PRADIPTA RAY, J. ( 1 ) SELVEL Advertising Ltd. the present appellant (plaintiff in the Court below) entered into an agreement dated April 4, 1995 with Analysis marketing and Management, a propietory concern of present respondent No. 2 sri Somdeb Banerjee, (defendant No. 2 in the Court below) for execution of a proposed park named 'theme Park' at B. B. D. Bag Mini Bus Terminus area. Under the said agreement the said Theme Park was to be laid exclusively by the present appellant with the right to bring any sponsor of its choice and the appellant-company secured absolute and exclusive legal right to collect the cost of construction, monthly maintenance and monthly rental charges from such sponsor. As consideration the appellant company paid Rs. 2 lakhs to the respondent No. 2 on April 5, 1995 and agreed to pay Rs. 28,000/- every month to the said respondent No. 2. Although no period was expressly mentioned in the said agreement, it was stipulated in clause 19 of the agreement that:"19. The second party will comply and abide all the conditions contained in the lease deed (signed on 28th September, 1994) with Government of west Bengal and the first party. This also relates to the part of period of contracts and renewals etc". ( 2 ) IT appears that the respondent No. 2 as proprietor of Analysis Marketing and Management obtained a lease dated September 28, 1994 from the government of West Bengal for a period of 3 years renewable after expiry of the said initial period of 3 years for laying, preparing and maintaining the proposed park at B. B. D. Bag Mini Bus Stand. In fact, two renewals were granted by the Government of West Bengal, one from September 28, 1997 to September 27, 2000 and another from September 28, 2000 to September 27, 2003. It, however, appears before the renewal of lease dated August 22, 2000. Analysis marketing and Management was converted into a private limited company by the name AMM Media Works Pvt. Ltd. and Somdeb Banerjee was acting as its chief Executive. In fact, the deed of lease dated August 22, 2000 was entered into between the Government of West Bengal and M/s. AMM Media Works pvt. Ltd. represented by the respondent No. 2. Analysis marketing and Management was converted into a private limited company by the name AMM Media Works Pvt. Ltd. and Somdeb Banerjee was acting as its chief Executive. In fact, the deed of lease dated August 22, 2000 was entered into between the Government of West Bengal and M/s. AMM Media Works pvt. Ltd. represented by the respondent No. 2. ( 3 ) ON December 21, 1999 the representatives of the present appellant and the respondent No. 2 representing M/s. AMM Media Works Pvt. Ltd. held discussion on further continuance of the agreement dated April 4,1995 and/or the rights and obligations under the said agreement. It was agreed therein :" (A) A new agreement to be signed between Selvel and AMM in the line of agreement between AMM and PWD (Govt. ). (B) Selvel will arrange early payment of AMM dues (7 bills ). (C) AMM agreed to the request of Selvel not increase Project Management cost for 3 years. (D) Selvel agrees to increase reasonable Project Management Cost after 3 years. (E) Some minimum repairing cost to be borne by Selvel by emergency basis. " ( 4 ) IN or about March, 2000 M/s. Portland India Outdoor Advertising Pvt. Ltd. approached M/s. AMM Media Works Pvt. Ltd. with a proposal of obtaining the right of procuring sponsors and displaying advertisements. Upon March 31, 2000 the arrangement with the present appellant continued and thereafter from April 1, 2000 M/s. AMM Media Works Pvt. Ltd. handed over the right of procuring sponsor and displaying advertisements to Portland India Outdoor advertising Pvt. Ltd. and discontinued the arrangement/agreement with the present appellant. ( 5 ) ON or about September 29, 2000 the present appellant initiated a proceeding under section 144 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging illegal obstruction and forcible prevention from carrying maintenance works and displaying hoardings in the said Theme Park. The said proceeding was dismissed on the ground that the subject-matter of the dispute did not come within the scope of section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thereafter on or about March 19, 2001 the present appellant filed Title Suit No. 418 of 2001 in the 7th Bench in the City Civil Court at Calcutta for declaration that the agreement dated April 4, 1995 between the appellant and the defendant Nos. Thereafter on or about March 19, 2001 the present appellant filed Title Suit No. 418 of 2001 in the 7th Bench in the City Civil Court at Calcutta for declaration that the agreement dated April 4, 1995 between the appellant and the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 stands renewed and is continuing and subsisting for permanent injunction restraining the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and their men, agents, representatives or sponsors from obstructing and/or preventing the appellant from securing sponsors, alloting space in the said Theme Park and from collecting any amount from any sponsor in breach of the terms of agreement dated April 4, 1995, and other incidental reliefs. In the said suit the present appellant also filed an application for interim injunction. By judgement and order No. 29 dated August 5, 2003 the Court below rejected the said application, inter alia, on the ground that