JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J. - This is a petition for quashing order dated 24.4.1984 (Annexure P-12) vide which Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Chandigarh (hereinafter described as respondent No. 1) accepted the petition filed by respondent Nos. 3 to 6 under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (for short the Act) and ordered that the words "shamlat deh" appearing in the column of ownership in Khatoni Paimaish be deleted and substituted with the words "Patti Budhra Heri" and in the ownership column of all the revenue papers including jamabandi, the name of "Patti Budhra Heri" be entered in supersession of all the existing entries including that of the Gram Panchayat. 2. The facts on which there is no dispute between the parties are that the consolidation proceedings were conducted in village Ban Bhaura, Tehsil Malerkotla, District Sangrur in the year 195-56. In the consolidation scheme, Khasra Nos. 1949 to 1951 and 1953 to 1957 were allotted to the Gram Panchayat. This was reflected in the Khatoni Pamaish (Annexure P-1) prepared by the consolidation authorities and jamabandis of the years 1957-58 (Annexure P-2), 1961-62 (Annexure P-3), 1966-67 (Annexure P-4), 1971-72 (Annexure P-5), 1976- 77 (Annexure P-6) and 1981-82 (Annexure P-7). 3. After about 18 years of the finalisation of consolidation proceedings, respondent Nos. 3 to 6 filed a suit for permanent injunction in the court of Sub-Judge Ist Class, Malerkotla (for short, the trial court) by asserting that they are owners in possession of the land comprised in Khasra Nos. 1949, 1950 and 1955 and the defendants (including the petitioner herein) were interfering with their possession. The trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 12.4.1978. In July, 1979, they filed another suit for declaration and permanent injunction with similar pleadings. They also averred that there is a passage through khasra Nos. 1949-1950 which was being used by the villagers for last 30 years; that they had installed flour mill in Khasra No. 1677 and were using the passage for going to the said Khasra and that the defendants were trying to interfere with their right to passage. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 21.7.1981. 1949-1950 which was being used by the villagers for last 30 years; that they had installed flour mill in Khasra No. 1677 and were using the passage for going to the said Khasra and that the defendants were trying to interfere with their right to passage. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 21.7.1981. The appeal was dismissed by District Judge, Sangrur vide his judgment and decree dated 19.3.1982, the relevant extracts of which are reproduced below :- "The plea of the plaintiff is that the land entered in Khasra No. 1949-1950 was left for the use and occupation of the khewatdaran but was wrongly shown as the shamlat deh and under the ownership of the Nagar Panchayat. That although the land was shown as shamlat deh, it was meant for khewatdaran only and could not be shown under the ownership of the Nagar Panchayat. The plaintiffs thus want an adjudication on the question whether the land in suit is or is not a shamlat deh. Shri Ram Sarup, the learned counsel for the defendants has urged that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try and decide this matter is barred by Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act and he has supported his argument by reference to Gram Sabha Balad Kalan and another v. Sarwan Singh and others, 1979 RLR 479 (P&H). Their Lordships in the above quoted authority, held that the Civil Court was debarred from not only entertaining the suit but also from passing any judgment upon the question whether land is or is not shamlat deh. I thus accept the argument of the learned counsel that the plaintiffs cannot institute a suit for a declaration that the land is not shamlat deh and that it could not vest in the Gram Panchayat. With respect to the possession, the Jamabandies 1957-58 Ex. D-5, 1961-62 Ex. D-6, 1966-67 Ex. D-7 and 1971-72 Ex. D-8 record Gram Panchayat as owner and the land to be in possession of the owners. This entry is consistent with the legal presumption of the possession follows title. In Jamabandi 1976-77 Ex. D-9, the land is recorded in possession of landless Harijans and others. There is no reliable evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness in favour of the jamabandies. This entry is consistent with the legal presumption of the possession follows title. In Jamabandi 1976-77 Ex. D-9, the land is recorded in possession of landless Harijans and others. There is no reliable evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness in favour of the jamabandies. I thus hold that the plaintiffs have failed to bring any evidence on record in support of their possession. With respect to the plea of the plaintiffs that they had a passage through Khasra No. 1950 for approaching Khasra No. 1677 and pleadings do not make out a case of right of passage. A passage can be created either by way of grant or by easement or by proof of a private or a public street. The plaintiffs have, however, failed to plead any of the necessary ingredients to prove the existence of a passage. