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2004 DIGILAW 247 (SC)

R. P. BHARDWAJ v. UNION OF INDIA

2004-02-19

ARUN KUMAR, BRIJESH KUMAR

body2004
ORDER 1. This is an appeal, preferred against the judgment and order passed by the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi, rejecting the OA preferred by the appellant, challenging the promotion given to Respondents 7 to 10, who according to the appellant, were junior to him and did not fulfil the eligibility criteria. So far as Respondents 4 to 6 are concerned, though junior, were eligible for consideration but they were a promoted superseding the appellant. During the course of the argument, grievance was also made about the promotion of two other officers, namely, A.K. Bhatnagar and D.S. Sachdeva, on the ground that they were not found fit for ad hoc promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer but later, on the same material, they were regularly selected and placed above the appellant. However, we find that so far as these two officers, namely, b Bhatnagar and Sachdeva are concerned, they are not impleaded as parties in this appeal. Hence, their matter stood closed. We may have to consider the question of selection and seniority of Respondents 4 to 10. 2. The promotion in question relates to the post of Superintending Engineer from the post of Executive Engineer. It appears that the appellant was appointed in the year 1973 as Assistant Executive Engineer and was C placed at S1. No. 435 of the seniority list of the Assistant Executive Engineers. So far as Respondents 4 to 10 are concerned, they were appointed on different dates. Some of them earlier to the appellant and some later. They were, however, placed below Sl. No. 435 in the seniority list. It further appears that they were promoted as Executive Engineer on different dates and the seniority position was maintained as in the earlier seniority list, namely, they were placed below the appellant. Thereafter, the next promotion which was to the post of Superintending Engineer, was made in the year 1986. The appellant was appointed to the grade of Superintending Engineer, on ad hoc basis by order dated 30-6-1986. According to the respondents, namely, S.R. Pandey and Jose Kurion, they were also appointed on ad hoc basis but were placed below the appellant. Some other Executive Engineers were also e promoted on ad hoc basis by order passed in March 1986. The appellant was appointed to the grade of Superintending Engineer, on ad hoc basis by order dated 30-6-1986. According to the respondents, namely, S.R. Pandey and Jose Kurion, they were also appointed on ad hoc basis but were placed below the appellant. Some other Executive Engineers were also e promoted on ad hoc basis by order passed in March 1986. This list included Executive Engineers who were senior to the appellant and other respondents who were junior to him and had been left out in the earlier list of ad hoc promotion. 3. The regular promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer was made by order dated 20-10-1994. The grievance of the appellant is that he has been shown at Sl. No. 56 whereas other officers, namely, Respondents 4 to 10 and the seniors who were left out earlier, have been shown above the appellant even though the record available for consideration for the two selections, namely, ad hoc promotion and regular promotion, was the same. We may, at this juncture, like to observe that the earlier promotion seems to have been considered and made on ad hoc basis. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that it was done by scrutinising the records by a Screening Committee whereas the regular selection is by the Committee headed by a member of the Public Service Commission. The consideration and the scrutiny for regular promotion would obviously be on a different footing. The regular selection would not fail merely by the reason that someone who is selected, was not given ad hoc promotion earlier. It is submitted that the criterion for selection to the post of SuperintendingEngineer is merit. That being the position, in our view, no grievance can be made even if some person junior to the appellant may have been selected a considering merit, leaving out any other senior officer. 4. However, the main grievance of the appellant is that those officers who besides being junior were also not eligible for consideration on the date the selection was held, they could not be considered and promoted at all. If that is done, it would adversely affect the appellant, as those who were not eligible for consideration have been considered for promotion and promoted on the basis of comparative merit. If that is done, it would adversely affect the appellant, as those who were not eligible for consideration have been considered for promotion and promoted on the basis of comparative merit. There is no dispute on the point that eligibility criterion is 7 years,regular service on the post of Executive Engineer so as so be considered for promotion to the post of SuperintendingEngineer. lnsofar as tbe manner in which this period of 7 years is to be reckoned, it is to be found in OM dated 19-7-1989. This OM has been issued by the Department of Personnel and Training and it says that after considering the matter, it had been decided that while holding DPCs during a year, the crucial dates for determining the eligibility of officers for promotion would be 1st July of the year in cases where ACRs are written calendar yearwise, but it would be 1st October of the year where the ACRs are written financial yearwise. On the basis of the above criterion, it is also not in dispute that the relevant date for reckoning the eligibility would be October 1 of the year in respect of which the vacancies are being filled up, that is to say, the position as it stood on 1-10-1985, since the selection in question is for the year 1985. We also find that the aforesaid OM containing the instructions has been made effective with immediate effect. It further provides that those instructions should be brought to the notice of all concerned, including the attached and subordinate offices. 5. Applying the above criteria, Respondents 7-10 would not be eligible for consideration for promotion in respect of the vacancies pertaining to the year 1985, since they were regularly absorbed as Executive Engineers on 31-12-1978. In that view of the matter they completed 7 years as regular Executive Engineers in December 1985, whereas on 1-10-1985 they were short of 7 years, hence they were not eligible for consideration. