JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This second appeal has arisen out of the judgment and decree, dated 13.8.2002, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), No. 3, Kamrup, Guwahati, in Title Appeal No. 70 of 2001, whereby the judgment and decree, dated 14.8.2001, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), No. 1, Guwahati, in TS No. 313 of 1995, were upheld. 2. From the records, it appears that this appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law: Whether the learned Court below misconstrued and misinterpreted Section 54of the Transfer of Property Act, 1886, in holding that the Respondent-Plaintiffs had acquired right and title in the suit property vide sale deed Ext. 1 in view of the stand of mental illness taken by the Appellant-Defendant at the item of execution of the sale deed (Ext. 6) in favour of the vendor of the Respondent-Plaintiff No. 2? 3. Perused the materials on record including the impugned judgments and decrees. 4. Heard Mr. SK Medhi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, and Mr. HK Deka, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents. 5. Before entering into the merit of the present appeal, appropriate it is to ascertain the cases that the parties concerned set up for decision in the trial Court. The Respondents herein instituted, a Plaintiffs,. Title Suit No. 313 of 1995 aforementioned against the present Appellant and six others seeking declaration of their rights, title and interest over the suit land and houses standing thereon, recovery of khas possession, etc., their case being, briefly stated, thus: The Plaintiff-Respondent No. 2 had purchased the suit property from Defendant No. 1 by a registered sale deed, dated 25.9.1992, and took possession of the suit property on the same day. The Plaintiff-Respondent No. 2 sold the suit property to the Respondent-Plaintiff No. 1 by another registered sale deed, dated 2.2.1993, and delivered possession thereof, whereupon the name of the Plaintiff No. 1 was duly mutated in respect of the suit land. Plaintiff No. 1, then, let out the suit houses to Defendant Nos. 3 to 6. Defendant No. 2, namely, the wife of the Defendant No. 1, instituted a proceeding under Section 144 Code of Criminal Procedure and with the help of a prohibitory order, obtained ex parte, Defendant Nos. Plaintiff No. 1, then, let out the suit houses to Defendant Nos. 3 to 6. Defendant No. 2, namely, the wife of the Defendant No. 1, instituted a proceeding under Section 144 Code of Criminal Procedure and with the help of a prohibitory order, obtained ex parte, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 forcibly entered into the suit land on 7.10.1995 and occupied a room by breaking open the lock, while the said room was in the occupation of proforma Defendant No. 7 and the Defendant No. 1 also stalled collecting rents from Defendant Nos. 3 to 6. The Plaintiff No. 1 approached the police and instituted a suit for declaration of her right, title and interest over the suit land, for recovery of khas possession, permanent injunction, etc. The present Appellant, as Defendant No. 1, along with Defendant Nos. 2 and 5 contested the suit, their case being, in brief, that the Defendant No. 1 had been suffering from mental imbalance for the last 10 years and he was not in a position to execute a sale deed; the sale deed, in question, was a forged one and that the Defendant No. 1 had never delivered possession of the suit property to any one, the value of the suit property being as much as three lacs. 6. The following issues were framed for determination in the suit: 1. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form at law? 2. Whether the Plaintiff No. 1 has right, title and interest over the suit land? 3. Whether the Plaintiff No. 1 is entitled for a decree for recovery of khas possession circling the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from the suit land? 4. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree for permanent injunction? 5. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to get any relief/reliefs under the law and equity? 7. Both sides adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. By judgment, dated 14.8.2001, the learned trial Court answered the issues framed in the suit in the affirmative and in favour of the Plaintiffs. The suit was accordingly decreed and the same were impugned in Title Appeal No. 70/2001, but the appeal was dismissed and the impugned decree accordingly followed. 8. Assailing the concurrent findings arrived at by the learned Courts below, Mr. The suit was accordingly decreed and the same were impugned in Title Appeal No. 70/2001, but the appeal was dismissed and the impugned decree accordingly followed. 8. Assailing the concurrent findings arrived at by the learned Courts below, Mr. SK Medhi, learned Counsel for the Appellant, has submitted that though the Appellant, as Defendant No. 1, had specifically stated that for the last 10 years, he had been suffering from mental disorder and he was not in a position to execute any sale deed and that the sale deed, in question, was a forged one, no issue was framed on the plea of mental disorder taken by the Defendant No. 1 nor was there any issue as to whether the Defendant No. 1 was in a sound state of body and mind, at the time, when the alleged sale deed was executed by him. Non-framing of the said issue, according to Mr. Medhi, was an error of law and in the facts of the present case, the same need to be treated as a substantial question of law, which, eventually, affected the findings arrived at by the learned Courts below. 