in accordance with law as per the aforesaid clause. ( 3 ) ON the contrary, Sri N. Siva Reddy, the counsel representing the legal representatives of deceased-respondent- plaintiff Sri P. Satyanarayana made the following submissions: the learned counsel would contend that both the courts after appreciation of the evidence of P. W. 1 and D. W. 1 and also exs. A-1 to A-8 had recorded concurrent findings that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of eviction, but, however, the relief of perpetual injunction had been dismissed. The counsel also would maintain that the relief of perpetual injunction was prayed for restraining the defendant from making any holes etc. , to the walls of the plaint schedule property. The learned counsel also submitted that it is no doubt true that there is a renewal clause. But, however, the learned counsel had drawn the attention of this court that even if the appellant-defendant is entitled to the relief of renewal for further period of five years, it had lapsed long back and hence on the ground that the suit had been instituted even before the expiry of the period, in the light of the subsequent event, there is no necessity of driving the legal representatives of the original landlord to yet another litigation in this regard. The counsel pointed out the findings recorded in o. S. No. 473 of 1997 on the file of I Addl. Junior Civil Judge Kakinada and in a. S. No. 37 of 2000 on the file of III Additional district Judge, Kakinada. ( 4 ) HEARD both the counsel and also perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record and the findings recorded by the court of first instance and also by the appellate court as well. ( 5 ) NO doubt, the plaintiff P. Satyanarayana who is no more, had instituted the suit O. S. No. 473 of 1997 for delivery of vacant possession of the plaint schedule property and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from making any holes to the walls of the shop room impairing the value and utility of the shop room and for costs of the suit. It was pleaded in the plaint as follows:"the plaintiff is the owner of the premises bearing door No. 14/28-1-31, ir/kda Subhas Road/54409 described in the plaint schedule and the same was leased out to the defendant under a registered Lease Deed dt. 4-11 -1986 in which the defendant is having its bata Shoe Mart. The lease was for ten years as per the stipulations and conditions and on the rents stipulated in the registered lease deed dated 4-11-1986 entered in between the plaintiff as lessor and the defendant as lessee and the defendant has to vacate the plaint schedule shop premises by the end of April, 1997. The rent that was being paid by the defendant is rs. 2,102/- by April, 1997. When the manager (Lease and Rent), Bata India limited, Calcutta requested the plaintiff by virtue of his letter dated 17-1-1996 to inform just and reasonable terms in the matter of renewal of lease, the plaintiff got issued a registered notice dated 27-1-1996 informing the defendant that his two sons who have became majors are intending to start business in the leasehold premises under the tenancy of the defendant, bonafidely. The lease expires by 30-4-1997 and as the plaintiff s two sons are need and necessary of the shoproom to have their business for which the require bonafide for their business and as such the plaintiff does not want to renew the lease further and the defendant Bata India Limited has to vacate the demised premises by the end of April, 1997 by which date the terms of lease expires. The defendant through its Manager (Lease and Rent) sent a reply dated 5-2-1996 alleging that the defendant needs the premises for their business and hence it will not be possible to vacate the same as required by the plaintiff and advised their representative for amicable settlement in the matter. The plaintiff got issued registered notice dated 6-7-1996 to the defendant in continuation of the prior notice dated 27-1-1996 requesting that the schedule premises required bona fide for personal use and occupation to enable the sons of the plaintiff to start their business and that the representative of the defendant did not meet the plaintiff for amicable settlement, that the defendant Bata shoe Mart people in charge of Shoe mart situated in plaint schedule property are making efforts to fix some decolum sheets by making holes in the wall of the shop impairing permanently the value and utility of the shop room etc. The defendant issued reply dated 16-8-1996 informing that it is not possible to vacate the premises and to extend lease for further period of five years. Later the plaintiff got issued a registered quit notice dated 20-3-1997 under Section 106 of Transfer of property Act to the defendant to vacate the plaint schedule premises by the end of April, 1997 by which date the lease expires, as the sons of the plaintiff bona fidely require the schedule premises for their business purpose and if the defendant failed to vacate accordingly, the defendant is liable to pay Rs. 10,000. 00 per month towards damages for use and occupation from 1-5-1997 besides liable for eviction. The defendant and it s Branch Manager at Kakinada though received the quit notice under postal acknowledgments dt. 26-3-1997 and kept quiet. The plaintiff reserves his right to recover damages for use and occupation of the plaint schedule premises by defendant from 1-5-1997 at Rs. 10,000. 00 p. m. Hence, this suit for eviction and for possession as prayed for supra. 26-3-1997 and kept quiet. The plaintiff reserves his right to recover damages for use and occupation of the plaint schedule premises by defendant from 1-5-1997 at Rs. 10,000. 00 p. m. Hence, this suit for eviction and for possession as prayed for supra. " ( 6 ) THE appellant herein as defendant had resisted the suit pleading in the written statement as hereunder; "admittedly, the plaintiff is the owner of the premises bearing door No. 14-28-31 ir/kda and there was a lease deed dated 4-11-1986 which is a registered one in which the defendant is running bata Shoe Mart. It is not true that the lease is for ten years from 4-11 -1986 to 31 -4-1997 and that the rents being paid by the defendant is Rs. 2,102. 