P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) ON 28-4-2003 this Court framed the following substantial questions of law under section 100 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1. The finding of the first appellate Court, that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the face of the statutory provision, contained in Section 20 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act, 1960, is illegal and unsustainable and hence, has to be interfered and set-aside as such ? 2. Whether the findings recorded by the first appellate Court, on the basis of res judicata and maintainability of the suit, are illegal and unsustainable at law and hence, warrant interference in the S. A. ? 3. Whether the first appellate Court misappreciated the material on record and recorded illegal findings, and thereby, lead to miscarriage of substantial justice and misadjudication of substantial questions of law involved in the case ? 4. To what reliefs ? ( 2 ) SRI Bhaskar Reddy representing Sri Dayakar Reddy, the Counsel representing the appellant in the Second Appeal, Sri B. Dass, had maintained that the Court of first instance on the material available on record had arrived at a correct conclusion by dismissing the suit and the appellate Court had totally erred in granting the said relief. The learned Counsel also had distinguished the decision K. NARSAMMA Vs. K. MALLAMMA on the ground that definitely the present suit is not a comprehensive suit. The Counsel also would maintain that a suit for declaration of this nature cannot be maintained especially in view of the remedy available to respondents under the provisions of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1960. The learned Counsel also submitted that whenever the ground of fraud is raised, particulars are to be clearly pleaded and for want of particulars also, the respondents/plaintiffs are liable to be non-suited. The learned Counsel also made elaborate submissions on the aspect of applicability of doctrine of res judicata in such a case. The Counsel also pointed out that there was some delay in approaching the Court and this also would show that the respondents/plaintiffs had not prosecuted the litigation diligently. The learned Counsel also made elaborate submissions on the aspect of applicability of doctrine of res judicata in such a case. The Counsel also pointed out that there was some delay in approaching the Court and this also would show that the respondents/plaintiffs had not prosecuted the litigation diligently. The learned Counsel also made an attempt to show that no proper opportunity had been afforded in the Court of first instance to the appellant/defendant and despite the same, no doubt on appreciation of the material available on record, the suit was rightly dismissed and hence at any rate it is a fit case where the matter may have to be remitted for the purpose of affording further opportunity to the appellant/defendant to contest the matter. ( 3 ) ON the contrary, Sri Rajasekhar Reddy, Counsel representing the respondents/plaintiffs had submitted that in para 7 of the plaint particulars relating to fraud had been specifically pleaded and inasmuch as the title is not in dispute on the strength of the material available on record, the appellate court had arrived at the correct conclusion. The learned Counsel also would maintain that fraud would vitiate everything and in such a case, where fraud is alleged and proved, there is no question of applying the doctrine of res judicata. The learned Counsel also had contended that the appellant/defendant cannot take advantage of his own wrong and having practiced fraud, to avoid decree at the hands of a Civil Court, the contention that a remedy by way of appeal is available under the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act, 1960 cannot be permitted to be raised. The Counsel also submitted that under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, definitely a suit of this nature is maintainable. The Counsel also had placed reliance the decision referred (1) supra and the decisions in S. P. CHENGALVARAYA NAIDU (DEAD) BY L. RS. Vs. JAGANNATH (DEAD) BY L. RS. AND OTHERS and MAHBOOB SAHAB Vs. SYED ISMAIL AND OTHERS. Heard both the Counsel. The Counsel also had placed reliance the decision referred (1) supra and the decisions in S. P. CHENGALVARAYA NAIDU (DEAD) BY L. RS. Vs. JAGANNATH (DEAD) BY L. RS. AND OTHERS and MAHBOOB SAHAB Vs. SYED ISMAIL AND OTHERS. Heard both the Counsel. ( 4 ) RESPONDENTS/plaintiffs instituted O. S. No. 1280/98 for the relief of declaration that the Judgment and decree dated 18-4-1995 in R. C. No. 63/93 on the file of principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad are null and void and consequently the eviction order passed in R. C. No. 63/93 be set-aside and the defendant to deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property i. e. , house bearing Municipal no. 16-1-205, admeasuring 35 sq. yards situated at Saidabad, Hyderabad and for costs. The respondents/plaintiffs pleaded in the plaint as follows: the husband of the 1st plaintiff and the father of the plaintiffs 2 to 8 i. e. , late D. Maheswar was the owner and possessor of the house bearing Municipal no. 16-1-205, admeasuring 35 sq. yards situated in the slum area at Saidabad, hyderabad having purchased the same from one B. Rangaiah and Raheemuddin under registered sale deed dated 8-5-1963 bearing document No. 903 of 1963. Since the date of purchase, the said D. Maheswar along with his family members i. e. , plaintiffs were residing in the suit premises by paying Municipal taxes and electricity charges from time to time. The said D. Maheswar also obtained water connection to the suit premises. While so, the defendant who is the son of one of the vendors of D. Maheswar filed a fictitious and false eviction petition under R. C. No. 63 of 1993 on the file of Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad against