P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) RELIANCE Constructions, represented by its Partners, moved this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of india as against Mohd. Younus Ahmed and others aggrieved by an order made in I. A. No. 59/ 2003 in O. S. No. 294/2003 dated 8- 5-2003 on the file of IV Junior Civil Judge, city Civil Court, Hyderabad. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that as against the selfsame order, inasmuch as it is an appealable order, C. M. A. No. 307/03 on the file of III Additional Chief Judge, City civil Court, Hyderabad was preferred and the same is pending disposal. ( 2 ) SRI E. Manohar, the Senior Counsel representing the revision petitioner/4th respondent/4th defendant had taken this court through the grounds raised in the civil revision petition and would contend that the IV Junior Civil Judge, City Civil court, Hyderabad has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit O. S. No. 294/2003 and I. A. No. 59/2003 in view of the fact that the plaintiffs have already filed L. G. C. No. 73/ 2002 on the file of Special Court established under the A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) act, 1982 and also filed a similar application la. No. 105 9/2002 under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of civil Procedure, hereinafter in short referred to as "code" for the purpose of convenience, in relation to the self-same property. The main grievance ventilated by the learned senior Counsel is that though the question of jurisdiction was specifically raised both in the counter and also by filing a memo s. R. No. 6072/2003 dated 6-3-2003, the learned Judge had left that question untouched and had not disposed of the said memo but had disposed of the temporary injunction application only without touching the crucial aspect of jurisdiction which was specifically raised. The learned Senior counsel while elaborating his submissions would maintain that in para 3 of the plaint in O. S. No. 294/2003 it was specifically pleaded that the plaintiffs were constrained to file LGC No. 73/2002 against Defendants 1 to 5 and others which is pending. The learned Senior counsel while elaborating his submissions would maintain that in para 3 of the plaint in O. S. No. 294/2003 it was specifically pleaded that the plaintiffs were constrained to file LGC No. 73/2002 against Defendants 1 to 5 and others which is pending. In the light of the said plea being specifically taken, the suit is barred by virtue of the provisions of the A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) act, 1982 and hence the learned Judge should have rejected the plaint under Order 7, rule 11 of the Code. At any rate, the Counsel would contend that when the question of jurisdiction is specifically raised, on the mere fact that an application in this regard was not preferred, the said aspect cannot be ignored. Even otherwise, the Counsel submitted that non-recording of reasons on the aspect of jurisdiction while disposing of the temporary injunction application and non-disposal of memo to which a counter memo also was filed, would definitely vitiate the impugned order and hence this is a fit case where the parties need not be driven to appellate forum on the ground that the revision petitioner is having a remedy by way of an Appeal under order 43, Rule 1 of the Code. The learned counsel no doubt had taken this Court through the respective pleadings of the plaintiffs both in L. G. C. No. 73/2002 and also in O. S. No. 294/2003 aforesaid and also would contend that in substance the questions involved are one and the same except impleading the Municipal Corporation of hyderabad as an additional party. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that a similar application filed in the Land Grabbing case i. e. , I. A. No. 1059/2002, was not pressed and the petition was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file fresh petition if so advised by an order made by the Special court dated 1-4-2003. The Counsel also had placed reliance on Government of A. P. v. Sathaiah, 1993 (2) ALT 252 and State of a. P. , Revenue Department v. C. Murali mohan, 1997 (1) ALD 442 . The Counsel also had placed reliance on Government of A. P. v. Sathaiah, 1993 (2) ALT 252 and State of a. P. , Revenue Department v. C. Murali mohan, 1997 (1) ALD 442 . ( 3 ) PER contra, Sri Niranjan Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the respondents/plaintiffs would maintain that the remedy under Article 227 of the constitution of India itself is a misconceived remedy since the self-same order was questioned by way of C. M. A. No. 307/2003 on the file of III Additional Chief Judge, city Civil Court, Hyderabad and hence this practice of proceeding with simultaneous proceedings may have to be deprecated. The learned Counsel also had explained in detail the different provisions of A. P. Land grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and the scope and ambit of Land Grabbing case and the prayers made therein and the scope and ambit of the Civil suit filed by the parties and the averments made in the pleadings therein and the reliefs prayed for in the suit. The learned Counsel also would maintain that such suit cannot be entertained by the Special Court under the a. