L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a Limited company incorporated under the Indian companies Act. It has filed this writ petition seeking a declaration that the auction proceedings initiated by the 1st respondent in pursuance of its advertisement dated 24-7-2002, and the consequent acceptance of the bid of the 2nd respondent of the industrial unit belonging to the petitioner, as illegal, contrary to Condition No. 29, stipulated in the tender form, and for consequential reliefs. ( 2 ) THE petitioner states that it had borrowed a sum of Rs. 8. 42 lakhs for purchase of plant and machinery from the A. P. State Financial Corporation, the 1st respondent herein, before 1980, and thereafter a sum of Rs. 11 lakhs, for expansion, in September 1980. The petitioner claims that it had liquidated major portion of the loan and only a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs was outstanding by the year 1980. It is alleged that the 1st respondent levied penal and compound interest without acceding to the request of the rescheduling the loan, and it started demanding repayment of Rs. 74 lakhs. It is stated that even while the petitioner was taking steps to settle the accounts, the 1st respondent issued a publication in the press on 24-7-2002, proposing to auction the industrial unit. ( 3 ) IT is alleged that though the industrial unit of the petitioner is significant from the point of view of, value, location etc. , it was shown as one of the items in a general advertisement with misleading information. A further contention is advanced that in the tender form, the 1st respondent incorporated Condition No. 29, which is to the effect that a notice of (15) days will be given to the promoters of the unit to pay the sale price, which is fetched in the auction, and in the event of their failure, sale letter would be issued to the successful bidder, and in violation of the same, the 1st respondent has not issued any notice to any of the promoters or directors, and has chosen to issue sale letter to the 2nd respondent. The petitioner contends that non-compliance with Condition No. 29 has vitiated the entire proceedings, and no rights can be said to have accrued to the 2nd respondent. ( 4 ) THE 1st respondent filed counter- affidavit. It disputed the claims of the petitioner as regards repayment. The petitioner contends that non-compliance with Condition No. 29 has vitiated the entire proceedings, and no rights can be said to have accrued to the 2nd respondent. ( 4 ) THE 1st respondent filed counter- affidavit. It disputed the claims of the petitioner as regards repayment. It is alleged that the petitioner committed default, despite repeated demands, interest was levied strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract, and that the sale was held in accordance with law. It is stated that though Condition No. 29 was incorporated, it has no significance, in view of the clarification issued by the 1st respondent in its office order dated 5-3-2002. The 2nd respondent filed a counter-affidavit and has almost adopted the stand of the 1st respondent. ( 5 ) SRI E. Ayyapu Reddy, learned senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the 1st respondent had levied penal and compound interest and refused to extend the benefit of rescheduling the loan, contrary to the guidelines issued by the reserve Bank of India from time to time. He submits that the 1st respondent had advertised the sale of the property of the petitioner in a misleading way. According to him, had the correct information been furnished and the advertisement been prominent, it would have fetched a higher sum. The second but main contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that through the 1st respondent itself has incorporated a condition in the tender form, to the effect that the promoters would be given an opportunity to pay the sale amount that is fetched in the auction and it is only on their failure, that the sale letter would be issued, none of the promoters were given an opportunity, and thereby, the sale is vitiated. ( 6 ) SRI Y. N. Lohita, learned Standing counsel for the 1st respondent and Sri K, bhaskara Rao, learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent submit that several units were brought to sale and in that view of the matter, an advertisement, in respect of as many as 16 units, was given in a prominent daily. ( 6 ) SRI Y. N. Lohita, learned Standing counsel for the 1st respondent and Sri K, bhaskara Rao, learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent submit that several units were brought to sale and in that view of the matter, an advertisement, in respect of as many as 16 units, was given in a prominent daily. They submit that necessary information pertaining to the petitioner was given, and no exception can be taken to the same ( 7 ) AS regards the complaint that condition No. 29 was not complied with, the learned Counsel submit that the same was incorporated in view of the judgment of the supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, AIR 1993 SC 935 , and