D. Maheswar on the grounds of alleged wilful default in payment of rents and alleged personal requirements. In the said R. C. , late D. Maheswar engaged one Sri Mazarulla Khan as an Advocate to defend him in the eviction petition and he filed a counter denying not only the relationship of tenancy but also claiming ownership of the suit premises. As the Rent Control petition went on for trial, the health of D. Maheswar deteriorated and he was not in a positionto attend the Advocate s office to know about the stage of the suit. As the Rent Control petition went on for trial, the health of D. Maheswar deteriorated and he was not in a positionto attend the Advocate s office to know about the stage of the suit. In the month of April 1994, the said D. Maheswar suffered severe paralytic attack and he was admitted in Government Ayurveda Hospital at Charminar and he was there upto 18-7-1994. He was not in the position to carry on his daily routine works also. ( 5 ) MEANWHILE, the eviction petition went on for trial. As there was no representation on behalf of D. Maheswar, an exparte eviction order was pass don 18-4-1995. After passing of the exparte eviction order, the defendant filed e. P. No. 21/1995 and took possession of suit schedule premises on 23-8-1995. D. Maheswar came to know about the facts and approached one M. Rajavardhana Reddy and M. Krishna Rao, Advocates for taking legal action to set-aside the exparte eviction orders. The said advocates prepared petitions on 20-10-1995. They also prepared the affidavits of D. Maheswar. They took the vakalatnama of D. Maheswar but due to their carelessness they did not file the above papers before the Court for setting aside the exparte eviction orers. In the meanwhile D. Maheswar expired on 19-11-1995. Thereafter, the plaintiffs again approached the said advocates who in turn prepared other petitions on behalf of the plaintiffs in the month of December 1995. They also took the Vakalat of the plaintiffs but they did not file the said petitions in the Rent Control Court, for setting aside the exparte eviction orders. The plaintiffs perused the matter with the above Advocates for long time. Finally on 20-8-1997, their Advocates returned the file with a letter stating that the bundle was misplaced. In the circumstances, the plaintiffs have no other option except to file the present suit for cancellation of the said eviction orders passed by the Principal Rent controller, Hyderabad. It is submitted that the defendants have no legal right to file or claim any relief against late D. Maheswar. The filing of false eviction petition and obtaining of illegal orders and consequently illegally evicting D. Maheswar and his family members from the suit premises are nothing but abuse of process of law. It is submitted that the defendants have no legal right to file or claim any relief against late D. Maheswar. The filing of false eviction petition and obtaining of illegal orders and consequently illegally evicting D. Maheswar and his family members from the suit premises are nothing but abuse of process of law. Therefore, the orders of eviction illegally passed are liable to be set-aside and the same has to be declared as null and void and unenforceable as against the plaintiffs. Thus the plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration that the Judgment and decree dt. 18-4-1995 in R. C. No. 63/93 on the file of the Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad as null and void and consequently to set-aside the eviction order passed in respect of the premises bearing No. 16-1-205 situated at Saidabad, Hyderabad and to deliver vacant possession of the said premises to the plaintiffs and direct the defendant to pay a sum of Respondents. 100/- p. m. towards damages for having retained the possession of the above premises from the date of the suit till the date of delivery of possession. ( 6 ) THE appellant herein/defendant was in fact set ex parte. No doubt, at present a controversy is raised to the effect that there was no proper service. But however, this question was not raised even before the appellate Court and hence the said question cannot be permitted to be raised, it being a question of fact. The 2nd plaintiff was examined as PW-1 and Exs. A-1 to A-32 were marked. PW-1 had deposed all the aspects in detail and Ex. A-1 registered sale deed in Urdu in favour of late Maheswar and its English translation Ex. A-2 were marked. Ex. A-3 is the plan in Urdu annexed to Ex. A-1 and its English translation is Ex. A-4, exs. A-5 to A-8 are Municipal tax receipts and electricity charge receipts, ex. A-9 is the passbook issued by APSEB in favour of D. Maheswar, Exs. A-10 and a-11 are notices of revenue authorities to late Maheswar for payment of non-agricultural assessment tax in respect of the suit schedule property, exs. A-12 to A-20 are the water connection order notice issued by Water Works department, water tax payment receipts etc. , Exs. A-21 to A-25 are the medical prescriptions of late Maheswar, Ex. A-10 and a-11 are notices of revenue authorities to late Maheswar for payment of non-agricultural assessment tax in respect of the suit schedule property, exs. A-12 to A-20 are the water connection order notice issued by Water Works department, water tax payment receipts etc. , Exs. A-21 to A-25 are the medical prescriptions of late Maheswar, Ex. A-26 is the affidavit and the petition of late Maheswar prepared for setting aside the eviction order, Ex. A-27 is the office copy of the petition to condone delay in filing the petition to set-aside the eviction order. Ex. A-28 is the office copy of the petition along with affidavit for redelivery of possession, Ex. A-29 is the death certificate of late maheswar, Ex. A-30 is the affidavit of the 5th plaintiff for setting aside the eviction order, Ex. A-31 is the Vakalatnama given by plaintiffs and Ex. A-32 is the letter of Sri M. Krishna Rao, Advocate to the effect that the bundle was