Yaseen alias Dhondhey (Deceased) though L. Rs. v. Mohd. Ali
2004-11-23
N.K.MEHROTRA
body2004
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT N. K. Mehrotra, J.—This is second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 30.10.1981 passed by Civil Judge, Baharaich in Civil Appeal No. 116 of 1980 arising out of Regular Suit No. 415 of 1998 decided by Ist Additional Munsif, Baharaich vide judgment and order dated 31.3.1980. Since the appeal was partly allowed and partly dismissed, the plaintiff has also filed cross objections against the judgment of the first appellate court. 2. I have heard Shri U. S. Sahai learned counsel for the defendants-appellants and Shri Mohd. Arif Khan counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. 3. It appears that the plaintiffs-respondents filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from making any interference in the plaintiff’s possession over the land shown by letters ABCD in the map Paper No. 24C prepared by Commissioner and also from maintaining any window, ventilator, door and drain in the south of the land shown by letters AD in the Commissioner’s map and also from raising and construction on the passage land shown in that map. The case of the plaintiffs is that they are the owners of their house as shown in the plaint map since the time of their father. The main door of the plaintiffs’ house faces towards north. The disputed land shown by letters ABCD in the plaint map is the ‘sahan’ of their house which is used for sitting and which is used for the purpose of ceremonies in connection with death and marriages. Plaintiffs also tie their cattle on the land in suit. It is alleged that the land in suit has settled with the plaintiffs under Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and it is in plot No. 701 Minjumla. The plaintiffs purchased this land for Rs. 75 from Gaon Sabha in auction. Defendants have no concern with the land in suit. It is further alleged that east and north of their house, there is a passage which is existing for the last 50 Years. This passage goes in a chak road. The plaintiffs are using this passage for the last 50 years for carrying their bullock carts. By making amendment in the plaint, a relief for mandatory injunction for closing the door opened in the wall AD as shown in the Commissioner’s map was also sought. 4.
This passage goes in a chak road. The plaintiffs are using this passage for the last 50 years for carrying their bullock carts. By making amendment in the plaint, a relief for mandatory injunction for closing the door opened in the wall AD as shown in the Commissioner’s map was also sought. 4. The defendants contested the suit and alleged that he has old ventilators and doors in their southern wall of the house. The house of the plaintiffs is in the east of the passage. The easementary rights have been claimed by the plaintiffs in respect of the house lying in the west of the passage. This house had been constructed nearly 12 years ago. The sahan of the plaintiffs lies in the south of their house. The plaintiffs have no user on the land in the north of their house. Following issues were framed by the learned trial court : “(1) Whether the land in suit is the sahan of the plaintiff as alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint? (2) Whether the land in suit is appurtenant land of the plaintiffs’ house and has vested in them under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act? (3) Whether there exists rasta in the east of GF and north of IG as shown in the Commissioner’s map C24 and the plaintiff had right of way over it? (4) Whether the suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act? (5) Whether the suit is under-valued and the Court fee paid is insufficient? (6) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (7) Whether the suit is beyond the jurisdiction of the civil court as alleged in paragraph 25 of the written statement? (8) To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? (9) Whether the plaintiffs are the owners in possession of the disputed land on the basis of the auction purchase from the Gaon Sabha? 5. On issue No. 1, it has been held that the disputed land is not the sahan of the plaintiffs’ house. On issue No. 2 it has been held that the land in suit has not been settled with the plaintiffs under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. On issue No. 3, it was held that there exists rasta as shown in the Commissioner’s map.
On issue No. 2 it has been held that the land in suit has not been settled with the plaintiffs under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. On issue No. 3, it was held that there exists rasta as shown in the Commissioner’s map. On issue No. 4, it was held that suit is not barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Issue No. 5 with regard to the valuation was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. On issue No. 6, it was held that suit is not barred by limitation. On issue No. 7, it was held that suit is not beyond the jurisdiction of the civil court. On issue No. 7, it has been held that the plaintiffs have taken this land from Gaon Sabha in an auction and on the basis of which they are the owners in possession of the disputed land. On the basis of the finding on issue No. 9, issue No. 8 has been decided by holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief claimed. In view of such findings, the suit has been decreed for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs over the land shown by letters ABCD in the plaint map and from opening the window ventilators, drain and door and from raising any construction over the passage shown in the Commissioner’s map. Suit for mandatory injunction to close the door opened by the defendants in the wall shown by letter AD in the Commissioner’s Map was also decreed. The defendants preferred first appeal. The first appellate court recorded the findings that the land in suit is sahan of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs are in possession over this disputed land. The rest of the findings are against the plaintiffs in the first appeal. It has been held that it has not been established that the land taken in auction from Gaon Sabha is the same land which is the disputed land and therefore, the plaintiffs are not the owners of the land in suit on the basis of the allotment by Gaon Sabha.
