B. PRAKASH RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants, who are the Respondents 3 and 4 in the lower appellate Court having been impleaded therein, seek to assail the judgment and decree in A. S. No. 7 of 1986 dated 24-12-1991 on the file of the District Judge at Nalgonda, in the appeal filed at the instance of the defendant (who is, surprisingly, not made a party in this appeal), as against the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 8 of 1984 dated 6-2-1986 on the file of the subordinate Judge at Bhongir, Nalgonda district. ( 2 ) HEARD Sri T. S. Anand, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, and sri N. Venkat Rayudu, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. ( 3 ) INITIALLY, the suit has been filed by the respondent herein as against her husband-defendant along with their daughter, as Plaintiff No. 2, claiming for maintenance at Rs. 350. 00 per month and the arrears at Rs. 12,600. 00 and sought for creation of charge over the properties mentioned in plaint-A Schedule. The case of both the plaintiffs was that the defendant having married the Plaintiff No. l, lead a happy marital life for quite some time and out of the said wedlock, a son and minor daughter-the Plaintiff No. 2 having been born. The husband-defendant beame hostile at later stage and got addicted to liquor and alcohol, which lead to domestic quarrels between them, and, ultimately sending away the Plaintiff No. l to her parents. Subsequently, the husband-defendant married a lady by name Prameela second time, and later on he again married another lady by name Padma and thus he is neglecting to maintain both the plaintiffs. Hence, the suit. ( 4 ) CONTESTING the suit claim the case of the husband-defendant was that, no doubt he has married the Plaintiff No. l and two children were born, but it is only the plaintiff No. l herself left the company without any justification, and in spite of best efforts, she could not come back. Further, the allegation that he married again and again was denied. It was further stated that the plaintiffs are not entitled for any charge. Further, the allegation that he married again and again was denied. It was further stated that the plaintiffs are not entitled for any charge. It was further pointed out that he has already filed an application under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act in o. P. No. 70 of 1979, after service of notice therein, the present suit is filed only as counterblast, and, therefore she is not entitled for any relief as claimed. ( 5 ) ON these and other allegations the trial Court on framing of the issues and conducting a trial, wherein the plaintiffs examined P. Ws. l to 8 and marked Exs. Al to A7 and on behalf of the defendant d. Ws. l to 3 having been examined and marking Exs. Bl to B4, decreed the suit to the extent of Plaintiff No. l, holding that she is entitled to maintenance, and determined the same at the rate of Rs. 200. 00 per month, apart from a sum of Rs. 7,200. 00 towards the arrears of maintenance and created a charge over the items shown in Plaint-A schedule properties. However, as regards the Plaintiff no. 2, the suit was dismissed, since she subsequently got married. ( 6 ) AS against the said judgment and decree the husband-defendant filed the appeal, wherein the mother and other two sisters of the husband got impleaded as Respondents 2 to 4, inter alia, on the ground that certain items of properties have already been sold and gifted away to them long back and therefore the question of creating any charge over such properties does not arise. On the consideration of evidence and material on record, the lower appellate Court, while partly allowing the appeal, confirmed the findings that the respondent No. l-the wife is entitled for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200. 00 per month, however, in regard to the properties claimed by the mother and two sisters of the husband, it was held that in view of Section 39 of the Transfer of Property act, the plaintiff is not entitled to charge over the Items 8 to 11 of Plaint-A schedule properties, but however, the charge as laid against Items 1 to 7 and 12 to 16 of Plaint-A schedule properties was confirmed, whereby the claim made by the mother of the husband was upheld, whereas that of the sisters was rejected. Hence, this Appeal by the two sisters. ( 7 ) SRI T. S. Anand, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, strenuously contended that the appellants have claimed the properties under Exs. B7 and B10, which are dated 6-3-1979, and therefore in a suit filed for maintenance in the year 1984, it could not be said that they had any notice of claim and thus the provisions of Section 39 of the transfer of Property Act would not in any way come against them and no charge as such can be fixed on such items. The main stress as sought to be laid was that the appellants had acquired the said properties under the valid registered documents at a time when they had absolutely no notice of the claim and therefore the said items ought to have been excluded from the charge. ( 8 ) SRI N. Venkatarayudu, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, sought to repel the said contentions on the ground that in view of the vested claim of the wife, it cannot be said that the appellants had no notice or knowledge thereof. ( 9 ) CONSIDERING the submissions made on either side and on perusal of the material, intriguing question which falls for consideration is as to whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, where the earlier acquisition of properties by the appellants under Exs. B7 and B10 would disentitle a charge towards claim of maintenance by wife. ( 10 ) THERE is no dispute in regard to the relationship between the parties. The claim in the suit is for maintenance by the wife as against husband, which originally was filed along with her unmarried minor daughter, a charge was sought against the plaint-A schedule properties on the ground that they belong to the husband-defendant. There is no dispute in regard to the ownership of the defendant over the said properties. The said claim was contested by the husband only on the ground that it is the plaintiff-wife, who has deserted him for no justification and therefore she is not entitled for maintenance. No plea as such in regard to any such transfer having been affected in favour of the mother or the sisters was made by the husband in the trial Court, nor there was any issue or enquiry thereon. No plea as such in regard to any such transfer having been affected in favour of the mother or the sisters was made by the husband in the trial Court, nor there was any issue or enquiry thereon. Therefore, there was no occasion for the Trial Court to consider the said aspect. It is only after decree, awarding the maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200. 00 per month and arrears of Rs. 7,200. 00 and in an appeal by the husband, the mother and the sisters got impleaded claiming the items as sold and gifted to them. The lower appellate Court after impleading them, allowed them to file written statement and conducted a trial, wherein evidence was let in and documents were marked. The appellants herein have claimed under Exs. B7 and B10 dated 6-3-1979, in respect of properties, shown as Items 12 to 16. Similarly, the mother sought to claim the items under Exs. B5 and B6, which are a sale deed and a certificate under section 50 (b) of the A. P. (T. A.) