V. C. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) SHRI Rakesh Bahadur learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri R. K. Awasthi learned standing Counsel on behalf of respondent No. 2 are present. No one is present on behalf of respondent No. 1, the main contesting party though a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 and a rejoinder affidavit in rebuttal filed by the petitioner is on record. ( 2 ) THE present writ petition has been filed challenging the judgment and order dated June 15, 1993 passed by respondent No. 2 allowing the application of respondent No. 1 moved under Section 15 (3) of the Payment of Wages act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)claiming therein the arrears of salary for the period January 4, 1990 to March 31, 1991 amounting to Rs. 14,456/- along with the said application, an application for condonation of delay had also been filed without any affidavit in support of the same. A written statement was filed on behalf of (sic) the petitioner objecting to the claim of respondent No. 1 and for condonation of delay. The respondent No. 1 had claimed that he had been appointed as Naib moharrir by the then President of the Municipal board, Ramnagar, vide its order dated October 3, 1989 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition)without having any jurisdiction to pass such appointment though no such post exists. However, vide its order dated October 19, 1989 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition), president of the Board granted approval of the services of the petitioner on the application of respondent No. 1 itself for a period of two months only, a copy of which was duly served on the respondent No. 1 who appended his note on the said order that he had been made aware of the same. ( 3 ) AFTER hearing the parties, the respondent No. 2 vide its order dated June 15, 1993 allowed the claim of the respondent No. 2 holding therein that he had been wrongly and illegally not paid his wages with effect from january 4, 1990 to March 31, 1991 to which he was entitled to and directed the petitioner to release the payment of the same. ( 4 ) THE petitioner did not file any appeal under Section 17 of the Act before the Court of small Causes in the District Court and filed present writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India directly challenging the impugned order passed by the prescribed authority under Section 15 (2) of the Act on the ground that the said impugned order dated june 15, 1993 was wholly perverse, illegal and without jurisdiction on account of the fact that it had completely misread the statements of daroga Singh witness of the petitioner while recording a finding that the averment of respondent No. 1 that he had regularly worked since January 2, 1990 had not controverted. Moreso, the President of the Nagar Palika was not the appointing authority under law and as such the appointment itself was wholly void and illegal and there did not exist any such post on which the respondent No. 1 could have been appointed. In any view of the matter since, the respondent No. 1 had not worked after January 2, 1990 and he was aware of the resolution of the even date, he had not moved any application for payment of his wages before the petitioner. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the petitioner it has been submitted that the Municipal Board vide its resolution dated January 2, 1990 directed the cancellation of all such appointments made by the President including that of the respondent no. 1 being illegal, and that he had no right to continue to work after January 2, 1990 in view of the fact that the appointment was for a fixed term of two months only and as such after the expiry of two months period his services were not required to be formally terminated nor did he challenge the same before any competent forum, rather, he had filed an application under section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act claiming his wages with effect from January 4, 1990 to March 31, 1991. Written statements were filed on behalf of (sic) the parties and evidence was led. Written statements were filed on behalf of (sic) the parties and evidence was led. On behalf of the petitioner, one daroga Singh officiating Tax Superintendent, nagar Palika, Ramnagar, Varanasi was produced as a witness who gave a statement on april 20, 1993, wherein he categorically stated that the respondent No. 1 was working under him and his services had been terminated along with services of another 5 persons with effect from january 2, 1990 and the respondent No. 1 did not thereafter work at all with the Nagar Palika. In the cross examination he had admitted that a resolution was passed in the Board meeting wherein it was decided that the services of respondent No. 1 along with others would not be allowed to continue any further and no copy of the agenda of the meeting was required to be provided to any employee, though a copy of the resolution in respect of the termination of the services of respondent No. 1 along with termination letter dated January 4, 1990 (Annexure-4 to the rejoinder affidavit) was given to him and he has appended his signatures in lieu of the receipt of the same. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention stressed that the writ petition is very much maintainable inspite of the fact that there existed an alternative statutory remedy by way of an appeal and has relied upon the case reported in AIR 1990 SC 2070 (Pushpa Srinivasa case) -1993 Vol. 1 UPLBEC page 322 1999 Vol. 2 UPLBEC page 1562 1996 Vol. 4 UPLBEC page 2469 (17)1997 Vol. 2 UPLBEC page 1315, 1997 Vol. 2 UPLBEC page 1262 1994 Vol. 4 High Court Views Daily page 117 (DB)1998 Vol. 1 UPLBEC page 218 (DB)1997 Vol. 2 ESC page 1213. ( 7 ) LEARNED Standing Counsel has raised preliminary issue that the writ petition was not maintainable in view of an alternative statutory remedy available to the petitioner by way of appeal under Section 17 of the Act and, therefore, the writ petition was not tenable at all since, the impugned order was not without jurisdiction, nor in violation of fundamental rights, nor the vires of any provisions of the act had been challenged and therefore, the writ petition deserved to be dismissed inspite of the fact that it has been pending for a long time. In this respect, he has relied upon the cases reported in AIR 1995 Allahabad page 702 (V. 42 C. 212 Dec.), 1994 AWC page 1060, para 11 and 1992 AWC page 367 para-21. Learned standing Counsel while arguing the case on merits, has submitted that the appointment was not a tenure appointment and, therefore, the service of the petitioner would not come to an end automatically and a letter of termination was required to be served. ( 8 ) I have looked into the record of the case and heard learned counsel for the parties, present at length. In 1996 Vol. 4 UPLBEC page 2469 (17), wherein it has been held that even if since the writ petition for a considerable long time and counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged, it was not feasible to dismiss the writ petition solely on the ground of an alternative remedy. In 1997 Vol. 2 UPLBEC page 1315, it has been held that in case no dispute of material question on fact and no inquiry into facts was involved the impugned order would be looked into and decided in the writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India. On the question of maintainability of the writ petition, I find that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered with the decisions in the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. This writ petition has been pending since 1993 and 11 years have elapsed, and the writ petition has already been admitted and counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged, it would not be feasible nor proper under the present circumstances to throw out the case only on the ground of alternative statutory remedy being available to the petitioner. This writ petition has been pending since 1993 and 11 years have elapsed, and the writ petition has already been admitted and counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged, it would not be feasible nor proper under the present circumstances to throw out the case only on the ground of alternative statutory remedy being available to the petitioner. Moreso, since, the respondent No. 2 has grossly erred in passing the impugned order on the basis of misreading and wrongly mentioned that the witness Daroga Singh produced by the petitioner had admitted that no such order of termination had been served on the petitioner and neither controverted the averments made by the respondent No. 1 that he had been working continuously since January 2, 1990 onwards, whereas, Daroga Singh has in fact given a contrary statement as is absolutely clear and apparent from his statement dated April 2, 1993 on record, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition, which the respondent No. 2 failed to consider. ( 9 ) UNDER the abovesaid facts, circumstances and observations made hereinabove, the impugned order dated June 15, 1993 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition)passed by respondent No. 2 being wrong, bad and manifestly erroneous on the face of the record, is hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. . .