00 by April, 1997 for the schedule premises. The manager of Bata India Limited, calcutta by his letter dated 17-1-1996 to inform the Bata India Limited, a just and reasonable terms in the matter of renewal of the lease, the plaintiff got issued a registered notice to defendant that his sons require the premises for their bona fide occupation to start business and the said requirement is not at all a bona fide one. The lease deed does not contain such recital. The property is governed by the Transfer of property Act and not by the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act. There is no term in the lease deed that if the landlord requires the premises bona fide that the leased property is to be given back. The only question to be decided is whether the defendant exercised its option to extent the lease for a further period of five years before the termination of the registered lease deed dated 4-11-1986. The defendant-exercised option by virtue of its letter dated 17-1 -1996 long before the termination of the lease period. By virtue of option exercised by the defendant, the lease automatically stands extended by five more years starting from May 1997. As long as the plaintiff did not come out with a reasonable figure, the defendant is entitled to continue for a five more years on the rent that was mentioned in the lease deed dated 4-11 -1986. By virtue of option exercised by the defendant, the lease automatically stands extended by five more years starting from May 1997. As long as the plaintiff did not come out with a reasonable figure, the defendant is entitled to continue for a five more years on the rent that was mentioned in the lease deed dated 4-11 -1986. After exchange of notices, it is clear that the defendant exercising its option and it is for the plaintiff to come to the understanding with regard to the rent to be paid. Further, the quit notice issued is not according to the law and the suit filed on the basis of quit notice which is not according to law i. e. , not satisfying requirements of Section 106 of transfer of Property Act, the suit is liable to be dismissed. On this count also, the plaintiff s claim of Rs. 10,000. 00 as damages is not maintainable. The plaintiff is not entitled to claim damages from 1-5-1997 at Rs. 10,000. 00 per month. The damages claimed are penal and are hit by Section 74 of contract Act. There is no whisper in the plaint how the amount to Rs. 10,000. 00 is arrived out. When the suit is filed on 23-5-1997 and when the plaintiff claims damages at Rs. 10,000. 00 from 1 -5-1997 he should pay court fee on that basis. So, the suit is liable to be dismissed, as court fee paid is not correct. The schedule filed by the plaintiff is wrong. This defendant is not making holes on the walls but only using the premises as per the terms of the lease deed. The defendant is prepared to pay the agreed rent without prejudice to the rights and contentions of both the parties. There is no cause of action for the suit and the same is invented for the purpose of filing of the suit. " ( 7 ) ON the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled by the court of first instance: (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of eviction of defendant from the suit premises and possession of the same as prayed for? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for? (iii) To what relief? ( 8 ) THE plaintiff was examined himself as p. W. 1 and Exs. (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for? (iii) To what relief? ( 8 ) THE plaintiff was examined himself as p. W. 1 and Exs. A-1 to A-8 were marked and d. W. 1 was examined on behalf of the defendant. Through P. W. 1, Exs. A-1 to A-8 were marked. Ex. A-1 is the registered agreement of lease deed executed in between the plaintiff and defendant. Ex. A-2 is the office copy of notice got issued by plaintiff to the defendant. Exs. A-3 and A-4 are postal acknowledgements. Ex. A-5 is the office copy of notice dated 21-7-1996 got issued by plaintiff to the defendant. Ex. A-6 is the reply letter. Ex. A-7 is the office copy of notice issued by the counsel for plaintiff to defendant. Ex. A-8 is the reply letter got issued by defendant to the counsel for plaintiff. ( 9 ) BEING unsuccessful, the defendant preferred appeal A. S. No. 37 of 2000 on the file of III Additional District Judge, Kakinada and the appellate court having framed the point for consideration as "whether there are grounds to interfere with the findings of the lower court", proceeded to discuss with all the aspects commencing from paras Nos. 8 to 11 and ultimately came to the conclusion that the appeal is liable to be dismissed with costs. ( 10 ) IT is no doubt true that there is no controversy between the parties about clause No. 2 of Ex. A-1 at page 13, which reads as hereunder: "if the lessee shall be desirous of taking a new lease of the said premises after expiry of the said term hereby granted and shall at least one month before the expiration thereof signify such intention by a notice in writing to the lessor, the lessor shall at or before the expiration of the said term make and execute at the cost of the lessee a new and effectual lease of the said premises hereby demised for a term of five years to commence from and after the expiry of the term hereby granted at the rent to be mutually settled between the parties then and subject to like covenants as are herein contained. " ( 11 ) IT is no doubt true that the right to exercise option had been reserved under the aforesaid clause No. 2. " ( 11 ) IT is no doubt true that the right to exercise option had been reserved under the aforesaid clause No. 2. But it is not a right to exercise the option simply but with certain other additional terms and conditions. Be that as it may, inasmuch as concurrent findings had been recorded in this regard, this court is not inclined to disturb the said findings recorded by the court of first instance and also by the learned III additional District Judge, Kakinada in Appeal no. 37 of 2000. It is not in controversy that even the period of five years which is stated to be the period to which the appellant-defendant is entitled to continue in the premises, had lapsed long back. This fact is not in controversy between the parties. In the light of the same, the questions raised as substantial questions of law which were elaborately argued by Sir M. R. Harsha, need not be gone into in detail in the light of the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below. However, Sri M. R. Harsha representing the appellant had stated that it would be very difficult to get alternative accommodation since the premises is non-residential premises and business is being run in the said premises by the appellant-defendant for sufficiently a long time and obtained goodwill as well. No doubt, in view of the concurrent findings recorded and in the light of the subsequent event the lapse of time during the pendency of the litigation, this court is not inclined to disturb the findings recorded by both the courts below. ( 12 ) ACCORDINGLY, the second appeal shall stand dismissed without costs. However, in view of the facts and circumstances, the appellant defendant is given six months time to vacate the premises.