9. Assailing further the findings arrived at by the learned Courts below, Mr. Medhi has submitted that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a sale is incomplete until the time delivery of possession is given. In the case at hand, according to Mr. Medhi, adequate evidence could not be adduced by the Plaintiffs to show that the possession of the suit property was ever delivered to them following the alleged sale by Defendant No. 1, yet the learned Courts below treated the sale deed sufficient to declare the title of the Plaintiff No. 1 over the suit property. Support for the submission that a sale of immovable property without delivery of possession is not a valid sale in the eyes of law, Mr. Medhi has placed reliance on Bhikhabhai v. Chaimanlal, reported in AIR 1953 Bom 437 . 10. Controverting the above submissions made, on behalf of the Appellant, Mr. Support for the submission that a sale of immovable property without delivery of possession is not a valid sale in the eyes of law, Mr. Medhi has placed reliance on Bhikhabhai v. Chaimanlal, reported in AIR 1953 Bom 437 . 10. Controverting the above submissions made, on behalf of the Appellant, Mr. HK Deka, learned Counsel for the Respondents, had submitted that though it is true that no issue was framed by the learned trial Court with regard to the mental state of Defendant No. 1 at the time, when the sale, in question, took place, the fact remains that this was a plea, which the Defendants took in their written statement and the Defendants, in support of their plea, adduced evidence, but the same was, upon consideration, found to be wholly unbelievable by the learned trial Court and in such a situation, the trial Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the plea of mental disorder taken by the Defendants was not believable. The learned first appellate Court also, according to Mr. Deka, committed no error in concurring with the findings so arrived at by the learned trial Court. It is also submitted by Mr. Deka that since the parties went into trial knowing finally well each other's case, Defendants adduced evidence in support of their plea of mental imbalance of the Defendant No. 1, but the Defendants having failed to adduce convincing evidence and when the appellate Court found that the Plaintiff, on the other hand, could adduce adequate evidence to support that the sale deed, in question, was indeed, executed by the Defendant No. 1, the fact that no issue was framed on the question of mental imbalance of Defendant No. 1 becomes redundant and immaterial inasmuch as no prejudice was caused to the Defendants for the omission to frame the issue, in question, Mr. Deka seeks to derive strength for his submissions, so made, from the law laid down by the Apex Court in Kameswaramma v. Subba Rao, reported in AIR 1963 SC 884 , Kunju Kesavan v. Philip and Ors., reported in AIR 1964 SC 164 and Syeda Akhtar v. Abdul Ahad, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 52 . 11. With regard to the submissions made, on behalf of the Appellant, that the sale is incomplete without delivery of possession of immovable property, Mr. 11. With regard to the submissions made, on behalf of the Appellant, that the sale is incomplete without delivery of possession of immovable property, Mr. Deka has submitted that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act places no such restriction inasmuch a sale is transfer of title and for the purpose of transfer of title, delivery of possession is not a condition precedent. This apart, points out of Mr. Deka, adequate evidence was adduced by the Plaintiff to show that following execution of the sale deed, dated 25.9.1992, in favour of Plaintiff No. 2 the possession of the suit property was delivered to the Plaintiff No. 2 and when the Plaintiff No. 2, in turn, sold the suit property, on 2.2.1993, in favour of Plaintiff No. 1 the possession of the suit property was delivered to Plaintiff No. 1 by the Plaintiff No. 2 and, in course of time, even the Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 atoned to Plaintiff No. 1 as their land-lord. In the face of such evidence, when the delivery of possession of the suit property by the Plaintiff No. 2 to the Plaintiff No. 1 stood proved beyond any shadow of doubt, there was, contends Mr. Deka, no reason for the learned Courts below to hold that the Plaintiff No. 1 had not come into possession of the suit property. Viewed from this angle, the learned Courts below committed no error of law and facts according to Mr. Deka, in granting the relief of recovery of possession of the suit property as had been sought for by the Plaintiff and in granting permanent injunction against the Defendants. The appeal is, submits Mr. Deka, wholly without merit and has raised no substantial question of law and the same may, therefore, be dismissed with costs. 12. Before entering into the merit of the rival submissions made before me, on behalf of the parties, it is necessary to my mind, to settle the position of law governing the facts of the present case. Deka, wholly without merit and has raised no substantial question of law and the same may, therefore, be dismissed with costs. 