that, since it was overruled by the supreme Court in State Financial corporation v. M/s. Jagadamba Oil Mills, air 2002 SC 834 , it is no longer obligatory on the part of the 1st respondent to issue notice to the promoters. ( 8 ) THE industrial unit of the petitioner- company was brought to sale by the 1st respondent for realisation of dues. Though the petitioner disputes the extent of its liability, the same cannot constitute the subject-matter of this writ petition. The unit was ultimately sold through an auction notice dated 24-7-2002 in favour of the 2nd respondent. As observed earlier, the challenge by the petitioner to this sale is two fold, viz. , defective advertisement, and non-compliance with Condition No. 29. ( 9 ) IT is felt appropriate to examine the 2nd contention first. The 1st respondent is constituted under the State Financial corporations Act (for short the Act )- Its activities, with particular reference to the method it adopts in recovering the dues, be it, in exercise of Section 29 of the said Act, or through other methods, has been the subject-matter of various cases from time to time. The endeavour by the Courts has always been to strike a decent and delicate balance between protecting the industrial units, which availed the financial assistance from the State Financial corporations, on the one hand, and to ensure that the funds of such Corporations are preserved by effecting proper recoveries. In Mahesh Chandra s case (supra), the supreme Court undertook extensive discussion as to the procedure to be adopted while effecting sale of industrial units. In Mahesh Chandra s case (supra), the supreme Court undertook extensive discussion as to the procedure to be adopted while effecting sale of industrial units. The supreme Court framed six guidelines in the matter of effecting sale of the units by state Financial Corporations. The preamble to these guidelines indicated that every endeavour should be made, to make the unit viable and to put it in working condition, and that sale should be effected if only the endeavour becomes unworkable. The relevant conditions with which we are now concerned read as under:" (3) If tenders are invited then the highest price on which tender is to be accepted must be intimated to the unit holder. (4) (a) If unit holder is willing to offer the - sale price, as the tenderer, then he should be offered same facility and unit should be transferred to him. And the arrears remaining thereafter should be rescheduled to be recovered in instalments with interest after the payment of last installment fixed under the agreement entered into as a result of tendered amount. (b) If he brings third parties with higher offer it would be tested and may be accepted. " ( 10 ) IT was in this context that the 1st respondent has incorporated Condition No. 29 in the tender forms issued by it for the purpose of conducting auction of units of the defaulting borrowers. It reads as under:"29. Once the offer for sale of the unit is accepted by the Corporation, 15 days notice will be issued as a final opportunity to all the original promoters of the unit and the sale letter to the successful bidder/tenderer will be issued if there is no response for the same. " ( 11 ) IN Jagadamba Oil Mills case (supra), the Supreme Court observed that the view taken by it in Mahesh Chandra s case (supra), is not in consonance with the ground realities and the intended objects of the State Financial Corporations Act. It also observed that the guidelines laid down by it in the said case would amount to putting a premium on a dishonest borrower. Ultimately, it took the view that the said guidelines need not be applied universally in every case arising under Section 29 of the act. Thereafter, it proceeded to distinguish the case before it, on facts. It also observed that the guidelines laid down by it in the said case would amount to putting a premium on a dishonest borrower. Ultimately, it took the view that the said guidelines need not be applied universally in every case arising under Section 29 of the act. Thereafter, it proceeded to distinguish the case before it, on facts. ( 12 ) IN this very judgment the Supreme court exhorted that the observations made by the Courts in their judgments should not be read in isolation. The relevant observations read as under: "courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid s theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, (1951 AC 737 at p. 761), Lord Mac dermot observed:"the matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of willes, J. as though they were part of an act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge. " ( 13 ) THE Supreme Court ultimately overruled its judgment rendered in Mahesh chandra s case. It is no longer obligatory on the part of the Financial Corporations to comply with the guidelines issued by the supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra s case. If the insistence by the petitioner of compliance with the said condition is only on the basis of the said judgment, it will be difficult for this