It has been held that it has not been established that the land taken in auction from Gaon Sabha is the same land which is the disputed land and therefore, the plaintiffs are not the owners of the land in suit on the basis of the allotment by Gaon Sabha. It has also been held that even if it is taken to be correct that the disputed land was taken by the plaintiffs in an auction from Gaon Sabha, then the rights of the plaintiffs have extinguished because no construction has been raised by the plaintiffs after taking this land and the allotment has become meaningless under Rule 115Q of the Rules framed under U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The learned first appellate court has also held that no argument was advanced by the plaintiffs in support of the contention that the land in suit has been settled with the plaintiffs under Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It has also been held that the plaintiffs have not alleged that they are using passage for the last 20 years continuously as of right and therefore, they have failed to prove that they have acquired the right of way on the land in suit. After recording these findings against the plaintiffs-respondents, the learned first appellate court has partly dismissed the appeal and partly allowed the appeal. The suit for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs over the land shown by letters ABCD remained decreed and rest of the decree has been set aside and the suit for rest of the prayer has been dismissed. 6. Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants has submitted that there is only one substantial question of law in this appeal. After accepting the argument of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellants, following substantial question of law was formulated in this second appeal : “Whether all the findings having been recorded against the plaintiffs by the lower appellate court, the suit of the plaintiff could be decreed partly.” 7.
After accepting the argument of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellants, following substantial question of law was formulated in this second appeal : “Whether all the findings having been recorded against the plaintiffs by the lower appellate court, the suit of the plaintiff could be decreed partly.” 7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find that the suit for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction is based on the ground that the land in suit has been settled with the plaintiffs after the abolition of Zamindari under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and the plaintiffs have taken this land in the auction from Gaon Sabha on making payment of Rs. 75 on 21.12.1975. The learned first appellate court has recorded the findings on these two grounds against the plaintiffs. It has been held that the receipts issued by Gaon Sabha in favour of the plaintiffs do not connect the disputed land and the identity has not been established because the village Pradhan has allotted land to several persons after taking a consideration of Rs. 75 per person and these receipts are on the record and since the identity is not connected with the receipts issued by the village Pradhan, it cannot be said that it is a disputed land which has been given by village Pradhan to the plaintiffs. At the same time, the learned first appellate court has held that even if it is found that the disputed land was allotted by Gaon Sabha in favour of the plaintiffs on 21.12.1975, the right of the plaintiffs have extinguished under Rule 115Q of the Rules framed under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act because no construction has been raised on the site by the plaintiffs. The learned first appellate court has also recorded a finding that no argument has been advanced in support of the contentions of the plaintiffs that the disputed land is settled with the plaintiffs under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The trial court has also recorded a finding on the issue whether the land has been settled with the plaintiffs under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and this issue has been decided against the plaintiffs on the ground that admittedly the land has been taken by the plaintiffs from Gaon Sabha on 21.12.1975 as has been alleged in the plaint.
Therefore, it is obvious that prior to 21.12.1975, Gaon Sabha was the owner of the disputed land. 8. So far as the finding of the learned first appellate court that it is established, it does not establish that it is the disputed land shown by letters ABCD in the Commissioner’s Map Paper No. 24C which has been taken from Gaon Sabha by the plaintiffs on 21.12.1975. I do not find any evidence on record to disturb this finding of the learned first appellate court but so far as the finding with regard to the extinguishment of rights of the plaintiffs over the land allotted by Gaon Sabha under Rule 115Q of the rules framed under U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act is concerned, it cannot be upheld. 9. Rule 115Q of the Rules of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act is as follows : “115Q. The person to whom the housing site is allotted shall be required to build a house and begin to reside in it or to use it for the purpose for which it was built within three years from the date of allotment : if he fails to do so or uses it at any time for a purpose other than that for which it was allotted his right shall be extinguished and the site may be taken over by the Land Management Committee : Provided that in the case of a person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe the aforesaid time-limit for building of the house shall not apply.” 10. The aforesaid rule goes to show that allottee was required to construct a house and begin to reside within three years from the date of allotment of the site. According to the plaintiffs, the site was allotted on 21.12.1975. Their possession was disturbed and suit was filed on 8.11.1978 before the expiry of the period of three years. Therefore, it cannot be said that the rights which the plaintiffs got on the basis of the allotment by Gaon Sabha have extinguished under the provision of Rule 115Q cited above. 11. So far as the finding on issue No. 2 is concerned, a perusal of the judgment of the two courts below goes to show that the learned courts below have not recorded the finding on this issue in accordance with law. Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act is as follows : “9.
