JUDGMENT V.K. Gupta, CJ. (Oral): Relying upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of H.P. Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and others v. Raj Kumar and another, reported in Latest HLJ 2001 (H.P) 1178, the learned H.P. Administrative Tribunal vide judgment dated 13th July, 2004 passed in OA No. 2728 of 2003 has dismissed the case of the petitioner on the ground that it did not have the jurisdiction in the matter but at the same time reserved liberty to the petitioner to avail of the alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by approaching the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be. 2. We have very carefully perused the aforesaid Division Bench judgment of this Court in H.P. Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and others v. Raj Kumar and others (supra) and find that in that case the Division Bench was seized of the controversy relating to the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal with respect of the adjudication of an order terminating the service of an employee of H.P. Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. In the present case, the petitioner had approached the Tribunal seeking the relief of his being conferred the status of a workcharge employee on the ground that he was engaged as a daily wager Beldar in the year 1990 and he having already put in more than 10 years of service was entitled to be conferred the aforesaid status of a workcharge employee. 3. The jurisdiction, powers and authority of a State Administrative Tribunal have been laid down in Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. This Section specifically says and lays down that a State Administrative Tribunal shall inter alia have jurisdiction with respect to all service matters. The expression "service matters" has been defined in Section 3(q) of the 1985 Act.
The jurisdiction, powers and authority of a State Administrative Tribunal have been laid down in Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. This Section specifically says and lays down that a State Administrative Tribunal shall inter alia have jurisdiction with respect to all service matters. The expression "service matters" has been defined in Section 3(q) of the 1985 Act. This definition reads thus:- “3(q) "service matters", in relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the Government, as respects:- (i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits; (ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation; (iii) leave of any kind; (iv) disciplinary matters; or (v) any other matter whatsoever;" Undoubtedly, the aforesaid relief claimed by the petitioner in the OA filed by him before the Tribunal came within the ambit and purview of the aforesaid definition of "service matters". Whether we talk of regularisation on the tenure, including confirmation, promotion or the like nature, undoubtedly the relief claimed by the petitioner has a direct nexus and a close link with the concept of "service matters" as has been elaborately defined in Section 3(q) of 1985 Act. 4. A Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would have the jurisdiction to entertain a matter if it relates to the adjudication of an industrial dispute as has been defined in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 2(k) reads thus:- "2(k) "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person;" Even though in Section 2(k) (supra) an industrial dispute has not specifically been defined in the sense that this sub-section merely states that any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment etc.
would be an industrial dispute, a look at the Second and Third Schedules of this Act would give an insight to the nature of the dispute which perhaps could be taken up either before an Industrial Tribunal or before a Labour Court for adjudication. Somebody 1 claiming the relief of conferment of the status of a workcharge 1 employee, on a very close scrutiny of the Second Schedule or the I Third Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would not be a part of the reliefs claimed under either of the aforesaid two schedules and, therefore, in our opinion, such a matter cannot be termed as an industrial dispute. Rather, with reference to Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 read with Section 3(q) of the said Act, the relief claimed by the petitioner surely would be in the realm of "service matters", falling within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal. 5. Apparently therefore, the Tribunal committed an error in relying upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of HP. Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and others v. Raj Kumar and another (supra) while dismissing the petitioners O.A. for want of jurisdiction, because this judgment did not dwell upon any distinction between an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the ambit and scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal with reference to Section 15 read with Section 3(q) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. HP. Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. (supra) was dealing with the case of a termination of service which undoubtedly would be an industrial dispute in view of clause 3 of the Second Schedule of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which talks of discharge or dismissal of a workman. 6. We, therefore, feel convinced that the HP. Administrative Tribunal had the jurisdiction to entertain the OA. filed by the petitioner and that the order dated 13th July, 2004 passed by the Tribunal and ) under challenge in this petition suffers from an error of law. 7. This petition accordingly is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal for the disposal of O.A. afresh in accordance with law and on its merits.