misplaced. The main contention advanced by the appellant is that there is a remedy by way of an Appeal as against the order impugned and also a remedy to file an application to set-aside the said order under the provisions of A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1960 and hence the suit of this nature cannot be maint ained. In the decision referred (1) supra it was held :"it is true that the Rent Control Act provides for appeal against an order passed by the Rent Controller for restitution. The landlady is not barred from filing a comprehensive suit for the declaration that the order passed by the rent Controller for the restitution is void for want of jurisdiction to pass such an order when the premises was demolished even long prior to the stay order. It cannot be said that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or to proceed with the suit for the reliefs prayed for as the Rent control Act does not provide for exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil court on matters of this nature. " ( 7 ) IT is needless to say that specifically allegations of fraud had been clearly averred in para 7 of the plaint and PW-1 had deposed in detail about the same. Ample documentary evidence also had been placed in relation thereto. " ( 7 ) IT is needless to say that specifically allegations of fraud had been clearly averred in para 7 of the plaint and PW-1 had deposed in detail about the same. Ample documentary evidence also had been placed in relation thereto. It is also clear that from the material available on record, Exs. A-26 to A-32, that certain attempts were made to get the order set-aside, but however in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances inasmuch as it is a clear case of fraud and since fraud would vitiate everything, in stead of resorting to the remedies under the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, they being only summary proceedings, a regular civil suit was thought of for declaration and recovery of possession. In such a case, especially in the light of the reasons recorded in detail after framing the Point for consideration at para-8 and the recording of reasons commencing from paras 10 to 18, this Court does not see any reason to disturb the findings recorded in A. S. No. 359/99 on the file of xi Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court-Fast Track Court, Hyderabad. It is no doubt true that the III Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad had dismissed the suit O. S. No. 1280/98, but the appellate Court had recorded reasons in detail why the said Judgment and decree cannot be sustained. When the service was duly effected on the appellant/defendant and it being a question of fact, the appellant cannot be permitted to raise that question at this stage and hence in this view of the matter, there is no question of making an order of remand. Inasmuch as fraud would vitiate everything there is no question of such judgment and decree operating as res judicata. Reliance also was placed on the decision referred (3) supra. Where a Judgment and decree were obtained by fraud and to be treated as nullity, such Judgment and decree can be definitely questioned even in collateral proceedings and the meaning of fraud also had been well explained in the decision referred (2) supra. Reliance also was placed on UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO LIMITED Vs. RAJENDRA SINGH relating to the concept of fraud and invocation of review jurisdiction of the Tribunal or a court. Reliance also was placed on SHRI RAM AND ANOTHER Vs. Reliance also was placed on UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO LIMITED Vs. RAJENDRA SINGH relating to the concept of fraud and invocation of review jurisdiction of the Tribunal or a court. Reliance also was placed on SHRI RAM AND ANOTHER Vs. I ADDITIONAL district JUDGE AND OTHERS on the aspect of the jurisdiction of the Civil court. Viewed from any angle, this Court is of the considered opinion that in a case of this nature, where the very order is questioned on the ground of fraud, the question of applying the doctrine of res judicata or the question of dismissing the suit on the ground of availability of the remedy under the provisions of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, definitely would not arise especially in the light of the fact that clear findings had been recorded relating to the maintainability of the suit in the light of the ratio laid down by this Court in the decision referred (1) supra. Reliance also was placed on the undernoted decisions in relation to what a substantial question of law would mean and when the High Court can interfere under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure : VEERAYEE AMMAL Vs. SEENI ammal 6, PARAS NATH THAKUR Vs. MOHANI DASI (DECEASED) ANA OTHERS, SINHA ramanuja JEER ALIAS, VANAMAMALAI RAMANUJA JEER SWAMIGAL Vs. RANGA RAMANUJA JEER alias, EMBERUMANAR JEER,others, V RAMACHANDRA AYYAR Vs. RAMALINGAM CHETTIAR, madamaiichi RANIAPPA Vs. MUTHALURU BOJJAPPA, SIR CHUNILGJ V MEHTA, SONS limited , ADVOCATE GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA INTERVENER Vs. CENTURY spinning, MANUFACTURING CO LTD, AND ALSO KONDIBA DAGADU KADAM Vs. SAVITRIBAI sopan GUJAR. ( 8 ) EXCEPT the questions referred to supra, no other questions had been canvassed by the respective Counsel representing the parties. Before parting with the case, it is made clear that whenever a serious allegation of fraud is made, normally technicalities should not come in the way of doing substantial justice to the parties and in the opinion of the appellate court the same thing was done in the present case and in that view of the matter, the Judgment and decree of the trial Court had been reversed. Hence, this Court is accepting with the findings recorded by the appellate Court and arrives at a conclusion that the Second Appeal is devoid of merit and the same shall stand dismissed, with costs.