Court to accept such contention. ( 14 ) THE Supreme Court rendered judgment in Jagadatnba Oil Mills case (supra) on 24-7-2002. The tender notice in the present case was issued on 28-2-2002. If the insistence by the petitioner of compliance with the said condition is only on the basis of the said judgment, it will be difficult for this Court to accept such contention. ( 14 ) THE Supreme Court rendered judgment in Jagadatnba Oil Mills case (supra) on 24-7-2002. The tender notice in the present case was issued on 28-2-2002. If Condition No. 29 was incorporated by the 1st respondent, not being aware of the ratio in Jagadamba Oil Mills case (supra), the contention of the learned standing Counsel for the 1st respondent that incorporation of such condition in the tender notice does not result in any legal consequences, can safely be accepted. On the other hand, if the 1st respondent has incorporated this condition, not as a measure of the implementation of the judgment in mahesh Chandra s case (supra), but did so, on its own accord, and even after becoming aware of the ratio of the said case, the situation would substantially be different. ( 15 ) FROM a perusal of the counter- affidavit and the documents enclosed to it; and on a consideration of the submissions made by the learned Standing Counsel, it is evident that after the Judgment of the supreme Court in Jagadamba Oil Mills case (supra), the 1st respondent has issued an office order dated 5-3-2002. It has discussed the impact of the judgment in jagadamba Oil Mills case, and observed as under:"the Full Bench of the Hon ble Supreme court in State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Jagadamba Oil Mills (supra), has recently overruled the judgment in Mahesh chandra s case on 28-1-2002 and held that the guidelines issued in Mahesh Chandra s case place unnecessary restrictions on the exercise of powers by the Financial corporations and will only lead to further delay in realization of the dues of the corporations. It is further held that "the issuance of guidelines in Mahesh Chandra s case are contrary to the letter and the intent of Section 29. In our view, the said observations in Mahesh Chandra s case do not lay down the correct law and the said decision is overruled". ( 16 ) NOTWITHSTANDING this, it has incorporated Condition No. 29 in the tender notice dated 23-8-2002. In our view, the said observations in Mahesh Chandra s case do not lay down the correct law and the said decision is overruled". ( 16 ) NOTWITHSTANDING this, it has incorporated Condition No. 29 in the tender notice dated 23-8-2002. It was not as if the 1st respondent had a bunch of forms terms and conditions printed prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jagadamba Oil mills case (supra), and that they were annexed to the tenders, without deleting condition No. 29, even after the said judgment. Each tender form was furnished in the name of the applicant for the specific tender, duly furnishing relevant details of items for which the tender forms issued etc. The terms and conditions were printed afresh with each tender form. The petitioner had placed before this Court two tender forms furnished to its Directors/promoters, by name, C. V. Reddy and Geetha Reddy. In both these forms Condition No. 29 is present. ( 17 ) THE respondents tried to explain away the impact of Condition No. 29 with the following passage in the counter- affidavit:"in regard to the averments contained in para 9, it is submitted that Condition No. 29 are to be relied upon by the petitioner as non-existent on the date of finalising the sale, having regard to the office order issued by this respondent-Corporation dated 5-3-2002. " ( 18 ) IF the 1st respondent has chosen to incorporate Condition No. 29, de hors the judgment of the Supreme Court, and despite its office order, its impact cannot be ignored. The office order does not have the effect of obliterating any clauses, which are not in conformity with it. In the light of these facts, it can be observed that while inclusion of Condition No. 29, in the tender form in question, by the 1st respondent, is on its own accord. ( 19 ) IN this connection, an analogy is worth being drawn with certain legal principles. The provisions of various enactments may require the persons governed by them to do particular acts or refrain from doing certain other acts. Doing a particular act may amount to compliance with the statute depending on its terms. Where, however, such compulsion ceases to exist, be it, on account of amendment or repeal of the statute, the legal regime undergoes a change. Doing a particular act may amount to compliance with the statute depending on its terms. Where, however, such compulsion ceases to exist, be it, on account of amendment or repeal of the statute, the legal regime undergoes a change. In such an event, the individual may, or may not, perform the same acts, depending on his volition. If he chooses to perform the same acts on his own accord or volition, the fact that the compulsion against him ceased to exist, does not relieve him