12. Before entering into the merit of the rival submissions made before me, on behalf of the parties, it is necessary to my mind, to settle the position of law governing the facts of the present case. While considering this aspect of the matter, it is important to bear in mind that it is no more res integra that when the parties to a suit enter into trial fully knowing each other's case and lead evidence in support of their respective cases and/or in denial of each other's case, it cannot be said that the absence of an issue is fatal to the decision unless prejudice is shown to have been caused on account of omission to frame the issue, particularly, when evidence either in support of such an issue, which is not framed, is given, in effect, supporting the issue or in disproof thereof. Reference made by Mr. Deka to the case of Kameswaramma v. Subba Rao (Supra) is not misplaced inasmuch the Apex Court, in this case, while dealing with the question of omission to frame a relevant issue, observed and held as follows: No doubt, no issue was framed, and the one, which was framed, could have been more elaborate; but since the parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation of those of the other side, it cannot be said that the absence of an issue was fatal to the case or that there was that mistrial which vitiates proceedings. We are, therefore, of this narrow ground, and also that there is no need for a remit, as the evidence which has been led in the case is sufficient to reach the right conclusion. Neither party claimed before us that it had any further evidence to offer. We, therefore proceed to consider the central point in the case, to which we have amply referred already. 13. Reference made by Mr. Deka to Kunju Kesavan v. Philip and Ors. Neither party claimed before us that it had any further evidence to offer. We, therefore proceed to consider the central point in the case, to which we have amply referred already. 13. Reference made by Mr. Deka to Kunju Kesavan v. Philip and Ors. (Supra) is also not misplaced inasmuch as in this case too, the Apex Court dealt with the same question and answered thus: The parties went to trial, fully understanding the central fact whether the succession as laid down in the Ezhava Act applied to Bhagavathi Valli or not. The absence of an issue, therefore, did not lead to a mistrial sufficient to vitiate the decision. 14. The above aspect of the matter has also been dealt with in Syeda Akhtar v. Abdul Ahad (supra), wherein the Apex Court observed and held as follows: 10. Furthermore, as indicated hereinbefore, the Plaintiff sought for a decree for eviction against the Defendant also on the ground of commission of nuisance. It is true that the trial Court did not frame any specific issue of nuisance. It is true that the trial Court did not frame any specific issue therefore but a bare perusal of the judgment passed by the learned trial Court will clearly demonstrate that the parties were aware thereabout and not only adduced evidence in that behalf but also advanced their respective submissions in relation thereto. The Court of appeal formulated two specific questions, for determination of the appeal, one of them being: Whether the Appellant had created nuisance in the premises in question ? It was held: on the point of nuisance, though, no issue was framed by the lower Court, yet it is clear on the basis of relevant pleadings and evidence produced that the parties were well familiar with the existence of the said issues. Under the circumstances, in face of the want of framing of issues, prejudice was not caused nor were the proceedings vitiated, it is not proper to remand the case back in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported as Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao. 15. In the light of the observations made by the Apex Court in Kameswarmma v. Subba Rao, Kunju Kesavan v. Philip and Ors. 15. In the light of the observations made by the Apex Court in Kameswarmma v. Subba Rao, Kunju Kesavan v. Philip and Ors. and Syeda akhtar v. Abdul Ahad (Supra) with regard to the effect of non-framing of an issue, when I advert to the case at hand, I find that the Defendants took a clear plea in para-4 of their written statement that for the last 10 years, the Defendant No. 1 had been suffering from "mental troubles" and he was not in a position to execute any sale deed and that so-called sale-deed was a forged one. It is clear from the plea so taken in the written statement that so far as the Defendant- Appellant is concerned, he knew as to what his case in the trial Court was and knowing his case fully well, he adduced evidence asserting that he was mentally imbalanced, when the sale deed, dated 25.9.1992, was executed in favour of Plaintiff No. 2 and that he came to know about the alleged sale deed after his recovery from illness in 1995. However, the Defendant No. 1 produced no medical certificate in support of his mental imbalance or unsoundness of mind nor did he produce any medical prescription indicating that he was ever treated from mental disorder. Far from this, in his cross-examination, the Appellant admitted that in the year 1989, he had purchased an Auto Rickshaw and the said Auto Rickshaw had been registered in his name in the year 1990, he obtained driving licence in the year 1984 and the said driving licence was kept on being renewed after lapse of every 3 years. Noticing the evidence, which so surfaced on the record, the learned trial Court concluded that the Defendant No. 1 had failed to lead any satisfactory evidence in support of his plea of mental imbalance at the time, when the sale deed was executed, on 25.9.1992, in favour of the Plaintiff No. 2. Coupled with this, the learned trial Court also took notice of the fact that the signatures of the Defendant No. 1 on the relevant title deed, namely. Ext. 6, stood duly proved by the scribe of the sale deed. Coupled with this, the learned trial Court also took notice of the fact that the signatures of the Defendant No. 1 on the relevant title deed, namely. Ext. 6, stood duly proved by the scribe of the sale deed. Learned first appellate Court, while dealing with this aspect of the matter also, took notice of the facts indicated hereinbefore and, upon a threadbare discussion of the evidence on record with regard to the plea of the Defendants that the Defendant No. 1 had been, at the relevant time, suffering from mental disorder, found that the said plea was not substantiated by the evidence. Similarly, both the learned Courts below noticed the fact that except asserting that the sale deed was forged, the Defendants adduced no evidence; rather, admission of Defendant No. 1 was that the signatures on Ext. 6 (i.e., sale deed), namely, Ext. 6(1) to 6(4) and Ext. 6(7) are his signatures thereon and that along with this admission, evidence was also adduced by the Plaintiffs to prove the said signatures as the signatures of Defendant No. 1. 