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and in view of Section 9 of the Code, Civil court alone is competent to entertain such suit. The learned Counsel on the aspect of land grabbing had placed reliance on shalivahana Builders Private Limited v. Sri ganapathy Co-operative Housing Society, 2003 (2) ALD 476 and Syedulla v. Special court Under A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad, 2002 (1) ALD 654 . The learned Counsel also would contend that even if an order of rejection would have been made, inasmuch as it would amount to the final disposal to suit itself, the remedy is to file a civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code and at any rate not to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the constitution of India. The learned Counsel also would contend that filing of a memo is not contemplated either by the Code or by the civil rules of practice and hence non-disposal of the same would be of no consequence unless a regular application as contemplated by the provisions of the Code had been preferred. The learned Counsel also would contend that filing of a memo is not contemplated either by the Code or by the civil rules of practice and hence non-disposal of the same would be of no consequence unless a regular application as contemplated by the provisions of the Code had been preferred. The learned Counsel ultimately had concluded that at any rate such civil revision petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India definitely cannot be encouraged in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 4 ) HEARD both the Counsel. ( 5 ) THE maintainability of the suit O. S. No. 294/2003 in an ordinary Civil Court on the question of jurisdiction to entertain the suit had been raised. As can be seen from the material available on record, the learned judge had disposed of I. A. No. 59/2003 in o. S. No. 294/2003 without touching the aspect of jurisdiction and it is pertinent to note that a prima facie decision on this question definitely would be essential for the purpose of deciding strong prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss to be decided while deciding an application for temporary injunction under order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code. It is not as though this question was raised only by filing a memo, but specifically the same was raised in the counter and the matter was opposed. It is no doubt true that filing of a memo of this nature may have to be deprecated and a regular application as per the provisions of the Code alone could have been thought of by the revision petitioner. Be that as it may, now the first hurdle coming in the way of this Court is the invocation of simultaneous remedies by the revision petitioner questioning the self-same order by invoking the jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and jurisdiction of the appellate court III-Additional Chief Judge, City Civil court, Hyderabad, by preferring C. M. A. No. 307/2003. In the ordinary course, I would have driven the parties to agitate the matter before the appellate Court in view of the fact that an Appeal already had been preferred against the self-same order. In the ordinary course, I would have driven the parties to agitate the matter before the appellate Court in view of the fact that an Appeal already had been preferred against the self-same order. But however, on a careful scrutiny of the averments made in L. G. C. No. 73/2002 and also the averments made in the plaint in o. S. No. 294/2003, it is clear that the aspect of the jurisdiction is being seriously agitated from the earliest point of time. Section 24 of the Code deals with General Power of transfer and withdrawal. Sub-section (1) specifies:"on the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desired to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High court or the District Court may at any stage. (a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same, or (b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it, and (i) try or dispose of the same; or (ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same; or (iii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court from which it was withdrawn. (c) It is needless to say that such power of transfer and withdrawal can be exercised ". . . . of its own motion without such notice. . . . . ". Section 24 (1) (b) (i) specifies: "withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it, and try or dispose of the same". In Peoples Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sardul singh Caveeshar and others, AIR 1961 punjab 87, it was held that the High Court can suo motu and without hearing parties transfer proceedings pending under Sections 184, 185, 195, 196 of Companies Act, 1913 in a Court of District Judge to itself under section 24 of the Code. In Mst. Ayeshya Bai and others v. Daleep Singh, AIR 1961 Raj. In Mst. Ayeshya Bai and others v. Daleep Singh, AIR 1961 Raj. 186, a Division Bench of Rajasthan High court held that under Section 24 of the code of Civil Procedure, High Court has power to transfer the Appeal to itself even though no such application is presented and there is no lack of jurisdiction in the High court to hear the Appeal which is filed before it, even though Appeal lies to the district Court under Section 21 of the rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance. In kanduru Subbarayudu v. Kammara Rangiah and others 1961 (1) An. WR 212, a Division bench of this Court held:"though Section 24, Civil Procedure Code, clearly indicates that the District Court may transfer