JUDGMENT Dilip Gupta, J.—By means of the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the award of the Labour Court dated 26.8.1991 and also the order dated 21.4.1987 by which the Labour Court has condoned the delay. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Samir Sharma at length. 3. By means of the order dated 25.2.1976 the temporary services of the respondent workman were terminated on the ground that they were no longer required. The appeal filed by the respondent workman before the Regional Manager was also rejected by order dated 14.4.1977. An application dated 8.10.1986 was filed by the respondent workman before the Regional Conciliation Officer to which an objection was raised by the petitioner regarding the delay of about more than 10 years in filing the application before the Regional Conciliation Officer but by means of the order dated 21.4.1987 the Regional Conciliation Officer condoned the delay in filing the application. In paragraph No. 11 of the writ petition it has been stated that the petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the aforesaid order dated 21.4.1987 but the petition was dismissed on the ground that the said order could be challenged after the award was given by the Labour Court. The State Government, on 1.3.1989, made a reference to the Labour Court as to whether the order dated 25.2.1976 terminating the services of the workman was valid and if not then to what relief the workman was entitled. The Labour Court in its award dated 26.8.1991 has held that the services of the respondent workman had been terminated in violation of the provisions of Section 6N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. It has, therefore, set aside the order dated 25.2.1976 holding that the services had not been terminated in accordance with law and reinstated the workman with full back wages. 4. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the finding recorded by the Labour Court regarding violation of the provisions of Section 6N of the aforesaid Act is perverse. Having carefully perused the award, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Even in the written statement filed by the petitioner before the Labour Court it has not been contended that the workman had not worked for more than 240 days in the preceding year. 5. Having carefully perused the award, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Even in the written statement filed by the petitioner before the Labour Court it has not been contended that the workman had not worked for more than 240 days in the preceding year. 5. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was that the order dated 21.4.1987 passed by the Labour Court condoning the delay in moving the reference application, is bad in law. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the services had been terminated on 25.2.1976 but the application was filed before the Regional Conciliation Officer only on 8.10.1986 and the reasons stated in the said order do not make out a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 6. The petition was admitted on 15.7.1992 and on the application for interim relief, the Court passed the following order : “Issue notice Operation of the impugned award, so far as it relates to the past wages, is stayed subject to the condition that the petitioner reinstates the concerned workman, respondent No. 3 within a period of one month from today and keep on paying him the salary from month to month as and when it falls.” 7. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner was re-instated in 1992 and is continuing in service. Only the payment of past wages had been stayed by this Court. He has since then worked for more than 11 years. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U. P. State Electricity Board and others, 2001 (3) AWC 2342 (SC) : 2001 (3) ESC 499, considered the question of inordinate delay of 15 years in making a reference to the Court. Reference may be made to paragraph No. 15 of the said judgment which is as follows : “There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case when the Government have chosen to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 4K of the U. P. Act the High Court should not have quashed the reference merely on the ground of delay. Of course, the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authorities while moulding its reliefs.” 9. In my considered view, therefore, it would be appropriate to consider whether the respondent workman would be entitled to the wages for the period between the date of the filing of the application before the Conciliation Officer and the date of termination of his services. In the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Arvind Chaubey and another, (2002) 9 SCC 549 , the Supreme Court observed as follows : “So far as the payment of back wages is concerned, it was submitted that respondent No. 1 was removed from service on 21.2.1976 and he did not raise any dispute till expiry of seven years and only on 13.11.1982 he sought a reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal and as such at least for this period, he was not entitled to any back wages as delay was caused by him alone and for the delay he cannot make the appellant Mandi Samiti to pay the back wages. It was also submitted that during the relevant period respondent No. 1 was having a commission agency business. Be that as it may, in our view, after the termination of his service on 21.2.1976, respondent No. 1 himself for reasons best known to him did not think it fit to raise an industrial dispute at least from 21.2.1976 till 13.11.1982. He is not entitled to any back wages for that period. Only on this short ground, the appeal is accordingly allowed. The order regarding payment of back wages is confirmed subject to the modification that from 21.2.1976 to 13.11.1982 respondent No. 1 will not be entitled to any back wages. The rest of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal and as confirmed by the High Court is obviously maintained.” 10. Only on this short ground, the appeal is accordingly allowed. The order regarding payment of back wages is confirmed subject to the modification that from 21.2.1976 to 13.11.1982 respondent No. 1 will not be entitled to any back wages. The rest of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal and as confirmed by the High Court is obviously maintained.” 10. In the present case the respondent workman did not raise any dispute for a long period of 10 years after the passing of the termination order dated 25.2.1976 inasmuch as the application was filed before the Conciliation Officer only on 8.10.1986. He was solely responsible for the delay. The respondent workman is, therefore, not entitled to any back wages for this period. 11. The petition, therefore, succeeds in part. The award of the Labour Court dated 26.8.1991 is modified to the extent that the respondent workman shall not be entitled to any back wages from 25.2.1976 to 8.10.1986. The rest of the award of the Labour Court is maintained. No order as to costs.