16. What logically follows from the above discussion is that though no issue was framed with regard to the question as to whether the Defendant No. 1 was, at the relevant point of time, suffering from mental disorder, the fact remains that the Defendants, knowing fully well their own case and the case of the Plaintiff, went into trial and adduced evidence in support of their plea so raised, but miserably failed to adduce adequate and convincing evidence. Nothing could be pointed out, on behalf of the Appellant, at the time of hearing of this second appeal, to shown that the findings so arrived at by the learned trial Court and upheld by the learned first appellate Court were, in the light of the evidence on record, erroneous. Hence, mere omission to frame the issue, in question, has caused no prejudice to the Appellant and the learned first appellate Court was justified in maintain the impugned decree passed by the learned trial Court. I see no reason to take any view different from what the learned Courts below have taken. 17. Turning to the submission made by Mr. Medhi that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act makes delivery of possession of immovable property a condition precedent for completion of sale and the rival submissions made by Mr. I see no reason to take any view different from what the learned Courts below have taken. 17. Turning to the submission made by Mr. Medhi that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act makes delivery of possession of immovable property a condition precedent for completion of sale and the rival submissions made by Mr. Deka that for completion of a sale, delivery of possession of immovable property is not at all essential and/or a pre-requisite, I am afraid, none of the two rival submissions is entirely correct. How sale is to be made is defined in Section 54 as follows: 54. 'Sale' defined. "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made : Such transfers, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. 18. From a careful reading of what Section 54 contains, it clearly transpires that 'sale' of any immovable property requires registration if the value of the property, in question, is one hundred rupees and upwards. No such registration is required if the value of the property is less than one hundred rupees. A property, value of which is less than one hundred rupees, may be sold either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property and the delivery of the property would mean placing the buyer in possession of the property by the seller. Hence, if the value of an immovable property is less than one hundred rupees, it is possible to sell such a property by mere delivery of possession of the property, but if the value of a property is one hundred rupees or above, then, transfer of title by way of sale thereof is not possible without a registered instrument and for the purpose of completion of such sale delivery of possession of the property is not a condition precedent. 19. 19. In the case at hand, admittedly, the value of the suit property is more than one hundred rupees. Such a property cannot be sold without a registered instrument. In the present case, the registered instrument, namely. Ext. 6 has been well proved as indicated hereinabove. This apart, the parties to the suit adduced evidence in support of their respective case and, upon a threadbare discussion of the evidence on record on issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4 the learned trial Court concluded that the Defendant No. 1, upon execution of the sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff No. 2 had delivered the possession of the suit property to him and the Plaintiff No. 2, in turn delivered the possession of the suit property to Plaintiff No. 1, when the sale deed, dated 2.2.1993, was executed. Nothing could be pointed out, on behalf of the Appellant, in this second appeal, to show that the conclusion, so reached, with regard to the delivery of possession is incorrect. Even the learned first appellate Court, I find, did take into account the evidence on record, in their entirety, and concurred with the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court by assigning cogent, adequate and reasonable grounds. I see no reason to disagree with the findings so reached. 20. What, thus, crystallizes from the above discussion is that the findings reached by the learned trial Court and concurred by the learned first appellate Court cannot be said to be perverse and/or without evidence. The omission to frame the issue, in question, has not adversely affected the interest of the Appellant. Situated thus, it is clear that the present appeal has, in fact, raised no question of law, far less a substantial question of law, for determination by this Court. For the conclusion so reached, I see no merit in this appeal. 21. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. 22. Send back the LCRs along with copies of this judgment and order. Appeal dismissed