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. They are of the year 1979. The lower appellate Court accepted the claim of the mother and deleted the said items, holding that the respondent-plaintiff is not entitled to claim charge over the said lands. However, in respect of the properties claimed by the appellants herein, the lower appellate Court sought to proceed on the ground that the documents having been executed on 6-3-1979, the claim of the respondent-plaintiff long subsequent to such acquisition of right and therefore the respondent is entitled to claim charge over the said properties. The main thrust on behalf of the appellants herein is that the present claim by way of suit itself having been laid in the year 1984, would not in any way effect their alienations made much prior thereto and therefore it cannot be said that they had any such notice or knowledge of claim of maintenance by the respondent. ( 11 ) SECTION 39 of the Transfer of property Act reads as follows: "39. ( 11 ) SECTION 39 of the Transfer of property Act reads as follows: "39. Transfer where third person is entitled to maintenance : Where a third person has a right to receive maintenance, or a provision for advancement or marriage from the profits of immovable property and such property is transferred the rights may be enforced against the transferee, if he has notice thereof or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against a transferee for consideration and without notice of the right, nor against such property in his hands. " the above section contemplates that where any transfer is affected, the right to claim maintenance can be enforced against such transferee unless he has no notice of such right. Admittedly, the appellants are not total strangers, but they are part and parcel of the same family. The appellants are the sisters of the husband of the respondent-plaintiff and thus they cannot possibly plead total ignorance. Further, in regard to the right of maintenance is concerned, it is now well established that such right exists the moment a woman gets married to husband and continues to remain. Merely because, no claim is made in any format or no suit is filed, nor any decree is obtained, would not either affect such right, nor can it be said that the claim only comes into being on the date of filing of such suit. Any claim for maintenance in a Court of law is only in pursuance of an existing right as contemplated under the law. ( 12 ) CONSIDERING similar situation a learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in Raghavan v. Nagammal, 1979 (1) MLJ 172 , held as follows:"it is not necessary that the rights to maintenance should become crystallized in the form of a decree to enable the wife to proceed against the property in the hands of the husband or his transferees. Merely because at the time when the settlement deed was executed the wife had not obtained a decree for maintenance would not mean that she will not be entitled to enforce the right of maintenance against the property gratuitously transferred. . . . . . . . . "i am entirely in agreement with the above. Merely because at the time when the settlement deed was executed the wife had not obtained a decree for maintenance would not mean that she will not be entitled to enforce the right of maintenance against the property gratuitously transferred. . . . . . . . . "i am entirely in agreement with the above. ( 13 ) EVEN on a bare reading of section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, clearly it recognizes that existence of right to receive maintenance can be enforced against the transferee. Therefore, it does not contemplate that such right has to be recognized in any other manner or culled out in a form of decree before any such transfer. Nor, any demand or assertion is a precondition for enforcement. notice expression used should have broader connotation and cannot be construed literally to mean an intimation given. Aptly, it should mean knowledge and awareness. As long as a right exists under the law, it is obvious notice to one and all. Any claim made through legal process is only an enforcement of such right. Further, the object of the provision is to safeguard the rights of a woman towards maintenance. Where one seeks to enforce such right, any transfer madeis subject to such recovery. Therefore, it has to be held that since the documents in favour of the appellants are much prior to the present claim, it cannot be said that the items covered thereunder cannot be proceed against for charge towards maintenance by the wife. ( 14 ) IT is relevant to note the definition clause as provided for under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, wherein the expression "a person is said to have notice" is defined as of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. The explanation as provided thereunder sufficiently and amply makes the situation very clear that the said expression takes in all such knowledge which would have been well within its know of. The explanation as provided thereunder sufficiently and amply makes the situation very clear that the said expression takes in all such knowledge which would have been well within its know of. Thus, in its legal sense notice can be termed as an information concerning a fact actually communicated to a party by an authorized person, or actually derived by him from a proper source, or else presumed by law to have been acquired by him, which information is regarded as equivalent to knowledge in its legal consequences. It therefore follows that the notice is the making something known, of what a man was or might be ignorant of before. Hence, knowledge of any fact would put a prudent man upon inquiry. ( 15 ) IN the circumstances, the expression notice used under Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act has to be read along with the definition clause as contained in Section 3 thereof, which could only lead to a conclusion that where a person is fully aware of the existing rights of the parties and more so where such transferee is a member of the family, it cannot be said that he is not aware of the rights of the other members or persons forming part. ( 16 ) IN this appeal, the contesting defendant-husband against whom decree for maintenance with charge against properties is granted, is not made party, on the ground that no relief is sought against him. The creation of charge is incidental to the liability as enforced in the decree and not a separable or distinct one. Where a claim is put forward against an item of property, whereupon a charge was made, it cannot be said that main defendant, who is held liable for maintenance, need not be a party. If a claimant seeks a relief, it should be against both the plaintiff and defendant. A decree of maintenance coupled with a creation of charge is a inseparable one and therefore there cannot be any partial attack against such decree. Hence, the absence of the defendant in this appeal is fatal. ( 17 ) HENCE, I do not find any merits in the above appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.