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs tried to urge that the plaintiffs have no other passage for approaching Khasra No. 1677 where they had installed a flour mill. He tried to claim an easement of necessity but then easement of necessity can only be created where there is a partition of some land. Otherwise, the plaintiffs can succeed only by proving acquisition of right by prescription. For that purpose there has to be clear pleadings of a dominant heritage and a subservient heritage and a continuous user of the right for the statutory period. No amount of evidence can be looked into in respect to a plea not contained in the pleadings." 4. Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 challenged the judgments and decrees of the trial Court and the appellate Court by filing second appeal which was registered as R.S.A. No. 721 of 1982. In the course of hearing of the second appeal, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 to 6 made a statement that the civil Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and on that basis, the appeal was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. 5. In the meanwhile, respondent Nos. 3 to 6 filed third suit bearing No. 55 of 1982 in the trial Court for grant of permanent injunction against Darbara Singh and others. That suit was also dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 23.5.1983 (Annexure P-9). 6. Soon after the dismissal of R.S.A. No. 721 of 1982, respondent Nos. In the meanwhile, respondent Nos. 3 to 6 filed third suit bearing No. 55 of 1982 in the trial Court for grant of permanent injunction against Darbara Singh and others. That suit was also dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 23.5.1983 (Annexure P-9). 6. Soon after the dismissal of R.S.A. No. 721 of 1982, respondent Nos. 3 to 6 filed a petition under Section 42 of the Act with the prayer that the entries made in the consolidation scheme may be corrected by claiming that the area comprised in Khasra Nos. 1949, 1950 and 1953 to 1957 had been wrongly recorded in Khatoni pamaish as shamlat deh. According to them, this should have been entered as Patti Budhra Heri. 7. Respondent No. 1 allowed the petition filed by respondent Nos. 3 to 6 and gave the following directions: (1) That in Khatoni Pamaish in the column of ownership, the words shamlat deh are deleted and instead the words Patti Budhra Heri are substituted. (2) The area which falls in Patti Budhra Heri in Kabristan and Marian shall stand intact for use as it has been hitherto before. (3) That in the ownership column of all the revenue papers including the Panchayat, the name of Patti Budhra Heri shall be entered in substitution of all the existing entries including that of Gram Panchayat. 8. The petitioner has challenged the impugned order on several grounds including the one that respondent No. 1 did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by respondent Nos. 3 to 6 after 29 years of the finalisation of the consolidation proceedings. Another ground on which the petitioner has questioned the legality of the impugned order is that while dismissing the petition filed by respondents No. 3 to 6, respondent No. 1 completely ignored the concurrent finding of fact recorded by learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Malerkotla and District Judge, Sangrur on the issue of ownership of the disputed land. 9. In their written statement, respondent Nos. 3 to 6 have emphasized that the land belonging to them was wrongly recorded in the name of the Gram Panchayat and that respondent No. 1 did not commit any illegality by entertaining the petition filed under Section 42 of the Act. 10. 9. In their written statement, respondent Nos. 3 to 6 have emphasized that the land belonging to them was wrongly recorded in the name of the Gram Panchayat and that respondent No. 1 did not commit any illegality by entertaining the petition filed under Section 42 of the Act. 10. The question whether a petition under Section 42 can be filed at any time and the authority constituted under the Act can entertain the same ignoring the long delay between the finalisation of the consolidation proceedings and filing of the petition was considered by the Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat v. Director Consolidation of Holdings, 1989(2) Suppl. SCC 465 and Gram Panchayat, Kakran v. Additional Director of Consolidation and another, 1997(8) SCC 484. In the second decision, the Supreme Court