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent, namely, the Union of India, submits that a letter was issued later on, which is dated 23-11-1989, by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension, Department of Personnel and Training, addressed to the Secretary, Union Public Service Commission. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent, namely, the Union of India, submits that a letter was issued later on, which is dated 23-11-1989, by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension, Department of Personnel and Training, addressed to the Secretary, Union Public Service Commission. In paragraph 2 of the said letter it is written as follows: "As regards the issue of determining the crucial date of eligibility in respect of vacancies of previous years, the matter has been examined and it is proposed to issue instructions clarifying that while considering promotions against vacancies of previous years, eligibility may be calculated with reference to 31st December, if the previous year is 1988 or earlier and with reference to 1st July llst October if the previous year happens to be 1989 or later (in future)." 7. According to the above provision, the eligibility is to be reckoned with reference to 31 st December if the relevant year was 1988 or earlier and in case it happens to be 1989 or later, the crucial date would be 1st July/1st a October. The above letter has been issued in reply to some clarification which, it seems, was sought by the Commission. It is again to be noted that it appears to be only a letter making a proposal, the approval of which or comments thereon were sought from the Commission. There is nothing to indicate as to whether any comments were sent or approval was given by the Commission. However, the Tribunal has taken the view that since the b Commission acted in accordance with the proposal contained in the letter dated 23-11-1989, it is to be taken that tacitly it had the approval of the Commission. 8. In connection with the abovenoted lettcr dated 23-11-1989, we would like to observe that nothing has been indicated as to why the position as prevailing earlier, by virtue of OM dated 19-7-1989 required any change. We C also find that the position as provided by OM dated 19-7-1989 has not been done away with by the letter dated 23-11-1989. There was only a proposal for alteration of the period during which the two dates were to operate. According to the letter dated 23-11-1989, noted above, for the selections which were to be held after 1989 the crucial dates would be July 1/0ctober 1. There was only a proposal for alteration of the period during which the two dates were to operate. According to the letter dated 23-11-1989, noted above, for the selections which were to be held after 1989 the crucial dates would be July 1/0ctober 1. It was also similarly provided by means of earlier OM dated 18-7-1989 but d for the period prior to 1989 it would be 31st December. What would be the purpose of the proposal to do away with the provision of crucial date being July 1/0ctober 1 for the period prior to 1989, is not decipherable from the letter itself, nor, as fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the respondents, could he provide any explanation for the same. It was understandable if the criteria as provided by the OM dated 19-7-1989 were e done away with altogether for all cases, if not, some reasons should have come forward as to why the same criteria were retained for selection for the period after 1989, but insofar as it related to the period prior to 1989, a change was proposed to be made. In case it was not reasonable to have this criterion of crucial dates for the period prior to 1989, in what manner would it be proper for the period thereafter, is not understandable. We have already f noticed that the OM dated 19-7-1989 contained instructions to be noted and followed by all concerned. That position was prevailing when the proposal by means of letter dated 23-11-1989 was mooted. It was not yet issued as OM for compliance by all concerned as was done in respect of the OM dated 19-7 -1989. In our view, it was still at a premature stage and before being final so as to be circulated by the Government of India for being followed by the 9 authorities and the departments and all concerned, it seems to have been acted upon by the Service Commission against the OM which was in operation. Even if any implied approval is inferred by the Public Service Commission, it would be of no consequence since then too it would not be anything more than an approval of a proposal. An approved proposal would not replace an OM issued by the Government of India. Even after approvalthe Government may not issue any OM. The Commission wrongly acted upon the mere proposal. 9. An approved proposal would not replace an OM issued by the Government of India. Even after approvalthe Government may not issue any OM. The Commission wrongly acted upon the mere proposal. 9. So far as Respondents 4 to 10 are concerned, though served, have not put in appearance nor anyone appears for the Commission to explain the position. There is no dispute about the position that if the eligibility criteria are reckoned in the light of the OM dated 19-7-1989, Respondents 7 to 10 would be required to complete 7 years on 1-10-1985 and not on 31-12-1985. Since on 1-10-1985, they had not completed 7 years, their consideration for filling up the vacancies of Superintending Engineer pertaining to the year 1985, is against the eligibility criteria. The case of the appellant was considered on the basis of comparative merit vis-a-vis Respondents 4 to 10 as well. The ouster of the appellant from the field of competitive selection may be attributed to his placement against Respondents 7 to 10. That being the position, in our view, the case of the appellant is liable to be considered afresh, keeping Respondents 7 to 10 out of the field of consideration. 10. In the light of the discussions held above, we allow the appeal in part and direct Respondents 1 to 3 to consider the case of the appellant for promotion against the vacancies for the year 1985, keeping Respondents 7 to 10 out of the selection exercise on merits, and in case, on consideration of merit he is selected, the consequential order of his promotion against one of the vacancies of 1985 shall be passed. In case he is not selected it would obviously make no difference in the position, namely, his promotion against the vacancies for the year 1986, as has been provided to him would be retained without disturbing the existing position. There would be no order as to costs. 11. Needless to clarify that for the purpose of selection, the service records of the appellant shall be considered, as per rules, for the period up to 31-3-1985.