there was no material before the said Court to show that the Government of West Bengal renewed the lease and that the agreement between the appellant and the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was renewed by the parties. Being aggrieved the present appellant has filed this appeal. ( 6 ) THE present appellant has claimed that the agreement dated April 4, 1995 is a kind of perpetual agreement automatically renewable with the renewal of the lease by the State Government in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have acted illegally and in violation of the terms of the said agreement in not allowing the appellant to procure sponsors and to display advertisements of such sponsors. The defendants, on the other hand, have contended that the agreement dated April 4, 1995 was never renewed and even after the discussion of December 21, 1999 the appellant did not come forward to execute any new agreement for continuance of the rights under the agreement dated April 4, 1995. ( 7 ) THE rival contention regarding the continuance or expiry of the agreement dated April 4, 1995 will be considered and decided in the pending suit. It is not possible nor desirable to make any comment on the merit of the respective cases at this interim stage. ( 7 ) THE rival contention regarding the continuance or expiry of the agreement dated April 4, 1995 will be considered and decided in the pending suit. It is not possible nor desirable to make any comment on the merit of the respective cases at this interim stage. What is important and material for the purpose of considering a prayer for interim order is the state of affairs actually prevailing on the eve of the institution of the suit and/or filing of the application of interim order in the Trial Court. Admittedly the present appellant was ousted and/or not allowed to exercise his rights if any, under the agreement dated April 4, 1995 and to bring in any sponsor for the Theme Park on and from April 1, 2000. There is still no material before this Court to show that any sponsor was procured through the present appellant after March 31, 2000 or that monthly consideration was tendered by the appellant to the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 after March 31, 2000. Appellant has alleged that I. T. C. was actually procured by them but the respondents violated the understanding and ultimately entered into arrangement with same I. T. C. either directly or through another agent. ( 8 ) PRESENT suit was filed on March 19, 2001. Long before the institution of the suit the appellant was ousted and not allowed to do any work of procuring sponsors and displaying any hoarding or advertisement in the said Theme Park. The interim order sought for by the present appellant in the Trial Court and also in this Court is actually in the nature of a mandatory injunction directing the defendant-respondents to restore a position as it was on March 31, 2000. Ordinarily an interim order is granted to prevent any alteration of the situation prevailing on the date of institution of the suit or on the date of the application. A mandatory interim order is granted only in exceptional cases where the status quo as on the date of institution of the suit has been subsequently disturbed or changed to obtain an undue advantage or to deprive the opponent of his right and possession on the date of institution of the suit. A mandatory interim order is granted only in exceptional cases where the status quo as on the date of institution of the suit has been subsequently disturbed or changed to obtain an undue advantage or to deprive the opponent of his right and possession on the date of institution of the suit. ( 9 ) ASSUMING that the appellant has a good prima facie case to be adjudicated in the suit, such prima facie case does not by itself entitle the appellant to get an interim order having effect of disturbing the status quo as was prevailing on the date of institution of the suit. The Court is required to be satisfied that loss or injury likely to be suffered is irreparable and cannot be compensated in terms of money. It appears to us that loss of business, if any, suffered by the appellant during continuance of the suit can be ascertained and compensated in terms of money. Admittedly the appellant was not allowed to procure sponsor and to undertake any work in the Theme Park from April 1, 2000 and for the last 4 years the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have been procuring sponsors through other agents or directly. ( 10 ) MR. Adhip Kar, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has submitted that even if the plaintiff/appellant was ousted and illegally prevented from enjoying his legal rights before the institution of the suit the plaintiff is still entitled to get an interim order restoring his legal right and allowing him to exercise those legal rights during pendency of the suit. ( 11 ) IN support of his submission Mr. Kar has relied upon an observation in the judgement of the Supreme Court in Gangubai Bablya Chaudhary and Ors. vs. Sitaram Bhalchandra Sukhtankar and Ors. , reported in AIR 1983 SC 742 . ( 12 ) MR. Kar refers to the following observation in paragraph 6 of the aforementioned judgement:"when an interim injunction is sought, the Court may have to examine whether the party seeking the assistance of the Court was at any time in lawful possession of the property and if it is so established one would prima facie ask the other side contesting the suit to show how the plaintiffs were dispossessed?