referred to the earlier decision and observed :- "This, however, cannot be understood as enabling the party which is aggrieved by the repartition to make an application under Section 42 after an unreasonably long lapse of time. Even where no period of limitation is prescribed, the party aggrieved is required to move the appropriate authority for relief within a reasonable time. In fact this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings dealing with Rule 18 itself, said that when no limitation is prescribed for an application under Section 42 dealing with confirmation of the scheme, the application should be made within a reasonable time and this question will have to be decided on the facts of each case. In that case the delay of about 3 years and 8 months in filing an application under Section 42 by the Panchayat was held to be not unreasonable. In the present case, however, the delay is of 40 years. We have tried to ascertain from the 2nd respondent whether there is any explanation for this unreasonable and inordinate delay. But no satisfactory explanation appears to be there for this inordinate delay in making the application under Section 42. The only contention which has been urged before us by Respondent 2 relates to the application of Rule 18 and the period of limitation prescribed therein not being applicable where the challenge is to the consolidation scheme and repartition. But even if Rule 18 is not directly attracted, an application which is made after such inordinate delay ought not to have been entertained. But even if Rule 18 is not directly attracted, an application which is made after such inordinate delay ought not to have been entertained. It is also contended by the 2nd respondent that the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the order of the Additional Director of Consolidation in a writ petition because the land in question continued to remain in the name of the proprietary body. He drew our attention to Rule 16(ii) of the said Rules. Rule 16(ii), however, quite clearly provides that the management of such land shall be done by the Panchayat of the estate or estates concerned on behalf of the village proprietory party and the Panchayat shall have to utilise the income and the benefits of the estate or estates concerned. Even before the Additional Director, the appellants were made a party-respondent. This contention, therefore, has no merit." 11. By applying the ratio of the aforementioned decisions to the facts of this case, I hold that the impugned order suffers from an error of law, inasmuch as, respondent No. 1 entertained and allowed the petition filed by respondent Nos. 3 to 6 without considering the issue of delay of 29 years and concurrent finding recorded by the civil Courts that they were not the owners of the land in question. 12. Shri K.S. Grewal, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 to 6 tried to defend the impugned order by arguing that the same should be treated as one passed under Section 43-A of the Act. In my opinion, there is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel. A reading of the petition (Annexure P-10) filed by respondent Nos. 3 to 6 shows that they had not invoked the provisions of Section 43-A. Respondent No. 1 too did not advert to Section 43-A of the Act. Even in the written statement filed before this Court, respondent Nos. 3 to 6 have not relied on Section 43-A to justify the direction given by respondent No. 1. Therefore, it is not possible to invoke Section 43-A for sustaining the impugned order which suffers from a patent jurisdictional infirmity. 13. Even in the written statement filed before this Court, respondent Nos. 3 to 6 have not relied on Section 43-A to justify the direction given by respondent No. 1. Therefore, it is not possible to invoke Section 43-A for sustaining the impugned order which suffers from a patent jurisdictional infirmity. 13. Before concluding, I may mention that in the course of hearing, Shri K.S. Grewal relied on the judgments of the learned Single Judge in Saraswati Devi v. Sant Ram and others, 1983 PLJ 249 and Gram Panchayat of Village Kandhargarh and others v. The Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab and another, 1983 PLJ 524, but I do not consider it necessary to deal with them because in neither of the cases, the Court had considered the effect of delay in filing the petition under Section 42 of the Act. 14. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed. Order Annexure P-12 is declared illegal and quashed and the case is remanded to respondent No. 1 for deciding the matter afresh. The parties are directed to appear before respondent No. 1 on 19.4.2004, who shall, after hearing their counsel, pass fresh order within next two months. 15. Copy of this order be given dasti on payment of fee prescribed for urgent applications. Petition allowed.