11. So far as the finding on issue No. 2 is concerned, a perusal of the judgment of the two courts below goes to show that the learned courts below have not recorded the finding on this issue in accordance with law. Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act is as follows : “9. Private wells, trees in abadi and buildings to be settled with the existing owners or occupiers thereof.—All wells, trees in abadi and all buildings, situate within the limits of an estate belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary tenant or person, as the case may be, and the site of the wells or the buildings within the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.” 12. The touchstone of appurtenance is dependence of the building on what appurtains to it for its use as a building. Under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, the appurtenant land is that which is necessary for the use of the adjoining house. In view of the said context, the actual use over the appurtenant land and occupation and the same being appurtenant to disputed house are relevant factors. The use of the concerned party over the disputed land and possession is relevant consideration for holding appurtenant land. The determination of the appurtenant land should be based on the fact whether the disputed land is essential or not for the use of adjoining house. In the instant case, the Court should record a finding whether the house of the plaintiffs existed on or before the date of vesting and the plaintiffs were in possession over the disputed land and had been using the land in suit as sahan land for deciding the issue whether the land in suit has been settled under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act.
What happened in this case is that two courts below have decided the issue of settlement of land under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act on irrelevant circumstances and evidence while after recording the finding that the disputed land is the sahan of the plaintiffs, the suit has been decreed by the first appellate court for injunction against the defendants-appellants to restrain them from interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs over the land shown by letters ABCD in the Commissioner’s map. That finding has been recorded on the basis of the Commissioner’s map Paper No. 16C and the statement of the defendant witnesses. The first report of the Commissioner is Paper No. 16C in which the door of the house of the plaintiffs has been shown towards the disputed land while after seeking supplementary report, another Commissioner’s map through Paper No. 24C was got prepared in which there is no door in the plaintiffs’ house towards the disputed land and instead of it, the two doors of the house of the plaintiffs has been shown towards east and south. Before relying either of the two maps, there must be a categorical finding of the appellate court about the correctness of a particular map. There should be a finding whether the map Paper No. 16C is correct map or Paper No. 24C is the correct map according to the spot situation. After recording the finding about the correctness of any particular map, it can be held that whether there is any door in the plaintiffs’ house towards north which open on the disputed land or not. 13. I find that except the finding about sahan land, all the findings have been recorded against the plaintiffs by the appellate court and without recording the specific finding after appreciating the evidence and law as referred above, the suit has been partly decreed which is not in accordance with law. Therefore, the appeal is to be allowed. 14. The plaintiffs have filed cross-objections. I have gone through the cross objections. It has been mentioned in the cross-objections that the lower appellate court has recorded a finding that the plaintiffs are the owner of the land in suit by perfecting their rights under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. I find that this is not the correct position. There is no such finding of the first appellate court.
It has been mentioned in the cross-objections that the lower appellate court has recorded a finding that the plaintiffs are the owner of the land in suit by perfecting their rights under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. I find that this is not the correct position. There is no such finding of the first appellate court. It has been further alleged in the cross-objection that the findings of the first appellate court are in favour of the plaintiffs. This is also not the correct position. It has also been alleged in the cross-objection that there is nothing on record that the disputed land was ever left for abadi during consolidation proceedings. This matter shall be looked into by the first appellate court afresh when the matter shall be remanded. 15. I find that the cross-objections have no force and since the appeal filed by the defendants-appellants is going to be allowed and the matter is being remanded, the cross-objections are dismissed. 16. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 30.10.1981 passed by Civil Judge, Baharaich in Civil Appeal No. 116 of 1980 is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the first appellate court to decide the appeal after recording findings on the issue whether the house of the plaintiffs was existing on or before the date of vesting and the plaintiffs were in possession over the land in suit on such date and use of the land in suit was necessary for beneficial use of their house in view of the legal position cited above.