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 13 ) THE aforesaid observation does not appear to be a statement of law applicable to all circumstances. The said question may be relevant in a case where a preventive interim order is sought for in order to preserve the status quo or to restore a position prevailing on the date of institution of suit or the date of filing of application. Judgement in Gangubai Bablya Chowdhary (supra)was on the basis that plaintiffs therein were in possession of 8006. 04 sqm. of land and there was nothing to show that the said plaintiffs were dispossessed from the said land at the time of submission of application. ( 14 ) IT appears to us that "at any time" mentioned in the quoted observation means "at any time" after institution of the suit. In the said case the Supreme court considered the balance of convenience and inconvenience and granted an interim order restraining the respondents therein from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff/appellants in the suit land. The facts of the present case are totally different. ( 15 ) IN the present case the plaintiff/appellant has sought for a kind of mandatory interim order directing the defendant/respondents to put the appellant back into possession of the Theme Park and to allow him to exercise his rights under the agreement dated April 4, 1995. Admittedly the plaintiff/appellant was ousted and not allowed to exercise his claimed rights under the agreement dated 4th April, 1995 on and from April 1, 2000 i. e. long before institution of this suit. In the meantime even the period of 3 years from December 21, 1999 i. e. the date of memorandum of Understanding had expired on December 20, 2002. Whether the agreement dated April 4, 1995 still subsists or the plaintiff/appellant has/ had the right to enjoy rights flowing from the agreement dated 4th April, 1995 without entering into or executing any fresh agreement is a matter to be decided in the suit. Prima facie, there is nothing on record to show that after March 31, 2000 the appellant offered or tendered any amount to the defendant/respondent on account of agreed monthly consideration. Prima facie, there is nothing on record to show that after March 31, 2000 the appellant offered or tendered any amount to the defendant/respondent on account of agreed monthly consideration. On January 31, 2001 the appellant paid all the bills of the respondent No. 1 for the period upto March 31, 2000 but still no written intimation was sent conveying the appellant's intention to exercise its rights under the agreement dated April 4, 1995. ( 16 ) CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances and the nature of the dispute involved we are unable to hold that the plaintiff/appellant will suffer any such irreparable loss or damage as cannot be compensated by monetary damages in absence of the kind of interim order prayed for in this case. It is well-settled that the purpose of granting interim injunction is to reduce the risk of irreprable injury and injustice which cannot be compensated in terms of money. ( 17 ) IN several decisions the Supreme Court has laid down the guiding principles to be followed while considering prayer for interim order in Dalpat kumar and Anr. vs. Prahlad Singh and Ors. , reported in AIR 1993 SC 276 . The supreme Court has reiterated :"satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in 'irreparable injury' to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that 'the balance of convenience' must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit". ( 18 ) IN Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Sriman Narayan and Anr. , reported in 2002 (5) SCC 760 , the Supreme Court has again observed :"in Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden, 1990 (2) SCC 117 , this court, discussing the principles to be kept in kind in considering the prayer for interlocutory mandatory injunction, observed : 16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, Courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are : (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. 17. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. 17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the Court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as a prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion'". ( 19 ) SEVERAL other decisions have been cited from the Bar. It is not necessary to refer to and discuss all these decisions. Only in exceptional and rare cases mandatory interim orders ere granted to restore a position prevailing long before the institution of the suit. The present case is not such an exceptional case. If the appellant ultimately succeeds in the suit, the loss if any, suffered by it due to the alleged illegal ouster or deprivation, can be assessed in terms of money and can be compensated. ( 20 ) IN the circumstances we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order. In view of the nature of the dispute the Trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible preferably within 6 months from the date of communication of this order. The appeal is thus dismissed. ( 21 ) NO order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy be given expeditiously upon proper application. Appeal dismissed.