a proceeding without giving notice, rule 48 of the Civil Rules of Practice contemplates two possible courses viz. , (1) if the transfer is done without giving notice to the parties, then the District Court shall record in writing its reasons for dispensing with notice; and (2) the District Court may transfer the suit of its own motion after giving notice; in which case there can be no occasion or need for writing reasons such as contemplated in the first course. Rule 48 is obviously intended to impress upon the district Court that a transfer might cause hardship to parties and to ensure that the district Court before transferring any proceeding suo motu, apply its mind and satisfy itself that avoidable undue hardship would not be caused to any party by such transfer. For, if it gave notice to the parties, each of them would be in a position to bring to the notice of the District Court any hardship which it would suffer by the proposed transfer and any objection which it had to such transfer. If the District Court did not give notice, it had to record its reasons for not giving the same. The underlying idea of requiring the District Court to record reasons is to indicate what compelling reasons it had to make the transfer. Rule 48 was meant to be a safeguard and is an adequate safeguard to parties being put to avoidable undue hardship by transfer of a suit suo motu unwittingly by the District court. "in Annamalai v. Ramanathan, AIR 1936 mad. Rule 48 was meant to be a safeguard and is an adequate safeguard to parties being put to avoidable undue hardship by transfer of a suit suo motu unwittingly by the District court. "in Annamalai v. Ramanathan, AIR 1936 mad. 55, the Madras High Court held:"both under Clause 13, Letters Patent and section 24 Civil P. C. , the High Court has power to withdraw a suit from a subordinate court and dispose of the action itself. Section 24 of the Code provides that such an order may be made by the High Court of it sown motion without notice to the parties and at any stage of the suit. Clause 13 of the letters Patent says that for purposes of justice the High Court may remove a suit from a subordinate Court and try and dispose of it as a Court of Extraordinary Original jurisdiction. It is significant that while clause 13 of the Letters Patent enacts that reasons shall be recorded for the order of transfer, Section 24 of the Code contains no such limitation upon the power of the high Court. "rule 63 of the A. P. Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders 1990 which would correspond to Rule 48 of the Old Rule reads as hereunder:"an application for transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding from one Court to another shall be made by Original Petition entitled in the matter of the pending suit, appeal or other proceeding as in Form No. 17. Notice of the application in Form No. 18 shall be issued and served on the other parties to the suit, appeal or other proceeding: provided that if under Section 24 of the code, the District Court transfers a suit, appeal or other proceeding of its own motion and without giving notice in the first instance, it shall record in writing its reasons for dispensing with such notice and shall direct the Court from which it has been transferred to intimate the parties or their Advocates about the transfer and the date on which they should appear before the Court to which it has been transferred. "the proviso specifies that if under Section 24 of the Code, the District Court transfers a suit, appeal or other proceeding of its own motion and without giving notice in the first instance, it shall record in writing its reasons for dispensing with such notice and shall direct the Court from which it has been transferred to intimate the parties or their Advocates about the transfer and the date on which they should appear before the Court to which it has been transferred. In the present case, there is no application moved by either of the parties. The proviso also specifies in relation to the District Court transferring a suit, appeal or other proceeding on its own motion. Except the Municipal corporation of Hyderabad being a party, the subject-matter is the same and substantially the parties also are the same and it is not in controversy that the Land Grabbing case and the suit aforesaid are pending between the same parties and both the proceedings, the present civil revision petition and the civil miscellaneous appeal on the file of iii Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad, were preferred as against the self-same order and the same question is involved. Hence, in view of the facts and circumstances explained supra, this Court is of the considered opinion that in interest of justice CMA No. 307/2003. on the file of III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil court, Hyderabad, has to be withdrawn by exercising suo rnotu powers by this court to be transferred to this Court to be heard along with the present CRP No. 2923/ 2003. Accordingly, the records in CMA no. 307/2003 on the file of III Additional chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad be transferred to this Court for the purpose of having a convenient hearing of both the matters at the earliest point of time. ( 6 ) LET the Office list this civil revision petition for final hearing along with the transferred CMA aforesaid, after two weeks after receipt of records in the said transferred cma.