of his obligations flowing from such acts, unless that very act is prohibited by law. It would be subject to the same legal principles. The only difference in these two situations is that, while in the former, he did it under compulsion of law, in the latter he did it on his own accord. The corresponding rights arising out of it, in either case, are one and the same from the point of view of the person in whom the legal correlative is vested. ( 20 ) FROM the above discussion, it emerges that the 1st respondent was very much aware of the judgment of the Supreme court in Jagadamba Oil Mills case (supra), and it felt relieved of the obligation to incorporate conditions, requiring issuance of notice to the promoters of the company to pay the bid amount. On the basis of the same, an office order was issued in this regard. If it has chosen to incorporate such a condition, despite these developments, it cannot enjoy the liberty of relieving itself, of the obligation arising under that condition. The 1st respondent did not dispute that it had not issued any notice calling upon the promoters of the petitioner to pay the amount that is fetched in the auction within (15) days, or that they have failed to comply with the same. The learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent made an attempt to explain away condition No. 29, stating that it was not meant to be acted upon. Such a plea is too difficult to be accepted, particularly where valuable properties are involved and the auction emanates from a state agency, like the 1st respondent. The condition being mandatory and material in nature, its non-compliance would certainly nullify the subsequent proceedings. Such a plea is too difficult to be accepted, particularly where valuable properties are involved and the auction emanates from a state agency, like the 1st respondent. The condition being mandatory and material in nature, its non-compliance would certainly nullify the subsequent proceedings. ( 21 ) THE 1st respondent claims to have sent notices to the original promoters even while advertising the assets for sale, advising them to sponsor or bring bidders. Only one copy of letter dated 31-12-2001 is placed before this Court, which is said to have been sent under certificate of posting to the managing Director. This Court does not approve such a course of action when dealing with matters of this magnitude. The petitioner has flatly denied on having received any such intimation. It is not known as to how the 1st respondent feel itself satisfied by sending notice under certificate of posting. Nothing is placed before this court to show that the notice has been served on the Managing Director, let alone, the promoters. Therefore, it is evident that it has not even complied with its own office order dated 5-3-2002. ( 22 ) THE first contention is as regards the illegality in publishing the notification. A perusal of the advertisement published on 24-7-2002 inviting tenders discloses that it dealt with various kinds of defaulters. They were divided into Parts A and B. Under part-A, 10 units were sought to be sold by receiving tenders at its branch at Ranga reddy (West ). Collateral securities of three more concerns were included in this part. The petitioner was shown in Part-B along with two others. The tenders for these were to be opened and accepted at the head office. The 1st respondent did not take proper care in furnishing the relevant information. A perusal of the advertisement discloses that the name of the petitioner is shown as automobile Radiators and its actual name i. e. , Euroka Heat Exchangers limited, is shown under the heading "collateral securities offered for sale". Particulars in respect of the petitioner can fit into the headings at the top of the advertisement. However, it was intervened by another set of headings. It cannot be said that these deficiencies and lapses, did not have any impact on the prospective purchasers, be it, as regards their number, or the nature of their offer. Particulars in respect of the petitioner can fit into the headings at the top of the advertisement. However, it was intervened by another set of headings. It cannot be said that these deficiencies and lapses, did not have any impact on the prospective purchasers, be it, as regards their number, or the nature of their offer. ( 23 ) IN Jagadamba Oil Mills case (supra) itself the Hon ble Supreme Court administered almost a caution in the matter of generalization and observed as under:". . . IT is not to be understood that in every case the Corporation shall take recourse to action under Section 29. Procedure to be followed, needless to say, has to be observed. If any reason is indicated or cause shown for the default, same has to be considered in its proper perspective and a conscious decision has to be taken as to whether action under section 29 of the Act is called for, and thereafter the modalities for disposal of seized unit have to be worked out. . . . . . . " ( 24 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed as prayed for. No order as to costs.